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and progress,should prevail."
- Muammar Gadafi.The Third International Theory
"Cling one and all to the faith of Allah and let 
nothing divide you...."
- The Koran.Sura III('The Family of Imran*),verse 103
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ABSTRACT
Libya has remained a, relatively neglected field for 
academic historians since the collapse of Italy’s African 
Empire in 1943.This is particularly the case with regard 
to the effect of colonial rule upon the indigenous pop­
ulation itself.In seeking to examine,through the use of 
the surviving secondary sources and the available archival 
material,the effect of colonial policies in education upon 
the Moslem population,it is hoped that a start has been 
made in opening up this important area to the mind of the 
historian.
After a brief background chapter dealing with Italian 
colonial policy and its chief determinants,there follow 
two chapters which examine the initial policies of Italian 
rule in respect of the indigenous institutions and the 
government’s own schools.The main policies of Italian 
rule,however, are examined in chapters four,five and six, 
for in the period 1919-1922 Italy was confronted with 
the need to formulate an educational policy for Libya,which 
made sense in terms of the overriding concern to avoid a 
further colonial war in the country.Nationalist determinat­
ion to avoid conceding Italy’s colonial future in Libya for 
the sake of a temporary truce with the Libyan Independence 
Movement causes the Colonial Ministry to take a long hard 
look at the existing policies and their possible political 
implication for the future.As a result the educational pol­
icies that characterise Italian educational activity under 
fascism emerge.
Chapters seven,eight and nine deal with the government’s 
attempt to implement the educational policies of the Fund-, 
amental Law of 1919 in both Tripolitania and Cirenaica.The 
concluding chapter deals briefly with the main strands of
fascist policy,which are telescoped for the remaining years 
of colonial rule,to provide the necessary educational pers­
pective upon the period as a whole.
ABBREVIATIONS :
A.C.S.- Archivio Centrale Dello Stato,Roma.
A.P.CvD.- Atti Parliamentari Camera dei Deputati.
A.S.M.A.I.- Archivio Storico ex-Ministero dell?Africa 
Italiana(Ministero degli Affari Esteri),Roma.
B.M.A.- British Military Administration.
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dell'Africa Italiana.
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NOTE
In transliterating Arabic names and places,I have 
invariably adopted the form and spelling given in 
the Italian documents and other sources.This method 
has also been adopted whenever English or French 
sources appear within the text.For common geograph­
ical expressions,such as "Cirenaica",I have used 
the Italian rather than the English spelling.Further 
more,all translations are mine unless otherwise 
stated.
9Chapter One Italian Colonial Policy and Libya
1. The Central Aims and Strategy:
A) Diplomatic Policies
Although Italy had longstanding aspirations in the Red Sea, 
North Africa,the Middle East and East Africa,little was done 
by way of realising these hopes in the years immediately foil 
owing the unification of the country in 1870. As a result of 
this inactivity,Italy *s North African ambitions suffered an 
irreparable blow in 1880,when France effortlessly occupied 
Tunis,which possessed a large Italian population.Wounded 
national pride prevented the Italian government from accept­
ing the French offer of compensation in Tripolitania, and 
efforts were made instead at developing interests in the Red 
Sea and East Africa,where by the early nineties Italy had 
obtained her first colonies of Eritrea and Somalia. This 
search for national compensation in East Africa,however, 
proved soon to be delusionary for any hope of expanding into 
Abysinia was dashed on the field of Adowa,where on 1 March 
1896,the Italians were decisively defeated by the Negus,whose 
forces had been armed and trained by the French.The cons- 
quences of this defeat led Italy to return to the cultivation 
of her interests in the Mediterranean,so commencing the train 
of events that would eventually lead to the Libyan War of 
October 1911.
The importance of securing diplomatic recognition by 
The Powers of Italy's claim upon Tripoli was brought home 
to the Italians in 1899 when Britain and France acquired 
the profitable Libyan hinterland with its direct access to 
the rich markets and mineral resources of Central Africa,so 
diverting the trans-Saharan trade from its customary outlets
at Tripoli to the ports of Tunis,Algeria and the British 
protectorates of Egypt and the Sudan.The potential threat 
of the 1899 Fashoda Agreements lay in the possibility that
they might induce France to occupy Tripolitania and Britain 
Cirenaica,so eliminating whatever chance was still left for 
Italy to secure a North-African base for her fleet and the 
development of her maritime interests in the Mediterranean. 
The possibility that this threat might suddenly materialise 
led Giolitti in 1902 to end the Italo-French rift,caused by 
France's occupation of Tunis in 1880,by signing a 'treaty .with 
Paris,whereby Italy renounced her Moroccan interests in re­
turn for French assurance of "disinterestedness" in Tripolit­
ania.An agreement with Britain in January 1902 also secured 
the Italian claim in Libya,so enabling Giolitti to commence 
a policy of "pacific penetration" in Tripolitania and Ciren­
aica, as an additional means of insuring Italy's pre-emption 
rights upon the territory.Giolitti believed he had settled 
Italy's Libyan claim beyond dispute,when on 13 December 1906, 
he signed with Britain and France a further agreement,confirm 
ing Italy's orientation from East Africa in the direction
of Libya.
Giolitti's reliance upon British and French recognition 
of Italy's claim upon Tripoli,as sufficient to secure the 
immunity of the territory from the political and economic 
interference of other interested powers,failed between 1906 
and 1911 to take sufficient account of other factors in a 
rapidly changing international situation.Amongst these 
factors, the Young-Turk Rebellion,which emphasised the growth
of nationalism in Turkey,and led to renewed concern in Con­
stantinople to preserve the Empire ^  an important ele-
ment in explaining Italy's failure to resolve the Tripoli 
claim by diplomatic means alone.The revival of Ottomanism 
in Tripoli and Turkey's increasing dependence upon German 
power ,which from 1906 onwards was threatening to completely
r
undermine Italian efforts at pacific penetration in Libya, 
caused Giolitti to finally declare war upon the Porte in 
the autumn of 1911,lest the occupation of Tripoli by another 
power "endanger the monarchy in Italy".
Giolitti's annexation of Tripoli in 1911 failed to 
resolve the tensions and uncertainties of some forty years
standing.The Libyan War also unwittingly embarked Italy 
on the road of expansionism in Africa.Unless such a
movement could be reconciled with moderate statecraft at
the level of domestic and foreign policy,the whole centre
of Italian politics could be thrown into jeopardy.If the
Allies had in 1919 accepted the demands of the moderate 
i m p e r i a l ist,Sonnino,for the exchange of Tripolitania in
return for the former German colonies of the Cameroons,a 
further colonial war might have been averted in Libya,and 
national feeling in Italy partly convinced that the"equitable 
compensations "promised by Article XIII of the Treaty of 
London had in some measure been realised.Further modest 
revisions of the boundaries of Eritrea and Somalia might 
then have followed, and a date fixed for the independence 
of Libya,following the conceding of protectorate status
in June and October of 1919.
Instead Italian colonial aspirations failed to be sat­
isfied in any form and strong nationalist pressure prev­
ented the ceding of Tripolitania to the Arab movement,so 
leading to the outbreak of hostilities in Libya,even before
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the March on Rome had had brought Fascism to power in Italy. 
The failure of Liberal foreign policy in Africa,thus provided 
Mussolini with two separate aims and strategies:firstly,the 
achieving of the policies of the moderate imperialists Sonnino 
Orlando and Tittoni,which aimed at obtaining for Italy"equit- 
able compensations"in fulfillment of Article XIII of the Treat; 
of London ; and secondly,the expansionist policy sketched out 
for the future in 1916 by the Ministry of Colonies,Gasparre 
Colosimo,who had aimed at the creation in Africa of an Ital­
ian empire in accordance with the aims of the national.ists( see 
MapSr.II i&III) .By working between 1922-1935 to achieve the 
first policy,whereby following Mussolini's agreement with 
Laval,Italy was to have received 44,000 square miles of Libyan 
desert,along the South-Eastern border between Tummo and the 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,it by no means followed that the Duce 
had not been preparing for some time to implement the second 
policy(see,Map II,areas for "eventual control").The actual 
date when Mussolini finally decided to actively prepare an 
expansionist policy in Africa in fulfillment of the dreams 
of Crispi and the schemes drawn up by Colosimo in 1916,and 
subsequently rejected by the Allies at|Versailles and in 
the subsequent negotiations with Britain and France,is a 
matter of debate amongst diplomatic historians,though the 1935 
agreement marked the completion of the diplomatic preparations 
B) Internal Policy and Collaboration
The need to obtain collaboration had not presented itself as 
a problem in the colonies of Eritrea and Somalia,where the 
populations were mainly nomadic and Italian development plans 
virtually non-existent,though much solid progress had been 
achieved through the unpublicised efforts of a tiny band of
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administrators and soldiers,who received little support 
from Rome.In Libya,however, the position was profoundly 
different for not only was the country geographically 
proximate to Sicily,but its people were mainly Arab-Ber- 
ber with their own language,religion and culture.Such 
people would not easily take to schemes of colonial dom­
ination and the most that Italy could reasonably expect 
was to exercise a limited form of suzerainty.
Indeed the assurances received by Giolitti from the 
Senusi leaders in Cirenaica (not to intervene in any war 
between Italy and Turkey)appear to have been based upon 
the calculation that Italian rule would be little diff­
erent from Ottoman rule, and by confining itself to the 
coastal areas would have little impact upon Senusi heg­
emony in the hinterland.The attitude of the Tripolitanian 
tribes is difficult to discern,though the activity of the 
agents of the Banco Di Roma in Tripoli and the coastal 
towns ensured the support of pro-Italian factions in the 
event of a military takeover.
The nature of this uncertain and tepid support was 
ill**conceived by the invading troops and their commander 
in chief,General Carlo Caneva,who had been led to believe 
by the Italian Foreign Ministry ,that they were about to 
be received by the Libyan population \  as "liberators” 
from the oppression of Turkish rule. The disinclination 
of the mass of the population and their leaders to wel­
come the arrival of Italian forces in Libya considerably 
confused the high command'and an elaborate propaganda
exercise was at once mounted with'a view to showing 
the justice of the Italian cause and Italy's friendship
14
for the Arabs and their religion.The chance of capital­
ising upon much latent feeling against the Turks disapp­
eared almost overnight when,following an incursion behind 
the Italian lines of Suleim Baruni's irregulars,Caneva 
ordered savage reprisals against the population of Tripoli, 
who he mistakenly believed were on the point of staging
an insurrection against him.This hasty eaction,sub
ober 1911,ended for the immediate future,at least, any 
hope that Italian rule might consolidate itself in Trip­
olitania 'with the support of the mass of the Libyan pop- 
lation. The subsequent entry of the Senusi into the war 
on the Turkish side and the allying of the Tripolitanian 
tribes with the Turks had,before the year was over,trans­
formed what Giolitti believed would be a short campaign 
for limited strategic goals,into an armed confrontation 
of nationalist and religious dimensions between Italy, 
Turkey and the Libyan people.
Efforts to secure collaboration following the Treaty 
of OUChy of 16 October 1912,which officially ended the 
state of war between Italy and Turkey,had little real 
effect upon the military situation in Libya,where the 
Libyans continued the war for nationalist and religious 
purposes.The virtual withdrawal of Italian troops from 
Libya between 1915 and 1919,during which the Italian pres^ 
ence was confined to the garrisoning of Tripoli,Horns 
and Zuara in the West and Bengasi,Merg,Derna ,Cirene and 
Tobruk in the East,failed to relieve Italy of the need 
to find an internal solution to the problem of governing 
Libya.Italian military weakness during these years sub­
sequently known as the "Tripoli Massacres" of 23-28 Oct
15
sequently became a;.bone- bfr'contehtion.betweeeh Italy 
and the Allies,for the return of the interior to 
Turko-Libyan control necessitated the maintenance 
by Britain and France of considerable forces along 
the borders with Tunisia and Egypt.The extent of the 
Italian withdrawal placed in doubt Italy's case for 
further colonial acquisitions in Africa.
It wa& with the aim of reducing the total theatre 
of military operations in Libya by cutting off the 
Arabo-Turkish forces in Tripolitania from Senusi supp­
ort in Cirenaica , that led Italy and her allies to begin 
negotiations with.Sayyid Idris, El-Senusi,the head of the 
Senusi' Order,which resulted in the Modus Vivendi of Acr- 
oma of 17 March 1917.This agreement ensured peace in 
Cirenaica and enabled the Italian government to commence 
the process of establishing civil government in the area. 
Relations between the Senusi and the Italian government 
were sufficiently cordial by 1919 for Italy to be able to 
concede virtual autonomy to Cirenaica in October of that 
year.
The Accord of Acroma,however,had no relevance to the 
affairs of Tripolitania,where from 1915 until the appoint­
ment of Volpi as governor in 1922,the Italian administrat­
ion had virtually no power or control beyond Tripoli and 
the fortified outposts along the coast.The military vacuum 
had meanwhile enabled the movement for national independ­
ence to get underway with the establishment at Misurata 
of a National Assembly and the adoption of a republican
form of government.A settlement with the Italian5was,how­
ever, urgently needed following the drafting to Tripolitania
in 1919 of 80,000 seasoned troops released from the war 
in Europe.The fact that neither side wanted a further 
armed confrontation at this point enabled compromise to 
briefly prevail* and in return for Arab recognition of 
Italian suzerainty local autonomy in the form of a 
protectorate was conceded by Italy.
Known as the Statutes of Libya,the Fundamental Law 
of Tripolitania was as unpopular with Italian nationalists 
as with^Libyan nationalists.Both believed it to repre­
sent some form of betrayal and both were equally resolved 
to undermine it by whatever means should come to hand.The 
refusal of the Arab nationalists to agree to the closure 
of the National Assembly,set up in the wake of Turkey's 
final evacuation of the country in 1918, and make way for 
the promised parliament,in effect doomed the Statutes of 
Libya in Tripolitania,though it is extremely doubtful 
whether such legislation would have lasted for very long 
under Fascist rule.Instead,fresh demands for independence 
from Italian rule were formulated,which would have made 
Idris El-Senusi Emir of the two provinces.The refusal of 
the nationalist governor Volpi to negotiate upon such a 
basis issued in the second Italo-Senusi War,lasting with­
out intermission by either side ,until 1932 when the It­
alians finally overcame the last vestiges of armed opp­
osition.
The outbreak of war automatically ended the accords 
with the Senusi-declared null and void by the governor 
of Cirenaica in 1923.The Statutes of Libya(never implem­
ented in Tripolitania)were not finally "abrogated",howev­
er,until 1928 waencthey were- replaced-by the-rfirst of a 
series of "organic laws",which became the hallmark of 
all subsequent fascist legislation in Libya.Collaboration
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under Fascism took place within terms of the system 
itself rather than in relation to the system of col­
onial rule,as envisaged by the grant of protectorate 
status in 1919.This system was broadly similar to the 
pattern of direct rule established in 1911;the differ­
ences are to be outlined and explained in terms of 
Fascism itself; and in the greater efficiency of the 
military and bureaucratic machine after 1922.Essent­
ially, however , the system after 1922 was the one in­
herited from the early years of direct rule in Libya. 
Ultimate authority was vested in the governor who was 
responsible to the authorities in Rome or directly to 
the Duce himself in the case of important fascist per­
sonages like Pietro Badoglio or Italo Balbo.Control 
of the Libyan population,however,was vested in the. 
military and the various sections of the bureaucracy, 
who after 1928 allocated positions to those Libyans 
who were prepared to collaborate with the regime and 
perhaps join the fascist party.This process was greatly 
accelerated by Italo Balbo(1934-1940) ,who sought to 
counteract the political effects of demographic colon­
isation on the Arab population by adopting a policy of 
"parallel development".Evidence shows,however,that des­
pite such efforts nationalism was on the increase amongst 
the Libyan population ; and there is little reason to 
suppose that collaboration under Fascism was any more 
successful amongst the mass of the Arab population than
it had been under Liberalism.Rather adherence to tradit­
ional religious and cultural ideas and practices charact­
erised the mood of the people after 1922 as before.
11.General Determinants: A) Economic(Capital and
Commercial)
Italian economic interests in the Levant,North Africa, 
the Red Sea and East Africa were already well establish­
ed by 1870 and led many to believe that the Maritime 
Republic was about to be revived.This concept was based 
upon the belief that if Italy exploited her advantageous 
and dominant position in the Mediterranean ,she might, 
as in the days of Ancient Rome,become the leading econ­
omic power in the region. Colonisation ,it was argued, 
had already become an economic reality in the form of 
the considerable diaspora of Italian families who had 
industriously settled along the coasts of North Africa 
orbin' the Middle East.Not all Italians expressing an 
interest in such questions agreed with the all-embrac­
ing sufficiency of "voluntary colonisation".The latter 
argued instead that only actual colonisation would in
the future guarantee Italy cheap raw materials and marts 
for Italian produce.Allied to such concerns was the ever 
present reality of overpopulated cities and a land over­
burdened by its peasantry.Demographic colonisation even 
before the turn of the century was at least never beyond 
the pale of political debate,however unrealistic in pract­
ical terms.
Imperialism in the opening years of the twentieth 
century ceased to have the influence it had exerted in 
the hungry 1880*s and Italian industry and commerce pre­
ferred for the most part to do without it.Instead the new 
policy of pacific penetration,introduced by the pragmatic 
Giolitti, enabled Italian finance to explore the opport­
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unities for profitable investment in the territories of 
the Porte.It was in the rich trading regions of the 
Middle East,North Africa and Egypt as well as in Turkey 
herself that the Italian merchants and industrialists 
most sought to develop pacific penetration.These areas 
and the trade with France,following the abandonment of 
protectionism,which had characterised the 1880's ,proved 
far more attractive than the struggle to build an em­
pire in Eritrea and Somalia,or to develop trade in Libya 
in pursuance of the government's claim upon the territ­
ory.
The disinclination of Italian capital to invest in
Libya was a cause of serious concern to Giolitti who
realised that only if Italian interests in the country
were strongly developed would it prove possible to
prevent foreign interests from establishing a foothold 
there r . in April 1905, the granting by the Turks of an
important concession to a French company for the const­
ruction of a new harbour-complex in Tripoli,led Tittoni, 
against a mounting backlash of nationalist opinion ,to 
organise an extensive programme of public investment in 
Libya.The Banco Di Roma was the agency chosen by the gov­
ernment for this operation.By 1911 the bank had invested 
five million dollars in Libya in the form of industrial 
holdings,mining concessions and shipping installations.
The Libyan War of 1911 hardly affected the attitude 
of Italian capital towards the question of further inve­
stment in Libya,despite the development of a heated deb­
ate upon the economic potential of the new colony by the 
national press.The war,however,saw the emergence of the 
imperialists as a political force in their own right and
20
the Italian press began increasingly to make use of 
their arguments in favour of colonialism in an attempt 
to popularise the war with the nation as a whole.Libya thus
became depicted as a "terra promessa"or land of economic 
and agricultural oportunity for Italians.Recognised econ­
omists , however , set little store by such j propaganda>point-
I
ing instead to the obvious drawbacks of the new colony- 
the lack of ports,roads,modern buildings and other such 
basic amenities ,without which extensive investment could 
easily be thrown down the drain. Underlying observations 
of the latter variety were other disincentives,for example, 
the continuing military and political stalemate,and the fail­
ure of successive governments to indicate the extent to 
which Italy would be committed to the new colony in the 
future. So the situation continued until after 1928,by 
which time Fascism had consolidated itself in Italy and 
in the colonies.Even at this point,it was government-cap­
ital rather than business-capital that began the process 
of developing Libya in terms of the regime's .notions of 
autarchy,which by 1939 had still failed to provide the 
country with an economy sufficiently resilient to stand 
up on its own feet.
B) Social
The idea that Italy's burgeoning population problem might 
be resolved through the possession of a colonial empire- 
so diverting the stream of emigrants from Europe,the over­
seas possessions of other powers,and the New World-easily 
took root in the uncertain years following Unification, 
when the economic and agricultural problems of the young 
state were most acute.Demographic colonisation,as a solut­
ion ,was advocated by a small minority calling themselves 
"Africanisti".1t was not a view that appealed to the gov­
erning classes to whom the whole notion of "expansionism" 
seemed both dangerous and implausible.
Demographic colonisation failed to become more reas­
onable as Italy emerged into the 1800's ,though the mam- 
oth increase in the emigration statistics(between 1890 and 
1905 an estimated 8.5 million Italians left the country)and 
the worsening social,industrial and agricultural climate, 
led some politicians to take up the idea,which was not 
without its political merits.Thus Crispi,while having the 
courage to undertake expansion for strategic reasons in 
the 1890's,also accepted deomographic colonisation as a 
possible solution to Italy's population at the same time.
A pilot scheme with such possible aims in mind was briefly 
launched by him in Eritrea,where a few hundred Italian 
families were settled in the highlands,which were deemed 
suitable for farming by European methods.
Crispi's fall and the upturn in Italy's economic fort­
unes during the halcyon Giolitti-Era rendered further 
debate upon such schemes purely academic.lt was not until 
1911 that demographic colonisation was revived by the press 
in an attempt to popularise the Libyan War.Essentially,how­
ever, the idea was as impractical as ever,and the government 
never seriously for a momement believed it could go ahead 
in the unsettled political and military climate of Libya, 
with the mass settlement of Italian peasants upon Libyan 
soil. This cautious approach was confirmed by three import­
ant technical commissions between 1912 and 1913 which 
reported upon the agricultural possibilities of Tripolitania. 
Agricultural possibilities were not denied but more research
and experimentation was required before a definite prog­
ramme could be evolved for the region.Bertolini,himself, 
drew attention to the fact that the collaboration of the 
Arab population would be a most important aspect in the 
success or failure of any plans to develop the agricult­
ural potential of the colony.3y 1922,little had been 
accomplished,other than the implementation of the Bert­
olini proposals in the area immediately adjacent to Tri­
poli,where an experimental farm had been established.In­
deed by the end of the Liberal Era,the number of Italian 
colonists employed in the agricultural sector numbered 
no more than 429 or less than 1 per cent of the Italian
families in Tripolitania.lt required a major reorientat­
ion towards empire-building by Mussolini,a development
which did not occur until after 1930,before the state 
was prepared to take over,where the private sector of the 
economy had so blatantly failed,by seriously investing 
in the demographic colonisation of Libya.
C) Political and Ideological
The first attempts at developing a political and ideology 
ical premise for expansionism in Africa took place in the 
early years of the Italian state against a background of con­
fidence and optimism mixed with uncertainty and gloom as 
the problems of the new state assumed a concrete form.Init­
ially ,post-Risor£imerrto yearning after the vanished glor­
ies of Ancient Rome-whether Republic or Empire-combined 
with Mazzinian idealism to provide Italy with the notion 
of a "civilising mission" she could communicate to the
world beyond her shores.
Less idealistic was the search by the Africanisti for
an intellectual panacea which would make sense of imperial­
ism in terms of Italy's own particular problems and there­
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fore popularise expansionism amongst the urban masses. 
Foremost amongst such Africanisti was Enrico Corradini, 
who in the shadow of Adowa and the eclipse of j post-Risorg- 
imento idealism created by the pragmatism of the Giolitti 
Era,took it upon himself to fashion a new theory of imper­
ialism.Expressed as"The Proletarian Nation.”this doctrine 
became increasingly fashionable after 1918 and was made 
particular use of by Mussolini in attempting to popularise 
imperialism with the Italian people.
During the early years of the new century,the colonial 
party was able to capitalise upon much right-wing reaction 
to the progressivism of the Giolitti Age .Landowners and 
prominent members of the business community were attracted 
to its ranks as trade union activity increased/and the price 
of labour was! blamed upon the government's refusal to adopt 
a colonial solution to Italy's emigration problems.The col­
onial movement was_alsohable\ to:.attracti the suppott. of lead­
ing figures,such as the philanthropist,Franchetti,and men 
of the calibre of Sonnino or^the social and political stand­
ing of the Marquis Di San Giuliano .The establishment of 
a Colonial Institute in Rome in 1904 under the patronage of 
San Giuliano was an important step in the direction of 
making colonialism a respectable political movement.
Though anii-Giolittian in tendency,the nascent colonial 
movement remained largely intellectual,and hardly raised 
its voice in protest at the threat to Italian interests 
in Libya in 1905.Corradini*s view was that the time was 
not ripe for Italian intervention in Libya.The rumour put 
out by the Banco Di Roma in 1910 that it was about to sell 
its interests in Libya produced a different reaction from
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the Nationalists,and a wave of indignation was organised 
throughout Italy.Giolitti's inactivity,Corradini declared, 
was a threat to Italy's interests both now and in the fut­
ure .Occuring in the same year,the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis 
fuelled the nationalist case,and led to the holding of their 
first congress with the Libyan Question in mind.Corradini's 
founding of L'ldea Nazionale in March 1911 brought ab­
out the launching of a crusade designed to pressurise the 
government into declaring war on Turkey over Tripoli.
The Libyan War has been seen by recent students of 
the period(*)as an important turning point in the.history 
of modern Italy.Both the Nationalist Association,the career 
of Giolitti and the future of Italy as a democratic state 
are seen to have been profoundly affected by the war and 
its aftermath.If this is so ,it certainly was not seen to 
be the case at the time and the view that Giolitti was doing 
no more than foreclose on an old mortgage is as plausible.
It is ,however,beyond doubt that the war enabled the nation­
alists to get imperialism accepted by the government and the 
press as a respectable policy .More open to speculation is 
the effect of the war upon Italian politics.The Nationalist 
Association may have emerged from it with a stronger ident­
ity and more power and influence than before.It is doubtful, 
however,if Italian politics were profoundly effected by 
the Libyan War,though they might well have been badly scathed'.
Far more dramatic and lasting was the impact of the European 
War upon the Italian centre parties jbut is arguable in the 
extreme whether the gains to the Nationalists resulting from 
the Libyan War are sufficient to explain their success after
*) See,R.S. Consolo,"Italian Nationalism and the Revolt 
against Giolitti",Journal of Modern History.6.1965.nn. 
186-207,p.186. —
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1.918:' in'itianaging; to wean. then conseirvative^ element in .Ital­
ian politics from its traditional support of the centre
parties, and moderate policies .More important by far was 
the effect of the European War upon the parties of the 
left and the success of Mussolini's Revolutionary Social­
ist Party in exploiting the discontent of the post-war 
years at the expense of the Socialist parties.
Perhaps, during the 1914 -1918 War the Nationalist 
Association was able to repeat the role it had played 
throughout the related phases of the Libyan conflict,such 
as calling for the redress of the limitations of the Treaty 
of Lausanne(sometimes known as the Treaty of Ouchy)with 
a Treaty of Versailles,which would ensure an adequate re­
vision of the frontiers of Libya,Eritrea and Somalia.lt 
cannot ,however,be seriously maintained that this partic­
ular element in their platform was responsible for any 
largescale defection from the Liberal ranks.The reasons 
for the crumbling of Italian politics in these years are 
much more diverse than can be can be explained by any sing­
le hypothesis.Imperialism was certainly in the wind and 
Mussolini's conversion to it ,despite his earlier attack 
upon Socialists who supported the Libyan War,is indicative . 
of the mood of Italian politics ajid the Italian people at
this time .Even so, it was not until April 1921 at Bologna 
that the Duce formally accepted Imperialism as a constitutive 
element of Fascism.The merging of his own party with the Nat­
ionalist Association on 26 February 1924 may have been an 
act: of opportunism by Mussolini.Historically,however,it prov 
ided Fascism with something,hitherto,it had always lacked in 
the form of an ideology of expansionism in Africa which,in 
the years ahead,it would make more than adequate use of.
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Chapter Two Direct Rule and the Government Schools 1911-19
1. Introduction
’’Italy was forced in 1911 to critically 
examine the whole notion of the religious 
community in Libya in the light of the 
special needs of Italian Sovereignty.Under 
Ottoman rule ,separate oases of special 
sovereignty had been permitted to function 
alongside the administrative organs of the 
state.Italy,however,felt obliged to combine 
the whole community into a single entity,
regardless of factors such as race,relig­
ion or culture” .(*)
As a centralised western-democracy,Liberal Italy found 
it next to impossible to graft her own governmental and 
administrative system ,which had been developed in acc­
ordance with Italian needs and history,upon the system 
inherited in Libya from the Turks(l).At the same time, 
the Italians were wise enough to recognise that,reg­
ardless of its many defects,the Ottoman system had wor­
ked relatively well in Libya.Institutions such as that 
personified by the Muktar were a vital element in admin­
istering the country and could not easily be dispensed 
with(2).Even so,the traditional system with its easy tol­
erance of different and separate communities,each based 
its own laws,rights,customs,languages,religions and adm­
inistration was completely foreign to western and .'Italian 
conceptions of the state and its proper functioning.Such 
a system was also judged to be inconsistent with Italian 
claims to complete sovereignty in Libya for it also prov­
*) Caruso-Ingilleri,D.,1 Primi Ordinamenti Civili Della 
Libia(Roma,1914),p.263
1) Ibid.
3) Queirolo,E.,11 Muchtar Nella Legislazione Ottomana 
(Tripoli,1918),p.52
27
ided the Sultan with ample scope to challenge the authority 
of the Italian government in fulfillment of his responsibil­
ity as protector of the rights and special autonomy of his 
former Moslem subjects,a .position which had been guaranteed 
by the provisions of the Treaty of Ouchy,which had conclud­
ed the Italo-Turkish War.The Sultan*s special position in 
Libya following the Treaty of Ouchy was a cause of irrit­
ation and embarrassment to the Italians and every attempt 
was made to circumvent his authority by pressing ahead with 
reforms designed to consolidate Italian control over the 
Moslem majority.Official propaganda justified the import­
ation of Italian laws,bureaucracy,administration and cust­
oms in terms of the need bring "civilisation and progress" 
to Libya and create under the Italian flag a single and 
undivided people.The Ottoman system ,it was argued,was not 
only inefficient and corrupt,but also unfair in that it
favoured the oslem majority against Christian and Jewish
minorities.Under Italian rule all were promised equal trea-
In furtherance of these aims no effort was spared 
between October 1911 and the promulgation of Bertolini*s 
decree of 9 January 1913(N.39),outlining the future admin­
istrative policy for Libya, to model the administration 
and organinsation of the country upon that of an Italian 
province(5).Tripoli and Bengasi in particular were trans­
formed into Italian communes and rapidly began to take
4) Caruso-Ingilleri,p.263.
5) Guidice,L.,L *Amministrazione Municipale di Tripoli Nel 
Suo Ordinamento Nei Suo Servizi Biennio 1916-18:Relazione 
Del Primo Commissario Municipale(Tripoli,1918),p.10.
tment by the state ,,regardless; of race,religion or cult- 
ure(4). \
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on the characteristic appearance of Italian towns.In 
achieving this result,the military and civilian bureauc­
racy brought over from Italy to replace Turkish offic­
ials, who had been expelled from the country during Nov­
ember 1911,worked hand in hand.Supreme power had init­
ially been bestowed upon the commander in chief,Carlo 
Caneva,who between 11 October and 30 November 1911(6), 
established a centralised system of bureaucracy, and 
delegated control and responsibility for its operation 
to General Tomaso Salza(7 ).salza1s extensive powers as 
'•Commandant of the Piazza” included responsibility in 
the "pacified zones" for law and order,military secur­
ity as well as for the maintenance and development of 
social and political services(8).For the purpose of carr­
ying out such functions as efficiently as possible in 
the circumstances of the time,Salza*s office was divided 
into three sections: a department of military affairs, 
a department of civil affairs and a general secretariat 
for handling correspondence and compiling reports for 
the authorities in Rome(9).
This system,while producing a good many concrete 
achievements in a remarkably short space of time(hospit­
alisation,modern buildings,street-lighting,disposal of 
sewage,new roads and port facilities and cleansing Trip­
oli in particular from repeated epidemics of Cholera,are
6 ) Caruso-Ingilleri,p .13'
7) Ibid.,p.36
8) Ibid.
9) Responsibility for the management of education was 
entrusted to the directorate of civil affairs under 
Dr. Caruso-Ingilleri.In practice,however,charge of 
the schools was absorbed into the general running of 
the directorate,which caused much confusion.Ibid.,p.36.
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to be included amongst its more notable achievements)had
the effect of building up a pattern of government that depended
far too heavily upon Italian officials and military personnelt
for its day-to-day running.Arabs had little place or say 
in the administration of the country and in consequence were 
rapidly alienated from colonial rule.Bertolini's attempts, 
following the establishment of a Ministry of Colonies in 
December 1912,to effect the transition from military to 
civilian government failed to take account of the need to 
bring the Arab population into a closer working alliance with
) . i
the authorities.The attempt to establish Consultative Comm­
ittees (with a view to furthering collaboration between Arabs 
and Italians)was also not destined to succeed,because of the 
interference and opposition of officials,concerned to retain 
all the essential elements of authority under their own cont­
rol. Such a system of colonial rule came under increasing 
criticism by leading authorities of Arab and Islamic culture 
and civilisation(1 0),as well as from other candid observers, 
who recognised that the adoption of simpler systems in the 
British and Dutch colonies,provided greater scope and flex­
ibility for local participation(11).Between 1911 and 1919, 
however,the desire to emulate the success of the French in 
North Africa,and Italy's own tendency following the achieve­
ment of Unification in 1870 to model the institutions of the 
infant state upon those of France and Germany,led to the 
adoption in Libya of a pattern of "direct rule"both unsuited 
to Italy's limited experience of colonial government or to 
the mood and traditions of the Libyan people.
10) See,C.A.NallinoiTrattamento degli Indigeni e loro Part- 
icipazione all'Amministrazione Coioniale,Atti del Con- 
veqno Nazionale Coloniale per il Dopo Guerra delle 
Colonie,Roma 15-21 Gennaio 1919(Roma,1920),pp.123-4.
11) Guidice,L.,p.10.
11.Education and the Transition from Turkish to
Italian Rule 1911-1913
"Without any exaggeration , the school is the 
most powerful pacific means available to us 
for achieving a union of aim and spirit with 
the indigenous population."(12)
In addition to the Kuttabs,Medressah and School of Arts 
and Crafts in Tripoli!13),Libya also possessed in the 
fifteen years prior to the Italian occupation,the nucleus 
of a state-system of education,which had been set up^by 
the Ottomans!14).This system,although mainly existing in 
Tripoli,where it provided elementary,professional and sec­
ondary education,including a normal school for the train­
ing of elementary teachers!15),had also been established
in Bengasi,as well as in the chief towns and villages 
of the coastal areas,and even possibly in the principal 
oases of the interior (16).The Ottomans had set up the
12) Caruso-Ingilleri,p .8
13) See,Chapt.Three,Infra,pp.65-95
14) See,Contini,F.,"Storia delle Istituzioni Scolastiche 
delle Libia"in LibiasRivista Trimestrale Di Studi Libici 
(Tripoli,1953),pp.5-101,p.6.
15),See,infra,Appendices 11•,Statistics*(B) Relating to 
Libyans and other Moslems in Tripoli before 1911,p.3.
16) Angelo Scallabrini(Director of Italian Schools Overseas) 
reported to Bertolini(Minister of Colonies(20-11-1912- 
19-3-1914) in 1913 that he had toured the areas of Libya 
then under Italian control,and had noted the existence 
of at least a dozen schools originating before 1911.Still 
more schools,he added,existed in parts of the country as 
yet unpacified.Moreover, there were also schools in the 
government areas which he had not yet had the opportunity 
to visit.See,MAI-AS,Fasc.113/1-5,Scuole*Scallabrini Report, 
22 July 1913(unsigned,undated and unnumbered).Also,see 
Coro,F.,Settantasei Anni Di Dominazione Turca in Libia, 
1835^1934. (Tripoli, 1913),pp. 85-9
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new schools quite separately from the traditional system 
of religious schools(17),and had staffed them with both 
Arab and Turkish personnel,specially trained for'such a 
purpose,and placed under the guidance and control of an 
inspector,appointed by the Ministry of Public Instruction 
in Constantinople(18).By ordering the evacuation of all 
former Turkish personnel from Libya in December 1911(19), 
including teachers,and requisitioning former schools for 
use as offices and barracks,the Italian occupation admin­
istered the coup de grace to the school system developed 
since the nineties by the Ottomans(20).The reopening in 
February 1912 of the pre-colonial Italian schools(21),foll­
owing the cleansing of Tripoli from the final traces of the
Cholera epidemic of December 1911(22),thus left the
population with few educational options other than the 
traditional Kuttabs or the Italian national schools.
Moslem
17) Education in Turkey had until 1846 been exclusively 
religious,apart from instruction imparted in military 
schools,and it was only from 1869 onwards that new^ 
developments were brought about,as the result of a 
series of organic laws.issued on the authority of the 
Caliph-Sultan,the new laws approved a secular system 
of elementary,professional and secondary education.The 
procedure for implementing the deforms was by no means 
guaranteed to produce results,especially in the provinces 
of the empire,where much depended upon local circumstan­
ces and the enthusiasm and honesty of the governor.See,
G.Young,Corps De Droit Ottoman Receuil des Codes,Lois, 
Ordinances et Actes Les Blus importants du Droit Inter- 
ieur.et d'Etudes sur le Droit Coutumier de 1 "Empire 
Ottoman,Vol.11.Titre XXXIV.Instruction Publique(Oxford, 
1905),p.352-387
18) Micacchi,R.,L"Enseignement aux Indigenes dans les Col­
onies Italiannes Dependant Directement de la Couronne 
(Bruxelles,1931),p.469
19) Caruso-Ingilleri,Op.Cit.,p.!3
20) fnn;P^i’T^-P°iitani2'T ^ /2'219’Scuole ItalianesRelaz-xone del Direttore degli Affari Civili,Dr.D.Caruso- 
Ingilleri,April,1912,pp.3 and 10.
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The reaction of Salza's Civil Affairs Department to 
the absence of educational facilities for Moslems in Trip­
oli led to the establishing of an Itala-Arab annexe at the 
Italian national school in the Sciara Espagnol.This was 
intended primarily to provide instruction in the Italian 
language along with a form of elementary education based 
upon the programmes adopted in the Italian lower-element­
ary schools.The teaching of the Arabic language and the 
Koran was also included in the curriculum as a concession 
to Arab national and religious feeling(23).The long-term 
solution to what was termed the "scholastic problem" was 
recognised as the responsibility of the Ministry of Col­
onies which was not as yet>established(24).As an interim 
measure,however,Caneva established by special decree a 
commission under the chairmanship of the Director of Civil 
Affairs,Dr.Caruso-Ingilleri,to both supervise the provis­
ional arrangements,and draw up proposals designed to refl­
ect local opinion,and assist the authorities in Rome in 
the task of evolving a policy to suit Italian and Arab
21) See,Proclama del Governatore del 12 Febbraio,1912. 
Istituzione di nuovi corsi nelle scuole della Trip- 
olitania,O.L.,988.
22) The outbreak of a cholera epidemic on 14 October 1911 
delayed the re-opening of the national and private 
schools until February 1912,when Italian teachers ev­
acuated to Italy for the period of the emergency,were 
recalled to their posts.Caruso states that the epidem­
ic was latent as Italian troops disembarked in Tripoli . 
on 5 October 1911,and spread rapidly due to the unsan- 
itory condition of the town and the disarray of the mun­
icipal medical services as a result of Turkish neglect 
and the war.Archival sources indicate that it is likely 
Italian troops contacted the disease at Naples,prior
to their emharkation for Tripoli in October,1911.See, 
Caruso-Ingilleri,1 Primi Ordinamenti Civili Della 
Libia,p.23.
23) See,Proclama del Governatore del 12 Febbraio,1912,Op.Cit.
24) See,Legge 6 Luglio,Istituzione del Ministero delle 
Colonie,B.U.C.,1913,8.
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tastes(25).In the meantime,similar provisional measures 
were adopted in Cirenaica with the establishing in Beng­
asi of an Italo-Arab annexe at the Italian elementary sch­
ool, along with the opening of a small school on the same 
lines as the annex at Sidi Daud(26).A scholastic commiss­
ion was also authorised to function in accordance with the 
same criteria as its equivalent in Tripoli.(27)Both comm­
issions concerned themselves primarily with three princip= • 
al areas of activity;the curriculum and the relative posit­
ions of the Arabic and Italian languages in the government 
schools;the response of the Libyan population to the prov­
isional arrangements adopted with the reopening r of the 
national schools; and the means that should be adopted in
The following persons were named in the decree to 
assist’ Caruso in his work on the commission;Dr.Gaetano 
Basile,Director of Sanitory Services;Abdel Rahmen,Cadi 
of Tripoli;Professor Pietro Marinuzzi,Director of the 
Technical-Commercial School;Cav.Gianetto Paggi,Director 
of the Royal Elementary School;Khalid Bey Ghergheni;
Alfredo Nunes Vais;Harfalia Hahum.See,Decreto 21 Marzo,
1912 del comandante in capo del corpo di spedizione per 
la nomina della deputazione scolastica di Tripoli,O.L.
370, 990.
See,Decreto del comandante le forze italiane in Cirenaica,
4 Marzo,1912.Reapertura delle scuole f?ubliche a Bengasi, 
O.L.,368,989.
At Bengasi,the commission was to be headed by the director 
of the Department of Civil Affairs,acting as president,and 
assisted bysProfessor Garello,Director of Schools;Dr.Aldo 
Mei;Antonio Manghi;Dr.Vicenzo Mercatelli,Director of Med­
ical Services;Captain,Angelo Modena;Mohamed Bib-Amer,Cadi 
of Bengasi,Mansur Kehia;Hag.Ahmed Gihani,Mayor of the city; 
Sid Negim;and Giuli Elia.See,Decreto 3 Marzo,1912 del 
comandante le forze italiane in Cirenaica de istituisce la 
Deputazione scolasticaadi Bengasi,0 .L.,370,990.
Both commissions reported intermittently during 1912 to 
the government,but appear to have been wound up shortly 
after the establishment of the Ministry of Colonies in 
July,1912.See,Caruso Ingilleri to P.C.M.,April^1912,p.18; 
and ACS,PCM,Amministrazione Civile e Servizi llnerenti ,
(Scuole),Bengasi,1 Sept.,1912,T.-1/2,714,p.12.
26)
27)
28)
the future to secure the extension of pacific penetration 
amongst the mass of the Libyan population(28).
The need to foster Italianit& amongst Italy's num­
erous emigrants,through the teaching of the Italian lang­
uage and the creation of an awareness of Italian national­
ity and culture,had been the aim of the Italian schools 
abroad under Francesco Crispi(29).Little,however,had been 
done to extend this programme to Arabs in Libya before 
1911,despite the government's adoption of a policy of 
pacific penetration in the country,which included supp­
ort for education(30).The same defects were also apparent 
in Italian policy for the other colonies of Eritrea and 
Somalia,where education was either neglected completely 
of left entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church(31). 
The need for Italy to justify her aspiration towards the 
status of a major colonial-power in terms of a "civilising 
mission" had been the subject of a somewhat inconclusive 
debate in the Chamber of Deputies immediately prior to
29) See,Palamenghi-Crispi,T.,Le Scuole e la Protezione Dell' 
Italianit^ all'Estero,L'Italia Coloniale E 'Francesco Crisr 
(Milano,1928),p.215;Biasutti,R.,L*Italianit& Nell'Africa 
- Mediterranea,Italia E Africa Mediterranea(Ed.,Sansoni,G.
C.,Firenze,1942-XXI),pp.88-143.
30) A special course for Moslems(including instruction in 
the Italian language,arithmetic,geography,French and 
Arabic)had been established by the Italian community 
of Tripoli(at the instigation of the Consul) in 19Q4 
at the Technical-Commercial School.Forty-five Moslem 
pupils had attended the course,but political pressure 
by the Turkish authorities soon reduced the numbers 
in attendance,so that it was rapidly closed down and 
not re-opened until the end of 1910.The course,howev­
er was not finally re-started until the establishment 
of the Italo-Arab Annexes in Tripoli and Bengasi by 
Canova and Briccoli in February and March 1912:Contini, 
"Storia delle istituzioni scblastiche" ,etc. ,0p.Cit. .p .6
31) Malvezzi de Medici,A . ,"Native Education in the Italian 
Colonies,"Educational Yearbook(1931),pp.651 & 657.Also, 
see,Piccioli,A.,La Nuova Italia d'Oltremare,1933,Vol.
II.,p.1154.
the Libyan War of October 1911(32).Scallabrini's own 
visit to Libya,shortly before the re-opening of the 
Italian schools in February and March 1912,had no doubt 
served to underline the need to develop teaching in the 
Italian language amongst the Arab population,and had con­
tributed to the decision to establish Italo-Arab Annexes 
and schools on a trial-basis(33).This assumption seems 
to be justified by the report drawn up by Caruso-Ingilleri 
in his capacity as Director of Civil Affairs and President 
of the Scholastic Commission for Tripolitania in April 
1912(34).In this report,reference is made to Scallahrini's 
recent visit, and the need to- base the future work of the 
schools in Libya upon the development of Italianita among­
st the Italian residents and collaboration amongst the 
Libyans(35).For Caruso,the main elements of the curriculum 
of the Italo-Arab schools would without any doubt consist 
of "the teaching of our language,history and geography", 
along with the usual subjects of the elementary school 
syllabus,such as arithmetic and suitable emphasis upon the 
"rules and duties of proper hygiene"(36).Although Caruso
32) With reference to Africa,the Marquis Di San Giuliano 
(Foreign Minister)argued that African peoples should 
receive instruction in the Italian language for their 
own and Italy's benefit.Great care,however, should be 
taken as far as the teaching of Western culture was 
concerned .Experience in this respect had shown that 
neither the colonial power not the native people them­
selves derived great benefits from the latter,which 
alienated them from their own people, and led them
to criticise the authorities when their expectations 
were not met.This issue,he concluded,was one of the 
most onerous problems confronting Western statesmen 
with responsibilities towards Africa.Atti Parliament- 
ari ,Legislatura XXlll-la Sessione-Tornata Del 5 Luq- 
lio,1910,Camera dei Deputati,pp.9775-989.
33) Caruso-Ingilleri Report of A p r i l ,1912,p.4.
34) Ibid.
35) Ibid*,p. 8 .
36) Ibid.,p p . 12-13.
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accepted the place of Arabic and the teaching of the Koran 
in the curriculum of the Libyan schools,his report for the 
first time confirms the premise that the principal function 
of the colonial schools was to teach the Italian language 
and a sufficiency of Italian culture to further the aims 
of collaboration.Under no circumstances was Arabic or even 
the teaching of Islam-of which the Italians on the whole 
approved ,providing it was free of any political of anti- 
colonial tendency-to occupy the same position in the curr­
iculum as Italian-type subjects.In this way ,it was gener­
ally believed,the schools would be able to induce in the 
population as a whole an attitude receptive to colonialism 
( 3*2) .Despite such general assumptions,regarding Italy's 
"civilising mission",at the very commencement of Italian 
colonial rule in Libya,the commissions themselves were 
far from clear in 1912,as to future pattern of Arab educat­
ion in the colony.Whatever might be written in the confid­
ential reports passing between Tripoli and Rome upon the 
subject of Libyan education,on the surface at least, gov- 
erraent officials were anxious to play down the theme of 
Italianisation, and justify the place of the Italian lang­
uage in the curriculum as necessary to enable Libyans to 
study in the Italian schools themselves(3$).When this just­
ification failed to calm the fears of, Libyans who believed
37) Ibid i
38) Italian policy sought to distinguish in theory and 
practice between East Africa and Libya,where a more 
developed policy was required.For Caruso and other
...... officials at the time ,it was a sine qua non of pol­
icy that the Italian schools abroad should be prim­
arily concerned with Italianitk in the case of Ital­
ian pupils and pacific penetration for Libyan child­
ren. In the circumstances of 1912,Caruso judged the 
Italo-Arab Annexes to be purely instrumental ~ ifi| enabling 
Arabs to acquire., suff icient Italian to be able to
attend with profit the Italian national schools.Italy's 
"civilising mission",as far as Caruso was concern-
assimilation to be the real aim of government policy, 
official propaganda emphasised that the initial measures 
were of a purely provisional nature,until such a time as 
the Ministry of Colonies could organise schools in full 
accordance with local wishes(39).
The reception given to these initial measures by 
the Arab population in Tripoli and Bengasi was mixed 
and uncertain or indifferent and hostile in some quart­
ers.In Tripoli itself(the war prevented the experiment 
form being extended further afield),Caruso was only able 
to report to Rome that 259 Arabs had enrolled in the Ital­
ian schools as a whole(this figure included Arab Libyans 
who had entered the Italo-Arab annexe),a figure well bel­
ow the numbers attending the Turkish schools in the final 
year of Ottoman rule(40).Rather,however, than admit that 
the new measures were not meeting with the approval of 
the mass of the population -an admission ,which logically, 
at least,should have obliged him to critically examine - 
the assumptions upon which present and future policies 
were to be based-Caruso preferred to make an ambiguous
(contin.)ed,lay in facilitating the attendance of Arabs 
at the national schools.This was not simply because the 
Moslem population lacked schools of their own-other than 
the Kuttabs-but a matter of principle.No mention is made 
in the Caruso report of the possibility of an alternative 
system ever being developed by the government for the 
more-or-less exclusive use of the Libyan population: Ibid, 
pp.8-9•
39)Caruso*s attitude appears.to reflect nationalist opinion, 
at this time riding on the crest of a wave in Italy.More 
reasoned,though by no means pro-Arab or Islamic,were Di 
San|Giuliano *s attitudes,which.were indicative of gov­
ernment opinion.Italy,Di San (Giuliano had promised,while 
inspecting the Italian schools in Libya during 1910,hoped 
in the future to set up schools in which Islam would be 
taught.This undertaking was written into Canova's decree 
of 12 February 1912,in the form of a foot-note,stating
comparison between the number of Moslems enrolled in the 
government schools and the number of Jews so enrolled.
Such comparisons revealed -if the 75 Moslems attending 
the Catholic boys' school is excluded from the total of 
259 Moslems attending Italian schools-that only 184 Mos­
lems had in fact enrolled in the government schools,as 
opposed to 811 Jews-a disturbing conclusion in a land, 
where Moslems comprised the- vast majority of the popul­
ation 41) .The reasons advanced by Caruso to explain such 
a state of affairs-at a time when the government 
should have been deeply concerned to gain the sympathy 
and support of the Moslem majority for its policies and 
rule-laid the blame on the Arab population itself,which 
unlike its Jewish counterpart was unprepared to collab­
orate with Italian sovereignty .The Jews on the other1, hand 
had before 1911 done much to prepare for Italian rule by 
attending the Italian schools and learning the language(42)
(contin)that the government intended after the war to set­
up "elementary and higher schools in conformity 1(vith the 
civil and religious laws of the Islamic Religion:Libia 
Neqli Atti Parliamentari E Prowedimenti Del Governo,Parte 
It 1881-1911(Milano,1912-13),pp.301-2.Also,See,Proclama 
12 February,1912,Op.Cit.
40) 1,460 pupils attended the Turkish schools in the final 
year of Ottoman rule,as opposed to 258 Libyan Arabs,att­
ending the Italian schools in the first scholastic 
year of Italian ruletCaruso-Ingllleri Report~of April, 
1912,pp.2 & 4-5.
41) Ibid.,pp.6-7.
42) See,Ibid.(the disproportion between Arab and Jewish
enrolments in relation to the native population),p.1 1 .
jy
To consolidate his point,Caruso concluded,that the Jewish 
population derived greater benefit from the Italian sch­
ools by virtue of the fact that they comprised by far the 
most energetic and enterprising section of the indigenous 
population in Tripoli,predominating,headded, in business comm­
erce and cultural activity(43).Even Caruso at this point, 
was prepared to concede that both Arabs and Jews preferred 
to first send their children to be educated in their res­
pective religious schools before sending them(if at all) 
to the government schools.As if to emphasise the inadeq­
uacy of the government schools-while avoiding any open 
criticism of what he took to be government policy on the 
subject-Caruso emphasised that the indigenous population, 
received^jnpre than a purely religious education in the 
traditional schools(the comparison being with the catech­
ism taught to Italian children in the Church schools,but 
not in the national schools).Arab and Jewish pupils,the 
director affirmed,apart from the purely religious subjects, 
also acquired a knowledge of the laws and customs of their 
own community,along with much else that affected their 
private and public life(44).Caruso confessed himself to 
be basically in ignorance of the mentality of the Arab 
population regarding'.'educ&tion, .and with- few solutions to 
offer as far as the direction of future policy was conc­
erned .Better by far he urged,if the government consulted 
Italy's veteran teacher in Tripoli,Gianneta Paggi ,who 
understood the mentality of the Arab people and was a far
43) Ibid., p.ll.
44) Ibid.,pp.10-11.
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better judge of such matters than he was himself.(4 5 )
In Bengasi,the Italo-Arab schools seem to have proved 
more popular with the local people than in Tripoli,poss­
ibly because of the calmer political climate ,and the 
absence of unpleasant incidents,such as the Tripoli mass­
acres of October 1911,from which Arab-Italian relations 
were slow to recover in the colony, if they could 
be said to have recovered" atsall(46).Th£~different atmos­
phere in Bengasi itself,where the school year had started 
a month later than in Tripoli,seems refected in the grad­
ual increase in the number of enrolments.By June the num­
ber of pupils enrolling in the government schools had risen 
to 90 from an initial figure in March of 69,a result which 
appeared to the Italian inspector of schools,Dr. Battig- 
nani, as generally satisfactory(47).These figures led the 
Civil Affairs Department in Bengasi to take an optimistic 
view of the future, and forecast a school population of 
304 Arab boys for the succeeding schools year(1912-1913)
(48).The change in the atmosphere ,also seems apparent in 
the unusual request by the President of the Scholastic 
Commission for the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Aff­
airs for the organising of a summer course in the Italian
i
language;both because of the lateness with which the sch­
ool year had commenced,and also because of the enthusiasm 
with which the local population had greeted the government's
it
I 45) Ibid.,p.10.
46) See,supra,Chpt.One,p.14.
47) ACS(PCM),Amministrazione Civile,etc.,Fasc.T.7 
1912(Aug.):from General Bricolla to the PCM.
48) Ibid.
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educational measures(49).
On the whole,however,the response of the Moslem pop- 
ulation-especially in Tripolitania-to the miserable pall­
iatives put forward in place of a proper educational pol­
icy at this time had been far from enthusiastic.The more 
favourable response in Cirenaica was in part conditioned 
by the government’s policy of opening schools as a means 
of alleviating the condition of the numerous children who 
had been orphaned by the war.The schools became centres 
for not only instruction but also places for the distrib­
ution of free clothing and a hot meal(50).The position 
was no less better in Tripolitania,especially Tripoli its­
elf, where apart from a basic problem of poverty,which would 
have affected whatever educational programme was adopted, 
there was a real need to adopt similar measures.Caruso was 
quick to spot the opportunity fbriincreasing;the school 
population in this Way (51),though there is much evidence 
both at this time arid subsequently,t$at the characteristic 
Italian tenderness towards children,and d=^eep .inoral con­
cern to avoid causing them any unnecessary suffering was 
devoid of political motivation,in so far as the latter is 
true of any government activity.Irrespective of such fact-
49) The summer course commenced on 1 Aug.1912 at Sidi Daud 
and functioned for two hours per day(from 7-9am.)for 
four days per week.Thirty-six pupils attended the course 
in i. two sections,consisting of twenty smaller boys and 
sixteen older boys.The former were taught by Signora 
Garello,the wife of the director ofjthe national elementary 
school in Bengasi,and the latter by a non-commissioned
officer,seconded for such a function by the army:Ibid.
50) Ibid.
51) Caruso-Ingilleri Report of April,1912,p.15.
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ors,the crisis of confidence in the government's educat­
ional policy was deep-seated,however much officials might 
try to explain away its inadequacies and defects in terms 
of the "provisional" character of its origins.A situation 
of deadlock had clearly been reached.Caruso could only 
propose short-term remedies,such as sending Italian teach­
ers into the Kuttabs and other religious schools-a measure 
which,he affirmed,the religious leaders-both Arab and 
Jewish-were prepared to approve(52).As a long-term meas­
ure, the transformation of the Kuttabs into government-type 
schools,Caruso believed,could be the best means open to 
the government for extending pacific penetration amongst 
the Libyan population(53).
For the immediate future,Caruso outlined his plans
for the benefit of the central government: the Italo-Arab
courses in Tripoli would for the school year 1912-1913
be divided into two sections-sectiorL-^Aioforenewtstsdeats
and section B. for those entering their second year.Ten
hours of Italian and:five hours of Arabic per week would
be assigned to the first-year students ;and twenty-one
teaching hours would make up the weekly total for students 
in the second class.The latter would consist of three
hours of Arabic,ten of Italian,two of Italian history,two 
of Italian geography,two of arithmetic and two of the el­
ements of pedagogy(54).To encourage students to continue 
their studies(on leaving the Italo-Arab annexe)at the Tech­
nical-Commercial school,a special initiation course was 
in the process of being organised.lt was hoped that this 
course would facilitate the entry of Arab students into 
the main stream of education at the school, or enable them
52) Ibid.,p.12.
53) Ibid.,PP.12-13
54) Ibid..p.17
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to become elementary school-teachers.Caruso advised the 
government to offer assistance to students intending to 
continue their -education in this manner in the form of 
special allowances,offered in Turkish times to students 
intending to train as elementary school-teachers,when 
such assistance had amounted to the sum of nine Lire per 
month(55).Caruso rounded off his proposals with an earnest 
plea for new school-buildings or the return of requisit­
ioned school property to its original use.It was also a matt­
er Of great urgency,he concluded, to improve both the 
supply and the quality of teachers in Libya if the goals 
he had outlined were to stand the remotest chance of ever 
being realised(56).
Ill.Bertolini*s Formulation of an Official Policy 1913-15
"....while we ought to seek ways of introducing into 
our new colony everything progressive and civilising, 
we must not neglect to oppose those who set out to 
deliberately offend against local traditions,customs 
and religious beliefs. 7(57).
Bertolini*s acceptance of the view of the Department of
Italian Schools Abroad,headed^by Angelo Scallabrini,that
the Libyan Kuttabs could not be transformed into Italo-Arab
Schools ruled out the Caruso proposals for developing these
schools(58).Likewise,the Nallino proposals to incorporate
the Kuttabs into a hybrid system of Arab elementary-school-
ing were also deemed unacceptable because of their failure
in ensuring the dominant position of the Italian language
55) Ibid.,p.16.
56) Ibid.,pp.13 & 16-17.
57) MAI-AS,Politica Indigena,Pos.126-1 a. 14,Fasc.l-14: 
Bertolini to General Garioni,Governor of Tripolitania,
11 June,1913,Rome,p.1.
58) See,Chpt.Three,Infra.
curriculum,so preventing the schools from becoming vehicles 
of pacific penetration(59).Instead,the minister turned to 
examine the methods,whereby the Franco-Arab schools of Al­
geria and Tunisia had succeeded in developing collaborat­
ion through pacific penetration with the Arab population 
of those regions(60).
By seeking to apply the principles upon which the Franco- 
Arab schools of Algeria were based to government schools for 
Libyans,Bertolini was determined to avoid extending to Lib­
ya the whole panoply of French educational aims and methods 
(61).Scallabrini by drawing upon the report of the regional 
inspector of Libyan schools,Dr.Amerigo Namias,warned Bert- 
olini in the summer of 1913 of the danger of trying to do too’ 
much too soon,and in particular of the dangers of applying 
to Libya westernised models of educational progress,which 
were responsible for the current political unrest in the 
French colonies(62).Namias had blamed "the so-called anti- 
Italian revolt"which had taken place in Tunis as Italian 
troops were disembarking for the first time upon Libyan 
soil*not upon any genuine anti-Italian feeling on the part 
of the Tunisians,but upon the "zenophobia" of Arab students 
from the University of Paris(63).In accordance with such a 
premise,Italy could avoid the danger of such unrest ever 
seriously developing in Libya by recognising at the comm­
encement of her rule the errors committed by Britain and
59) De Leone,E.,Chapt.V.,La?Nostra Politica Scolastica in
Libia,La Colonizzazione Dell Africa Del Nord(Roma,1937), 
p.404,a; R.Micacchi,L*Enseiqnement aux Indigenes dans 
les Colonies Dependant Directment de la Couronne"(Brux- 
elles,1931),p.481.
60) Micacchi ,Qn.Cit. ,p.482;and Pollard,M ♦ ,L "Enseiqhlement 
Pour les ^ Indicrene>si en Al'qerie( Algiers, 1914) ,p.91.
61) Bertolini to Garioni,0p.Cit.
62) MAI-AS,Assetto dei Servizi Civili,Scuole,Pos.113,Fasc. 
1-6,1913iReport upon the schools of Tripolitania,Amerigo 
Namias,p.5.
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and France in seeking to implement educational norms 
based upon Western tenets ih India and North Africa(64).
In particular,Namias continued,Italy should avoid dup­
licating the errors of other colonial powers at the sec­
ondary level.As had been abundantly shown elsewhere, 
secondary education in its Western form,only had the eff­
ect of producing an educated class,critical of colonial­
ism ,and ready at the slightest pretext to raise the bann­
er of revolt against the colonial power(65).Western mod­
els could only be fruitfully employed,added Namias,at 
the elementary and professional levels of education.At 
this level they could be effectively used to combat ill­
iteracy-teaching professional and agricultural skills,so 
urgently needed in Libya,along with a proper awareness 
of domestic and personal hygiene(6 6).
While urging Bertolini to avoid any slavish imitation 
of French policies,Namias re-echoed the concern of the 
Department of Schools to steer the minister away from the 
Nallino approach to Libyan education(67).Thus the Namias 
report of 1913 is full of indignant warnings against the 
dangers of accepting any thorough-going models of Islam­
ic education,especially with regard to the curriculum(6 8 ). 
Typical of the inspectors fulminations was his fear of
63) Ibid.,p.5.
64) Ibid.,pp.5-6.
65) Ibid.,pp.6-7.
6 6) Ibid.
67) See,Chpt.Three.Infra.
6 8 ) See,Namias Report of July,1913,pp.6-7.
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the Arabic language as the medium of instruction in the 
schools,as had been advocated by Professor Nallino.As 
a dissuasive against such a policy,Namias employed the 
hoary old myth that while Arabic was rich in verbal imag­
ery and syntax,it was totally unsuited to scientific 
thought ,and had contributed in no small measure to keep­
ing the otherwise intelligent Islamic peoples in "the pos­
ition of inferiority in which we find them today"(69).Rath­
er, he argued, the curriculum of the Libyan schools should 
be organised in accordance with "eminently practical crit­
eria, so as to avoid any unnecessary mental.emcumbrance,and 
this practical emphasis should even be applied to the teach 
ing of the Italian language itself".This he continued,ought 
to avoid any unnecessary emphasis upon grammar and syntax, 
and concentrate instead upon "norms of everyday speech",so
as to be of the greatest practical benefit to Libyans in 
their day-to-day dealings with Italians.(70)
In developing his "practical criteria" in the area of 
agricultural^and professional education and elementary
education, the inspector urged the minister to accept a 
curriculum based upon "spoken Italian,hygiene,the encour­
agement of hygiene,morality and a"love of the soil.""The
69) Ibid.,p.6 (For a discussion of the implications of cult- 
eral imperialism in connection with Arabic and Islam,
} see^ Haim, S . G .,Arab Nationalism,An Anthology(London, 
1976);and Arabic and Islamic Garland .Islamic Cultural 
Centre(London,1397/1977).
70) Namias Report of July,1913,p.7.
71) Ibid.
72) Ibid.,pp.7-8.
73) Ibid.
74) Ibid.
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aim of the government schools” ,he philosophised,”should 
be to make the people less refractory to progress,so that 
they might extract some profit from one of the commonest 
callings of mankind-namely,agriculture”(71).The inspector 
divided his proposals for professional education under two 
heads*those involving the teaching of particular skills 
to an”elite workforce”already provided for in the School 
of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli(72);and a more general type 
of professional education,as should be provided by the el­
ementary schools in accordance with the norms he had already 
outlined(73).Namias,however,did not,seem to expect enormous 
steps forward from the adoption of such measures, and warned 
Bertolini against such "illusions” .Inadequate results,he 
concluded,had followed from the such policies in Algeria 
(74).
#
Although the Namias report was forwarded to Bertolini" 
only on 22 July 1913,a month after the minister's own
lengthly directive upon the subject of internal policy 
to the newly-appointed governor of Tripolitania,General 
Garioni,it not only re-echoes the minister's own views,as 
expressed in the Garioni directive,but is also fully con­
sistent with the general approach of the Department of 
Schools itself.It was,therefore,part and parcel of the 
general educational package drawn up for the Moslem pop­
ulation of Libya by the Ministry of Colonies in concert 
with Sfcallabrini*s own school's department,based at the 
Foreign Ministry,in 1913-and finding ultimate expression 
in the 1914 and 1915 Scholastic Ordinances for Tripolit­
ania and C i r e n a i c a ( 7 5 ) .It is in the Bertolini-Garioni dir-
75) R.D.,15 Jan.1914,N.57 and D.Lgt.,17 Oct., 1915,N'. 
1809,BUC.,1915,p.5.
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ective of June 1913,that Italian doubts,limitations,insec­
urity ,unpreparedness and profound concern for the very fut­
ure of colonial rule in Libya,crystalise into an attitude 
towards Libyan education,which draws the line at any kind 
of educational development likely to augment Italian insec­
urity in the future(76).Against such a pattern of political 
and psychological insecurity,both Westernising and Eastern- 
ising approaches to educational development cancel themsel­
ves out for much the same political reasons-the one leading 
to the development of zenophobia and anti-colonialism,the 
other to pan-arabism and pan-islamism.As both approaches 
were,therefore, injurious of Italian interests, a middle 
road must be taken for the future.This middle way would con­
sist of the residue left from the alternative approaches 
rejected by Bertolini(and also by many of his successors).It 
would be made up of the remaining elements: a vague form-of 
Italianisation,along with a degree of uncertain accommbdat- 
ion with Arabic and the teaching of the Koran.The latter 
would be expressed in a programme of elementary education, 
consisting of a rudimentary form of agricultural training 
or the teaching of professional s k i l l s p r o g r a m m e s  which 
bare only the remotest resemblance to the programmes adopt­
ed by the French in Algeria.With such a plan of future act­
ion in Libya ,Bertolini sought to equip Italy with the nec­
essary means of fulfilling her "civilising mission"there(77).
76) Bertolini to Garioni,Op.Cit.
77) Ibid.
78) MAI-AS,Pos.113,Fasc.1-6,Scuole,1913.Scallabrini to Bert­
olini :Relazione sulle scuole della Tripolitania(undated),
pp.1 & 15.
Preparations for implementing the new policy were 
entrusted to Scallabrini,who made a survey of the exist­
ing opportunities during an extended visit to the colony 
in the autumn of 1913(78).During this visit the director- 
who had carried out a similar exploration of the existing 
educational facilities in Cirenaica a year earlier(79)- 
divided up the problem along topographical lines.The prob­
lems of Tripoli itself were thus separated from the needs 
of those areas of the interior occupied by Italian troops 
and under the authority of a military resident or local 
governor(80).In Tripoli,the chances of any rapid implem­
entation of the forthcoming educational ordinance were 
slight in the extreme because of the shortage of teachers 
(81) and also,because of the equally desperate shortage 
of suitable accommodation for use as schools(82).In ass­
essing the future needs of the population,Scallabrini - 
gave priority to Italians,whose numbers he anticipated 
would rise rapidly in the years immediately ahead.The 
popularity of the Italian schools with the Jewish pop­
ulation of the Hara, also made it,in Scallabrini's opin­
ion,necessary to provide special facilities for them in 
their own quarter to prevent them crowding into the nat­
ional schools,which were already suffering from the strain 
of excessive numbers.For such a purpose ,he urged
79) During this visit,Scallabrini extended his activities 
to beyond Bengasi itself,where along with the region­
al inspector,Dr. Battignani he had organised the re­
opening of the schools in March 1912,to areas along 
the coast,judged suitable for future schools.While at 
Derna,he was able to obtain a map of the area from 
the commandant, and with its aid plan the location of
future sites.In the course of this activity, a disacr- 
reement appears to have occurred between himself and 
the commandant,the latter preferring sites closer to 
the town,where the Franciscan sisters of Egypt had 
very recently opened a school:ACS(FMC),T.1/2-447,Mar- 
ch,1912.
the conversion of the Pietro Verri Barracks(formerly a 
Turkish Barracks),on the fringes of the Jewish Quarter, 
into a school- a proposal which was implemented later 
the same year.For the eventual solution of the accomm­
odation problem,as it effected the Italian sector,he 
acquired-through the approval and support of the Foreign 
Ministry-a large site adjoining land belonging to the 
School of Arts and Crafts.This important site subsequen­
tly became the location of the Italian secondary schools 
and chief Italian elementary schools in the town,the 
buildings of which still continue in use to today as 
Libyan elementary^preparatory and secondary schools.By 
announcing his acquisition to the press, Scallabrini 
considerably embarassed the government,which was still 
negotiating with the Ulemah over the possible use of the 
site(apparently owned by the municipality)for the sett­
ing up of a Medersah(83).
No such pians^wereviaid fortthe solution of the acc­
ommodation problem as it affected the Arab population of 
Tripoli,where it was a question of improvising existihg~rac- 
ilities for the immediate future,after which itewould pre­
sumably be possible to use the buildings vacated by the
80) Scallabrini Report of July,1913(Italo-Arab Schools), 
pp.14-23.
81) Ibid(Recruitment of Teaching Personnel),pp.24-8.
82) Ibid.,p.16.
83) Ibid.,pp.3 and 26.Also, see,ACS,PCM,Scuole Italiane, 
T.l/2 219:from the Ministry of Public Instruction to 
Cav.Gioliti,12 March,1912.
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Italian sector.Only when Italian needs had been satisfied 
would efforts be made to provide suitable accommodation 
for the Libyan sector,a process which.did not start in 
earnest until the early twenties.In the summer of 1913, 
however, it was a question of scraping together whatever 
resources were over.after dealing with the Italian and 
Jewish sections, and there is no doubt that in this res­
pect Libyans received the treatment awarded to third- 
rate citizens.The measures adopted by Scallabrini to prov­
ide c&r semblance of schooling for the Arab population, 
involved evacuating the Itaio-Arab Annexes of Arab pup­
ils, so as to provide more space for the Italian sector, 
by tranferring the former into the School of Arts and 
Crafts,anc institution under its own charter and specia­
lly reserved only for(Moslem pupils(84).A number of obst­
acles, however,stood in the way of this drastic proposal* 
Firstly,permission to remove Arab pupils from the Italo-Arab 
Annex in the National School,situated in the Italian quart­
er of the old city,depended upon gaining the support of 
the Director of the School of Arts and Crafts for the move 
- the absentee,Professor Andreoni,who was not in Libya, 
when Scallabrini arrived to prepare for the implementat­
ion of the new policy(85).A further obstacle to the sch­
eme lay in the opposition of the Tripoli notables,who dis­
liked the idea of educating their sons in an institution, 
originally set up by the Turks to house and train poor 
orphans(86).Scallabrini*s proposaljto accommodate boys
84) See,Scallabrini Report of July,1913,p.4.
85) Ibid.
86) Italian relations with the notables were very sensit­
ive over the educational issue because of the inadeq­
uacy of the government's measures,The government att­
empted to compensate for such defects by offering to
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not wishing to be transferred to the School of Arts and 
Crafts in what amounted to a converted broom-cupbord
was even less likely to win converts to Italian rule from 
the Tripoline families(87).In the final analysis ,Scall­
abrini, who was at his wits-end as to how he could solve 
the accommodation crisis,could do very little to provide 
school-space for the burgeoning Arab population of the 
inner city,which was crowded with refugees from the war 
zone ,and for whom the School of Arts and Grafts was too 
distant to be of any real use(88).
If an effective "systemazione" of the scholastic prob­
lem in Tripoli would have to wait for more favourable 
times,the situation in the countryside was more promis­
ing ,since the Turks -or local initiative- had set up 
elementary schools in the towns and more important vill­
ages. Also ,a greater abundance of property was available 
for hire,should school buildings have been requisitioned 
by the array or damaged beyond repair in the fighting(89)• 
Even so,Scallabrini was obliged to bear in mind Bertol- 
ini's policy of only "concentrating at particular places", 
leaving until better times the establishing of schools at 
the less important localities(90). As rules of thumb,the
(contin.) educate in Italy the children of the -more im­
portant families,a gesture which leading families had 
already anticipated by petitioning the government on th-
ier own account.Ibid.Also,see ACS,PCM,Student!,T.1/2-28- 
228,1912.________
87) Scallabrini Report of July,1913,p.4.
®8) Ibid,pp.9 & 16.
89) Scallabrini listed the following schools ,outside Tripoli, 
either requisitioned by the army or serving as government
H.Q.sSukh el-Djouma,Tagiura-along with other places he 
hand not been able to visit:Ibid..p.22.The school at Jeff- 
ren had been damaged during El-Baruni*s> struggle against 
the Italians and was in need of restoration before it cou­
ld be put to its former useslbid.,p.22.
90) Ibid.,p.!5.
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director adopted the following guide'lines : r .
a. if the school had existed before the occupation;
b. if a school building had been constructed-or set 
up during the course of the present school-year;
c. if the school had been functioning at the time of 
the Italian occupation-or had been established 
more recently;
d. if the school was supported from its own finances 
(i.e.a "private school but not a Koranic school"), 
or in receipt of a subsidy from the Beladia(mun- 
icipality)or from a vacuff;
e. if the establishment of the school was demanded 
with urgency by the local population,especially 
if already accustomed to having a school(91).
On the basis of these estimates ,the director of 
schools was able to inform the cadi,mufti and notables 
of Tripoli and its surrounding districts(as well as the 
Ministry of Colonies) that the new superintendent,Cav. 
Mascia(92) was about to organise schools at the follow­
ing places * Tripoli ( i.e. in ; the* School of Arts and Crafts) 
-"where the present I£alO-Arab annexe,attached to the 
National Boys' School,would be allowed to continue to 
function as before,though it cannot be expected to serve 
the needs of the whole town";Mescia-"here the recreat- 
orio opened by the resident contains 120 pupils at the 
cost of 0.80 Italian Lire per day.These are to be trans­
ferred to the School of Arts and Crafts,so making it poss 
ible to use the existing accommodation(a wooden hut con­
structed by the army),as a temporary school for the local
91) Ibid.,pp.15-16.
92) Even Scallabrini had found it impossible to find a
ity,though the orphanage at Bu-Meliana will remain in 
its present location,at least for the immediate future; 
Sahel-"the school situated at Sukh-el-Djouma was constr­
ucted by the Turks and will revert to scholastic use at 
the end of the year";Tagiura-"the local population have 
donated L.900 towards the cost of a new school,the form­
er school having been designated for use by the Carrabini 
ere as a barracks-through the use of military personnel, 
it ought to be possible to construct a school for this 
sum";Zanzur-"in this residency a school is already funct­
ioning in its own spacious accommodation ,and under an 
Arab teacher,paid by the municipality.lt could,nontheless 
be encouraged to widen its range of activities to cover 
the whole area,where there is much demand for education"; 
Sliten-"here there already exists an elegant school-house 
and I have ordered it to be immediately reopened in res­
ponse to the demands of the local population.";Jeffren- 
"in this vast residency,a school already functions,thou­
gh not in the original schoo1-building";Horns-"the school 
pre-exists the occupation,and is situated at Kabila di 
Tajasset";Misurata-"a school was opened this year by the 
resident in temporary accommodation,but must be replaced, 
as soon as can be arranged,by more capacious buildings 
to accommodate the needs of this important area"(93).
(contin.) vacant room at the offices of the Department 
of Civil Affairs in Tripoli for the new superintendent. 
Scallabrini,therefore,left it to Cav.Mascia himself to 
locate and rent a"local dwelling-house".For the monthly 
hire of the building,Scallabrini negotiated I from the 
Secretary General in Tripoli,the sum of L.50,along with 
L.60 for the salaries of an usher and secretary,and L.40 
for stationary and miscellaneous expenses,which as he, 
himself exclaimed was "not an enormous sum."Ibid.,p.14^
93) Ibid.(Italo-Arab schools),pp.14-23.
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In order to bring these schools into operation as 
soon as possible,Scallabrini urged the Minister of Col­
onies to recruit teachers from the roll of Italian Sch­
ools Abroad.He was prepared to concede that this meas- 
ure-if adopted-would not solve entirely the problem of 
teacher supply ,which it might indeed aggravate,because 
of the cost of recruiting such personnel,who were adjud­
ged amongst the best available(94).Another system was 
clearly required now that Italy was confronted with the 
responsibilities of colonial rule in Libya, and Scallab­
rini had no hesitation in recommending the minister to
recruit more widely from persons not perhaps,particularly 
;vwell-equipped with paper qualifications,but in other res­
pected suited to become teachers(95).Such persons could be 
offered a salary more in proportion to their services and 
needs of around L.250-300 per month.This sum could be supp­
lemented with other small favours and privileges so as to 
put the elementary school teacher on more-or-less the same
................   "    _ . c ..........  . - • . ________________________
footing as postal-workers,telegraph operators and railway- 
off icials(96).Such advice,however well inspired,unfortunately, 
failed to take account of the need to recruit teachers to 
work outside the pricipal towns and urban centres. Unless 
a different solution could be found,it would not be possible 
to staff the schools of the interior,where it would be nec­
essary to continue to rely for some time into the foresee­
able future upon untrained and inexperienced military pers­
onnel, whose value as teachers varied in accordance with 
individual aptitude and interest in the work of education(97)
94) Ibid.(Recruitment of Teaching Personnel),p.24.
95) Ibid.
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IV.Gaspare Colosimo's Reformulation of the Bertolini 
Premise 1916-1919
"Intermediate schools modelled upon the ecoles 
primaires superieures of Algeria and the ecol­
es regionales of French West-Africa are urgen­
tly needed to prepare pupils leaving the Italo- 
Arab schools for attendance at the Italian Sec­
ondary schools'.* (98)
The period of Libya's history occupied by the 1914-18 
European war-during which the Senusi of Cirenaica from 
1917 onwards settled for terms with Italy and her allies 
and the Tripolitanian tribes returned to their original 
allegiance with Turkey-prevented the implementation of 
the Bertolini-Martini ordinance upon any considerable 
scale.Micacchi indicates that by 1915 the government had 
implemented the 1914/15 decrees to the extent of opening 
Italo-Arab schools at Tripoli,Menscia,Sugh el-Giuma,Tag- 
iura,Horns,Zuara,Agilat,Beni Ulid,Garian,Giado,Jeffren, 
Kussabat,Misurata,Sirte,Zaugur,Zavia and Zliltern with 
a school population(in Tripolitania) of 600 pupils.(99) 
Arrangements had also been placed in progress for estab­
lishing further schools at Azizia,Bir el-Gaeraa,Nalut,Tar- 
huna and Zintan,which were intended to provide accommod­
ation for a further 200 pupils;but it had been necessary
96) Ibid.
97) MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi Del Soppresso Ministero Dell' 
Africa Italiana,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1:from Dr.(Rodolfo MicacchF 
Director General of the Italian Colonial Schools,to the 
Governor of Tripolitania;Report upon the schools of Trip­
olitania and Cirenaica,July,1919(unsigned ms.),pp.64-81 
and 111-130.
98) Colosimo,Gaspare,Relazione al^ParlameKfo^strlla Situazione 
Politica Economica ed Amministrativa delle Colonie Ital- 
iane.Presentata alia Camera dei Deputati il 23 febbraio 
1918 ed al Senato del Regno il 28 febbraio 1918(Roma,
1918),p.365.
99) Micacchi Report of July 1919,pp.64 and 142.
to call a halt in the operation because of the war.(1 0 0) 
Meanwhile,seventeen schools had been established in Cir­
enaica by 1918,where conditions had been more peaceful, 
and comprised 42 sections with 947 enrolled pupils(897 
Moslems»39 Christians and 10 Jews) and an average atten­
dance of 635.(101)It was the shrinkage in the area of 
Tripolitania under Italian control to Tripoli and the 
coastal towns by 1918 that was chiefly responsible for
the number of Italo-Arab schools in the province being
reduced by this time to the five existing ih Central Tr­
ipoli and Menscia and the ones at Tagiura,Horns and Zavia.
(102)Micacchi,who was concerned to present the Italo-Arab 
schools!in as favourable a light as was possible in the
circumstances of Italian decline in Libya, states that
at the end of the school-year 1918-1919,the number of 
such institutions in Tripolitania had risen to seven and
possessed a total of 882 pupils(the combined total for 
.both provinces amounted to 1,829). (.103)
If during these troubled years,education had virtually 
ceased to be an issue of any real importance in Libya or 
even a matter of serious debate in government circles(104), 
it did not follow that this would be the case once the 
war was virtually over in Europe.The prospect of the Ver-
100) Ibid.
101) These included,three schools at Bengasi(Bengasi Central, 
Sidi Daud and Sabri),along with those situated at Merg, 
Cirene,Marsa Susa,Tobruk,Ghegab,Ghemines,Tocra and Tol- 
meta.Ibid.,pp.100-123;and the Colosimo Report of Feb­
ruary, 191 8, p. 367.
102) Ibid.
103) Micacchi,L»Enseignement aux Indigenes,p.494;and the 
Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.142.
104) See,De Leone,Op.Cit.."Nostra Politica Scolastica in 
Libia",p.405.
sailles Conference and the chance that Italy might succ­
eed to the German colonies of the Cameroons(overun by the 
Allies in 1917) required the Colonial Ministry to produce 
evidence to revive Italy’s flagging reputation as a colon­
ial power.(105)It was with the aim of impressing public 
opinion and furthering his plans for a vast extension of 
Italian power in Africa that Colosimo on 28 February 1918 
presented the Italian Parliament with his proposals for 
the educational future of the indigenous populations of 
Eritrea,Somalia and Libya.(106)
In these proposals,Colosimo criticised the Bertolini- 
Martini policy as inadequate both in nature and scopei(107) 
Italo-Arab schools had been proposed only for the towns 
and urban centres,so ignoring rural and desert areas,which 
comprised virtually the whole of Libya;; moreover,no special 
provisions existed to cater for the education of an " el- 
ite"(other than could be provided in Italy);and,further­
more, the training of Arabs and Italians to work in the 
new schools had been completely neglected,(108)Colosimo- 
in his proposals to Parliament of 28 February |l918 and 
again later in the same year in the Colonial Sedtion of 
the "Report of the Post-War Commission"(109)-not only
105) The Italian evacuation of Libya during the war had 
lost Italy the respect of the Allies,who during the 
Versailles Conference opposed any further extension 
of her colonial ambitions in Africa:Evans-Pritchard, 
The Senusi of Cyrenaica(Oxford,1949), p . 13 8 .
106) See,Carlo Giqlio,Gli Archivi Storici Del Soppresso
Ministero Dell’Africa Italiana E Del Ministero Degli 
Affari Esteri Dalle Oriqini A1 1922(Leiden,1971),p. 
XXIVA1 so, see, Infra ,Map^IItp2  3 ; and Colosimo to the
Chamber of Deputies,Op.Cit.
107) Colosimo Report of February,1918,p.368.
rejects the cautious approach of his predecessor,Bertolini, 
towards the education of Libyans;but proposes radical new 
measures designed to< create for them a system *broadly sim­
ilar in its nature and scope,to the schools set up by the
French for their co-religionists in North and West-Africa. 
(110)
French and British ideas had already played some part 
in the formulation of Bertolini's proposals for Italo-Arab 
schools and Kuttabs,though the minister’s interest in such 
notions had been pragmatic rather than ideological.In this 
respect,it followed the Italian wish to pick and choose 
from the wealth of foreign experience,selecting only those 
ideas which seemed most relevant to Italian aims and needs.
(111)Colosimo,however,had formed the conviction that,un­
less Italy made extensive use of French experience in those 
parts of her territories most corresponding with the French 
empire ,she would not only fail to secure the active collab­
oration of the Arab-Berber population of Libya,but would 
aiso fail to gain the support and esteem of the powers 
upon whom the actualisation of the "maximum" and"minimum" 
programmes would depend.(112)
Colosimo*s radical extension of the limited Italianit^ 
and pacific penetration formulated by Bertolini,centres 
upon the recognition that the school had the means to effect
108) Ibid.
109) See,I.Discourse of the Minister of Colonies,Gaspare Col- 
osimo(0ur Islamic Policy),Post-War Commission's Report 
of January,1919,pp.7-19;Colonial Personnel and Their 
Preparation,Ibid.,pp.75-86: and Educational Preparation 
for the Colonies in Italy,C.Shanzer,Ibid.,pp.91-6.
110) Colosimo Report of February,1918,p.365.
111) Guidice.L.,0p.Cit.,p.120;and Bruni,G.,Il N u o v q . Assetto 
Politico-Amministrative Della Libia(Roma,1932),p.96.
112) Colosimo Report of February,1918,pp.363-9.
collaboration between both colonizers and colonized.(113)
Bertolini had believed that the school could only perform 
the most modest of functions in Libya.The decree of 1914, 
however,seems to reflect his own profound pessimism with 
regard to :the international situation rather than an object­
ive assessment of educational possibilities in the country. 
(114)Colosimo,on the other hand,lacked his predecessor's 
misgivings regarding the possible ill-effects that might 
politically result from creating an educational system 
similar in many respects to the Italian system itself.For 
Colosimo,the school was not only a means,whereby Italy could 
fulfill her "civilising mission" of develop "pacific pene­
tration" amongst the indigenous population;it was something 
much more vital,namely the primary element in securing the 
active collaboration of all sections of Moslem society.This 
was an idea he had derived from the French,for the founding 
fathers of French colonialism had rapidly recognised that the 
school was an excellent way of establishing friendly relations 
between the colonizers and the colonized.(115)Through an adroi 
use of the school,political conquest could be transformed into 
"moral conquest".Hence the importance of education in forming 
indigenous peoples and the need for care and attention in trai. 
ing their leaders.This,they believed,was one of the most impor 
ant tasks facing a colonial power.Instruction,however,can-
113) Ibid.,p.363.
114) "The ways of progress (are difficult and slow’,'Bertolini 
confided to Garioni,and "in view of the recent disastrous 
campaign in Abysinnia and the Russo-Japanese War,which 
had brought about a general climate of revolution in the 
world,Italy must avoid disturbing the as yet amorphous 
masses with the yeast of a vague intellectualism".See, 
Bertolini to Garioni,1913,p.1.
115) Faidherbe,Galleni and Trentinien.See,A.Charton,"Education 
in French West Africa"(Report to the Teachers' Congress 
at Nice,1932) in Overseas Education,Vol.XXI.,No.I. .Oct.
(London,1949),pp.956-972.
not be simply limited to the various groups chosen to 
lead,but must also,vitally affect the whole indigenous 
population through becoming a popular instruction.(116)
For Colosimo,Bertolini*s chief contribution towards 
achieving collaboration lay in his creation of the Italo- 
Arab school,which,though modelled upon the Franco-Arab 
school of Algeria,Tunisia and Morocco,was at the same 
time a "uniquely Italian-creation".(117)To these schools 
would be entrusted the task of enabling the new generat­
ion of Libyans to arrive at an”understanding and evaluat­
ion of our national actions" 5 for such institutions were 
the best means of "communicating our mentality to Arab 
youth".(118) Whatever the future potential of these schools 
however,even Colosimo was forced to concede that 
so far their output had been "miniscule” .(119)The poor 
results so far obtaining were not blamed by the enthus­
iasts at the Department of Schools or the Colonial Min­
istry upon any inherent weaknesses in the schools as in­
stitutions, but rather upon the shortage of able and exp­
erienced teachers.Such personnel were not only required to 
be good at teaching but also in possession of the spec­
ial frame of| mind that made a "good colonial educator” .
This was only acquired through long contact with the in-
116) Ibid.
117) See,Colosimo Report of February,1918,
pp. 363-4; and Micacchi ,L *Enseiqn|ementaux Indigenes, 
p.482(Micacchi noted that although the Italo-Arab 
schools of Libya were modelled upon the Franco-Arab 
schools of Algeria,they were different from the latt 
er»in so far as they were primarily schools in which 
Arabs received instruction in the Italian language).
118) See,Colosimo Report of February,1918,p.368.
119) Ibid.,p .364.
digenous population.(1 2 0)The shortage not only of teach­
ers judged "suitable1; but indeed of any teachers,had re­
sulted in schools outside the main towns being perforce 
staffed by military instructors*,^urnished with a certain 
capacity,but otherwise lacking in intellectual qualities’.' 
(121) The ultimate solution to this particular problem, 
Colosimo believed,lay in the creation of a corps of"aux­
iliary teachers",a solution adopted by the French in West 
Africa,as a means of extending the work of the government 
elementary schools to the remotest and most inaccessible 
corners of the empire.(12 2)As a gesture towards the ach­
ieving of a similar goal in Libya,Colosimo proposed the 
setting up of an obligatory training-course for Italian 
teachers,newly arrived in the colony and intending to ^ 
work in the Libyan schools.(123)
While recognising the Italo-Arab school as the prin­
cipal means for Italianising the rising generation of 
Libyans,Colosimo also realised that it was just as im­
portant to develop higher courses ,along with vocational 
and agricultural education.Courses similar to the ones 
provided in the ecoles primaires superieures ' of Algeria 
and West Africa(124) were urgently needed in Libya for 
the educating and training of an"active nucleus of coll­
aborators from amongst the sons of notables".(125)This 
higher elementary course would,if the Colosimo proposals
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had been accepted by the Italian Parliament,have prepared 
Arabs to attend the Italian secondary schools in Tripoli 
(especially,the Technical-Commercial School,reformed in 
1917,partly for this purpose),and ultimately have implied 
the right to study in the Italian universities »a situation 
foreseen by Colosimo and his advisors in 1918.(126)
The new educational proposals for Libya were far more 
advanced than the minister’s plans for Eritrea and Somalia* 
Italy needed to be able to convince the powers in 1919 that 
she possessed the moral capacity to rule in Africa.The 
evidence so far in this respect was uncertain,and the Ital­
ian colonies were generally adjudged to be the most back­
ward and undeveloped in Africa.Now that Italy wished to 
share a mandate in the Cameroons and reintegrate the Trip- 
olitanian hinterland with the coastal regions,she needed 
to indicate in a concrete manner ,her determination to 
economicallypolitically and educationally develop the 
territories already under her control.(127)Italy' s failure
126) The reform of the school followed upon a report by
a special ministerial-commission,consisting of Scall­
abrini and representatives from the Ministry of Col­
onies and the Ministry of Public Instruction.The com­
mission's aim was to make the school more relevant 
to local needs,and in particular to popularise its 
facilities amongst the Arab population.For these 
purposes it was recommended that the institution be 
changed from a Technical school into Tecjnico^Commerc- 
mercial school.See,R.D.Dec.1917,N.2155,BUC,606;and 
Ordinamento Della R. Scuola Media Technico-Commerc- 
iale di Tripoli(Tripoli,1918).The change in the st­
atus of the school made it possible for final-year 
students to obtain a diploma ,which provided access 
to the University of L.Bocconi in MilaniR.Soprain- 
tendenza Scolastica Della Libia.Annuario Delle Ist- 
ituzione D'Istruzioni Scolastiche>Anno Scolastico
1934-5,p.5(N.B..these facilities only remained in 
operation until 1922-3).
127) See,Colosimo Report of February,1918,pp.382 and 387.
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at the Peace Conference of 1919,to secure either a 
mandate in the Cameroons or the "frontier rectifications" 
promised by the Treaty of London in 1913,was without 
doubt a blow to the Africanisti .This failure,however, 
did not affect the package of educational proposals 
contained in the Colosimo strategy.The fate of the latter 
was sealed by Arab rejection of a colonialist plan of 
education within Libya itself.At last,or so it seemed 
at the time,the Ministry of Colonies and its supporters
was being made to listen to voices other than those of 
nationalist opinion within Italy itself,voices which until 
1919 it had chose to either ignore entirely orl forget existed.
\
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Chapter Three Direct Rule and the Libyan Schools
1911-1919
"In Libya,as in every other country,the local instit­
utions not only constitute a sum of political,legal 
and social interests,but,also, express in their own 
form,the nature and level of progress,along with the 
degree of civilisation,achieved by the society as a 
whole.Italian contol over such institutions seemed 
the best way of ensuring the future development of 
pacific penetration amongst the population."(*)
When Italian troops disembarked along the coast of Libya 
in October 1911,the country already possessed a wide ra­
nge of political,economic and social institutions-quite 
apart from the ones established by the Ottomans and Eur­
opean powers.For the sake of administrative and political 
convenience,the Italians divided the former into three 
general categories *;first those of a political-comm­
unal character;second,those of a social-communal charac­
ter; and third,those of a strictly Islamic character-by 
which they referred to the mosques and courts of the Sh­
aria. ( 1 )
The institutions of a political-communal character 
were understood to comprise the Libyan municipalities 
whether urban or rural-along with the various services 
for which they were responsible to the Arab-Libyan comm- 
unity(water,police,street-lighting,hospitals and clinics, 
education and sanitation).Of the municipalities,Tripoli 
was by far the largest,containing-apart from the oases- 
a population of around 40,000 inhabitants.divided up into 
five quarterstthe Beladier,Behelbahr,Cucebsafar,Homa and
*) Caruso-Inqilleri,1 Primi Ordinamenti Della Libia.Op.Cit.. 
p.214.
1) Ibid.(Chpt.IV),p.257.
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Hara,the latter comprising the substantial Jewish comm­
unity of 15,000 souls.Each of these quarters had its own 
head or rauctar ,assisted by a council of elders,who in 
turn were guided by the Iman or religious leader.The 
muctar's position was both delicate and vital;for it was 
he who drew up the electoral lists and acted as an inter­
mediary between his quarter and the Ottoman authorities.
The various quarters of the city were,therefore, quite 
different from the quarters in western cities,in that th­
ey expressed religious,cultural,legal and linguistic diff­
erences; and'divisions, which had been,on the whole,elimin­
ated from western societies by historical forces.In Libya, 
however, the Moslem community was in the majority, and while 
the organic nature of Ottoman law related differently to 
each group,granting autonomy to Christians and Jews,it was 
the Arab majority to whom the Turks conferred the polit­
ical dominance and control.(3)Thus at the level of overall 
control-regardless of whether the municipality was urban or 
rural-the Moslem community invariably ran the town council 
and co-operated with the Sultan*s representative who sup­
ervised their activities.The change from Turkish to Italian 
rule was a profound shock to the Arab-Moslem majority, who 
no longer found themselves to be the most favoured community, 
despite all the efforts of Italian propaganda to convince 
them otherwise.
The Institutions of a social-communal character not 
included in the services provided by the Town Council in 
Tripoli were termed by the Italians "the lesser institut­
ions" .These included the School of Arts and Crafts with 
its orphanage;two public vacuf,one connected with the
3) Ibid.(Chpt.V.)fp.220.
mosques,the other with the town walls(4)jvarious patrim­
onies and charities,mainly for the poor and sick;along 
with a number of Islamic schools,invariably attached to 
particular mosques.Of these latter,the most intellectually 
and socially important were the medresseh(5),numbering 
about five(6 )and attached to the mosques of Hamad Basha 
Karamanli,Dragut Basha,E1-Kharuba,Osman Basha and Sidi 
Salem(7).Medresseh were also to be found at Tagiura(Mur- 
ad Aga),Zlittern(Sidi Abdussalem),Misurata(Sidi Zarrugh) 
and Cussabat(the School of Sidi Ducali).(8 ).More numer­
ous by far than the medresseh were the Koranic Schools 
or "Kuttabs"(9) of which there were possibly as many as 
fifteen in Tripoli with a scholastic population in 1912
4) Vacuff san inalienable patrimony ,organised from Con- 
atantinople and with branches throughout the Ottoman 
Empire,including Libya.See,Caruso Inqilleri,! Primi Ord- 
inamenti Della Libia,p .252.A1so,see infra,Chpt.Three,Sect­
ion III."Whether to establish a Medersa in Libya".
5) Medressah , Medersa,and al-Madrasah are different 
spellings of the same institution, vlaT-Madrasah .Technically 
an Islamic institution of advanced learning(though many 
bearing this name were little more than a development of 
the Kuttab)"whose aim and goal is the better understanding 
of Islam’’.See,Munir-ud Ahmed .Muslim Education and the Sch­
olar's Status(Zurich,1968),p.52.Also,A.L.Tibawi,Bulletin
of the School of Oriental and African Studies,XXV/2(1962), 
p.225;and A.L.Tibawi.Arabic and Islamic'Themes(London,1976) 
p.213.
6 ) Cowper.K.S.,The Hill of Graces(London,!897),opposite p.l.
7) MAI-AS,Pos.113,Scuole,Fasc.1-6:Schools of Tripolitania 
and Cirenaica,Prof.Angelo Scallabrini,July,1913,pp.16-23.
8 ) Ibid.
9) | Kuttab *Arabic[singular of Kuttabib and derived from 
verb Kataba,liter ad ly/the continuous exercise of reading. 
In Moslem countries it is everywhere understood to refer 
to an elementary school,where instruction is exclusively 
provided in Arabic.See,MAI-AS,Pos.113,Scuole,Fasc.1-6,1913s 
The Kuttabs of Egypt,Prof.A.Stoppolini,Alexandria,July,p.1 .
of 700 pupils(10),and an unknown number elsewhere in 
Libya.(11)Particularly important in a Moslem country 
were the religious authorities,headed by the Mufti 
of Tripoli,who was : appointed from Constantinople and 
directly responsible for appointing the'cadi and-in 
an undefined way-for the running of the courts of Sharia, 
(12)
Italian policy towards the Moslem community was two­
fold ton the one hand,Italy undertook to fully respect and 
protect the legal and religious institutions of Islam(13), 
including the Sultan's traditional right to nominate and
10) MAI-AS,Pos.113,Scuole,Fasc.l-6:The Schools of Libya(an 
undated ,unsigned and handwritten memorandum from the 
Director of Italian Schools Abroad,Angelo Scallabrini, 
to the Minister of Colonies.
11) MAI-AS,Pos.ll3,Scuole,Fasc.l-6 : Schools Existing in Libya 
a Pro-memorandum to Signor Agnesa(undated,unsighed and 
handwritten,most probably: from JScall'abr ini).
12) See,Primi Ordinamenti.Chpt.V."Le Istitutuzioni Locali", 
p. 257. __ .. - .
13) See,Proclama del Ten.Gen.Caneva alle popolazioni della 
Tripolitania,della Cirenaica e delle regioni annesse in 
data 13 0ttobre,1911,0.L.,5.This document promised that 
all the inhabitants of the "said regions" would be ruled 
by their own leaders;religion and civil law would be res­
pected,as would be persons and property;respect for the 
rights and privileges of religious and pious foundations; 
the actions of the authorities would be determined by the
law and the Sunna ;justice would be administered by Mos­
lem tribunerals;no law of books would be published that 
were adjudged contrary to Moslem law;no taxes would be
levied onlMosTems;and no person would be called upon to 
serve in the armed forces of the crown against his own wil
14) By the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne(15 Oct.,1915), 
the Sultan withdrew from the war and conceded auton­
omy to his subjects in Tripolitania and Cirenaica.A 
special representative-the Naib-ul-Sultan-was appoin­
ted to care for the Sultan's interests in the country. 
These latter included the right to appoint the Mufti; 
who in turn was empowered to nominate cadi throughout 
the territory.Turkey was also to be responsible for 
the maintenance of the Mufti and the Naib-ul-Sultan.
69
maintain both the Mufti and his own special representat­
ive in Tripoli(14)jon the other hand,however,a comprenen- 
sive series of ” reforms” were initiated,designed to incor­
porate the political-communal and social-communal instit­
utions into the workings of the Italian state.(15)It is the 
educational aspect of these so-called "reforms” ,as they 
affected the Kuttabs,the School of Arts and Crafts in Trip­
oli, and the Auqaf that-must now be analysed.
II.Italian Policy and the Koranic Schools
"These schools are primarily chatechistical, 
and secondarily educational.In them,the mind 
of Arab youth is imbued with the tenets and 
principles that go to form the special ment­
ality of the Moslem.”(16)
The idea of involving the Kuttabs in the government's 
programme of pacific penetration suggested itself to the 
Italian authorities in Libya during March and April 1912, 
as the Italo-Arab Annexes were undergoing their trial-run, 
and data was being collected by Caruso out of which a fut­
ure policy could be evolved.(17)In the process of collect­
ing this data,Caruso noticed that the attendance of Musl­
ims at the Government's schools was considerably below 
what it had been at the Turkish schools in the final year
(contin.) In all other respects,however,Italy was granted 
"full and complete sovereignty"over Tripolitania and Ciren­
aica. See, BrJ^tlsh^an^J^rei^n^tateJPaEej^^l^l^jVol .CVI. 
(London,1916),p.1098.
15) See,Decreto del Comandante in capo del corpo.; di sped- 
izione 28 gennaio 1912,Amministrazione prowisoria delle 
istituzioni publiche di Tripoli,O.L.,179.
16) ACS,PCM,Tripolitania,T.1/2,219,Scuole Italiane:Relaz- 
ione del Direttore degli Affari Civili,Dr.D.Caruso- 
Ingilleri,April,1912,p.3,
17) Ibid.,p.4.
of Ottoman r u l e .(18).whereas the Kuttabs were 
constantly crowded with Arab pupils.(19) During
his conversations with the Arab notables ,Caruso had been 
unable to detect any dissatisfaction with the Italo-Arab 
Annexes that he could explain satisfactorily,(20);for it 
was generally understood in Tripoli that the existing arr­
angements were purely provisional and would be replaced 
as soon as possible with a system more in conformity with 
Arab wishes.(21) In the meantime,the conclusion was drawn 
that the fundamental weakness of the existing arrangements 
lay in their failure to include the Kuttabs within the 
government's schemes for extending pacific penetration 
amongst the Arab population.This was a defect that could 
only be remedied,Caruso argued,by "sending Italian teach­
ers into the Kuttabs",a measure which could be implemented 
as soon as these schools had been made hygienically safe,
18) Statistics for the final year of Ottoman rule show 
a total of 1,460 pupils(Arab and Turkish)in Turkish 
schools.Ibid.,p.4jalso,see infra.Appendices.il.Stat­
istics',' (B)Relating to educational provision for Libyans 
and other Moslems in Tripoli before 1911".Figures for 
the first year of Italian rule(Feb.1912-July,1912) 
reveal the following pattern*elementary boys-90(day);
44(evening);75(Franciscan Day-School);11(Technical- 
Commercial School)jgirls-39(Professional),so provid­
ing a total for Moslem pupils of 259.Also,see infra, 
Appendices,II.Statistics,A.,B.,and C.
19) Ibid.,p.4.
20) The Arab notables with whom Caruso had "frequently 
spoken" had,"while expressing a desire for their child­
ren to receive an Italian education",continued to send 
them to the religious schools,where,Caruso added,"Ital­
ian teachers could not gottFor an explanation of this 
phenomenon,the government should seek the opinion of 
Cav.Paggi,Caruso advised,"who would conduct a confid­
ential enquiry into the problem amongst certain of
the notables.See,Relazione del Direttore degli Affari 
Civili,Dr.D.Caruso-Ingilleri,April,1912,pp.ll and 10.
2 1 ) See,Proclama del Governatore del 12 febbraio 1912.1st- 
ituzione di nuovi corsi nelle scuole della Tripolitania, 
O.L.,988.
and adapted to modern teaching methods.(2 2)
Caruso's proposals were not unattractive to the auth­
orities in Rome to whom if was clear that the shortage of 
teachers,adequate school buidings and financial resources, 
made it extremely unlikely that the government schools wo- 
ul be sufficient in the years immediately ahead to solve Lib­
ya's pressing educational problems.(23)Also,the Kubtabs,al­
though primarily religious schools,were traditions11 ^ i n d ­
ependent and not directly a part of the responsibilities 
of the religious authorities.Thus,technically at least,no 
objection could be raised should Italy,while ostensibly 
respecting the religious character of the schools,decide, 
for educational,medical and political reasons,to place 
them more closely under the control of the administration 
than had been the custom in Ottoman times.With such aims 
in mind,Bertolini instructed Scallabrini in 1912 to draw 
up a report upon the working of the Kuttabs in the British 
protectorate of Egypt,where they had been reformed in 1902 
by Lord Cromer.He also asked for a survey of the Libyan 
Kuttabs■ to ascertain the suitability of Caruso's proposals 
regarding their future.(24) Italy's leading Arabist,Prof­
essor ,C. A.Nallino, was also invited to submit proposals for 
use in the forthcoming educational ordinance for Libyans.(25)
22) See,Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civiliv-- 
April,1912,p.12.
23) Ibid.,p.l3.
24) See,Stoppolini Report of July,1913.Op.Cit.; and Scall­
abrini Report of July,1913,pp.12-14.
25) See,L'Enseignement aux Indigenes.p.480.
The information received from Egypt was registered 
at the Ministry of Colonies on 24 July 1913 and indicated 
that Cromer's reform had divided the Kuttabs into two 
different types:government Kuttabs and "free" or "private" 
kuttabs.The former operated in terms of the law of 1902 
(No.962),which had determined the duties of the teachers 
or fikis ,the general discipline of the school and the 
admission of pupils,the length of the school year and the 
dates of holidays,besides dealing with the curriculum and 
administrative details.The 1902 legislation had made it 
possible for the "free" Kuttabs to apply to the Ministry 
of Education for a subsidy(provided they complied with 
the requirements laid down by the government,which varied 
in proportion to the importance of the school and its ed­
ucational work),following an -inspection of the school by 
a government official.Eligibility for the receipt of a 
subsidy was usually made conditional upon the school hav­
ing a classroom strength of not less than 25 pupils,being 
open to government inspection throughout the school year, 
regularly supplying the educational authorities with lists 
of pupils,and incorporating into the daily teaching-prog- 
ramme a diet of reading,writing and arithmetic.(26)
The Cromer policy upon Kuttabs was broadly in line 
with that advocated for Libya by Professor Nallinoi the 
Kuttabs would be subsidised by the government and organ­
ised upon a three-year basis;admission would be to infants 
of six years,who after the third class(from the age of nine 
and ten upwards) would be eligible for entry into the gov-
26) Stoppolini Report of July,1913,pp.2-4.
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ernment schools.These latter would be organised upon a 
five-year basis and,as in the Kuttabs,Arabic would be the 
medium of instruction,except in the final year,when Ital­
ian would be taught on an equal basis with Arabic.(27U n ­
fortunately, neither the Cromer nor Nallino approach was 
acceptable to Bertolini,since both approaches disregarded 
the place of the Italian language in the curriculum,the 
latter being focussed almost entirely upon the Arabic lang­
uage and Islamic Culture,so denying the schools a polit­
ical purpose as agents of pacific penetration.(28)
Meanwhile, the investigation into the workings of the 
Libyan Kuttabs,specifically in terms of the opportunities 
they presented for developing pacific penetration amongst 
the Arab population,had proved to be nugatory, having drawn 
the conclusion any attempt to interfer in their operation 
would be politically unpopular and educationally foolhardy. 
(29)If,on the other hand,Scallabrini argued to Bertolini, 
the Kuttabs were allowed to continue,merely as religious 
institutions,the government could gain considerable supp­
ort in*Libya,by offering to subsidise their activities in 
return for a few modest concessions,such as hygienic imp­
rovements^ widening of the curriculum, and other such min­
or alterations of their traditional function.(30)
Bertolini*s final decisions upon the Kuttabs were ex­
pressed in articles 21-24 of his scholastic ordinance for 
Tripolitania and Cirenaica,promulgated in January 1914,N.
27) Micacchi.L"Enseiqnement aux Indigenes,p.481.
28) De Leone,E.,Chpt.v.,"La Nostra Politica Scolastica in 
Libia",La Colonizzazione Dell Africa Del Nord,0p.Cit.,p .4C
29) See,Namias Report of July,1913,p.6.
30) See,Schools in Tripolitania,etc.,Scallabrini,July,1913,p.1
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56.In this law were expressed elements from all three pol­
icy options;the advice of both Nallino and Scallabrini 
underlay art.1.of the decree,whereby the Kuttabs were per­
mitted to retain their traditional character;article 23 
was modelled upon Cromer's law of 1902,which sought to 
introduce a number of changes affecting the day-to-day 
running of the schools in return for a government sub­
sidy .( 31 )0nly in articles 22 and 24 did the government 
seem to assert its right to a vague suzerainty over the 
Kuttabs,which reflected the general policy of subordinat­
ing all Arab institutions to the reforming hand of Ital­
ian bureaucratic control,though it is difficult to see 
what this could have amounted to i-n general practice, 
as the implementation of these articles was left to the 
collaboration of cadi in the vicinity in which the school 
was located,along with the local commission of notables.
31) "To the Koranic Schools that show the highest obser­
vation of the norms of hygiene,propriety,order,prof­
itability ,numbers of pupils in attendance,and in acc­
epting the teaching of disciplines ,included in the 
programmes of the Italian-type elementary schools,the 
Ministry can assign adequate subsidies,following the 
recommendation by the governor,or the same commissions 
as in art.22'.'It is relevant to note that the section 
of this article referring to the programmes operating 
in the Italian Elementary Schools,caused the legal 
experts responsible for drafting the law a good deal 
of difficulty.This is apparent from a scrutinising 
of the original draft of the 1914 decree in the MAI 
Archive.As many as five different attempts are in ev­
idence, in an effort to arrive at what was judged to 
be the right formula for expressing the article.These 
are as follows:
a) "disciplines comprising the programmes of the 
Italian elementary schools."
b) "disciplines,which will contribute to the inc­
rease and development of our colonial activity."
c) "disciplines,which will contribute directly to
the.formation of a wider culture,than the purely Is­
lamic.
d) "in extending the discipline of their program­
mes to include practical and linguistic knowledge, 
which can increase understanding("rapporti")between 
Arabs and Italian citizens." MAI-AS,Pos.113,Scuole, 
1913,Fasc.1-6:Ordinamento Schol.Della Tripolitania.
Ill.Whether to establish a Medersa in Libya ?
"The medressah attached to several of the mosques 
are a kind of seminary for boys intending to become 
priests,and who need to improve-their understanding 
of religious matters,through a study of the laws 
of the Koran."(32)
"The Wakf has for centuries been the only way 
for Islamic societies to support the cult,and 
provide for the public good."(33)
Bertolini's policy of bringing the Kuttabs under govern­
ment control,ostensibly for sanitaryo,administrative and 
educational reasons,but primarily for political reasons- 
however vague and nebulous-while at the same time allow­
ing them to"go their own way"(34),indicated a marked pref­
erence for Franco-type solutions in Libya(35)rather than 
the Arabist policies suggested by Nallino.(36)Bertolini*s 
policy of "tolerance"towards the Kuttabs,also marked a 
turning away from British policies,outlined by Stoppolini 
in his report from Alexandria in 1913,whereby Arab teach­
ers were to be trained for the "reformed Kuttabs" at spec­
ial centres attached to elementary schools.(37)Instead 
of the direction advocated by Nallino and implemented by 
the British in Egypt,Bertolini,by adopting the hybrid Italo-
32) See,Relazione del Direttore degli Affari Civili,
April,1912,p.3.
33) MAI-AS,Assetto Dei Servizi Civili(1911-1919),Pos.ll3, 
Fasc.l-2,Sistemazione dei beni auqaf(1911-1916),C.A. 
Nallino,27 Luglio,1916,p.2.(This report upon the working 
of the Auqaf in Tripoli,and the proposals to set up an 
Islamic University there,comprises 13-pages of detailed 
and scholarly treatment of the problems involved).
34) Report upon the Schools of Tripolitania and Cirenaica,
Prof.Inspector,Amerigo Namias,22 July,1913,Op.Cit.,p.6.
35) See,MAI-AS,Assetto Dei Servizi Civili(1911-1919),Pos.113, 
Fasc.1-18,|0rdinamento Politico:Report of the 20th April, 
1916 upon 0 .P.A.(Administrative and Organisational Policy) 
for Tripolitania,p.11.(involves heavy criticism of the 
Bertolini O.P.A. of 1914 on account of its excessive dep­
endence upon French colonial ideas ,deemed unsuitable by 
the author(possibly Nallino) for Libya).
36) See,Chpt.One,Section III..supra.
Arab schoolmodelled upon the Franco-Arab school of Alg­
eria ,required Arab teachers specially trained to work al­
ongside Italian personnel.The British method of training
elementary teachers,as outlined by Stoppolini,was unsuited 
to the development of a cadre of teachers for working in 
the new government-schools.If collaboration was to be the 
principal aim of Italian educational policy,and Libya was 
to be developed rather like Algeria,as a colony directly 
under the central government,Italy•s interests in the count­
ry would be better served by adopting the French expedient 
of training teachers in a special colonial-type institut­
ion. For such purposes, Bertolini favoured the establish­
ing in Libya of a Medersa similar to medersah establish­
ed by the French in Algeria during the late nineteenth 
century and subsequently transplanted into their other col­
onies. (38) In the long-term,such a method would ensure that 
the best Arab teachers were working in the government sch­
ools.The Kuttabs would be the chief casualties of such an 
arrangement,and,Scallabrini estimated, would gradually lose 
their importance and popularity with the population.(39)
37) See,The Kuttabs in Egypt(Section III.,The Training of 
Teachers for I<uttabs),A.Stoppolini,Alexandria,1913,pp.4-11
38) Pollard,M.,Op.Cit..pp.303-4.
39) The first elements of this strategy appeared in the 
Namias Report of 1913.In his report,Namias advised 
Scallabrini to establish in Tripoli"sui generis"a 
special course for training Arabi pupils in "spoken 
Arabic,pedagogy and didactic,the rudiments of scien­
ce, hygiene; -and agriculture" for a period of one or
c two years,during which they would receive a govern­
ment stipend in return for which they would undert­
ake to teach in the government elementary-schools
for not less than three years.See,Namias Report,pp.6-9; 
and Scallabrini Report,Op.Cit..p.14.
In establishing a Medersa in Libya,the Italians,un­
like the French,did not need to worry about having to 
graft colonialism onto the stem of an existing institut­
ion, since the most advanced type of Moslem school in the 
coastal area of Tripolitania(40)were the -medresah.(41)
These schools were attended by boys intending to take up a
religious career,who,on leaving the Kuttab,would spend 
around three years in developing their understanding of 
Arabic,Koranic commentary and religious and civil law(42), 
before commencing their final studies at either the anc­
ient medresah*s oftEz-Zeituna and Khaldunia in Tunisia, 
or at the famous University of El-Azhar in Cairo.(43)
These centres of higher Moslem learning were extremely unpop 
ular with the colonial authorities-whether French,British 
or Italian-who accused them of spreading "fanaticism" and 
acting as strongholds of Arab Nationalism or the Pan-Is- 
lamic Movement.(44) The French had attempted to by-pass 
them by creating a colonial version of the same school- 
a policy the Italians would seek to imitate in Libya- and 
the British were in 1919 to close down El-Azhar entirely 
because of its political activities.Even as early as 1913, 
the continued attendance of Libyan students at such cent­
res alarmed Bertolini,who in the course of a lengthly dir­
ective to the Governor of Tripolitania condemned El-Azhar 
for being a centre of Pan-Arabism from whence"subversive
40) See,M.Poulard,L'Enseignement pour les Indigenes en 
Algerie(Alger,1909),pp.142,145 and 230.
41) S e e . supra ,p,67.
42) Scallabrini Report(Scuola Superiore o Modersa),pp.25-8.
43) MAI-ASJpolitica Indigena,Pos. 126-1,a . 14,Fasc. 1-14;Bert­
olini to General Garioni,Governor of Tripolitania,11 
June,1913,Rome,p.1.
44) M.Poulard,0£_1Cit.,p.136;and Jone Briotti,!! Wagf in 
Libia(Roma,1936),p.62.
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ideas are spread to other countries".(45)Bertolini's 
way of solving this problem lay in the creation of a 
School of Higher Islamic Culture modelled upon the new 
medersas in Algeria in which intending teachers under­
took to study the French language,Islamic culture,Arab­
ic and the necessary elements of pedagogy prior to comm­
encing work in the government schools-in essence the pol­
icy suggested by Inspector Namias in 1913.It did not foll­
ow that the problem of discouraging students from attend-
f
ing the traditional centres of Islamic learning outside 
Libya could be solved by creating a tradional type med- 
ersa in Libya itself.This would only tranfer the unrest 
to Libya from Egypt and Tunisia and create a "yearning 
for political change which cannot be satisfied".(46)
Apart from the need to educate and train a corps of 
Arab teachers for the Italo-Arab schools,Bertolini was 
moved towards the idea of a Libyan alternative to El-Azhar 
by other factors connected with the internal situation 
in the country,despite his general misgivings upon the 
subject.First,there was the need to provide for the pres­
ent and future needs of colonialism in the country,by dev­
eloping an Italophile elite to whom Italy could entrust 
the management of Arab affairs;and second,was the need to 
win the approval and support of the Ulemah and mass of the 
Libyan population for Italian rule.If a new elite could 
be trained for the future,Italian influence could be incre­
ased in the Moslem tribunals #an area in which the Treaty
45) Bertolini to General Garioni,Op.Cit.,p.1.
46) Ibid.
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of Lausanne had left Italy bereft of prerogatives.(47) Also, 
it was important for Italy"to show that she cared for her 
new subjects" through the provision of educational instit­
utions dedicated to the maintenance,and development of th­
eir language, religion and culture .(48)It was important
as Bertolini saw it,to avoid offering too much both in terms 
*
of Italy's inadequate resources of men and experienced ’■ 
manpower,and also in terms of the need to avoid encouraging 
ambitions,which could only lead to civil unrest.(49)The cir­
cumstances of 1913 excluded any lavish imitation of French 
ideas even if the French medersa were the desired proto­
types for adoption.(50)
Knowing the Ulemah.were enthusiastic for a medersa in 
Tripoli,the question for Bertolini in 1913,was to what ext­
ent they would support his ideas upon the subject,rather 
than their own preferences,which inclined them not towards 
a colonial prototype favoured by the French in Algeria,but 
towards a more-or-less exact replica of the University of 
El-Azhar in Cairo.With such ideas in mind,the minister in-vl 
structed Scallabrini,during his visit to Libya in 1913(51)
47) As a result of the Treaty of Lausanne,the Sultan was 
empowered to appoint the cadi,who in turn appointed 
the Ulemah and officials responsible for the adminis­
tration of justice in the Moslem courts.Thus technic­
ally,Italy had little direct control over the legal 
system in Libya.This caused endless difficulties in 
running the country since it impinged upon Italian
sovereignty in vital areas.See,MAI-AS,II rappresent- 
ante del Sultano in Libia(1912-20),Pos.106.Fasc.1-6* 
from the Procurator General of the Court of Appeal of 
Tripolitania to the R.Governor of Tripolitania,28 Oct., 
1913,Tripoli•
48) See,Caruso-Inqilleri,Primi Ordinamenti,p.1.
49) Bertolini to Garioni,Op.Cit.,p.1.
50) See,Scallabrini Report,Op.Cit.,pp.!4 and 25.
51) The exact date of Scallabrini•s visit in 1913 is diff­
icult to establish with any degree of precision because
to sound out Arab opinion regarding the establishing in 
Tripoli of a medersa for the training of cadi,mufti m a g ­
istrates and school teachers.Also it was important to 
gain some estimate of the extent to which the Ulemah were 
prepared to support the project from local funds.(52)On 
arrival in Libya,Scallabrini,accompanied by Muzzafer Bey, 
the Inspector of Arab Schools,held wide-ranging discussions 
with the Arab leaders both in the oases and in Tripoli its- 
self,as a result of which he reported back ?to “his-chief 
that the reforms proposed by Bertolini would be welcomed. 
(53)In a particularly long conference held with the Ulemah 
to discuss the proposed medersa.scallabrini was discomfort­
ed to learn that the minister's concept of a medersa was 
not shared by the Arab leaders,who wanted an Islamic univ­
ersity , similar to El-Azhar in Cairo.(54)In support of its 
proposals,the Ulemah offered to finance its schemes from 
the revenues of the Auqaf El-Sur(55)and provide land for 
a new building in the region of the School of Arts and Cr­
afts in Tripoli and the Moslem cemetery.(56)
(contin.) of the undated and unsigned condition of the
surviving copy of the report compiled by Scallabrini up­
on the visit.See.Scallabrini Report.
52)Scallabrini relAtesYI outlined to them briefly Your 
Excellency's intentions with respect to the Koranic 
Schools,elementary schools for Arabs and even for the 
high school or medersa" . See,Scallabrini Report,p.13.
53)ibid. ,p.!4. - 7-
54)Ibid.,p.25.
55)Ibid.,pp.25-26.
56)Ibid.
57)"The School of Islamic Culture will be founded in acc­
ordance with letter f.of art.1.in Tripoli,with the aim 
of opening to Moslem youths entry to religious and legal 
offices,and the career of native school teachers.An educ­
ational decree will determine the form of the administrat 
ion to be adopted by the school,along with the teaching
Although no doubt relieved to hear that his forth­
coming ordinance for Libyans appeared to enjoy general 
support,Bertolini was disconcerted to learn that his plans 
for a medersa had encountered the opposition of the Ulem- 
ah and other Arab leaders.The proposal to set up a univer­
sity funded from the revenues of the Auqaf El-Sur was more 
than either he himself or any of his successors were prep­
ared to concede.The placing on the statute book,however, 
in 1914 and 1915 of the Italian intention only to estab­
lish in Tripoli a "School of Islamic Culture"(57) must be 
interpreted as an act of obstinacy and ambivalence if not 
down-right deception.Calculated to win support in Libya 
for the Ministry's new educational policy for Libyans,it 
at the same time ensured that the new institutions would 
be of the reformed variety, and not the traditional kind 
of medersa urged by the Ulemah.The wording,however,was so 
vague and without precedent that it could easily convey 
to people in the community at large-whether A^ab or Ital- 
ian-that the term "SGhool of Islamic Culture" meant(or 
could mean)Islamic University.This was certainly the int­
erpretation placed on the term by the special open-comm- 
ission of Arabs and Italians who met in Tripoli oh 4 Nov­
ember 1915 to establish ways of reforming the Wakf in Lib- 
ya(58),and in particular to examine ways of "devolving"
(contin^)programme.See,R.D.,15 Jan.,1914,N.56,BUC,268."A
School of Islamic Culture" will 'be 'set~_up in Tripoli and 
comprise two sections:one to fulfil the functions of a 
normal school for the preparation of native teachers,the 
other for the preparation of cadi and mufti(art.96),board- 
in accommodation willbe attached to the school(art.97)and 
both the school and the student-bursaries will be financed 
from the Wakf ,already devoted to this purpose(art.98).
See,D.Lgt.,17 Oct.,1915,N.1809,BUC,1916,5.
58) "Wakf in Libya":the word waqf is the plural of uquf
the revenues of the Auqaf el-Sur (59) upon a"School 
of Islamic Culture’.'( 60)
The unanimous decision of the commission to rechannel 
the revenues of the of the ancient Auqaf-El-Sur from the 
maintenance of the city walls of Tripoli into the estab­
lishment of of an Islamic University was not surprising 
in view of the circumstances at the time.On the Italian 
side, the government's intention to establish a University 
for Moslems in Tripoli,to avoid having to send Libyan st­
udents to Cairo,had been a feature of colonial policy since 
1912,and Caruso himself had remarked upon the fact in his 
work of 1914.(61)The position of Tripoline Arabs had been 
made clear to Scallabrini in his capacity as Bertolini*s 
representative in the summer of 1913,and the Arabr members 
of the commission of November 1915 made their position 
doubly clear,by drawing an analogy between the Auquaf's 
original purpose in protecting the town from enemy ’invad­
ers, and its new; purpose in establishing an Islamic Univer­
sity, which would protect Tripoli from the enemies of Is­
lam. (62)
The Ministry of Colonies was unprepared for such a dec­
ision, and must have assumed that the presence of Italians 
on the commission would be sufficient to ensure that its
(contin.)and Auqaf means basically to "arrest"or"halt"
(in the legal sense of staying a judgment following a ver­
dict) and is derived from the triliteral waqafa meaning to 
immobilise or render inalianable by constituting a Wagf . 
See,Califano,G.,11 Regime Dei Beni Augaf Nella Storia 
E Nel Diritto Dell'Islam(Tripoli.1913).p.1.
59) At the commencement of the Italian occupation in 1911, 
there were in Libya three wagf :the auqaf el-Giama, 
auqaf es-Sur and the auqaf ad-dhurriia.See.J.Briotti. 
II Wagf m  Libia,0 p .Cit.,p.52
6°) Ibid.(ChpttIV."La Riforma"),pp.19-31.
position as stated in the Bertolini and Martini Ordinan­
ces of 1914 and 1915 would be respected.The final dec­
isive words of advice upon the viability.'/ of the comm­
ission's work came from Nallino himself to whom the Min- 
sitry of Colonies had entrusted the preparation of the 
scheme of the law for the reform of the auqaf.(63)Nallino's 
response to the situation was to urge the Ministry to dis­
regard the commission's proposals both in view of the in- 
comptence of the Italian members of the commission and 
also upon technical grounds.He does not seem to have be­
lieved that Italy was morally committed to adher to the 
commission's findings,regardless of the unsatisfactory 
nature of its proposals from the Italian point of view. 
Rather he took the view that the commission had bungled 
the reform of the auqaf and hopelessly^.comprQmieledhfehe:7c_e 
future of any higher educational establishment for Moslems 
in Tripolitania.(64) The best that could be done in such 
circumstances was to publish the commission's findings and 
then ignore them completely by promulgating a special dec­
ree governing the the reform of the auqaf es-sur and devol­
ving it6 revenues upon the School of Islamic Studies already
61) See,Primi Ordinamenti,re "the government looks forward 
to opening an Islamic University",p.283.
62) See,Projetto Pi Ordinamento Dell Amministrazione Dei 
Beni Auqaf,Nov.4 1915(Roma,1916),pp.94-5
63)see,Nallino Report of July,1916,pp. 7-12.
64) Ibid.,p.11.
65) Ibid(summary of the Nallino position throughout)
proposed in the Bertolini-Martini Ordinances.(65)
Nallino sought to justify his opposition to 
the commission's proposals,regarding the reform of the 
auqaf and the use of its funds in setting up an Islamic 
University,upon legal and technical grounds that capit­
alised upon the government's stated position-only to set 
up in Tripoli(the date was unstated and so left open to 
public speculation and political convenience)a School of 
Islamic Studies.-and made use of his own immense know­
ledge and experience of Arab and Islamic affairs.He also 
made use of educational arguments which revived and ext­
ended the proposals he had put forward to Bertolini in 
1913 upon the subject of Libyan education, and would be 
used yet again before the Post-War Commission of 1919,ev­
entually finding legal acceptance in the legislation of 
the Parliament of Cirenaica in 1922.It would be no exag-
eration to affirm that it was the hand of no less a per­
son than Nallinothimself,who draftedr out the articles 
of the Bertolini-Martini orindances,as they affected the
 ..................................... ' f ' ... ' • '
establishing of a medersa in Tripoli.His influence in this
respect would extend on into the Fascist era,and can be 
traced in both the 1928 attempt to set up the school,and 
also in the 1936 legislation,which finally brought about 
its creation.The Nallino handling of the proposals of the 
Government Commission for the Reform of the Auqaf in 1915, 
however, is particularly interesting in the light it casts' 
upon the professor's role in the formulation of Libyan pol­
icy. It also reveals his own basic political attitude towards 
Arab affairs in Libya.This may be summed up as a rejection
of the assumptions of cultural imperialism,as conveyed by 
by pacific penetration,but an opposition to Arabisation,as 
expressed by Fahat-Bey,the nationalists and the Islamic party.
IV.Italian Policy for Professional Education and the
School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli
"The school,together with the school of agriculture 
which I believe Your Excellency intends to open in 
the near future,could be of immense use in bringing 
about prosperity in the country,and in helping us 
to spread pacific penetration amongst the populat­
ion."(6 6 )
In the case of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, 
the goal of collaboration by means of pacific penetration 
seemed infinitely more realisablejfor whereas the kuttabs, 
medresah and medersa were closely related»through the shar­
ing of a common purpose>with the religious community as 
a whole;the School of Arts and Crafts,established in 1897 
by the Turks to serve as both orphanage and training cen­
tre for professional skills,clearly pursued social and ec­
onomic goals.(67) Also,although the school had been estab­
lished by the state,it was financed and largely controlled 
by the raunicipality(6 8 ), which had already donated the 
land upon which the building stood,besides providing for 
its maintenance and running costs with a percentage from 
certain taxes.(69)Such ian arrangement,however,did not aut­
omatically ensure complete Italian control,since it sep-
6 6 ) Scallabrini Report,July 1913,p.6.
67) MicacchiiL'Enseiqnement aux Indigenes,p.545.
6.8 ) Caruso-Ingilleri,1 :£rimi Ordimanenti Civili,p.213.
69) These taxes were primarily,the tax upon the sale of 
Esparta Grass("marochloa tenacissima"^indigenous to 
Southern Europe and North Africa),and the tax upon 
the slaughter of lambs.See,Namias Report,July,1913, 
Op.Cit?,pp.2-5.Although no source states the exact 
percentage of the tax upon Esparto grass received by 
the school,it is perhaps relevant to note that in an 
average year,16,690 tons worth were exported from Tripol 
amounting to £75,000 or just over a fourth of Tripoli's 
total exports at this time.See,Wellington Furlong,The 
Gateway to the Sahara Observations and Experiences in
Tripoli(London,1909),p .154.
arated the running of the school from the running of 
the government schools,which were financed from Italian 
sources, and conferred on it a certain degree of autonomy 
strengthened by by its own written constitution.This sit­
uation ensured that the scholastic superintendent had only 
a nominal responsibility for the school extending hardly 
further that the right to advise upon the curriculum as 
it affected the general education of the pupils.Technical 
matters affecting the school were the responsibility} of the 
Ministry of Economics in Rome and overall control was the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Colonies.Day-to-day ad­
ministration and control, however, was^* the task of the 
director and his staffs who in the final analysis took 
their orders from the governor of Tripolitania. The fact, 
however,that not only Was the school still financed from 
its own patrimony after 1911 as before;but that its const-
ituion stipulated that only Moslem orphans or day-pupils
/
could use its facilities, helped to ensure that its general 
well being was; a cause of lively concern to the people 
of Tripoli.(70)The Italians were well aware of its local 
importance and whenever the government was concerned 
to win Arab support for its measures(as in 1914,1916 and 
again in 1919),the school became the object of some new 
reform,which would peter out as the policy in question 
failed to win Arab support or produce the results desired 
in Rome*(7 1 )
70) See,Scallabrini Report,July,1913,pp.6-9.
71) See,MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi Del Soppresso Ministero 
Dell'Africa Italiana(including Fondo Volpi),Cart.13/1, 
Fasc.B-l-Relazione del dr.Piccioli(27.6.1926)sullo 
stato della Scuola di Arti e Mestieri di Tripoli.,pp. 
5-11.
This uncertain state of affairs at the school made 
little sense in practice either of pacific penetration 
or any other policy beloved by the central government 
and,in the first year of the occupation,the buildings 
of the school were rapidly acquired by the military,who 
used them as an artillery barracks and general head­
quarters .( 72 )The Directorate of Civil Affairs in Tripoli 
became responsible for the school following its creation 
in 1912,but failed to secure possession of the buidings 
until a year later,when they were vacated by the artillery. 
(73)In the meantime,in an attempt to alleviate the severe 
refugee problem,the government opened two orphanages for 
Arab children on the outskirts(at Bu-Meliana(73D) and Men-
72) Primi Ordinamenti,p.268.
73) Piccioli notes thato'during its occupation of the school 
and for some considerable time after its vacation of the 
building,the army made use of the'topography department, 
which had a valuable printing press, in return for which, 
it paid the Directorate of Civil Affairs an unspecified 
percentage of all profits accruing from the sale of prin-
I
; ted materials.See,Piccioli Report of 1926,p.47.
74) Established by the Civil Affairs Department in June 
1913 for 120 orphans of both sexes under the age of 
seven years in a former palace of the Caramanli fam­
ily at a cost of L35,000 per [annum to the colonial bud­
get .Although, initially, only intended as a temporary 
measure,the orphanage continued in existeracefor sev­
eral years until absorbed into the School of Arts and 
crafts(in the case of male children).Scallabrini was 
opposed to the latter measure in 1913 on humanitarian 
grounds,despite the government's desire to rid itself 
of the economic burden of having to care for the child­
ren.Scallabrini 's opposition to the scheme was based 
upon his own assessment of the"disorder" and decline 
into which that once thriving institution had fallen 
sinee 1911.See,Piccioli Report of 1926,p.6;the Scall­
abrini Report of July,1913jand Primi Ordinamenti.p.270.
75) Originally opened in Sept.1912 by the governor and plac­
ed under the control of the Ministry of War,this inst­
itution for the training of vagrant and orphaned Arab
scia(75))lUntil such a time as the School could be 
sufficiently organised to function normally again 
(76)This seemed to be on the point of being accompl­
ished ,when,at the end of 1912,the Civil Affairs Dep­
artment, apparently by acting on its own authority, 
reopened the orphanage,along with the general educat­
ion section of the school,to a small number of older 
orphans.De Blasi was provisionally appointed director, 
and further plans were drawn up and submitted for 
approval to the Ministry of Colonies in Rome.(77)
The Ministry ,however, was determined not to have 
the pace of development dictated by Tripoli or its own 
lofty plans brought to earth by the heed to balance 
the colonial budget in Tripolitania.The plan forwarded 
from Tripoli was therefore turned down,and responsibility 
for the school entrusted to the Directorate of Italian 
Schools Abroad,which in July 1913 forwarded to Bertolini
(contin.) youths as non-commissioned officers in the 
Ascari soon became a purely civilian establishment.
As such,it functioned both as an orphanage and as a 
school,gradually sending older boys to the jpartly open­
ed School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli or to be train­
ed as mechanics at the artillery workshops in the town. 
See,Contini,F.,MIstituzioni Scolastiche",Op.Cit.,p.l6
76) In the autumn of 1913,Scallabrini proposed to Bert- 
olini that the recreatorio at/Menshia be gradually 
phased out;its 120 pupils being removed to the School 
Arts and Crafts in Tripoli(the latter was then only 
being used by 26 pupils,three of who slept in the 
dormitory).Unfortunately,no provisional estimate 
had been accepted by either the Ministry of Colon­
ies or the Dept.of Civil Affairs in Tripoli,as to 
how many boarders the school could accommodate with­
out the extra charge for their maintenance falling 
to the colonial budget.Namias had(in following Scal- 
labrini's lead) estimated that the School could acc­
ommodate all 120 pupils from the recreat,orio on its 
own budget.The Commissioner Extraordinary,A w . Z e d d a , 
who was not an official cif the Ministry of Colonies, 
disagreed with the 120-estimate,indicating that on 
his own estimate the school could only feed and board 
from its own resources 100 orphaned boys.See.seal1-
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its own amalgam of ideas and practical sugesstions for 
the institutions future development.(78)These plans 
took into account not only the particular development 
of the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli?but of the 
development of professional education in Tripolitania,as 
a whole.Again,as with previous proposals emanating from 
the Department of Schools or the Ministry of Colonies, 
French ideas are dominant, and Tripolitania is for the 
purpose of professional education compared with the Frenbh 
colonies in North Africa, where schools similar to the 
School of Arts and Crafts were seen to exist.(79)The 
idea of developing the school as a centre for the revival 
of traditional arts and crafts in Tripolitania as a whole 
was prominent amongst these borrowed notions.(80)In this, 
way,it was confidently predicted,an additional source of 
livelihood for the region,as well as an extra source of 
export revenue would be created.(81)In his final report 
for the 1912-13 school-year,Namias outlined the aspects 
of such a policy,which might,he believed,prove particularly 
beneficial to the arts and crafts industry in Libya,thr­
ough the development of appropriate courses at the School
(contin.) abrini Report of July,1913,pp.6-9;and the Namias 
Report of July,1913,pp.2-5.
77) Namias Report,pp.2-7;and Piccioli Report,1926,pp.4-7.
78) Namias Report,pp.2-5;and Scallabrini Report,pp.6-9.
79) Namias Report,pp.2-5;Scallabrini Report,pp.6-9;and the 
Colosimo Report,p.374.
80) Ibid.
81) Ibid.
82) Namias Report,p.3.
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of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli:
"a.The carpet industry-still producing works of a
relatively high standard at Kairouam and Misurata; 
for which an embryonic type of instruction is prov­
ed by us at the girls'professional school in Tripoli
b.The pottery industry,although it had almost dis­
appeared in Tripoli,has in the past produced items 
of an extremely high auality in the form of vases, 
tiles and ceramics,vestiges of which can still be 
seen in the houses of rich merchants?
c.Wood-carving,unfortunately today almost non-exist- 
ant in the province,but flourishing in Tunisia,where 
furniture,beautifully inlaid with ivory and mother 
of pearl is readily available at competitive prices?
d.Plaster-craft,especially stucco,of which magnif­
icent examples can be seen in the Bardo Museum of 
Tunis and the Belvedere cupola and also in numer­
ous religious buildings in both Libya and Tunisia;
e.The copper industry,developed with such an eye 
to perfection in nearby Egypt?
f.Leather work-local industry is fully capable,aided 
by suitable encouragement and training,of produc­
ing craft-products,noted for their ingenious use 
of gold and silver embroidery to produce exquisite 
results;
g.The construction industry,so notable in the past 
for its impressive architecture of which so many 
fine and interesting examples abound in the coun­
try. "( 82)
Namias backed his proposals with additional suggest­
ions of a more practical nature to the effect that the 
implementation of such a policy would depend upon the 
Ministry managing to recruit suitably skilled craftsmen 
from Egypt and Tunisia to teach in the school.Such a pol­
icy ,he believed,would not prove financially onerous to 
the government,and would after all be a matter of invest­
ment in the future of thie colony.Namias recommended the 
Ministry to employ a local painter(Signor Vito Stracqua) 
to supervise these arrangements and oversee the imported 
craftsmen in their work of instructing Libyan apprentices,
though further enquiries would first have to be made into 
his qualification and background.(83)
Namias' proposals were approved in general by his 
chief,Scallabrini,who duly forwarded them to Bertolini at 
the Ministry of Colonies in July 1913; and developed themes 
on the same lines in his own report,though with greater 
emphasis upon the industrial aspect of the school's devel­
opment in connection with which Namias had said nothing. 
(84) The emphasis upon the need to cultivate industrial 
skills in Libya amounted to a return to the principal 
aims underlying the foundation of the SchooloiSfA&rts?ahd 
Crafts,by the Turks.This had been primarily for the train­
ing of artisans,mechanics,tradesmen and skilled labourers; 
for which the school was amply equipped with the best 
machinery it was possible to obtain.(85)
The Namias-Scallabrini proposals of 1913 were subseq­
uently embodied in the report of a special ministerial com­
mission upon the school,promised by the government in 1912 
(86),but delayed until after the promulgation of the Bert­
olini-Martini Ordinances of 1914 and 1915,not finally meet­
ing until the end of 1915.(87)As a result of its investig-
®3) Namias Report,p.3
84) Following the Namias proposals,Scallabrini urged Bert­
olini to authorise the recruitment of teachers for the 
school from Syria,Egypt and Tunisia,affirming that the 
revivial of traditional skills would be well received 
by the Arab leaders,who were in favour of such propos­
als. Deposits of clay,he added,were available in ample 
quantities in Nabeul and could be used for a ceramics 
industry.Scallabrini Report,pp.6-9.
85) In Ottoman times,the school had offered a six-year course 
consisting of six classes,five of which were preparatory
(elementary geography,history,arithmetic,geometry,read­
ing and writing in Arabic and Turkish,the Koran and rel­
igious doctrine)and the remaining class professional.
ations,the commission concluded that the school should 
be organised in terms of the criteria outlined by the 
Turks or of similar institutions in Algeria and Tunisia. 
(88)The school’s principal task according to such aims 
was "the creation of sound operatives,trained to main­
tain local traditions of manufacture,through the use of 
modern ideas and methods of production.In this way a cap­
able class of workman will be developed,able to work in 
all parts of the colony and perform tasks which Italian 
workmen are unable to perform."(89)
In emphasising the revival of traditional industries, 
there can be no doubt that the Italians like the French 
were very much concerned to avoid a duplication of skills 
amongst the work-force,such as might lead to competition 
between Arab and Italian workmen for similar work,hence 
the final note of ambivalence in the report.(90)The comm-
(contin.)In the professional course,which followed the 
two hours of general education,and lasted until one hour 
before sunset,the following skills were taught:shoemaking, 
carpentry,fitting and mechanics,tailoring,brass and copper 
work^saddling^building,typography,gold and silver work,along 
with special crafts reserved for girls(weaving,carpet-mak­
ing and seamstressry) and conducted in a special girls' 
section of the school.See,Piccioli Report,1926,p.4
86) See,Scallabrini Report,1913,p.6
87) See,Piccioli Report,1926,p.9
88) In Algeria,the French had sought to revive indigenous 
industries,once very prosperous,through the training 
of Arab artists and craftsmen,as a means of responding 
to the social and economic organisation of the country. 
See, Poularrf.Op.Cit. ,p.247.
90) The French did not believe there was any solution to
the problem of cpmpetition on the open market in a cap­
italist economy.Confrontation between Arab and French 
workmen could,however,easily result from such a situation. 
One possible solution was to train two separate workforces 
for different but complementary roles in the colonial econ 
omy.Hence,emphasis on the need to revive traditional indus
ission,however,failed to endorse the idea that was quite 
common in the first days of Italian rule,namely that the 
school should be"opened to the whole community,regardless 
of race or religion".Such ideas had been espoused by Nam­
ias who in 1913 stated his belief that the school should 
be opened to"all nationalities and not only to Arabs."(91) 
This policy was not without its attractions because of the 
need to train Italians as artisans,craftsmen and local 
shopkeepers,the facilties for which were lacking in the 
Italian schools at this time.The policy was not,however, 
adopted for a complexity of reasons in part associated 
with the school's special statutes,which restricted entry 
to Moslems only,but also with the decline in the school 
after 1911,and the farming out of the workshops to local 
entrepreneurs for their own use and profit.(92)
The policies evolved for the school by the Ministry 
of Colonies stood little chance of successful implement­
ation in the disturbed years following Italy's entry into 
the European war,and the outbreak in Libya of the Italo- 
Turk war,during which educational issues generally lost 
their importance at Rome.(93)It is arguable that,given 
the absence of such vicissitudes,Italy would have fodnd 
great difficulty in implementing the various proposals 
for the development of the school.First,not only had the
(contin.)ries to provide a form of alternative economy, 
as a means of avoiding economic,racial and social tens­
ion in the colony.See.Pnuiard.Op.Cit.,pp.240-247.
91) See,Namias Report,p.3;and Primi Ordinamenti,p.263.
92) See,Piccioli Report(Dati Di Fatto E Considerazioni Att 
enenti Alla Vita Economica Dell Istituto),pp.54-65.
93) Enrico De Leone,La Colonizzazione Dell Africa Del Nord 
p.404.
life of the institution been fundamentally disturbed 
and the continuity of its work broken by the expulsion 
of Ottoman personnel(both teachers and administrators) 
in October 1912(94);but Italy had failed to replace the 
former with Italian equivalentsrdue to general lack of 
such personnel in Italy,where the training of colonial 
personnel was still in infancy•(95)The difficulty in 
finding personnel,who were prepared to devote themselves 
to the running of the school in a fully professional.^nd 
selfless manner, was more than adequately demonstrated, 
when in July 1913,the Ministry replaced the Civil Affairs 
nominee,De Blasi,with its own appointee,Professor Andreoni. 
(96)Andreoni,lacking the necessary personnel to implement 
the Ministry's proposals,closed down the workshops at the 
school,confining its educational function to that of a 
mere Italo-Arab school.(97)Furthermore,following the Min­
istry's reluctant acceptance of his drastic measures for 
administering the school,Andreoni instructed boys who were 
not orphans to return to their parents,to make way for 
the admittance of boarders from|" el“Menshia and Bu-Meliana, 
which the local athorities were anxious to close for ec­
onomic reasons.(98)It was less these measures,however,and
94) See,Caruso-Ingilleri Report of April,1912,p.6.
95) xn i9I3,the following institutions offered a vague kind 
of preparation for service in the Italian colonies:the 
commercial university of Milan,Luigi Bocconi,the school 
of administrative studies in Rome,the higher school of 
commerce in Venice,the higher school of commerce(consul­
ar section),Bari,the institute of social sciences in 
Florence.The Ministry of Colonies was making efforts
to improve this situation by reforming the Oriental In­
stitute of Naples,encouraging the efforts of the Col­
onial Institute at Rome,and through sponsoring special
courses relevant to colonial activity throughout Italy. 
See,MAI-AS,Fasc.l76,pos.4-25:Schools for the teaching
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more Andreoni's continual"absenteeism in Italy",where he 
was also director of the noted industrial school at Reggio- 
Callabria, that brought about his dismissal ,barely six 
months after his initial appointment to the Tripoli post. 
(99)
Andreoni,who was replaced on 10 February 1914 by a 
certain Colonel Pellerano,was,regardless of his undoubted 
faults and failings,the last director of any acknowledged 
professional status or competence to be appointed to the 
school until Vicenzo Rosati's appointment on 1 December 
1919.(100)In the interim,first under Pellerano and(follow- 
ing his dismissal a year later for failing to develop the 
school adequately) then under his successor,Eduardo Ximenes, 
who owed his position principally to his position in Tripoli 
as a prominent free-mason,the school declined into almost 
complete educational stagnation.(101)
(contin.) of Colonial M atters,Marchl913.
96) Piccioli Report,p.7.
97) Andreoni closed down the following workshops:silk- 
weaving, wool and cotton(these had already been trans­
ferred to the girls* professional school,See,Chpt Two), 
tailoring,shoemaking,tanning,carpentry,fitting and mech­
anics and bricklaying:Ibid.,p.7.
98) This left the school at the end of 1913 with 13 orphans: 
Ibid.,p.7
99) Ibid.(Scallabrini initially favoured the appointment 
of a certain Captain Fasulo,who had been delegated to 
act as director during Andreoni's repeated absences 
at Reggio-*Calabria.This man subsequently became the 
most corrupt director in the school's history under 
Italian rule)
100)Ibid.,p.12
101)Taking up his duties at the school on 10 April 1916, 
Ximenes continued as director until 30 June,1919.Under 
his direction the school entered into a period of"stag­
nation and disorder."Finally,the director's incompetence 
reached such a point of public scandal,that the governor 
was forced to dismiss him,following his denunciation by 
a staff-member,a certain Capt.Cubeddu.Ibid.,p.10.
Chapter Four The Conceding of a Protectorate and the
Orientalist Policy of lAlfonsoi Nallino 
1918-1919 i
"  the massacre of Arab non-combatants,
women and children,by the Italian troops 
in Tripoli had embittered the Arabs beyond 
the ordinary against all Christians."(*)
Giolitti's principal miscalculation in planning the Libyan
War of 1911 lay in gauging the response of the Moslem Arab-
Berber population of Libya to the country's de facto
occupation by Italian forces.It was not a miscalculation
for which he can be personally blamed in view of the
combination of domestic and international factors which led
him in the summer of 1911 to suddenly authorise a campaign
for which only the diplomatic preparation was adequate and
even that slipping rapidly.The assumption,based upon the
scanty and erroneous information supplied by the Banco Di
Roma and their agents in Libya,that not only would the
Tripolitanian tribes welcome the Italians as "liberators
from the oppression and degradation of Turkish rule";but
also that the powerful Senusi rulers of the Cirenaican
hinterland would avoid an$ military confrontation with
Italian forces in the coastal areas,proved a costly
mistake from 1911 onwards,for which Italy would pay dearly.
In fact,however.opposition to Western Imperialism in 
all its many and various forms was already apparent by 1911 
in both the West and the EastjTeven if still insufficiently 
developed as a political and ideological force to count
*) Ostler,A . ,The Arabs in Tripoli(London,1912).p.11
very much in the calculations of the Western
powers. This was a situation which changed rapidly after 
the Great War ,during which many colonised peoples part­
icipated on the side of the Allies in return for\ guarantees
of their future independence from colonial rule.Such an 
undertaking was not given to the Libyans by the Italian 
government and Italy,during the whole of the war in Trip­
olitania and part of it in Cirenaica,was unusual amongst 
the allied powers in that she was at open variance with 
her colonial subjects, for whom the Great War became a 
war of independence, and the prize of victory freedom 
from Italian rule.
In 1911,and until Mussolini's/ conversion to 
imperialism , the official reaction of the Giolittian 
centre of Italian politics to the wave of demonstrations 
(not only in Egypt and North Africa but also throughout 
the Arab and Islamic world) against the Libyan War was 
to deny that Italy's aims were "colonialist" in the 
accepted sense of that term.Giolitti himself could indeed 
rightly claim that his policies in the economic and pol­
itical field had moved Italy away from "expansionism" in 
Africa;and in his own eyes the Libyan War was primarily 
concerned with Italian prestige at home and the defence 
of so-called strategic interests in the Mediterranean.If, 
however,Giolitti and his political allies tried to play 
down any colonialist overtones ,their policies might 
evoke outside Italy,and particularly in Libya i where Arab 
interests were involved,the anti-Giolittian forces of the 
right escalated the colonialist implications of the war, 
regardless of the government's attempts to develop a
fledglingf Islamic policy.Turkish *and indigenous pressure 
groups within Libya profitted immensely from the contrad­
ictions and divisions inherent or revealed of Italian 
political opinion ;and lost no time in sowing the seeds 
of anti-colonialism amongst the people.By 1913,Bertolini 
had become so alarmed at the inroads made through such 
propaganda that he warned the newly-appointed Garioni,to 
avoid all contact with the press himself, to exercise a 
rigorous censorship of all printed materials,and if nec­
essary to close down the frontiers with Egypt .and Tunisia.
Such measures completely failed to assuage the deep- 
seated fear of the mass of the population that the Ital­
ians intended,as soon as the moment was opportune,to 
take over their lands ,usurp their rights, and systemat­
ically convert them to Christianity.Against these basic 
fears,especially amongst the unlettered Beduin,Italian 
assurances counted for very little.Other factors cannot 
be discounted in tracing the causes bfl discontent with 
Italian rule and its increase.The growth of bureaucracy, 
for example,by entrusting all services to Italian officials, 
excluded Arabs from the government’s policy of so-called 
"power sharing",besides making nonsense of the "consultative 
committees" about which so much had been trumpeted ..by -the 
Italian press.Nationalism and the desire for complete 
independence from Italian rule developed rapidly in Libya, 
espcially in Tripolitania,once contacts had been renewed 
with the Turks during the long years of the European War, 
when Italian rule was reduced to Tripoli and a few coastal 
outposts.
The rising independence movement drew strength from 
the largely nominal nature of Italian rule throughout 
most of Tripolitania from 1916 onwards,as well as from 
the increasing exodus of Italian) families from the 
province.The generally low ebb of Italian fortunes was 
particularly noted in 1919 by Micacchi,who drew”a picture 
painted in dark hues" of the social and economic condit­
ion of the remaining Italian- families,little different 
from the conditions in which the Libyans were themselves 
living.This had resulted in a progressive decline in the 
number of enrolments to the Italian schools.(1 )Micacchi 
believed,however,that such a situation was"purely temp­
orary",and that the number of Italian families in the colony
would increase of its own accord,once "normality" had 
been restored,through the establishment of an"efficient 
school system equal to that existing in Italy'.*(2)
The impression that the Italians were on the point of 
quitting Libya seemed obvious to the general public from 
the government's unwillingness in 1919 to risk a further 
military confrontation for the sake of retaining the 
colony.Instead of recourse to arms,Italian policy aimed 
to consolidate sovereignty in Libya through a policy of 
accommodation.This involved arriving at a settlement with
2) The Royal Superintendent reported that enrolments at 
the Italian schools for 1918-19 had fallen from 1,696 
for 1917-18 to 1484(a reduction of 212 pupils),and the 
fall had continued throughout the school year,amount­
i ngin  the final term to 1,166 pupils(a loss of 318 
upon the original enrolment figure.See,Micacchi Report 
of July,1919,p.11.
the Libyan Independence Movement and its leaders in 
Tripolitania,as well as securing a settlement with the 
Senusi in Cirenaica,which would consolidate the Accord 
worked out at Acroma in 1917.Italian expectations that 
the Fundamental Law of June 1919 would provide the 
necessary elements of compromise,whereby civil govern­
ment could again be established,failed to comprehend 
with sufficient adequacy the strength and depth of 
local particularism,which by 1919 was unprepared to 
settle for anything less than complete independence, 
regardless of whatever agreements might be arrived at 
oh paper by way of a modus vivendi.
II.Arab Opposition to Italian Educational Policies
"By every method, ireject the proposal of Hasuna 
Paschia and the Commission,following the specious 
reasoning of Farhad bey(see,p.91),whereby the 
income of the Auqaf es-Sur is devolved upon the 
establishment of an Islamic University;"(3)
Arab opposition to the politica scolastica between 1911 
and the conceding of the Fundamental Laws in 1919,relates 
closely in its ideological pattern to the general movement
I
against Western Imperialism,gathering momentum in other 
parts of the Arab and Moslem World.It also fits in with 
the particular aims and strategies of local elites who, 
while not always -sharing the same attitude towards the 
Italian occupation itself,were frequently united by bonds 
of language,faith and culture and(as was shown in the 
proposal to establish an"Islamic University" in Tripoli) 
prepared to bury their individual political differences, 
in order to press the Italian government into yielding
3) Nallino Report of July,1916,p.9.
on a point of educational principle.(4)It would,however, 
be misleading to assume that complete agreement existed 
upon educational,as upon political,economic or social 
issues,amongst the articulate sections of the urban 
community.Many Arabs were clearly prepared to collaborate 
with the Italians and more than ready to send their 
children to be educated either in Italy or in the govern­
ment schools in Libya.The general tendency,nonetheless, 
tended increasingly,as Italian rule more and more revealed 
its weaknesses and limitations,to break down educational 
issues into questions involving either language,culture 
or religion.This movement and its political implications 
was well understood by Nallino(5),but not by leading 
colonial educators,such as Micacchi,who viewed colonial 
education for Libyans in terms of pacific penetration. 
(6)Thus for Micacchi,Arab dissatisfaction with existing 
policies was never seen as ever amounting to more than 
a dissatisfaction with the poor quality of teachers,school 
buildings,or a curriculum so closely modelled upon its 
Italian equivalent ,as to permit the teaching of viti­
culture, and the history of classical times to Moslem 
children.(3)Micacchi*s refusal to recognise that Arab
4) This is well illustrated by Nallino in his report 
upon the Reform of the Auquaf es-Sur in connection 
with the Italian proposal only to establish in Tripoli 
a"School of Islamic Culture."Upon such an issue,Hassuna 
Paschia Caramanli and Fahat bey were ready to sink 
their differences and support the Arab proposal for
a University rather the government proposal for a
School of Islamic Culture.See,Nallino Report of Julv 
1919,pp.9-11. 1 9
5) Micacchi,L'Enseignement aux Indigenes,Op.Cit,p.480.
6) Ibid.,p.498.
7) "The error of the Italo-Arab Schools of 1914",affirmed
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dissatisfaction with Italian policies was also ’an.issue ■ ' 
of^principle (and-political •aim) rather than practice 
is understandable in view of the fact that the principles 
upon which Italy as a colonial power, sought to base her 
educational policy in Libya were the same as those 
espoused by the Arab side.In this respect ,both Arabs and 
Italians shared a similar attitude to education,which was 
at all points political through and through.(8)Thus,whereas 
the teaching of the Italian language was recognised as 
being indispensable for the securing of true collaboration 
with the Arab population ,as well as securing Italy's 
prestige as a colonial power,the elimination of the Italian 
language from the elementary schools was viewed by many 
Arabs as equally important,if colonisation was to resisted 
and their special identity uplifted.(9)Similarly, the 
cultural issue for Italians involved the right to fulfil . 
Italy'/'civilising mission",as a means of either assim­
ilating or Italianising the new generation of Libyans. 
Arabs, on the other hand,understood by culture,the right 
to revive Arab civilisation and Isiam,both as a defence
against Western colonialism ,and because of its intrinsic
*
value.(10)In religious matters,although the Italians prided
i
themselves upon the tolerance,flexibility and liberality
(contin.) Micacchi,"was the integration of their programmes 
with the programmes of the metropolitan schools.This caused 
them to teach,for example,how wine was manufactured,the 
names of the kings of Rome,and the achievements of Mazzini, 
Garribaldi and Cavour,without a reference to the history 
and geography of Libya or recent colonial affairs.Modif­
ications",he added,"were needed,while preserving the gen­
eral lines already adopted."See,Ibid.,p500.
8) See,Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.140.
9) See,L'Enseignement aux Indigenes,p. 494;Eost-War 
Commission's Report of January,1919,p.112.
of their policies,which rigidlyjforbade the Catholic 
Church from any form of active| prosletisation in Libya 
(11),the fundamental aim of such policies was to ensure 
a separation of Church and State.Such a dichotomy was 
at complete variance with Islamic practice,where| Church 
and State are closely interconnected.Traditionally,this 
union was expressed in the office of the Caliph-Sultan, 
who was both religious leader and secular prince.The
collapse of the Ottoman Empire did not bring an end to
the concept of the unity of Church and State,since the
idea was embodied in many of the nation states that
replaced it.(It)Italian refusal to allow the setting up 
of an Islamic University in Tripoli or even to implement
the Bertolini proposal of 1914 for the establishing of
a School of Islamic Culture was as much political as
legal.As much as any other colonial power in an Islamic
situation,Italy understood the close alliance in Libya
of nationalism and religion and the political necessity
of keeping both as widely apart as was feasible.lt was
a universal:maxim that "texts from the Quran or Hadith
of the Prophet were expounded in such a way that the
outcome might be presumed to come from a political
treatise.Conversely ,current local affairs were often
represented in a religious garb,so as to have an j irres-
istable appeal to the minds of the young,that gave the
10) See,Colosimo Report,p.363;and the Post-War Commission's 
Report of January,1919,p.112.
11) See,Proclamtion of the General Commandant,Caneva,O p .Cit.
12) See,A.L.Tibawi.Islamic Education,Its Traditions and 
Modernisation into Arab National Systems,5.,Philosophy 
of Modernisation(London,1972),pp.68-87.
impression that the outcome was in accord with the wishes
of the early caliphs or indeed of Mohamed himself."(13)
It follows from such an analysis,that education was to
neither side the purely altruistic,intellectual,progressive
or pragmatic activity it is seen to be in situations when
all things are considered to be equal.Rather for both Arabs
and Italians,education between 1911 and 1919 was closely
related to the achievement of either national or imperial
goals.The latter found expression in linguistic,religious
and cultural forms whose points of departure were in the
main determined by historical events,which by 1919 had in
Libya arrived at a new turning point.
★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★
In tracing the growth of opposition to colonialism 
in Libya at the educational level,one is witnessing the 
evolution of a national identity based upon religion, 
language and culture,and expressed in the demand for 
educational policies making sense in terms of that 
indentity by contributing towards common aims.To view 
the causal aspect of this process,it is not necessary 
to go back much beyond the last fifteen years of Ottoman 
rule;for it was during these years that the educational 
changes,which had occupied Turkey in the middle years 
of the nineteenth century began to filter down to the
13) Tibawi,A.L. ,Arab Education in Maridatorv Palestine, ? 
l_91_3j2l948,Chptv)?VI I/Religion, National ism and Education 
(London,1962) '
14) "Of all the Arab countries,only Syria and Iraq were
around 1880 under the most direct Ottoman control. 
Tenuous control was exercised over the Hijaz in 
Arabian^Peninsula,largely because of the Holy cities, 
over Yemen and over the vast desert land of Libya.
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provinces of the empire.(14)The support of local Ulemahs 
for such a system,which was secular in form and content 
and therefore separate from the traditional religious 
schools,was assured by virtue of the backing the educat­
ional changes had already received from the Sultan in his 
capacity as supreme religious leader or caliph.(15)This 
also ensured that the new system would complement rather 
than intefere with the traditional system,while not prop­
agating doctrines contrary to Islam.(16)The new system both 
provided the nucleus of a state system of education in 
Libya at the elementaryprofessional and secondary level 
and acquainted the country with the modern idea of "progress”
as it was in the process of getting accepted and 
developed by the Turkish nation.(17)A further important 
effect of these changes is to be seen in the creation of 
an educational alternative to the rival French and Italian 
systems,which were becoming popular in Tripoli with the 
families of notables.(18) and the Jewish minority.(19)By
(contin.)Egypt,Tunisia and Algeria were all under foreign 
occupation.The kingdom of Morocco in the far west was then 
struggling to maintain its existence as an independent 
state in the face of competition among the European powers 
for influence and control."Islamic Education,Op.Cit.,p.65.
15) Ibid.
16) Ibid.,p.66.
17) "The importance of the new schools",writes Tibawi,”was
in their curriculum more than in their numerical! 
strength.The four-year cycle was theoretically an 
improvement on the Kuttabs.lt taught in addition to 
the traditional Arabic subjects,some arithmetic,history, 
geography and hygiene.From the lower elementary cycle 
upwards,additional subjects were attempted,including 
mathematics,physics,chemistry,biology,civics,Turkish, 
French and Persian.The programme for girls' schools 
was less loaded and stressed such subjects as domestic 
science,sewing and embroidery".Ibid.,p.67
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1924,when the Turks began to exercise j pressure to deter 
Arabs from making use of the Italian schools(20),the 
dangers of colonialism were becoming daily more obvious 
to Libyans,and there is little doubt that anti-colonial 
sentiments were encouraged in the Turkish schools and 
increased rapidly from this point onwards,largely in 
response to the dangers from Italy.(21)
The movement ”of~anti-colonialism in Libya was certainly 
favourable to the Ottoman cause and acted as a useful 
antidote to the attempts of the Banco Di Roma and the 
Italian Consul General to create a strong Italian party 
in the country through the liberal distribution of bribes 
and the development of cultural and economic penetration.
(22)Anti-colonialism also increased Ottoman popularity 
at the expense of any sudden development of Arab nationalism, 
which in Libya and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire began 
its incipient growth in the early years of the twentieth 
century.(23)During these years,it was apparent to the b 
most committed of enthusiasts for the Arab cause that, 
despite its many defects,Ottoman rule was preferable to
18) Contini states-es that the "ancient register of the 
Catholic elementary school in Tripoli(for the late 
nineteenth century) indicates the presence and att­
endance at the school of sons of Arab notables,Turkish 
officials,Jewish and Maltese pupils ,as well as Ital­
ian .See.Op.Cit.,p .10.
19) Until 1911,the Catholic Mission Schools in Tripoli 
and Bengasi and the Schools, of the Alliance Israelite 
Universelle were all in receipt of subsidies from the 
French government.See.ContiniOp.Cit.,p.7;Berqna,C.,
Le Missione Francescana in Libia(Tripoli,1924),pp.154- 
165;the Scallabrini Report(Scuole Private e Religiosi), 
July,1913,p.26.
20) The pro-colonialist,Contini recounts that in 1904 J  the 
Turks were so alarmed at the popularity of the"special
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Christian rule,and a strong Turkey the Arab homeland's 
best defence against the encroachments of the European 
powers.(24)The Italians reacted to the increase in their 
unpopularity in Libya by emphasising Italy's "civilising 
mission",as it was generally understood amongst informed 
circles that much of the resentment of many Arabs with 
Ottoman rule stemed from Constantinople's failure to 
press ahead with administrative reforms in the Arab _— - 
provinces.(25)Much resentment was caused by the public 
awareness that some governors misappropriated taxes,which 
were intended for new schools,roads and other such social 
ammenities.(26)1t was the argument ,Turkey had failed to 
improve the general standard of education and living in 
Libya that became the final Italian pretext for the 
invasion of October 1911.(27)
(contin.)course for Moslem students" at the Italian Tech­
nical Commercial School,that they set police agents at 
its entrances and exits in order to deter Arabs from using 
it.See.Qpt.Cit.,p.6.
*
21) See,R.Mori,"La Penetrazione Pacifica Italiana in Libia 
dal 1907 al 1911 e il Banco di Roma*' ,Rlvista Pi Studi 
Politici Internazionali(Firenze.1957),pp.102-118,p.103.
\
22) See,Evans-Pritchard,Op.Cit,The Turkish Administration,p.10
23) See,Ibid.,The Sanusiya and the Tribes,pp.62-90;T.E.
Ahmad Harrah,"The Young Turks and the Arabs",p.112
of "Arabic and Islamic Garland",Op.Cit.;and S.G.Haim,
Op.Cit.Introduction,Al-Afqhani and the Crisis of Islam 
(throughout).
*
24) See,S.G.Haim.O p .Cit..Introduction.p.7 :T.E.Ahmad Harrah, 
Op.Cit..p.112;and Evans-Pritchard.O p .Cit..The First 
Italo-Senusi War,p.108.
25) "Most Arabs in the Empire wanted reforms more than 
separatism-especially agricultural improvements,the 
encouragement of the Arabic language,road construction, 
improvement of transport and tax reforms*.*See,Ahmad 
Harrah,Op.Cit. ,p.H2.
26) See,Sir Edwin Pears,Forty Years in Constantinople.The
The ousting of Abdul Hamid in 1908,while initially 
seeming to favour the Italian cause in Libya,because of 
the unpopularity of the Young Turks in Tripoli and 
Bengasi(28),was but a brief gain;for the appointment of 
Ibrahim PaScha^as.goyernor of the vilayet in 1910(29), 
led to the implementation of extensive reforms(30),which 
seemed to rob Italy of her trump card by eliminating the 
need to save the Libyans from the "backwardness and neg­
lect of Turkish ruleV(31)Not surprisingly,diplomatic 
pressure was exercised at the highest level by Italy in 
a successful bid to force Constantinople to transfer the 
popular Ibrahim Pascha from Tripoli where he had proved 
such an embarrassment to Italian interests amd aims.(32)
(Contin.)Recollections of sir Edwin Pears 1873-1915(London,
MCMXVI)
27) Brigadier T.Barclay,The Italo-Turk Warc, See, Appendices: 
The Italian Ultimatum to the Ottoman Government,26 
Septembe r ,1911(London,1912),p.109.
.28) Evans-Pritchard ,0p .Cit., pi 100.
29) E. Bernet,En Tripolitaine(Paris,1912),p.241.
30) Ibrahim Pascha alleviated five years of famine and 
draught,as a result of which many had died,through 
the daily distribution of food.He also built roads, 
schools(including the School of Agriculture at Men- 
scia,which was completed by Oct.1911,but not opened) 
public buildings,sank wells and introduced many wide- 
ranging reforms.His work,however,was left incompleted 
on account of his sudden recall to Constantinople, 
from whence he was sent to quell the revolt against 
Turkey in the Yemen.See,E.Bernet.Op.Cit..especially 
the Appendix* Memoires du Marchal Ibraihim Pascha, 
Ancien Gouverneur,sur son oeuvre en Tripolitaine,
Avant la Guerre 1910-1911.
31) See,Barclay.Op.Cit.,p.!09;and Bernet,Op.Cit..p.152
32) Bernet recounts:"Although .Ibrahim Pascha has sought 
to avoid complications with the Italians that might 
lead to conflict,the Italians have constantly crit­
icised him on account of his high ability and energy, 
which they regarded as an obstacle to the development 
of their influence in Tripolitania.Pressure was exer-
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The setting up of "Schools of Propaganda" in Tripoli 
and Bengasi by the Committee of Union and Progress, 
not only increased anti-Italian feeling in the country, 
but,also,transmitted to Libya new political ideas, 
including nationalism and the secular state.(33)Behind 
such ideas was the presence of Western culture and in 
particular the secular notion of civil progress.Men like 
Sheikh Suliman Barouni,the-Arab deputy of the Zawia 
department(Western Tripolitania),who was to be almost 
entirely responsible for attaching the Tripolitanian 
tribes so loyaly to the Turkish flag in the subsequent 
war against the Italians, was an Arab nationalist par 
excellence,who had been educated in accordance with 
Western educational norms and dreamt of a revival of 
AralD science that would equal scientific knowledge in 
the West.(34)For Barouni and other influential Arabs-, 
such as Sheilkh Suni-ben Selim-Khezam,who was equally 
fluent in Arabic,Turkish and Djibelli(the difficult 
language spoken by the inhabitants of the hills) j Ottomanism 
and the Turkification issue were seen within the pers­
pective of the Italian threat and the ultimate estab­
lishment of a Tripolitanian Republic and perhaps even of
(contin.) cised upon the Grand Vizier,Hakki Paschia (for­
merly Turkish Ambassador in Rome) for his removal from 
Tripoli,where he was adored by the populace who he 
served so well." Op.Cit.,p252.
33) Scallabrini during his visit to Tripoli in 1913, ex­
pressed the conviction that Libyan enthusiasm for 
education was entirely"the product of the propoganda 
of the Young Turks,through their Committees of Union 
and Progress".Op.Cit.,p,14.
34) See,Griffin,E,H..Adventures in Tripoli(London,1924),pp. 
122,142 and 97;and Pastier,A.,0p.Cit.,p.64.
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a free and united Libya. ;
Italian failure to recognise the extent to which
Libyan nationalism had developed in the final 
years of Turkish rule brought the Bertolini educational 
programme into head on collision with Libyan sentiment, 
despite the government's claim that the new policy aimed 
at "accommodation".The Ministry of Colonies refused to 
attach any significance to Nallino's warning that any 
form of Italianisation measures would have the opposite 
effect.Caruso's observations of the extent of local 
dissatisfaction with the provisional educational arrange­
ments in Tripoli were likewise ignored.Opposition to the 
Italo-Arab Annexes and schools was,moreover,not confined 
to nationalist and Islamic zealots>but also expressed itself 
among Arabs sympathetic to the Italian cause,who were 
decidedly reluctant to allow :their sons to be educated 
in such institutions.Much of this latter opposition,however, 
was less directed against the principle of moderate 
assimilatiorvas expressed,for example,by bilingualism and 
useful injections of Italian and Western culture,as against 
poor and inadequate teaching,and unsuitable curriculum, 
along with the generally unsatisfactory nature of the 
provisional arrangements.T&is .was particularly attested 
in the case of more important Tripoline and Benghazine
families,who pressed the authorities into making special 
arrangements for the education of their children in Italy, 
despite Jewish protests about undue favouritism.The Turks 
too were not slow to provide educational facilities in
Turkey or elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire for the 
education of Libyan boys,both as a guarantee of the 
loyalty of particular areas,families and tribes and 
also as a means of providing a future cadre of leaders, 
loyal or sympathetic to the Ottoman cause.(35)Both 
collaborating and non-collaborating Arabs,however, 
believed the Italian schools to be run by atheists,a 
fear,which in the case of the former ,had the paradoxical 
effect of increasing the numbers of Moslem children 
attending the Catholic schools of the male and female 
religious orders in Tripoli and Bengasi.(36) Only the 
dropping of the Italiani^ation element from the Bertolini 
decree and the adoption of a strong Islamic policy could 
have disarmed the fear that the government schools were 
out to attack the Islamic religion,to nullify the Arabic 
language and generally reduce Arab culture to a cipher.(37)
A further source of uncertainty,regarding the role 
of the schools,lay in the very ambiguity of Giolitti's 
annexation of the country in 1912.Politically, the effect 
of this act was to place Libya under the "full and complete 
sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy"(38).Libyans,however, 
only became "subjects" of the King of Italy and not "Italian
35) MAI-AS,Pos.105/2-9sOrfani Arabi alle Scuole militari 
turche(1912-1915).
36) The popularity of the Catholic schools with both Ital­
ians and amongst certain sections of the Libyan pop­
ulation continued throughout this \ periodi.lt was re­
garded by Micacchi as a "silent criticism" of the
inefficacy of the government's elementary schools in 
failing to attract the better-off sections of the 
population.See,Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.82j 
and also,Caruso-Ingilleri Report of April,1912,p.5.
37) Monsignor Lodovico jAntonelliVthe Franciscan Apostolic 
Prefect in Tripoli,also accused the government schools 
of spreading immorality,indifference to religion,apathy 
and atheism in his [Pastoral Letter of Christmas,1917.
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subjects'* in view of the separate legal system for Moslems 
which Italy undertook to uphold in the Treaty of Lausanne- 
(39) In the matter of education,however, the Treaty of 
Lausanne had no effect whatsoever since Arabs had little 
option ,if they wanted a state education,but to attend 
the government schools,which were modelled upon the Italian 
schools in Italy.Even the Bertolini and Martini legislation 
could not free itself from the influence of the Italian 
system,even though specially intended for Moslems and this 
led many Arabs to believe that the government policy really 
intended to take away their Arab identity.((40) Assim­
ilation, thus seemed to be the government's aim, and the 
assurances to protect and respect local rights and trad­
itions, appeared like so many of the other Italian 
assurances to be no more than a bluff to extend Italian 
control over all aspects of Libyan life.By 1919 ,the 
Arab leaders were only prepared to accept complete abbrog- 
ation of the 1914 and 1915 legislation; and a firm under­
taking on the part of the government to avoid any Ital- 
ianisation in the future.(41)
S<___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ •
(contin.) This charge had already been made by Senusi
Muntasser,an Arab Student at the Technical-Commercial 
school,who protested to the Director,Sig.N.Gandolpho 
against the desimination of atheism in the school by 
certain teachers.See,MAI-AS,Fasc.140(Missione Cattoliche, 
1916-1935):from the Governor of Tripolitania to the Ministry 
of Colonies,27 February,1917.
38) Barclay,Op.Cit..p.113
39) Ibid.
40) See,Commissione Dopo Guerra,Op.Cit.,p.!29.
41) Ibid.,p.112.
A final source of dissatisfaction with Italian 
policies amongst the Arab population lay in Italy’s 
failure between 1911 and 1919 to implement any policy 
adequately.In this respect,Italy had undoubtedly failed 
to honour the promise made in her Ultimatum to Turkey 
in 1911,whereby the Marquis di San Giuliano had referred 
so uncompromisingly to the”state of disorder and neglect 
in which Tripolitania and Cirenaica are left by Turkey” 
and the "absolute necessity" of these regions being all­
owed to enjoy the same progress as that attained in 
other parts of North Africa.This "transformation",he had 
added,"constituted for Italy a vital interest of the first 
order by reason of the small distance separating these 
countries from the coast of Italy'.' (42) Educationally,at 
least, it was not necessary to look far in June 1919 or 
in October 1919 when the Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania 
and Cirenaica were conceded to see that little had been 
done to effect this piedge.If anything the educational 
state of Libya by 1919 was infinitely worse than it had 
been in the last years of Turkish rule. Fewer schools 
were available to Arabs by this time than were open to them 
under Ottoman rule.Also there were fewer teachers(Libyan 
or foreign); and the range of education available was 
considerably more restricted than under Turkish rule,when, 
besides elementary schools, facilities for secondary education 
also existed.
42) Barclay,T.,The Italo-Turk War,"Italy's Real Case",p.48
more or less representative of the relatively non-aligned 
view in Italian politics which over questions involving 
Libyan affairs took its cue from the basis of legality 
affirmed in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1911.Nallino made 
his position quite explicit in the Proceedings of the Post 
War Commission of 1919 when he referred to the need for 
Italy to return to a proper basis of legality in all her 
future dealings with the Libyan people.By the Treaty,Italy 
had concurred with the Sultan's concession of a: "full.'and 
complete autonomy " to his former Libyan subjects,but, 
despite frequent reaffirmations of that autonomy in num­
erous laws and official documents , had done little to 
bring, about its actualization.(46)Italian ommissions,were 
summed up by Nallino as the failure"to impose unsuitable 
forms of civilisation upon existing local conditions; to 
confer with the local population with a view to legally 
expressing their desires and interests in the conduct of 
local affairs; to establish effective organs of consul­
tation; to favour civil progress within, the-.'local and trad­
itional orbit of existing society" and in many other ways. 
(47)
Instead of being framed in accordance with the concept 
of autonomy,outlined and sanctioned in the Treaty of Laus­
anne,Italian policy,affirmed Nallino, had been drawn up 
in accordance with the tenets of colonialism, which in 
educational matters had resulted in the"tendency to 
Italianise" the indigenous population.(48)This tendency 
had found expression in the Bertolini Ordinance of 1914 
and amounted to a decision on the part of the Colonial
46) Post-War Commission's R e p o r t(Autonomie Ammin.Ed
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Ministry to assimilate the Libyan population rather 
as the Ancient Romans had Latinised Africa in the distant 
past,with,Nallino recognises/’incalculable benefits for 
civilisation".(49) "Any attempt,however, to imitate the 
Romans in the circumstances of the twentieth century",he 
added,"was mistaken for two principal reasons: firstly, 
because Roman civilisation in Libya had never penetrated 
to the interior ,but had confined itself to the coastal 
areas;and secondly,Roman civilisation had never been 
confronted by Islamic civilisation,only with a pantheon 
of pagan deities,not dissimilar to the gods of Ancient 
Rome itself."(50)Italy ,on the contrary,found herself in 
Libya confronted with a people"Islamised from the earliest 
Moslem era,and attempts to substitute the Italian language 
for the language of the Koran,could only antagonise the 
mass of the population, and lead them to the conclusion 
that the government of Italy had inaugurated a persecution 
of their religion."If a "national bond",Nallino added,"does 
not as yet seem to exist between the majority of Moslems, 
the religious bond is very strong,and attempts to employ 
policies of assimilation in such circumstances,will not 
only fail miserably,but also incur the violent antipathy 
of the majority of the population against Italy."(51)
(contin.) Ordinamento Politico Amministrativo) ,p.H9.
47) Ibid.(Direttive Generali Circa II Trattamento Degli 
Indigeni) ,p.H3.
48) Ibid.(L’Istruzione nelle Colonie),p.131.
49) Ibid. (Diretive Generale) ,p.H2.
50) Ibid.,p.112.
51) Ibid.
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In developing his analysis of Italy's obligations 
at the educational level following the Treaty of Lausanne 
(a Treaty which Italian nationalists detested and and 
believed to have been rendered null and void by Turkey's 
declaration of a Jihad against Italy in the opening stages 
of the Great War),Nallino's proposals to the Post War 
Commission of 1919 are strikingly dissimilar from those 
advanced already by Colosimo,at least in aim and method. 
This is particularly apparent in the Minister's criticisms 
of the Bertolini legislation on account of its "timidity" 
and failure to "Italianise decisively" through a thorough 
going integration of the Libyan with the Italian school 
system,particularly at the secondary level.Nallino,while 
rejecting the Bertolini legislation for being fundamentally 
unsuited to the Arab mentality,also deploredo Colosimo's 
“attempts to develop it by providing facilities,whereby 
Arabs would be able to attend with profit the Italian 
secondary schools and pass on ,if they so desired, to 
study at the Italian universities.(52)In support of his 
position,Nallino advanced four sets of reasoning against 
Italian educational policy until 1919: first,there did 
not exist in Libya,great centres of population,equal to 
those of Tunisia,Cairo,Alexandria and Damascus,the pop­
ulation, instead, being spread over a vast area,where it 
was for theymain part serai-nomadic or entirely nomadic.
The needs of such a population were infinitely less at 
the cultural and educational level than those of countries 
such as Egypt,Syria or North Africa.This could be observed,
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Nallino argued,from the fact that the greatest city in 
Libya had a population of less than 12,300 Moslem 
citizens,to which a further 19,900 could be added,if 
Gagaresc was included ,together with the huge area 
covered by the oasisof el-Menscia.Such a comparatively 
small population had only modest educational needs and, 
at the moment at least,it was not necessaryctochhirtkc,0f 
educating and training Arab doctors,engineers, lawyers 
and the like.Nallino's second observation rested upon his 
conviction that a vast outlay of resources in the form 
of schools and teachers was uncalled for in Libya,because 
Italian policy had never intended to transform the country 
into an area primarily of Italian settlement on account 
of its basic unsuitability for European colonisation.
The chief educational expense would be taken up,he continued, 
in providing the necessary inducements to encourage Italian 
elementary teachers to work in the interior.Also,given the 
local cultural conditions ,the limited n&eds,the inapprop­
riateness of the Italian state assuming responsibility 
for providing every grade of instruction,and,given the 
paucity of Arab teachers,trained in Italian methods of 
teaching, it would be necessary to proceed in stages and 
without too many pretensions,making the most of whatever 
schools already exist,especially in the mosques and zauie. 
(53)Italy would do well,Nallino urged,to encourage,guide 
and sustain,whatever is worthy of support,and to place 
the supervision of the educational system under commissions 
of enquiry and Arab and Italian officials,knowledgeable 
of Islamic education and its methods.(54)
53) Ibid.,p.130(According to the Colosimo Report(Op.Cit.) 
there were at this time lb known Kuttabs in Tripoli, 
no mention being made of the whereabouts of others.)
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In advancing his fourth criticism of the Bertolini 
legislation and the proposals put forward by Colosimo 
in 1918,Nallino developed the linguistic argument,so 
popular with the Arab nationalists,against the Italo- 
Arab schools.Nallino blamed the notion of Italianisation 
upon Waldeck Rousseau,who had enunciated it in its 
French form at the International Colonial Institute of 
Brussels in 1909.(55) Nallino summarised the Waldeck 
Rousseau approach,as applied to an Italian situation, 
as "the attempt to substitute Italian for Arabic in the 
schools of a country profoundly Islamised.lt followed", 
he added,"from the utopian notion that the European and 
Moslem elements could be fused together."In terms of 
reality",Nallino concluded,"it could only provoke a 
strong reaction on the part of the Arab element against 
ourselves." Such ideas,Nallino believed, were completely 
out of date and were at variance with the current tendency 
of evolving educational policies in Africa and Asia that 
made sense in terms of the language of the country for 
which they were intended.(56) This tendency had not yet 
caught up with the few Italian schools that existed for 
Arabs i-n Libya,which were based upon the Franco-Arab 
Schools in Algeria.Algeria,however,as Nallino pointed out
53) Ibid.
54) Ibid.,p.130
55) Waldeck Rousseau's views upon education had in fact 
developed considerably from their original some what 
narrow premise by 1909.By this time Rousseau believed 
educational policies in a colonial situation should 
be based upon linguistic and cultural compromise.See, 
Waldeck Rousseau,Atti della Sessione tenuta all'Aia 
dall'Institut Colonial International di Bruxelles
(Bruxelles,1911) as quoted in Ibid.,p.130.
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was profoundly different from Libya,which had never 
undergone colonisation by Europeans,and was also without 
the peculiar ethnic and historical conditions that 
preceded French rule in Algeria.In formulating the Franco- 
style policies for Libya,no account had been taken of 
the fact that French policies in Algeria depended for 
their efficacy upon the substantial numbers of Algerian 
teachers in the country ,who were fluent in the French 
language.Italy,on the other hand, was without teachers, 
whether Arab or Italian, who could educate Libyans in 
accordance with the ideas of Italianita , and most 
Libyans believed a schooling based upon notions of Ital- 
ianita were irrelevant to their own cultual and social 
ambience.The simplest and most effective solution to the 
teacher shortage did not lie ,Nallino believed, in the 
training of Italian teachers for Libya,as was envisaged 
by the current educational legislation(D.L.17 October,
1915);but in training Arab teachers, who would develop 
the educational programme of the natiye elementary schools 
in their own language and in accordance with their own 
needs.(57)
In elaborating his proposals for the educational future 
of the Libyan population,Nallino not only had the backing of 
the educational section of the Post War Commission(58),but 
also the knowledge and experience derived from his previous 
educational work,rejected by Bertolini in 1913,and in 1919 
developed to include secondary education.Even so,he added the
56) Post-War Commission's Report of January,1919,p.131.
57) Ibid.,p.l32.
58) Ibid.,p.135.
warning that,initially,at least,it was necessary to 
remain content with comparatively modest aims,confined 
to the city of Tripoli,as it would take "many years" 
before an educational solution could be found for the 
whole of Libya.(59) The subsequent importance of the 
Nallino proposals for the educational future of Libya, 
as envisaged by Italian Liberalism in its last days, 
merits a consideration of the various aspects of the 
Nallino scheme in detail. As such,at the time,they 
were seen to represent a complete volte-face on the 
subject of Arab education in Libya wi^h a view to 
representing Italy as the exponent of Wilsonian Liber­
alism in her dealings with colonised peoples in Africa.
In this respect,they replaced the Colosimo proposals of 
a year before,which were judged out of tune with the 
times both in Libya and before world opinion,now moving 
towards schemes of decolonisation in Asia or in favour 
of "mandates" in the former territories of the Kaiser
and the Porte.(60) Nallino's Orientalist policy is as follows*
I.Kuttabs (61)
"The 'improved Kuttab*,which would consititute the Libyan *
elementary school,would teach exclusively in the Arab
59) Ibid.,p.132.
60) Ibid.,pp.135-6.Also,see MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi,Cart. 
15/1,Fasc,B-10*I1 Nuovo Assetto Politico-Amministrativo. 
"Gli Statuti Del 1919"(without author or date,possibly,'37
61) Nallino notes that the correct designation of these 
schools was "Kuttab" and not "Scuole Coraniche"(a 
deviant usage borrowed from the French).Moreover,
"for more than ten centuries,the name "Kuttab" ind­
icated in Moslem countries,an elementary Moslem
sctiool in the Arabic language,where reading,writing, 
and arithmetic was taught,along with the fundamentals 
of Islam,and the acquiring by memory of a part of 
the Koran(but in the sense that the pupils also und- 
erstood it).In Libya,he adds,such institutions have
language(or Berber-Arab language),with an educational 
programme similar in all respects to that of the Government 
Kuttabs in Egypt.(62) This would be on the following lines:
a) religion and morality...... ;b)reading,writing and
dictation;c)arithmetic(limited to the four basic operations) 
d)the committing to memory of a section of the Koran.Text­
books must be urgently drawn up to deal with subjects 
relevant to Libya and an adequate syllabus must be con­
structed.The school will operate upon the basis of a 
four-year system to which a fifth year will be eventually 
added in areas where a secondary school exists.The pupils 
who attend the school will be between the ages of six to 
nine years of age or between seven and ten....... "
II.Lower Secondary Schools 
"These schools would offer a course lasting for three 
years and be open to pupils who had completed the three 
years at the Kuttab.They are intended to provide and 
education for the lower-middle classes through training 
postal and telegraph operatives ,police,small-time off- 
icials,etc.,etc.Instruction will be provided in the Arabic 
language in the following areas: religion and morality, 
grammar,writing,arithmetic,elementary geometry,general 
studies(comprising laws and duties of general applicability 
to Libya),knowledge of local agricultural conditions, 
geography and Italian history combined with the history 
of Tripolitania and Cirenaica.Where Italian is taught,it 
should be confined to reading and writing and ordinary 
spoken Italian."
(contin.) reduced their curriculum to the mere teaching 
of reading and writing together with the acquisition of 
the Koran by memory only."Ibid.,p,132.
62) Ibid . ,p. 132.Also,see su^ra,Chapt.Three,Sect.II.,pp.69-75.
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III.Higher Secondary Schools
"Candidates will be admitted to this school who have 
obtained the leaving certificate of the secondary 
(lower) schools,or otherwise satisfied the entrance 
requirements.The course will have the duration of four 
years,and the final year will bd divided into two sections: 
one will provide a general course for the education of 
merchants and Libyan officials,along with accountants, 
land surveyors,etc.5the other for the preparation of 
teachers to work in the Kuttabs and lower secondary 
schools.The teaching will be in Arabic with an obligatory 
course in Italian?the programme of individual disciplines' 
will be devised to respond to the (particular’ needs of 
the Libyan population.”
IV.An Islamic High School
"This school is basically for the preparation of Libyan 
magistrates and Ulemah and will be open to students with 
a certificate of admission provided either by the Higher 
Secondary Schools or resulting from a special examination 
of admission.The course provided by the school ought to 
last five years at the minimum,and preferably six years."
VI.Schools of Agriculture and Arts and Crafts 
"These would aim to train operatives for native industries 
and small factories run by Europeans,besides training 
printers,drivers of automobiles and agricultural workers. 
Such schools ought not to be based upon a particular type, 
but aim to meet the different requirements of different 
localities,especially with regard to agriculture for which 
they should be designed on a mobile basis."(63)
63) Ibid.,pp.132-137.
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IV.The Educational Provisions of the Fundamental 
Lav for Tripolitania(R.D.,June 1919,N.931)
7...with the conclusion of peace in 1919,
Italy again returned to the problems of 
her Libyan colony;but the climate of the 
homeland was dangerously disaffected by 
socialist agitators who were filled with 
illusions of perfect social equality;ill­
usions . which spread their deleterious 
effects to the land of Africa."(64)
The educational proposals <af the Post-War Commission,
although they ante-date the concession of the Statutes
of Libya by less than a year,not only mark a turning
point in Italian educational policy for Libya,but,also,
the culmination of a long debate upon the very nature
of that policy itself.The tendency of Italian jhistorians
has been to dovetail the second Nallino project with the
educational and political settlement of the Statutes
of Libya of 1919,so making it appear that the Nallino
proposals were no more than an aspect of the realpolitik
of the times,which was primarily concerned to avoid a
further colonial war in Libya by surrendering to Arab
demands for cultural,religious and political autonomy.
(65)There is no doubt a certain truth in this argument,
though it tends to overlook the fact that the new
educational policy has a place of its own in the history
of the times,and deserves to be treated for its intrinsic
merits,as much as for its association somewhat later with
the transient policy of the Statutes themselves.
If this view is accepted,a more realistic assessment 
is possible of the Italian attitude to Libya* the Libyan 
War of October 1911 is recognised as integral to the history
64) Op.Cit.(Gli Statuti Del 1919)No page references given.
65) Enrico De Leone,La Colonizzazione DelTAfrica Del 
Nord.pp.405-9.----------------- ------------------
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of Italy proper and therefore quite separate from the 
issue of how Libya was to be governed and developed.By 
indicating in 1913 that the colonialist policies in 
education advocated by Scallabrini and the nationalists 
were unworkable,Nallino was only restating in its 
educational form the political and economic argument of 
the Giolittian pragmatists and moderate imperialists, 
whose general attitude was to view Libya as a protectorate
(6 6 ),rather than as an integral province of the Kingdom 
of Italy itself.Giolitti Vs hasty annexation of Libya in 
1912 was notc:iritended to integrate Libyan territory 
and the Libyan people with Italy as such,as many Arabs 
believed at the time,but to frustrate any move by Germany 
to mediate on behalf of Turkey.(67) Settlement was also 
never intended between 1911 and 1922.Thus educational 
policies aiming primarily to teach the Italian language 
to Arabs and spread pacific penetration were as irrelevant 
to Italian needs in Libya as to Arab needs, and therefore 
a needless source of irritation.In the Fascist era ,Nallino*s 
policies became unfashionable and were associated with the 
a political attitude of the Italian political centre towards 
Libya.
As an outside adviser at the Colonial Ministry,Nallino*s 
advice was based upon his own working knowledge of the Arab
6 6) Ronald S. Consolo,Op.Cit.,pp.193-4.
67) Seton-Watson,C .T .,Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 
(London,1967),p.3 81.
world, and as such was almost out of place amongst the 
the schemes for colonial aggrandisement that came to 
characterise increasingly the attitude of the officials 
and senior advisers at the ministery after the departure 
of Bertolini at the end of 1914.Bertolini himself, as 
the founder of the ministry, had been concerned to limit 
its colonial aims in view of the|limited budget allocated 
to the ministry,despite nationalist pressure to adopt 
expansionist policies.Lack of trained and experienced 
officials caused him to rely for advice and personnel 
upon the Foreign Ministry and the Colonial Ministry itself 
never really escaped from the dominance of the Foreign 
Ministry or achieved genuine independence or autonomy.
It was the need for Foreign Ministry support which had 
opened the way for the Department of Schools,headed by 
Scallabrini at the Foreign Ministry,to exercise its baleful 
influence upon the evolving of a native educational policy 
in Libya.Nallino's proposals in 1913 had stood no chance 
of acceptance in view of the hegemony .exercised by 
Scalabrini and his inspectors over educational affairs 
at the Ministry which combined with nationalist pressures 
to squeeze out Nallino's objective appraisal of the sit­
uation -the least jcolonialist policy advocated during these 
years.Only the setback to Colosimo's "Maximum” and "minimum" 
strategy at Versailles in 1919 and-Rossi ' s appointment as 
Minister of Colonies on 23 June 1919 enabled educational 
policies to emerge,which were more characteristic of Italian 
attitudes to Libya after 1911 than the Italianisation policy 
to which Bertolini had been forced to accede in 1913.
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If,however,Nallino•s Arabist policy had been 
evolved in terms of objective criteria»wbich only made 
sense in terms of a low-keyed colonial strategy,its 
availability in 1919,almost pre-packed and ready to hand, 
suited the convenience and interests of the government 
when low-keyed colonialism was at last becoming fashionable. 
The Arabs ,whose educational requirements were first 
expressed in the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania of June 
1919(68) had not so far produced a detailed educational 
approach! to the problems of Libya, or an approach that 
made sense in terms of their overiding linguistic ,cultural 
and linguistic aims.In formulating such demands in terms 
of a concrete policy,the "Consultative Committees" 
established in 1917 by Colosimo had done little more than 
voice the usual grievances ,harking back to Ottoman times, 
by calling for reforms in the field of professional and 
agricultural education(or at least that the government 
exercise some initiative; in these areas),but little 
else besides.(69)Certainly, it was in these areas that the
6 8 ) Art.10* Private education is free ,but the government 
reserves "the right to periodically inspect such schools. 
Elementary education will be obligatory for all males. 
Secondary and high schools will be gradually established. 
Art.11: For Moslems,all the material of instruction at 
the primary level and all scientific material at the 
secondary level will be imparted in the Arabic language. 
The Italian language will be taught to all classes,except 
the first three elementary classes,when it will be 
optional.
Art.12s It is forbidden to teach anything opposed to 
the principles of I slam.See,Giorgio Rochat,I^ Statuto 
Concesso alia Tripolitania nel 1919 in II Colonlialismo ~ 
I_taTiano( Torino, 1973), p. 108. [
69) Set up byR.D.ll March,1917,N.469 in each administrative 
district throughout Italian controlled Libya,the "Con­
sultative Committees" were composed of chiefs and Moslem 
notables.They debated a number of issues,including ed-
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Libyan population had been led to believe Italy would 
fulfil her"civilising mission" both by the tenor of the 
"casus belli" with Turkey, and also by Bertolini's own 
legislation,which had promised to provide both agricultural 
and professional education.(70),though Italy had subsequently 
done nothing in either area.
It was therefore in Nallino that both sides felt 
they had both a spokesman and an expert,who could be relied 
upon to express their legitimate demands in accordance with 
objective criteria and in respect of which, the proposals 
upon education already outlined by the Post-War Commission 
would provide a useful guide for the deliberations ahead.
It is in such a context that the educational articles of 
the Statutes of Libya should be seen, for if the law itself 
was recognised as an indication of Italy's good intent(71);
(contin.) ucation,agriculture,road construction, profess­
ional education,local industry.In education,attention was 
focussed upon professional and agricultural education of 
which Libya was in particular need because of the low 
standard of living and low agricultural yields.See,Contini, 
OjuCi^. ,p . 19.
70) R.D. 15 Jan.1914,N.56: Article l.of this decree under­
took to establish for "cittadini e sudditi Italiani" inst­
itutions of secondary,classical and technical instruction; 
and article I I . "professional education in the Schools
of Arts and Crafts,Agriculture and Commerce,etc.
71) Azzam Pascia,President of the Arab League, writing in 1919 
in the jCorriere della Sera in support of the Statutes of 
Libya ,indicated that the new laws had made a most fav­
ourable impression throughout the Arab world. By them
"the Italians have now revealed themselves to be a 
people of ideals with a true capactiy for Italo-Arab 
friendship on account of their liberal and civilised 
mien."He added:" We have only fought against Italy 
because we believed her to be on the road of the“colonial 
predators, an attitude that can no longer be sustained
in view of these providential laws,which have impressed 
the whole Arab world."See,Contini,Op.Cit.,p.19.
the educational provisions were likewise understood 
to represent the general principles upon with a 
future educational ordinance for Arabs in Tripolitania 
should be based.The timely appearance of the "Second 
Nallino Project" indicated precisely the terms in 
which the Statutes of Libya could be expected to 
receive final legal-sanction in the future.This,however, 
was a prospect viewed with not inconsiderable dismay 
by the Colonial Ministry both in 1919 and subsequently.
Chapter Five The Conceding of a Protectorate and the
Policy of Accommodation Evolved by Rodolfo j 
Micacchi 1918-1919
"R.D.l June 1919 for Tripolitania and R.D.
31 October for Cirenaica provided both 
colonies with an entirely new character 
through the grant of full'autonomy,whereby 
they were encouraged in the hope that complete
independence might eventually be conceded."
(*)
By the Wilsonian inspired Fundamental Laws of Tripolitania 
and Cirenaica of 1919 the natives of the country who 
were not cittadini italiani metropolitani became cittadini 
italiani so receiving status equal to that of Italians 
but not identical with it because Arabs kept their Moslem 
personal law.They also enjoyed guarantees of personal 
liberty ,inviolability of domicile and property,the right 
to compete in military and civil careers and professions, 
even in the kingdom of Italy,electoral rights(a local 
Parliament was shortly set up at Bengasi),the right of 
petition to the National Parliament,and the rights of 
sojourn and emigration.Respect of religion and local 
customs was guaranteed,liberty of the press and right of 
meeting were recognised,citizens couidnnot be conscripted 
for military service, no fiscal tribute could be imposed 
which was not the same for all or without the consent of 
the local parliament,revenue from taxes was to be used - 
for Cirenaican purposes exclusively ,the Arabic language 
was to be compulsory for the teaching of certain subjects 
in the schools and no precepts contrary to Islam were to 
be taught.In general all the inhabitants of Cirenaica,
*) MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi,Cart.15/1,Fasc.B-10:Il Nuovo 
Assetto Politico-Amministrativo."Gli Statuti Del 1919" 
(without author of date,possibly 1937),p.2.
whether Arab or Italian ,were equal before the law.An
rj •
adult Arab could acquire Italian citizenship if he 
fulfilled certain conditions.(1 )
In the unsettled political climate of Tripolitania# 
between the negotiations of Khalet el Zeituna in the 
spring of 1919(these had led directly to the conceding 
of the statute for Tripolitania in June) and the commence­
ment of new military-operations by Volpi to re-establish 
Italian sovereignty,in the March of 1922,the elaborate 
provisions of the statutes counted for very little in 
practical terms.Instead, Italian rule remained ,as during 
the years of the European War,mainly confined to Tripoli, 
Horns,Azizia and the Western coastal area.Outside these 
regions power remained in the hands of independent leaders, 
who exercised it in their own interest,regardless of the 
Italians or the Arab assembly convened at Misurata, 
which had set'up-.a Committee of Reform to continue 
negotiations with the Italian government with the aim of 
bringing about Libyan independence.lt was this assembly, 
founded during 1918 under Turco-Germanic 'influence by 
Ramadan al-Shitaiwi and known as the Jumhuriya al- 
Trabulsiya (the Tripolitanian Republic),that in 1921 
dispatched a special delegation to Italy to petition the 
central government for the setting up of a Tripolitanian 
Amirate,a proposal sanctioned by a special assembly of 
notables at Garian, and supported by the Italian socialists, 
communists and trades union movement.(2 )
2) Evans-Pritchard,0p .Cit.,p.213.For the complete text of 
the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania,See ,11 Colonlialismo 
Italiano,Op.Cit.,pp.106-111. |
3) The delegation ,however, received no official encourage-
Events proved more favourable to Italian plans for 
keeping the peace in Cirenaica,where the granting of the 
Fundamental Law of October 1919 was followed on 25 October 
1920 by an agreement which consolidated the Accord of 
Acroma of March 1917 in the form of a new treaty ,signed 
in October 1920 at El-Rajma.By the Treaty of El-Rajma,Sayyid 
Idris el-Senusi received the title of "Amir" and became 
head of an autonomous administration centred upon the oases 
of Jaghbub,Aujila,Jalu and Kufra with the right of using 
Ajadabiya as his seat of administration.(3)Evans*Pritchard 
summarises the gains of the new treaty to the Italians as 
follows:"the Italians claimed that by the Treaty of El-Rajma, 
they obtained a more definite acceptance of their authority 
over Cirenaica without having to make recourse to arms, 
in effect,however,El-Rajma had resulted in the establishment 
of a rough form of condominium,whereby Cirenaica was 
henceforth divided into two zones,Cirenaica proper under 
an Italian administration and the oases under Senusi control." 
(4)
By these agreements peace was generally maintained in 
Cirenaica between 1917 and 6 March 1923 when,a year after 
Volpi's attack upon Misurata,which began the second Italo- 
Senusi War,the governor of Cirenaica,General Luigi Bongiovanni 
ordered the occupation of the "mixed camps",so ending the
brief era of Italo-Arab condominium in Cirenaica,and extend­
(contin.) ment in Rome, and its leader,Mohammed Khalid 
al-Qargani,went on to attend the Moslem Revolutionary 
Congress in Moscow.See.Evans-Pritchard.Qp.Cit.,p.147.
ing the war to the whole of Libya.During the period of 
condominium,however,civil government had been established 
in Cirenaica from 1919 onwards,though Italian rule had 
been maintained(unlike in Tripolitania) from 1917 and even 
before.In Cirenaica, the Fundamental Law resulted in the 
setting up of a local Parliament,which between 1 April,1921 
and its final dissolution in March 1923 had five sessions. 
Although the work of the Parliament of Cirenaica in retrospect 
seems to have been of a purely transitory nature,it is 
difficult to say what it might have achieved if conditions 
in Libya had favoured its development, and its inauguration 
had not coincided with the seizure of power in Italy by 
Mussolini.
II.Micacchi*s Mission of 1919 and his Defence of the 
Italo-Arab Schools
"The gravest section of the Fundamental Law,as 
far as education is Concerned,lies in Article 
Eleven.This,if implemented,would not only lead 
to the complete abolition of the Italo-Arab 
school as we know itjbut,also,to the renunciation 
by the state of any effective control over the 
organisation and administration of the Arab 
sector of education in Libya."(5) .
Although the political and educational principles of the
Statutes of Libya were more in accord with the original
agreements entered into by Italy with Turkey at Lausanne
in 1912 than with subsequent Italian efforts to organise
the administration and governance of Libya upon the model
of an Italian commune or French colonyj the new agreements
immediately became the object of nationalist scorn in Italy,
where they were viewed either as a sell-out of Italian
interests or as a national humiliation to be reversed
5) Micacchi Report of July,1919(11 Decreto Reale I Giugno, 
1919:L’Istruzione per I *indigeni),p.144.
at the earliest political opportunity.(6 )This division 
of Italian opinion over Libya reflected the general 
fragmentation of political alliances within Italy and 
the worsening political,social,economic and financial 
crisis of the post-war situation ,which was to produce 
the Fascist Revolution of October 1922•
Educationally,the policy outlined by Nallino to the 
Post-War Commission,the principles of which found expression 
in the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania of June 1919,by 
reducing the position of the Italian language in the 
curriculum of the schools to that of an optional subject, 
not only transferred primacy to Arabic as the medium of 
instruction for virtually the whole curriculum;but seemed 
to undo at stroke,the main efforts of the educational 
bureaucracy ,headed by Scallabrini and now by Dr. (Rodolfo 
Micacchi,to make the Italo-Arab school,with its emphasis
upon the teaching of Italian,the principal educational
i
organ for Arabs in Libya.(7)Not surprisingly,therefore, 
the verbal affirmation of the principles of the forth­
coming statutes at Khalet el Zeituna in the Spring of 1919 
presented the Schools' Department at the Colonial Ministry 
with serious problems.To deal with the matter,the newly-
I ‘
appointed Director of Colonial Schools,Dr. jRodolfo Micacchi 
was dispatched to Tripoli during the Spring term 1919.His 
task was to arrive at a solution of the problems in hand by
6) See,Pace Biagio,II Fascismo e La Riconquista Della Libia 
in La Libia in Venti Anni Pi Occupazione Italiana(Ed .
T. Sillani,Roma,1933-XT),p.63#
7) Micacchi,L'Enseigqlementaux Indigenes,Op.Cit. ,p.494.
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reconciling the principles of the forthcoming statutes 
with pacific penetration and Italy's civilising mission.
(8) He was also to make a thorough study and inspection 
of all the existing educational facilities in Italian- 
occupied Libya(the first of its kind),so that a pre­
determined plan of/.action/cduld be drawn up for future 
educational goils ;.in Libya*/ ■.
On arriving in the country,Micacchi judged the internal 
situation to be as yet "unripe for the implementation of 
any major educational reforms",both because of the prevailing 
conditions of political uncertainty;and ,also,because the 
Statutes of Libya required to be translated into a whole 
range of separate policies of which education was only 
one.Only when this work had been accomplished satisfactorily 
could the new programme be expressed in its proper legis- . 
lative form, and then be implemented.(9)There was little 
chance of any progress being made upon these issues until 
internal stability returned to Tripolitania,which Micacchi 
did not believe(correctly as it turned out) would be for 
some time.(10) M icacchi,therefore, concentra ted upon 
carrying out the inspection of the schools and in drawing 
up a substantial report upon education in Libya for the 
Italian authorities in Libya and.in Rome.
In his defence of the Italo-Arab School,Micacchi shows 
himself to be as much concerned with the political role of
8 ) Ibid.,p.492.
9) Ibid.
10) Ibid.
these schools and the possible effects their disappearance 
would have upon Arab education and Italian colonialism,as 
with the ideological function of the Italo-Arab school as 
a vehicle of pacific penetration,moral conquest and civil­
ising mission.(11)Italo-Arab schools,he pointed out,while 
modelled upon the Franco-Arab school of Algeria,were 
different in so far as they were primarily intended for 
Arabs and not Arabs and Italians.(12)This could be regarded 
as an important point,the real implications of which were
not fully grasped by many administrators,who failed to 
distinguish adequately between the Italian national system 
and the native system for Moslems,that Bertolini had aimed 
to create with his 1914 ordinance.(13)This confusion was 
not altogether surprising for,as Micacchi admits,"the new 
system drawn up in the first days of our administration 
reveals many defects derived from the undue haste with 
which it was constructed,the new ordinances being compiled 
from the laws and regulations for the Italian schools 
all 'estero.and from the French scholastic legislation 
operating in Algeria.Thus the Bertolini legislation was v 
formulated in accordance with criteria aimed to suit the 
requirements of societies different in many ways from the 
social and cultural environment of Libya.As such,their 
suitability for the Libyan environment was never investigated, 
with the unfortunate result that many defects were only 
revealed after the policy had entered the statute book."(14)
11) Micacchi Report of July,1919(Fine politico 
delle istituzioni scolastiche coloniali), 
pp.145-150.
12) Ibid.(Le scuole Italo-Arab^,p.142.
13) Ibid.(R.D.1914 N.56),p.140.
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On the credit side,however,these schools,Micacchi 
believed,had shown a rapid development since the 
commencement of Italian rule in Libya both in Tripolitania 
and in Cirenaica.But they have been able to really "flourish",
he added,"only in areas firmly under Italian control,having 
disappeared completely in regions depleted of Italian 
forces.Even so,where they had managed to survive ,albeit
not without the support of Italian bayonets,they had proved
• . •*themselves to be popular with the Libyan population,or at
least,added Micacchi,"with that section of it prepared to 
collaborate with us."These schools(he stressed)had a
sound future ahead of them,provided they were well organised 
and run,provided with sound and experienced teachers,modern 
methods ,excellent buildings,good hygiene and carefully 
prepared programmesj in which circumstances,there was no 
doubt ,they could become most effective instruments of 
♦moral conquest' ".(15)
If,on the other hand,the director/argued,the Italo- 
Arab schools were "abolished",as would follow from any 
literal interpretation by the state of Article 11 of the 
Fundamental Law,not only would Italy be deprived of her 
principal instrument of "moral conquest",but the state 
would also lose all effective control over the schools 
in the political sense.(16)As evidence in support of his 
hypothesis ,Micacchi drew a parallel between the possible 
effects of implementing a wholly Arabist system in Libya, 
as would result from a thorough-going interpretation of 
the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania,and the effects already
15) Ibid.(Le Scuole Italo-Arabe),p.l42.
16) Ibid.(II Decreto Reale),p.143.
manifest from the implimentation of similar policies in Egypt.
The Arabist policies implemented by the British in response 
to the wishes of the population and its leaders,had resulted 
in the transformation of the native schools into"hotbeds 
of nationalism and perfect instruments for the Arab revolt'* 
with "disastrous consequences for British rule in Egypt."
(17) Thus,Italy had little option,Micacchi continued,if she 
wished to retain any semblance of her colonial position,but 
to regard the schools as a means of securing collaboration 
with the indigenous population.(18)The alternative to 
regarding the schools as instruments of "moral conquest", 
"pacific penetration" or "civilising mission" was rank 
capitulation"to those forces,amongst the indigenous 
population,whose set aim was to use the schools as a means 
of dissolving and subverting the political structures of 
the state."(19)For Micacchi,education in a colonial-type 
situation involved a strategy of "moral conquest",whereby 
collaboration would be brought about between the "dominant 
colonial power" and the "subject population",who were to 
be colonised.Even in situations,such as that of Egypt,where 
the "dominant power" had little direct interest in develop­
ing policies of metropolitan settlement,and the political 
relationship was expressed in the terms of a "protectorate", 
the adoption of an orientalist -type solution to the problems 
of the schools had failed to stave off political subversion
17) Ibid.,143.
18) Ibid.(Fine politico delle istitutuzioni scolastiche 
coloniali),p,145.
19) Ibid.(II Decreto Reale,1919),p.145
20) Ibid.
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and had directly led to a major confrontation between the 
indigenous population and the colonial power itself,which 
the very orientalist policy itself had been intended to 
avert.(20)Hence,Italy could and should learn,argued Micacchi, 
from the experience and mistakes of other colonial powers, 
for it was clear that the implementing of Arabist-type 
policies in Libya, would only partly appease the needs and 
aspirations of the population.Moreover,once the initial 
popularity of these measures,which were always well received 
by all sections of the Moslem population,had faded away,the 
schools would become by gradual degrees,centres for anti- 
Italian agitation,so worsening the dissent,which the new 
policies were intended to alleviate,if not -eradicate 
entirely.(21)The Fundamental Law of Tripolitania and Article 
11,decreeing the exclusive use of Arabic in the elementary 
schools, was already a disastrous step in the direction of 
political anarchy in Libya,Micacchi believed.In education, 
it would result in the abolition of the Italo-Arab school, 
one of Italy's best defences against political subversion 
in the colony,and also in the rejection of the "assimilating" 
policies of the Franco-Arab school in Algeria in favour of 
adopting the "non-assimilating" policies of the British 
in Egypt,the dangers of which had already mdre than adequately 
revealed themselves in the recent political upheavals 
against British rule in Egypt, in respect of which"the 
schools had played a major role."(22)Politically, it would
20)Ibid.
21)Ibid.(Fine politico delle istituzioni scolastiche 
coioniali),pp.145-150.
22)Ibid.,p.l47.
have been better if Italy had adopted the type of political 
and scholastic system operating in Tunisia,the director 
concluded,for there the French had evolved a "highly 
flexible system." The latter,he described as a quid medium 
between the system operating under the British in Egypt 
and the system adpted in Algeria,where direct rule applied. 
(23)
III.The Third Theory: Micacchi*s Concept of Accommodation
" Waldeck-Rousseau*s philosophy makes good sense- 
'Faisons evoluer les indigenes dans leur milieu 
national *;but it is equally important to remember 
that in a colonial situation,the material and 
moral development of the population should not be at 
the expense of the colonial power."(24)
As a possible solution to the problems of colonial education 
Micacchi presented to the Colonial Ministry his "third 
theory" which was to prove extremely influential ,as Italian 
rule developed in Libya,and gradually came to be accepted 
as the standard Italian attitude to Libyan education under 
fascist rule.(25)It was based upon the recognition that"the 
error of yesterday was the failure to comprehend the extent 
to which Arabs and Italians differed*,^ failuretfehkt-had; led 
to the importation into Libya of "our laws,customs,administ­
rative system with a view to assimilating the Arab population 
"The error of today",however,Micacchi deduced,"is the 
widespread belief that Arabs and Italians are totally 
different",and,also,that Arabs are|"irreparably closed to 
the penetration of our culture.""The truth in my opinion,"
23) Ibid.,p.l47•
24) Angelo Piccioli,L'Istruzione Publica In Libia,in La Libia 
in Venti Anni di OCcupazione Italiana.Qp.Cit.,p.115.
25) See,Ibid.,pp.110-116 j and A.Piccioli,La Conquista 
Morales La Scuola in La Rinascita Della Tripolitania. 
Qp.Cit.,pp.285-291.
he decidedlies somewhere between both extremes,and it 
is unnecessary to abandon hope of influencing the Arab 
population,simply because of our earlier failures in 
this field.Rather, should we seek ,through the adoption 
of sound techniques and principles,to establish a proper 
basis of mutual respect and interest,so as to produce 
a real spiritual rapprochement between Arabs and Italians. 
The means of achieving this goal,is a sound policy of 
accommodation,which is both liberal and progressive, by 
providing the necessary basis of evolution without at the 
same time irritating or harming native beliefs and customs 
belonging to the true social milieu of the population.In 
this- respect,we have to remember that the intellectual and 
moral elevation of the population represent a vital interest 
for Italy as well as a natural interest for the indigenous 
population itself."(26)Micacchi also developed the argument 
as it affected the material interests of the Moslem popul­
ation. At the practical level,this amounted to involving 
the school in the development of native agriculture,along 
with industrial and professional activity together with 
the development of local arts and crafts.Such work ,he 
believed,"should not be left to the state,irrespective of 
the importance of the state’s commitment to the construction 
of roads,railways and other public concerns,without which 
the country could not be adequately developed.Neither 
should it be left solely to the private industrialist or 
capitalist,irrespective of the importance of the latter 
as an employer of labour and in exploiting the natural 
resources of the country.Rather, government policy should
26) Micacchi Report of July,1919,pp.148-150.
aim at developing self-reliance amongst the indigenous 
population,through the imparting of a type of education 
that would teach the Arab to love and care for his own 
soil by using up-to-date methods of agriculture.At the 
same time ,such a policy would also develop local industries 
for which purpose Libya needed not only schools of agriculture 
but also of professional education as well as for the 
teaching of the more traditional arts and crafts."(27)
Thus the"third theory " evisaged a pattern of future 
collaboration involving both "moral conquest" and "economic 
conquest" by which Arabs would be brought into a true 
reciprocal understanding with their colonial masters.In 
this was,Micacchi added,"mutual understanding,tolerance 
and respect would characterise Italy’s relationship with 
the indigenous population;and by it the benefits of colonial 
rule would be shared equally between the colonials and 
the colonised."(28)
Having outlined for the benefit of the Colonial Ministry 
his own particular philosophy of colonial education,Micacchi 
was able to deal safely with those who advocated positions 
upon the subject which he did not share.The proponents of 
other views included the orientalist Professor Nallino, 
who was advocating with considerable success "environment­
al ism',' and also the general public,who tended to view all 
attempts to enlighten the peoples entrusted to Italy’s 
colonial dominion,as both wasteful and dangerous.In times
27) Ibid.,p.149.
28) Ibid.
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of economic decline,the arguments of the latter could 
not be ignored by Micacchi who,like many government 
officials,felt particularly threatened by the rise of 
socialism and the increase of anti-colonial sentiment 
generally in Italy.Such a tendency viewed with contempt 
the Colonial Ministry as dangerous and useless extrav­
agance which Italy could well manage without.(29)These 
attitudes were all the more worrying.because they were 
not the stock-in-trade of any particular group or alliance, 
but seemed to have entered into common parlance.First, 
there was the argument.of the disgruntled "metropolitans" 
which tended to take the form of an open declaration to 
the effect that "the Moslem of North Africa is refractory 
to all forms of progress and hence any attempt to get 
him to collaborate by means of the school is- a priori 
destined to fail." This was because of the general hostility 
in North Africa towards the school and the school curriculum, 
and the tendency for Arabs to attend only for a few weeks
after which they would cease to attend with any regularity. 
Also parents frequently would either prevent children from 
attending the schools or interfere with their attendance, 
once they had enrolled.(30)"This objection",reported Micacchi, 
"does not apply to the Libyans ,who,while remaining loyal 
to their faith and traditions,are essentially a pragmatic 
people,favouring progress and therefore experiencing little 
difficulty in adapting to change or accepting innovations, 
designed to benefit them .Moreover,by and large they welcomed 
the Italo-Arab schools and attend them spontaneously
29) Ibid.,p.150.
30) Ibid.
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and with the support and encouragement of their families.
This is despite the fact that these schools are insufficient 
in number and quality and at present only possess a 
rudimentary kind of curriculum.In Tripolitania(he added), 
where school attendance was purely voluntary,the rate 
of attendance at the Italo-Arab schools is much higher 
than attendance at the Kuttabs,and the schools are in 
a flourishing condition.Furthermore,such results have been 
obtained without any form of coercion other than the influence 
ofj propaganda and encouragement where seen to be necessary. 
(31)
In dealing with prepared positions which conflicted 
with his own view of colonial education as "moral conquest", 
Micacchi singled out for special criticism the British 
attitude in Egypt,and the Nallino approach,which was currently 
troubling the colonialist party in Italy and attracting 
Arab support in Libya.The first of these positions ,which 
Micacchi attributed to Lord Cromer(a man who was certainly 
no admirer of Islamic education and its institutions) had 
adopted the view that a. Westernised system of education was 
as bad for the indigenous population as for the colonial 
government.This conclusion rested upon the observation that 
the school easily "alienated the native child from his 
natural environment,so leading him to leave his work in 
the fields in preference for the opportunities of the city." 
Once arrived in the city,he rapidly became an"apostate" 
from his traditional culture through taking up some small 
time appointment,which,while bringing him a higher income
31) Ibid.
than he could gain from rural-type employment,was insufficient 
for him to live satisfactorily in the town.Thus antagonism 
towards the social and economic system became tne general 
attitude of such people.(32)"This criticism of the colonial 
school",affirmed Micacchi, " a m o u n t e d  in fact to praise in 
its favour: for whereas it is true that the native child 
frequently became critical of his familiar domestic envir­
onment on leaving the school,such disssatisfaction with the 
status quo was surely not a bad thing,since there was 
invariably much to criticise in that familiar environment • 
Also by equipping the native child with . a new awareness 
of life along with modern skills this was enabling him to 
come to deal with modern life on his own terms." The real 
"apostate",opined Micacchi,"will always be the exception
rather than the rule and should this occur,it ought not 
to be blamed upon the school,which cannot rightly be held ( 
to be responsible."A more telling criticism of the school 
(he continued) was the accusation that"those who have received 
a higher education,are more likely to turn out to be enemies 
of the colonial power.This position has been recently argued 
by a notable French writer(33)in respect of the Kabylie in 
Algeria" Micacchi paraphrases Cherveriat's argument as follows 
"the educated native is less easily governable than the
32)Ibid.(Obiezioni contro 1 'insegnamento per l'indigeni), 
p.150.
33)Cherveriat,L. ,A Travers la Kabylie et la Question Kabylie 
(Paris,1889).Other writers arguing in the same vein who
contributed heavily to the formation of the Micacchi 
standpoint were G.Hardy in Le Probleme Scolaire au Moroc 
(Casablanca,1920), and M.Poulard in L ’Enseighement laour 
les Indigenes en Alqerie(Alger,1909).Also see works by 
Waldeck Rouseau as listed in the Bibliography of this 
thesis.
ignorant native, since the education he has received 
places him in a position of intellectual superiority that 
enables him to more easily appraise his actual condition 
and that of his race generally in the country,and this 
can in some circumstances lead him to take action of a 
political nature."Such a situation could not apply to 
Arabs under Italian rule,Micacchi asseverates,since Italy 
has anticipated the development of a critical state of 
awareness amongst the Libyan population by conceding the 
Statutes of Libya,which are more liberal than those 
invoked by any other colonial power and can only lead 
Arabs to an awareness of the benefits of colonial rule.
Also the undoubted fact that,although some students will 
turn against the colonial power, this should not be taken as 
an argument against educational provision for^all Arabs,only 
against particular trouble makers.The school should aim at 
freeing the new generation from hostility towards the colonial 
regime .Should it fail to achieve this goal, the blame is more 
likely to lie with the pupils own particular environment,rath­
er than with the school as an institution.Sometimes,unrest is 
transmitted from hostile sources beyond the colony.(34)
The third and final objection to education for Italy's 
colonial subjects as conceivedLby Micacchi reverts to 
the previous issue(the schools transform basically contented 
individuals into discontented enemies of the status quo). 
since the solution advocated by Micacchi differed from that 
advocated by professor Nallino. In his handling of the 
right approach to this problem the director reveals his 
profound disagreement with Nallino urrpon the whole Nallino
34) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.152.
147
approach to the education of Libyans.Nallino blamed the 
dissatisfaction of the Arab population upon opposition 
to the government’s educational policy rather than upon 
any successes resulting from the application of that
policy,in particular,the use of the Italian language as/
the medium of instruction in the elementary schools.The 
fact that his policy had failed was viewed by Nallino as 
a good thing.Contrary to Micacchi*s observations upon the 
so-called popularity of the Italo-Arab schools with the 
population of Libya,Nallino affirmed that Libyans had 
'•expressed little interest in these schools or in getting 
to know Italian culture."For Nallino,Micacchi•s conviction 
that the Libyans could only be transformed into collaborators 
through the the teaching of the Italian language and culture 
was a complete misconception of the Arab mentality,which 
was alienated by such a policy.Collaboration would only 
result if Italy accepted the Libyan position upon education, 
Nallino believed,though beyond this> point the rival Nallino- 
Micacchi positions ceases to contain any element of compar­
ability ,since they begin to diverge along different polit­
ical paths,the one leading to autonomy,the other to the 
reimposition of "direct rule".
In his report to the Colonial Ministry,Micacchi,while 
avoiding any head-on collision with the policy of the Statutes 
criticised the proposals of the "illustrious professor 
Nallino" to the Post-War Commission,as being completely 
out of date in the circumstances obtaining in Libya since 
the conceding of the Fundamental Law.Micacchi*s argument 
in the latter respect was that since this law had guaranteed
full freedom of the press to the Libyan population,it 
was the government's responsibility to ensure that the 
new generation at least had a sufficient knowledge of »
Italian to be able to read the Italian point of view 
in the various national journals and newspapers circulating 
in Libya.Not only would a knowledge of Italian facilitate 
a more rational awareness of what was happening in the 
world,Micacchi opined,but it was also required if the 
population were to be freed from the "gossip" and "intrigue" 
nurtured by the Arab press both inside and outside the 
colony.(35)
IV.Micacchi's Proposals for Implementing the Statutes 
of Libya
"From all I have had to say up till this point, 
emerges the necessity of preserving and improving 
the Italo-Arab schools,even if possible,following 
the publication of the Decree of 1 June,1919."(36)
Once he had outlined his philosophical and strategic outlook 
upon the subject of colonial education as it affected the 
Moslem population in Libya,Micacchi set about detailing 
the methods which should be adopted by the Colonial Ministry 
in implementing the Statutes of Libya.Upon one thing,however, 
Micacchi was fully clear,namely the "necessity to maintain 
and improve the Italo-Arab school:Micacchi's whole approach 
to the question of implementing the Fundamental Law of Tripolit 
ania and formulating a Fundamental Law for Cirenaica revolved 
around this one point.This required finding a legal solution 
to Article 11 of the Fundamental Law which had decreed that
"all the material of elementary instruction .... ...........
must be taught in the Arabic language,though the Italian lang­
uage can be taught as an optional subject in the first three
35) Ibid.,p.153.
36) Ibid.(Necessita di mantener la scuola Italo-Araba),p.l55.
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elementary classes"(37)5 and secondly,Article 11 must be 
reformulated for the forthcoming Fundamental Law of 
Cirenaica,so as to ensure that Italian would be taught 
alongside Arabic in the Moslem elementary schools.(38)
In evolving a formula for dealing with Article 11 of 
the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania that would preserve 
the Italo-Arab school in the province in substance if 
not in name,Micacchi determined upon a method which would 
"respect the spirit of the law if not the letter."(39)
What was needed,he decided,was an"elastic interpretation 
of the word *optional *(facoltativo)"which could be arrived 
at without too much difficulty through exploring the 
significance of the ttord in the context of the Italian 
system?(40)For "in our regulations,the term 'optional* is 
meant to apply to 'optional courses *(inseqnamento facoltative) 
in the sense of implying a choice on the part of the student 
from amongst.a number of set courses.lt is also used in the 
sense of implying courses that can be established,but which 
.the student is not necessarily obliged to attend."(41)As it 
is the second interpretation of the term 'optional' which 
seemed to have most relevance to Libya,in view of the 
director's desire to preserve at all costs the teaching 
of the Italian language in the country, he drew attention 
to a cultural argument which would strengthen the second 
interpretation of the Fundamental Law.Italy must make
37) Ibid. _
38) R.Micacchi,L'Enseigrjementaux Indigenes,Op.Cit•,p .494.
39) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.156.
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid.
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provision for the teaching of Italian in the coastal areas 
of Tripolitania and Cirenaica,he continued,because Italian 
is the lingua franca of the Mediterranean and these areas 
are integral to the Mediterranean region.(42)Thus Micacchi's 
aim was to ensure that the government interpreted Article 
11 of the Tripolitanian Statute as widely as possible,so 
as to avoid a situation arising in the future,whereby the 
Arab nationalists could use the Article as a means of 
vetoing Italian linguistic and cultural activity in the 
region,an activity Micacchi was determined to maintain 
as a means of securing Italy's political position. : a 
.Even so this was only half a solution tovthe problem 
of how to retain instruction in the Italian language in 
the elementary schools for Arabs of Tripolitania,since, 
as Micacchi was fully aware,optional courses at which 
attendance was not obligatory were frequently a waste of 
time and effort.(43)Therefore,"we will have to continue 
to maintain the existing Italo-Arab schools and also 
establish,where they are requested,parallel elementary 
schools which will teach exclusively in the Arabic language, 
so leaving it optional to the indigenous population which 
schools they wish to attend.11 Thus", he continued,"the situation 
will be similar to what it is at present vis-a-vis the 
Italian national schools and the existing Italo-Arab 
schools.lt is a matter of 'option* which of these schools 
the Moslem population wish to attend,as we can neither 
compel them to attend the national schools nor prevent
42) Ibid.
43) Ibid.,p.156.
44) Ibid.
them from attending if they so wish."(44) Micacchi 
concluded,therefore,that the Fundamental Law required 
the government to interpret Article 11 in the sense 
indicated,namely to provide elementary schools in which 
Arabic would be the only language of instruction(at least 
for Tripolitania)jbut did not exclude the provision of 
"other schools",which would be bilingual.(45)The choice 
of which schools to attend would be left to the Arab 
population itself,it being naturally assumed by Micacchi 
that "those who wish to collaborate with us" would 
choose to attend the Italo-Arab schools already provided.
In this sense the government would have provided"full 
freedom of choice "in the matter of elementary education. 
(46)Micacchi affirmed that such an interpretation of the 
Fundamental Law,and Article 11 particularly,had the full 
approval and backing of the Uffico Politico-Militare in 
Tripoli,and also of "some of the Arab notables",including 
the nationalist leader,Suleiman Bey Barunhi who,while 
affirming"the absolute necessity of upholding the Fundamental 
Law in its integral aspect"> was prepared to accept that 
Micacchi's interpretation did not necessarily contravene 
Article ll.(47)It is doubtful,however,whether the ex-deputy 
Barunni accepted the Director's interpretation of the 
Statute of Tripolitania,as wholeheartedly as the latter 
inferred,since it so clearly flouted the letter of the law 
and violated its spirit.(48)
45) Ibid.
46) Ibid.
47) Ibid.,p.157.
48) Barouni Bey and Ferhat Bey had been the very spirit of 
opposition to the idea of Italian rule since its first 
inception in October 1911.See.Ostler,Op.Cit.,Chpts 16-17.
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The conceding of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania 
in principle during the early Spring of 1919 seems to have 
taken the Ministry of Colonies off its guard,hence the * 
need to rush Micacchi to Libya before the final details 
could be worked out and the agreement sanctioned in the 
form of an official decree,which was not until June 1919. 
(49)lt would appear therefore that the Fundamental Law 
was agreed in principle,at least a month before its entry 
on the Statute Book.This left Micacchi in the position of 
having to react to an agreement between the Italian 
government and the Libyan nationalists of which he disapproved 
in both principle and practice;but which,as a civil servant, 
he was obliged to accept and implement in such a way as 
to avoid creating a situation of embarrassment for his 
employers.(50)The need to accept the expediency of the 
government's tactics,as a means of both stalling for time 
on the political front and avoiding a further military 
embroglio required the Director of Colonial Education to 
resort to the tactics of a trickster in a fair-ground 
who,on seeing the day's takings on the point of being 
consumed by a lucky contestant,calls a foul so as to keep
the kitty intact!Similar devious huckstering is also apparent 
in Micacchi's handling of the educational issue in Cirenaica. 
Here he claimed that the Consultative Committees in the latter 
colony had already communicated to the government their
49)It is impossible to state from existing sources the 
exact date when Micacchi actually arrived in Libya 
for the commencement of his mission,though it must 
have been not later than the early spring of April 
of 1919 for his report to have been written by July 
1919.See,Micacchi Report,Op.Cit.,pp.l & 2.
50)Ibid.,p.143.
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educational expectations as follows:
1) An elementary form of instruction for the mass 
of the population to include reading and writing in 
Arabic and where possible in Italian as well.Elementary 
notions of arithmetic,hygiene,agriculture,manual work, 
along with religious education to be taught without 
any restriction or impediment in accordance with Libyan 
aspirations.
2) A further kind of elementary education,but some­
what wider in scope,for pupils wishing to prepare them­
selves for the secondary schools.Also, for those who 
want to take up modest commercial and professional posts 
or to aspire to humble posts in the public service either 
as ushers and assistants or as non-commissioned officers 
in the Zaptie.
3) A secondary form of instruction for the sons of 
notables who need a reasonable education if they are 
to occupy a fitting position in public life.
4) A more advanced or higher training for the prep­
aration of Imam and C a d i ,e t c . ,e t c . (51) S
. . I
Upon the basis of this information,which was in fact 
derived from a special government communication dated 22 May, 
1919(No 2464/10),Micacchi was able to persuade the Ministry 
of Colonies(if it needed any persuasion) to frame the forth­
coming Fundamental Law of Cirenaica so that,while reproducing 
Articles 10 & 12 of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania,it 
modified Article 11 of the latter decree in favour of the 
retension of bilingual teaching in the government elementary 
schools for Moslems.(52)In seeking to base his proposals for 
the educational development of Cirenaica upon the deliberat­
ions of the Consultative Committees of Cirenaica,Micacchi 
was attempting to demonstrate that the Mthird theory1* had 
some popular support amongst the Libyan population.If so, he 
was certainly overplaying his hand,since although there was 
a political recognition in Cirenaica that bilingualism in the
51_lMicacchi Report of July, 1919(Fine politico dellje istituz- 
| ioni ■ scolastiche coloniali),p.146.Also,see L *Enseignement 
aux Indigenes,Op.Cit.,p .494.
52)See,R.D.31 ottobre,n.2401.Norme fondamentali per l'assetto
schools was necessary for the implementation of condominium 
in the colony,there was also a recognition that the future ' 
pattern of public education must be thoroughly Islamic,some­
thing which Micaccchi had conveniently overlooked.The actual 
position of the Consultative Committees of Cirenaica upon the 
subject of^education was clearly expressed to the government 
in February,1919,barely 2 months before the negotiations of 
Khalet el-Zeituna.1t is hardly conceivable that they could 
have changed their minds upon the future of education in the 
colony in so short a space of time.(53)Thus,although Micacchi 
in 1919 was able to find a way to implement the Fundamental 
Law of Tripolitania,including the controversial [Article 11, 
while at the same time preserving the Italo-Arab schools,and 
also prevent Article 11 from finding expression in the forth­
coming Fundamental Law for Cirenaica,he was unable to affect 
the desire of the Consultative Committees for an Islamic 
type of Education in the future.This desire would find ample 
expression in the complex negotiations ahead between the 
Senusi leader,Sayyid Idris el-Senusi ,and the Italian govern** 
ment for the implementation of the Fundamental Laws in Ciren­
aica. Article 11 of the Tripolitanian Fundamental Law would, 
however,prove[ an insuperable obstacle as far as the fulfilmen 
of the decree was concerned.The Italo-Arab schools would remai. 
as before,but Micacchi would plead that he could not set up 
elementary schools in the Arabic language because of the prob­
lem of securing politically trustworthy Arab teachers from 
the surrounding Moslem countries.
contin. della Cirenaica,B.U.C.,601.Also,see Micacchi Report 
of July,1919,p.159 and L*Enseignement aux Indigenes,p.495
53) See,infra,Chapt.Six,Section II.,p.174.
Thus,the Micacchi proposals for the implementation of 
the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania were,despite his declar­
ation to the contrary,undoubtedly at variance with both the 
nature and spirit of the Statute,which had in effect under­
taken to concede linguistic,cultural and religious autonomy 
to the colony.His proposals for Cirenaica too,while capit­
alising upon the j apparent preparedness of the Libyan populat­
ion to accept the idea of bilingualism in the government 
elementary schools,made no attempt to develop their desire, 
as expressed in the negotiations over the Accord of Acroma 
in 1917 or in the Consultative Committees,for a Islamic system 
of education.(54)As Micacchi was clearly not in any serious 
ignorance of Libyan aspirations in both colonies,the conclus­
ion must be drawn that he had declined to support such aspir­
ations in deference to special reasons which he shared with 
ruling circles in the colonial administration.The political 
and nationalistic assumptions of the Micacchi case have been 
sufficiently examined to show that such an inference must 
be regarded as on the whole valid.It remains,however, to 
examine Micacchi*s early attitude to the Orientalist policy 
put forward by Professor Nallino to the Post-War Commission 
in 1919 and also to Libyan wishes for an Islamic system of 
education.Both should be seen primarily as integral to his 
proposals for implementing the Statutes of Libya in both 
Tripolitania and Cirenaica,though they should also be consid­
ered in the light of his "third theory" or the future of 
Libyan education in a colonial situation where Italy would be 
the!dominant authority.
54)3See infra,Chapter Six,Section II.,Note 24,p.173 jlbid., 
p.174 ; and p.175.
Both the Nallino and Libyan positions for Tripolitania 
and Cirenaica were in close aggreement regarding the subject
of the future development of the Kuttabs.Micacchi was obliged 
to recognise in 1919 that the Fundamental Laws could not be 
implemented in either colony without some reference to the 
Kuttabs.His own attitude towards these schools,which were 
traditional to all Moslem countries,was highly critical.Not 
only were the Kuttabs,he observed,unhygienic and substandard 
as places of public education,but the teachers who ran them 
were both underpaid and for the most part virtually unlettered. 
There can be little doubt that Micacchi himself shared the 
attitude of many colonial educators towards these schools, 
which were regarded as being responsible for the relative 
backwardness of Islamic cuiture and society at this time.The 
almost exclusive development of the powers of memory at the 
expense of the other faculties was seen as both "atrophying 
the intelligence"and being the cause of the"distance and host­
ility "of the Moslem world to "contemporary civilisation".(55) 
In the circumstances of 1919,however,Micacchi recognised that 
no system of popular education was possible in Libya without - 
making use of the Kuttab.TheEe were simply not enough Italian 
teachers to send to distant centres in the colony,even if such 
an idea was feasible.Furthermore,he did not believe the Kuttabi 
were politically dangerous,since only Libyan teachers would be 
required to work in them,and not foreign Moslems,who might 
import^into the country dangerous anti-colonial ideas.Micacchi 
therefore,had no j hesitation- in advocating the reform of the 
Kuttab,along lines adopted in Tunisia by the French.Such a ref
55) See,Miccachi Report of July,1919,p.152.
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orm if carried out in Libya would require the training of 
teachers for the Kuttabs,modern installations,a more rational 
curriculum,and the banning of the Bastone,"at present,the 
principal means of correction".By such a reform,he concluded, 
the Kuttabs could become part of the general system of educat­
ion in Libya,instead of merely diffusing religious instruction. 
(56)
Despite the importance attached by Nallino and the 
Libyans to the subject of secondary education,which was such 
a marked feature of the Fundamental Law,Micacchi retained 
almost complete silence upon the matter,other than to reit­
erate the Bertolini proposal to set up a School of Islamic 
Culture for the training of cadi and mufti.His final recomm­
endations make only token reference to secondary education 
for Moslems and are part of Micacchi*s general recommendations 
for all education in the colony.These amounted to the follow­
ing :
1) Italian-type schools(infant,elementary,post- 
elementary and secondary);(*)
2) Schools for Libyan citizens(elmentary Italo-Arab 
schools,Arab elementary schools,Arab secondary schools and 
a School of Higher Islamic Culture);
3) Schools of Professional Education.(57)
56) Ibid.,p. 162.
*) These schools were intended for Italian citizens 
(metropolitani).
57) Micacchi Report of July,1919(11 Nuovo Ordinamento Scol- 
astico),p.176( Micacchi's silence upon the subject of 
secondary education for Moslems,especially in the form 
outlined by Nallino in the Post-War Commission's Report 
of i919,emphasised his own misgivings.Political circum-_ 
stances,he privately believed,while not jpublicly admitt­
ing at this point,would make it virtually impossible to 
implement the the Fundamental Laws in the matter of sec­
ondary education for Moslems.See,infra,Chapt.Nine,Section 
VI.,pp.292-297)
Chapter Six The Establishing of a Protectorate in 
Cirenaica and the Final Formulation of 
Liberal Educational Policy (R.D'.53February 
1922 and P.M.14 September 1922) 1919-1922
H ....in my humble opinion,Italy should 
adopt in Libya the system of a protectorate 
and abandon the idea of direct rule,which 
will be as expensive there as it has been 
to France in Algeria."(*)
Both the Nallino proposals to the Post-War Commission 
and the Micacchi counter-proposals to the Ministry 
of Colonies,irrespective of their particular pedigrees 
and separate histories,were the result of two different 
, if interelated crises affecting Italy at this time.
The first was the changed international situation 
following the eriding of the 1914-1918 War,especially 
in so far as it affected Italy's short-term and long­
term plans in Africa.The second was the particular 
crisis facing the Italian government in Libya,where 
there was a real threat in Tripolitania of further 
armed confrontation with the( Arab population,which 
could quickly engulf Cirenaica with which Italy had 
been at peace since the signing of the Accord of Acroma 
with the Sensusi in 1917.In the changed political 
situation neither the Nallino nor Micacchi solutions 
could be applied until condominium had been definitely 
established in the two Libyan provinces under Italian 
rule by the setting up of separate parliaments,which 
would be free to accept or reject the new policies.
*)MAI-AS,Pos.109/1tFrom Victor Cattan to H.E.the 
Minister of Colonies,Tunis,19 October 1920.
Only following acceptance by the forthcoming parliaments 
of Tripolitania and Cirenaica could the royal assent be 
given by the king of Italy to any new educational measures, 
which would then be expressed in the Statute Books as 
separate decrees for the two provinces.
The key problem therefore facing the Italians in 1919 
regarding Libya was the need to proceed as rapidly as 
possible with the establishment of some form of condominium 
for the country.Unless this could be achieved rapidly and 
painlessly,the recently conceded Statutes of Libya would 
not be worth the paper they were written on , before the year 
was out.Seen as a policy which attempted to secure Arab 
acceptance of Italy's sovereignty in Libya by the pen 
rather than by the sword,Arabs and Italians were required 
by it to settle their mutual disputes by diplomatic rather 
than military means.Such a strategy was infinitely more 
difficult to achieve in Tripolitania than in Cirenaica,where 
the Accord of Acroma had provided a basis for future 
discussions,since Arab nationalism on the one hand,and the 
independent power of the individual tribal chiefs on the 
other,made it impossible virtually that either side would 
be able to secure a sufficiently solid platform upon which 
a modus vivendi of any form could be constructed.(1 )In 
Cirenaica,however,the reverse situation tended to apply,for
in the powerful politico-religous ! Senusi 0rder(2) led by
1) See.supra.Chapter Five(Introduction).
2) Writing in the December edition of the Nuova Antologia,192C 
Malvezzi draws on Savino Acquaviva's description of the 
Senusi(Il Problema Libico e .11 Senussismo,Roma,1917),as 
being a "great politico-j reliqous confraternity with 
around three million adherents whose influence extends
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the Sayyid Mohamed Idris El-Senusi,Italy found a quasi-Statal 
focus of political power with which it was possible to arrive 
at a measure of diplomatic agreement,sufficient to ensure 
the achieving of the desired modus vivendi ,whereby condominium 
might be established through the setting up of a semi-protect­
orate. (3)
In 1920-21,that most unstable of years for Italian col­
onial policy,as it affected Libya(4),the predicament facing the 
government in Tripolitania was best grasped by an outsider, 
the Italophile lawyer,Victor Cattan(5),who addressing the 
Minister of Colonies,Rossi,from Tunis urged him to abandon 
the whole idea of direct rule in Libya,and adopt a form of 
government expressed in terms of protectorate status for the 
colony,on the lines already adopted by France in Morocco and 
Tunisia.Direct rule,Cattan argued,had never been a success in 
the French colonies,especially in North Africa,where it had 
only been applied to Algeria with any degree of success,though 
the expense to the treasury had been insupportable.(6 )Cattan, 
however,mitigated his argument in the case of Tripolitania,the
Achille's heel of Italian policy in Libya,because of the 
existence of rival tribes"enemies lacking a primus inter pares
(contin.)not only to Cirenaica,but also to the Sudan,Boru,
Darfur,Tibesti,Uadai as well as to Tunisia,Algeria,Morocco, 
Senegal and to the Beni-Harb tribe in Arabia"*"L*Accordo Italo- 
Senussita" in Nuova Antoloqia 1170 of 16 Dec.1920 by Aldobrandino 
Malvezzi.
3) See.supra.Chapter Five(Introduction)•
4) During 1920,the Colonial Ministry was occupied by no less 
than four different ministersiRossi,L.(23.6.1919-13.3.1920); 
Nitti,F.(14.3.1920-21.5.1920);Ruini,B.(22.5.1920-14.6.1920); 
and Rossi again(15.6.1920-3.7.1921).
5) See,Victor Cattan to the Minister of Colonies,October,
1920(unpaginated ms.).
6 ) Ibid.
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through which Italy might exercise a benevolent neutrality” 
in the form of a protectorate.(7)The problem,as Cattan saw 
it,lay in the impossibility of a Christian power dealing 
directly with Moslem subjects without offending the religious 
susceptibilities of the latter.The only way out of the 
seeming impasse was to secure the support of a local chieftain 
or leader sufficiently strong in his own right to be able 
to pacify local rivalries and disputes without compromising 
either himself or the colonial power in the process.Without 
such a collaborator,Cattan argued,Italy could not hope to 
arrive at a form of diplomatic settlement with the tribes 
of Tripolitania,and without arriving at such a settlement, 
condominium and protectorate status,as envisaged by the 
Fundamental Law of Tripolitania could never become practical 
politics or lead to the establishment of civil government 
of the province.The lawyer also ruled out the remaining 
possibility for achieving collaboration,namely through 
securing the support of the prominent nationalist leader, 
Suliman El-Barouni.No”orthodox chieftain” can give his 
confidence to El-Barouni,he concluded,because ”the latter 
is an 'Ibadite* or kind of heretic” . He is also”heavily 
involved with the Pan-Islamic Movement,which will never 
be content to see Italy at peace in Libya.”(8)
The establishment of a protectorate in Cirenaica, 
however,was perfectly feasible,for whereas the war 
had "utterly destroyed the Sultan's power in Tripolitania” 
it had left unaffected the position of the Senusi in Cirenaica 
and "in the eyes of the Moslem world,Sayyid Idris El-Senusi 
is the only political and religious chieftain in Cirenaica,
\
7) Ibid.
8 ) Ibid.
whose influence is incontestable ,and whose power to 
pacify the country almost certain.”(9) Thus by consolidating 
her agreements with Sayyid Idris in Cirenaica,Italy could 
hope to regularise her position as a colonial power.In 
this respect a protectorate was required which would be 
similar in its most important respects with the protectorates 
already established by Britain and France in Egypt and 
North Africa.The chances,however, of arriving at a modus 
vivendi in Tripolitania were more problematical and entirely 
unaffected by the conceding of the Fundamental Law of June 
1919.This was never implemented in the province and emergent 
nationalism and tribal particularism continued to struggle 
for ascendancy,regardless of the Italian presence,which was 
confined only to Tripoli itself and a few coastal towns.
ti.The Formulation of Arab Demands and the Emergence of 
an Arab Educational Policy for Libya
"Reform the so-called 'Kottab*(Koranic Schools) 
and'Mederse'(Higher Islamic Schools),according 
to the ordinances in vigour in Tunisia and in 
Egypt."(10)
The absence of any,-single political or religious leader, 
capable of acting as an "arbitrator" between the rival
chieftains,and willing to collaborate with the Italians, 
must be judged as the most obvious single factor in
9) Ibid.(Cattan based his views upon the general hypothesis 
that Islam was,at the time of his writing to the Minister 
of Colonies,undergoing a grave crisis,Vhich-communic&ted 
to Moslems the strong impression that,as a result of the 
War ,they had been disinherited,and were( like the Jews) 
on the point of becoming a people without a language or 
flag of their own.This fear was currently expressing 
itself through the Pan-Islamic Movement and would,Cattan 
believed,take a violent form in all Moslem countries.
Even when violence did not occur,he saw a deep anxiety 
taking root,which "would become the enemy of progress.")
10)MAI-AS,Cirenaica(1918-1919),pos.140/3,Fasc.22» Ministry
explaining the failure of the Arab population in 
Tripolitania to evolve an I educational policy after 
1915(when Italy entered the European War) which could be 
described as Arab in language,religion and culture.The 
nearest the Tripolitanian Arabs approached to formulating 
such a policy were the discussions at Khallat el Zeituna 
which had led to the conceding of the Fundamental Law.
There can be little doubt that the educational articles 
of this decree,were the work of the Arab nationalist and 
pan-Islaraic spokesmen on the Arab side,such as Ferhat Bey 
and Barouni Bey, and not of the Italian negotiators}who 
were notoriously unversed in Islamic matters^beingo 
primarily concerned with political and military goals. 
Unfortunately for the development of the educational aspect 
of the Arab position,the unity amongst the Tripolitanian 
Arabs ,which had led to the Fundamental Law,was too fragile 
to last longer than the summer of that year.(11)Thus Articles 
10,11 and 12 of the Fundamental Law provide the historian 
with the only glimpses of the educational position of Arab 
nationalism and Pan Islamism in Libya at this time,since 
no attempt was made to develop them,in view of the break­
down of negotiations with the Italians and the outbreak 
of fighting between rival groups on the Arab side.
To gain a further idea of the state of Arab opinion 
upon the subject of education in Tripolitania in these 
years,it is necessary to examine the reactions of the Arab
(contin.)of colonies,General Directorate of Civil Affairs 
and Public Works,Roma,27 April 1918:the petition of the 
native consultative committees upon agricultural and comm­
ercial education.
11) See,J.Sandison,"The Italian Conquest of Tripolitania" 
(Condensed from R.Rapex,L'Affirmazione della Sovranita 
Itatlana sulla Tripolitania).Italian Rule in Tripolitania. 
B.M.A.(Tripoli,1947),p.2Q.
leaders,and population at large,to the various Italian 
initiatives in the field of education between 1911 and 1922. 
The way,they reacted,for example,to the Medersa proposals of 
1915 and 1917,or to the Italo-Arab schools in those few 
places where such schools had been established.(12)These 
dissatisfactions,however,never became precise formulations 
of the Arab point of view, and it is doubtfult whether 
such a point of view could be said to exist before 1919 
except in nationalist and pan-Islamic circles.Certainly,
religion being the sensitive issue it was in Libya,the 
Italian government increasingly recognised that its 
earlier policies required to be reformulated to take 
greater account of religious,linguistic and cultural 
needs.The exact degree of accommodation needed ,however, 
was,as has been shown,a matter of considerable dispute 
amongst the Italians themselves,hence the rival Nallino 
and Micacchi proposals.
In terms of practical politics,the question of meeting 
the Arab demands upon educational issues always revolved 
atound the central problem of collaboration itself,and 
the Nallino proposals would in succeeding years come to 
grief,becauselof their failure to take sufficient account 
of this factor.Thus*even after the conceding of the Fund­
amental Laws*the government was reluctant to treat with 
the party of Arab nationalism in Tripolitania,except on
12) See.supra . chpt.Four(Arab Opposition to the Govern­
ment's Educational Policies).
13) See,The Petition of the native consultative committees 
upon agricultural and commercial education,27 April,19 
18(unpaginated ms.),Op.Cit.
on its own terms.Moreover,the party of Arab nationalism 
and its supporters was still an insufficiently cohesive 
force in Libya to be able to either impose its terms 
upon the Italian government or upon the independent Arab 
chieftains of the Gebel and the coastal plains.Thus the 
channel for expressing opinion upon education continued, 
as before,to be the Consultative Committees originally 
promised by Bertolini,and only set up by Colosimo teith 
R.D.ll March 1917,N.469.As only those Arabs who were 
prepared to collaborate in some form with the government 
(and whom the government found acceptable for such a 
role) ever sat on such committees,it is not surprising, 
therefore,that their minutes i contain no reference to 
either the nationalist or pan-Islamic premise.(13)Instead, 
the discussion of educational issues tended to revolve 
around practical projects,such as the understood need 
to provide agricultural and commercial facilities in the 
field of education,for the population of Tripolitania.
It is more than likely that those who participated in 
the discussions of the Consultative Committees would have 
recognised that the question of actually formulating 
policy was a matter for the Ministry of Colonies and not 
an issue to be debated openly.Collaboration was understood 
by the Italians to involve acceptance of such a position, 
and the Colosimo programme of February 1918(14) was largely 
devised to satisfy the aspirations of the Consultative 
Committees,whether in Tripolitania or in Cirenaica,since
14) See, supra,Chpt.Two(Gaspare Colosimo's Reformulation 
of the Bertolini Premise,1916-1919).
the latter were no more than had been promised by Bertolini 
in 1914.Collaboration through”consultation”assumed that 
both parties understood the essence of the government's 
strategy for Libya,which in 1918 was still the need to 
train Arabs as farmers,though,as with so many Other aspects 
of Italian colonial policy affecting the Moslem population, 
little serious thought had gone into methods of implementing 
the government's high-minded aims.It was,nonetheless,at 
this time recognised by all concerned with colonial devel­
opment that investment would not take place in the sphere 
of Libyan agriculture* until Libyans could be trained in 
accordance with modern ideas and methods.Only through the 
development of skilled manpower resources could the then 
abysmally low level of agricultural productivity(the root 
cause of widespread-poverty and near starvation in the 
Libyan rural-areas) be raised to profitable levels.(15)
In the latter sense,therefore, the Consultative Committees 
only advanced the government's own premise,namely the 
need to provide theoretical and practical facilities for 
the training of Libyan farmers at the existing centre 
for agricultural development at Sidi Mesri,outside Tripoli* 
or at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli,though 
some proposals envisaged agricultural training in special
15) ”At best,"writes Claudio Segre,”as the Italian tech­
nicians pointed out,the traditional techniques prov­
ided only a subsistence living.Indigenous agriculture 
yielded no more than three head of livestock and 1.5 
quintals of major crops per capita .Even thj-s meager 
subsistence was constantly threatened by drought.... 
Moreover,the indigenous system of agriculture was 
static.By themselves, the Libyans were unlikely to 
break the precarious cycle of their existence,a mem­
ber of Franchetti's mission to Tripolitania had observed, 
and even with the stimulus of outside investments and 
new techniques,the Libyans would be slow to change 
their ways."Op.Cit.,p.147.For an account of the addit­
ional poverty and suffering caused by the Italo-Turkish
rural centres established throughout the country or 
attached to the Italo-Arab schools.(16)
The government was also interested in the proposals 
put forward by the Consultative Committees of , Tripolitania 
to reform the Italian Secondary School in Tripoli in order 
that its facilities should be made more equally available 
to Arabs.In this respect at least,the Colonial Ministry 
had already done something to reform the school with such 
ideas in mind.(17)Again,however,as with the agricultural 
proposals put forward by the Committees,we see this 
seemingly modest request for better educational facilities 
at the secondary level,a proposal-fully in agreement with
(contini.) War in Tripolitania,where it caused widespread 
population displacement, see Ostler's graphic descriptions 
in Chapter XXVII(Starving wives and children....The Arab 
Poor) of The Arabs in Tripoli(Op.Cit.).
16) Although the government had repeatedly re-affirmed its 
intention to provide agricultural training for Libyan^ 
farmers,it had,in effect,done nothing,since the closure 
of the Turkish Agricultural school in 1911,to put its 
aims into practice.On the occasion of the final meeting 
of the Tripolitanian Consultative Committees in the 
Spring of 1918,the case had again ; been ^ presented £y h i  
Libyans for agricultural training facilities.And with 
"great clarity and persuasiveness,they had shown them­
selves ready to put into practice the government's 
policy with a desire to obtain some concrete results." 
Once again,however,the Civil Affairs Department had 
avoided taking any action on the issue,instead referr­
ing to Rome with vague outlines as to the possibility
of either using the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, 
or the Experimental Station at Sidi Mesri for such a 
purpose.This vacillation was further accentuated by the 
Colosimo Report itself,which avoided any direct committ­
ment to taking practical measures "until the political 
and military situation in the colony improved."See,Caruso 
to the P . C .M.,Op.Cit.,p.2;Colosimo Report(Agricultural 
Education),Op.Cit,p.374;and Minutes of the Consultative 
Committees of Cirenaica,Op.Cit.
17) See,R.D. 16 Dec.1917,N.2155,B.U.C.,1918,15.
the government's own stated policy,frustrated largely 
in Tripoli by the local bureaucracy,who avoided taking any 
action on the issue by passing it on to Rome.From there it 
entered into the educational section of the Colosimo 
Report of February 1918 and served the interests of Italian 
propaganda at a delicate phase in Italy's negotiations 
with the Allies for more African colonies but did nothing 
to alleviate educational conditions in Tripolitania.
In its handling of this issue,we see for perhaps the 
last time in Libya's first phase as a colony"directly under 
the crown",the bureaucracy at work in respect of native 
affairs.The original weakness of the Italian system,reveals 
itself in the attempt to systematise Arab affairs through 
the legislative and bureaucratic channels of the Kingdom 
of Italy.The Arab proposals,as put forward by the Consult­
ative Committees of Tripolitania,that Arab pupils wishing 
to attend the Italian secondary school for the purposes 
of further education,would greatly improve their chances 
of success at this school,if they first prepared themselves 
by attending the third grade of the Italian elementary 
school was perfectly in accord with government policy.It 
was a simple request that could easily have been dealt with 
at the local level in a normal situation.Unfortunately,the 
situation in Tripoli was far from normal and simple solutions 
were apt to take a long time before the effects became 
apparent.A highly centralised bureaucracy could only react 
to such a simple request by referring i t t o  Rome with"the 
additional proviso that Arab pupils could not enter the 
Italian elementary schools directly-from the Italo-Arab
Schools since the regulations of the Italian Schools
Abroad required that they should first sit an entrance
examination.(18)As a further dissuasive,the Civil Affairs
Department advised that an"undesirable precedent would be
established",if the Committees proposals were accepted by
the Ministry,since"it would incite fear and envy amongst
the Jewish population of Tripoli,and logically require
the extension of similar privileges to them,which would
not be a practicable proposition."(19) This was a bogus
argument,since Jewish pupils at the Technical-Commercial
School had always formed an important component of its
annual intake,and during these years almost exceeded the
numbers of Italians attending the school.Indeed it is
impossible not to draw the conclusion that the Italian
bureaucracy in Tripoli,rhgardless of whether the intentions
of the central government were true or false, was concerned
to either delay or prevent Arabs from attending this school.
It is not difficult to find reasons to support such a hypth-
esis in view of the strained relations between Arabs and
Italians in Tripolitania3 and Micacchi's desire to raise the
standards at the Italian schools there,in order that they might
be at least as good as the schools in Italy .jand therefore
a factor in determining the arrival and settlement of Italian 
families in the colony.Moreover,both the Arabists amongst
Italians and the Italianisers led by Micacchi and the Italian
nationalists were not in favour of Arabs attending Italian 
schools,and for different motives and ideologies thought
in terms of separate systems for Arabs and Italians.Even so,
18) See,Petition of the native consultative committees,27 
April,1918.
a strong government would have seen through the prevar­
ications and deceits of the Department of Civil Affairs 
in Tripoli,and have insisted upon appropriate measures 
being taken.As the Tripoli bureaucracy knew,however,the 
central government was weak and unstable,and theuQoliOnial
Ministry basically inclined to policies which favoured 
Italian interests before those of the Arab population.
As a method of preserving the Italian interest as far 
as the secondary schools was concerned,the Civil Affairs 
Department favoured a colonial-type solution which aborted 
the simple procedure advocated by the Tripolitanian Comm­
ittees.It was this solution which appeared in the Colosimo 
Report of February 1918 as the seeming product of Italo- 
Arab collaboration in Libya.By it French-type policies 
would be applied to Libya through the establishment of 
"ecoles primaires" and "ecoles superieures" as in French 
North Africa.In this way a bridge would be provided from 
the Italo-Arab schools to the Italian Secondary School,and 
a method would have been provided,whereby an elite could 
be trained in this school for the future.(2 0 )lt should be 
again noted,however, that this systemization was not what 
the Consultative Committees had asked for in the first 
place(though the resultant Colosimo Report maintained that
it was)and amounted to so much purely wishful thinking as far 
as any genuine improvement of existing facilities was concern 
ed.In effect,the bureaucracy had let slip an important opport 
unity for utilising the existing facilities,which were at 
this time under-used by the declining Italian population,
?0) Ibid.
so ignoring both the government's own public policy,
and the legitimately stated wishes of that section of
the Libyan population still prepared to collaborate
with Italian rule.A proper survey of the schools did I
indeed need to be undertaken in the near future ,but
this should not have been accepted as a cloak for lethargy !
by the central government.(2 1 )The local authorities,however,
made the undertaking of such a report the sine qua non
of any further action upon education in Libya,whether
for Arabs or Italians,a contretemps they would never have
attempted in Bertolini's days,and still less under his
Fascist successors.(22)
II. The Formulation of Arab Demands and the Emergence !
of an Arab Educational Policy for Libva(Phase Two)
In effect,the Colosimo programme of February 1918 was intended 
by the government as the answer to the Arab demand for a 
stated policy couched in terms of collaboration.Barely 
was it off the printing presses,however,than another 
answer emerged from the nationalist and pan-Islamic camp, 
which immediately upstaged it.The conceding of the Fund­
amental Law of Tripolitania in June 1919 finally made the 
Colosimo proposals,which were never more than a publcity 
gesture,redundant.Fewer educational policies,it could: be
added in final epitaph,were shorter lived,as they neither 
entered the statute book,nor ever received any execution 
in the form intended by their originators.The nationalist 
answer to the Colosimo Policy was hardly of longer duration,
21) Ibid.
2 2 )' I b i d «
since the fragile unity which had given birth to it,
' i.
had already disintegrated by the time it became law 
in June of 1919,and,as is shown elsewhere,it was never 
implemented.The desired official investigation of the 
existing educational facilities in Libya was the only 
definite fruit of these otherwise barren years,and as 
has also been shown was carried out by Micacchi in the 
second half of the 1919 school—year.
The difficulty in arriving at a political compromise 
by diplomatic as opposed to military means in Tripolitania 
led the Italian government increasingly to distinguish 
between Tripolitania and Cirenaica in the devising of 
political strategy.In this respect,Italian hopes for a 
settlement in Cirenaica were pinned upon the Senusi leader, 
Sayyid Idris El Senusi with whom they had(with British 
support)signed the Accord of Acroma in 1917.This agreement 
had in effect amounted to a package deal in which education 
had been only one of a string of items connected with the 
development and improvement of Cirenaica,almost in the 
form of a quid pro quo ,whereby Idris hadymade political 
concessions in return for Italian willingness to undertake 
practical measures.(23)The agreement is important for the 
student of Arab education in Libya,for not only does it 
reveal education to be integral to any form of political 
settlement in the country(as would also be shown in sub­
sequent developments in Tripolitania involving the Fundam­
ental Law)jbut it also happens to be the first statement 
of Arab educational policy by an Arab leader to date.(24)
23) MAI-AS,Cirenaica,1911-1939,pos.l39,fasc.1-6,Accord
of Acroma:Modus Vivendi N.2(Testo presentato da Idris 
Es Senusi il 23 Feb.Communicato integralmento al 
Ministero delle Colonie con telegramma Del Govern- 
atore N.203 Del 3 Marzo),Preliminary Conditions for 
Ensuring the tranquility of the country.
It is also important in so far as it comes from the 
foremost representative of the Senusi Order,whose 
intellectual .interests were highly developed at Jarabub.(25) 
These interests also extended to the provision of religious 
and elementary-type education amongst the Beduin of the 
Sahara,through the attaching of school rooms to the Senusi 
Zavias,which,though few in Tripolitania where the Senusi 
were not strongly established,extended throughout the 
Senusi-controlled Sahara and most of Cirenaica.(26)
By signing the Accord of Acroma,Italy again bound 
herself to the same principles of general autonomy to 
which she had acceded at Ouchy in October 1912,and 
solemnly reaffirmed,while failing to implement,in several 
subsequent statements of intent.No doubt with the Accord 
of Acroma in mind ,the Cirenaican Arabs-taking partLin the 
Consultative Committees expected more from the Italian 
government than their (co-religionists in Tripolitania, 
and,as events showed,had their demands more fairly acceded 
to by the Italians.In the manner of the Accord itself,the
24) The Senusi educational demands are stated in Article 
IV.ofKthe\A6card$l’! Italy will establish in Cirenaica, 
schools for the teaching of science and art in which 
the Koran will also be taught;Ulemah will only be 
instructed in Libya and not sent abroad to study;and 
the Italian government will undertake to love and 
respect the religion of Islam by diffusing it through 
teaching in all its dominions."The memorandum attached 
to the text of the document noted that "only by accept­
ing such conditions would it prove possible to quieten 
the fears of the Arab population,and gain acceptance 
of the government's protestations that Italian rule 
in the future would not be at variance with their own 
interests and religious beliefs."Article V. of this 
accord also dealt with the restoring to the Senusi
Confraternity of its zavia,previously confiscated by 
the Italians as a reprisal measure,during the first 
Italo-Senusi War.Ibid.
Consultative Committees of Cirenaica,framed their 
demands in the form of a package ,which reaffirmed many 
of the statements already confirmed at Acroma•(27)These 
included education,which was expanded by the Consultative 
Committees of Cirenaica into a set of specific demands^ 
not only for professional and agricultural instruction 
at a school of arts and crafts to be set up at Bengasi, 
but also for Arab universities at both Bengasi and Derna 
for the teaching of the principles of Islam.(28)The Italians 
were also asked to reform the Kuttabs and existing medersas 
upon the lines adopted by France in Tunisia and by Britain
25) See.Evans-Pritchard,0p.Cit.,p.17 ; Joan Forbes-Rositer, 
Secrets of the Sahara(London,1921).p.293 ; and The Times. 
7 March,1922,p.11,
25) For the condition ,number and location of Senusi 
lodges still in existence at this time,see,MAI-AS, 
pos.147/1-1 a 8(1911-1918),Fasc.147/1-1-1 Senusi, 
il loro capo,la confraternita,la loro forza,le loro 
zavia,etc.,etc.
2 7) The final votes of the Consultative Committes of 
Tripolitania on the eve of the conceding of the 
Fundamental Law to the supporters of the Tripolitanian 
Republic,merely restated their previous request for 
more practical-type education.As far as agriculture 
was concerned,this was not to be confined exclusively 
to Tripoli,but was to be extended throughout the fertile 
areas.Experimental farms were also asked for,along with 
travelling educational units managed by experienced 
teachers of agriculture.Only at the Technical-Commercial 
School in Tripoli,did they ask for preparatory courses, 
to enable Arabs to accede to the higher courses.The 
educational wishes of the Cirenaican committes,on the 
other hand,greatly exceeded in aim and scope those of 
their Tripolitanian equivalents and were enclosed along 
_  with some twenty other proposals for developing the 
country.See,MAI-AS,Cirenaica(1918-1919),pos.140/3,Fasc.
22:Voti Del Comitato Consultativo Indigeno Per la Ciren­
aica in Materia D 'Istruzione|Pubbliqa»Uf f .II .Af f .Civ.N. 
192,6 Feb.,1919(unpaginated).
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29) By 1919,the French in North Africa had abandoned their 
earlier policy of cultural and linguistic assimilation, 
which had only been really applied in the Kabylie regions
in Egypt.(29)Thus we find in Cirenaica,unlike Tripolitania,
the Consultative Committees producing their own programme
of agreed action in the sphere of education.This,while
not insisting upon the exclusive use of Arabic in the
schools,does ask for an Islamic structure of education
in the form of Kuttabs,Medersa and University,which,if
modelled upon similar institutions in French North Africa
and Egypt,would also embody certain changes from the purely
traditional pattern of Islamic education.(30)
It is,however,only in Article Thirteen of the Treaty
of El-Regima of October 1920 that Arab desires find their
final an unarabivalent expression in Cirenaicat
"Lower elementary schools(Ibtidaia)and secondary schools 
(Idadia) are to be established according to the needs of 
particular places,and,in all of these,the religious and 
modern material will be taught in Arabic or the Italian 
language in accordance with the distinctions set out in 
Article II. of the Fundamental Law.Furthermore,it is 
recognised by the two parties(Sayid Idris el Senusi and 
the Italian government)that it is necessary to establish 
at Bengasi a lower secondary school(Idadia) and a higher 
secondary school(Alia);also,an Idadia ought tQ‘be set 
up at Derna; and a highercelementary school(Rusedia)at 
Tobruch,Gedabia,and Merg;and,as soon as it is recognised 
to be necessary,further higher elementary schools should 
be set up at Marana and Zauia el-Beda."(31)
(contin.) of Algeria.Henceforward,a policy of accommodation 
was progressively applied to Algeria itself and also to 
Tunisia and Morocco.This latter policy sought to embody 
both the traditional Islamic system with educational norms 
current in France.The French systemNtoo;had undergone 
considerable modifications to meet Arab and Moslem require­
ments. Cirenaican requests for "reformed kuttabs" upon the 
model operating in French North Africa would have involved 
their"reform" in terms of the curriculum of the latter.In 
the Kuttabs of French North Africa,which had been "reformed" 
by the French government,the curriculum was much wider than 
in the traditional kuttabs. A third of the school-day was 
devoted to the learning of classical Arabic(reading,writing 
vocabulary,grammar recitation and composition),apart from 
the memorisation of the Koran and general instruction in 
other subjects,such as were taught in the French elementary 
schools and leading to the "certificat d'etudes primaires".
The treaty also lays down that lower elementary 
schools shall be set up in all the coastal centres and 
arido in the oases of the interior and that attendance 
at them shall be compulsory for all Moslem boys.(32)
The Treaty itself,however, was not regarded by the Sayyid 
as being an executive-type decree and the exact details 
of the coutry's future educational organisation and the 
programme of studies to be adopted in the Libyan schools 
would require a separate ordinance.In terms of the 
condominium established in Cirenaica by the Treaty of El 
Regima,this could only be decided by a special committee, 
which would have to be set up by the forthcoming parliament 
of Cirenaica.Even so the Treaty was an important basis 
for future aims,as is appatent from Article Fourteen which 
establishes that the official languages of Cirenaica would 
be Italian and Arabic,as had already been laid down by the
(contin.) This more general type of instruction was given 
in the French language by Arab or French nationals,who 
were certificated teachers.In the programme of studies 
followed at the medressas,both French and Arabic received 
equal emphasis.The curriculum of these schools included 
the Arabic language and literature,Moslem law,theology 
and exegisis,all of which were taught in Arabic by Arab 
professor;and French subjects*French language and liter­
ature ,history and geography,French law and administrative 
organisation,legislation relating to the colony,mathematics, 
the physical and natural sciences,and hygiene,all of which 
were taught in the French language by French professors.
The normal duration of these courses was four years,at the 
end of which,the successful students received a certificate 
of studies in the raedressas.The course could be continued 
for a further two years in a "higher division",though the 
latter was only organised in great urban centres such as 
Algiers,Tunis and Fez.See,P.Horluc,"The Education of Natives 
in Algeria".Educational Yearbook^1931),pp.203-223;L.Brunot,"The 
Education of Native Moslems in Morocco" ,Ibid_5>pp. 227-236;E ,Gau. 
"Education in Tunisia",Ibid.,pp.259-265.Also,see A.Scham,Chpt* 
IV."Franco-Muslim Education".Lyautey in Morocco(New York,1970); 
pp. 144-161 .Foj: British policies in Egypt,see A.L.Tibawi,Islamic 
Education,Its Traditions and Modernisation into Arab National 
S ys terns(London >1972).
Fundamental Law of Cirenaica.Article Fifteen decreed 
that all zavias would be freed from paying all taxes.
(33)
III.The Parliament of Cirenaica and the Educational 
Commission authorised by the Treaty of El-Regima
"For everything,Patience hath a remedy, 
but Impatience hath no remedy for anything"
(34)
While internal troubles continued to prevent the Fund­
amental Law from being applied in Tripolitania,the signing 
of the Treaty of El-Regima between the Sayyid Mohamed el- 
Senusi and the Italian government on 25 October,1920
30) See.supra.notes 23 and 24,pp.172 and 173.
\ MAI-AS,Libya(Cirenaica,1920),Pos.141,Fasc.1,2 and 3* 
Accordo di El-Regima,Art.XIII.,Government of Cirenaica, 
Department of Political Affairs,28 October,1920(proto­
col n.8205-Accord with the Sayyid Mohamed,Idris El- 
Senusi).A Further document listed as riservatissima 
(highly reserved) provides a "literal translation"of 
the treaty,which for Article Thirteen reads*"The Italian 
government agrees to immediately set up primary and 
secondary schools according to the needs of particular 
piaces,within^which will be taught both modern,-material 
and the Islamic religious sciences in the Arabic lang­
uage .Regarding these schools,two will be set up at 
Bengasi,one at Agedabia,one at Zauia el-Beda,two at 
Berna,one at Tobruk,one at Marua and one at Merg.Prim­
ary schools will also be set up in all the centres of 
the interior and along the coast,as well as in all the
Senusi zavias........."A translator's note provides the
following explanation for an ellipsis in the final 
sentence of the; Italian translation of the original 
"verbale"* "evidently, something is missing!According 
to Omar Pascia,the Saied was referring to primary 
schools."This translator's error is not without some 
importance,since by it,the Senusi leader also intended 
the government to assume responsibility for educating 
those Beduin who made use of the system of Senusi 
zavias.Thus, by this treaty Italy also assumed charge 
of elementary education not merely for the coastal 
zones,but also for the Cirenaican hinterland as well.
32) Ibid.
33) Ibid.
As extracted from the diplomatic memoranda accompanying 
the Italian draft of the Treaty of El-Regima of 25 Oct., 
1920* Op.Cit.
(35) cleared the way for the establishing of the promised 
Parliament of Cirenaica,which met in session for the 
first time on 1 April 1921.In so doing,the way was finally 
opened up for that all too brief condominium between Italy 
and Libya.In fulfilment of Article Thirteen of the treaty, 
a special educational commission was almost immediately 
established to prepare a suitable educational ordinance; 
and the Parliament of Cirenaica delegated twelve of its 
members to serve on it.(36)Perhaps it should be noted that 
the commission,the setting up of which was amongst the 
very first acts of the newly assembled parliament,seems 
to have marked one of the few occasions when Arabs and 
Italians actually sat down together with the aim of evolving 
a joint-programme of agreed socials action,which would be 
put into practice by the Italian government,at the behest 
of the Arab leaders and with the support of the majority 
of the Moslem population.
The task of the commission was(in the words of Micacchi 
himself)"entirely without any precedent",for both sides 
were required to work out a formula embodying the principle 
of bilingualism yet also fully Islamic.(37)It was moreover, 
equally necessary to provide space in the curriculum for 
the teaching of modern subjects of a so-called' secular 
nature in order to cater for the need to develop the country
, 35) See,R.D,25 October,1920,N.1755(whereby, the Italian 
government confers the title of Emir upon the most 
noble Mohamed es-Senusi,along with the title of 
Highness,and the position as Head of the autonomous 
oases of Augilia,Gialo,el-Giaghub and Cufra),BUC.,733.
36),HAI-AS,Fondo Volpi Di Misurata(sometimes listed under 
Fondo Ufficio Studi),Cart.6/2,Fasc.B.1JProgetto di 
ordinam scolastico per i cittadini musulmani della 
Cirenaica.
upon modern lines.The most difficult problem,however, was 
as Micacchi recognised that of blending the traditional 
system of traditional or religious education with the 
needs of a secular system,which aimed at creating a 
literate population,along with sufficient numbers trained 
in professional skills, besides academic training for 
the governing elite.(38)
In attempting to work out a solution to these problems, 
the commission was initially obliged to operate not only 
in terms of the general principles^ of the Fundamental Law 
and the Treaty of El-Regima;but also in terms of the special 
forms adopted by these decrees(especially of the latter)as 
far as education was concerned.This,said Micacchi, was the 
most difficult technical problem facing the commission,since 
the method of dealing with educational issues adopted by 
the Fundamental Law was quite different from that adopted 
by the Treaty of El-Regima,and it would be difficult to 
reconcile in drawing up a new ordinance.Thus,whereas Article 
Ten of the Fundamental Law merely stated that "elementary 
education was obligatory, and secondary and high schools 
will be gradually established",the Treaty of El-Regima had 
sought to express its aims in the form Of the terminology 
used by the former Ottoman educational legislation.(39)
37) L'Enseiqnement aux Indigenes dans les Colonies Italiennes 
contains by far the best account of the proceedings
of the commission.See,pp.510-533.
38) Ibid.
39) Ibid.Also,see Art.10 of the Fundamental Law of Cirenaica: 
R.D.31 ottobre 1919,n.2401,B.U.C.,601 ; and Art.13 of the 
Treaty of El-Regima:infra,p.177.
In attempting to resolve these apparent contradictions, 
the commissioners took perhaps the only course open to 
them,namely to jettison all ideas based upon the approach 
adopted by the Fundamental Law and the Treaty of El-Regima, 
since there was little possibility of reconciling the two 
in practical terms.Instead, they decided to evolve their 
own pattern which would be in part determined by Article 
Eleven of the Fundamental Law;but also comprise the 
important grades and levels of instruction laid down by 
the treaty itself.(40)
This pragmatic response to the situation was clearly 
what both sides most desired,for it placed the principle 
of bilingualism beyond dispute,while at the same time 
leaving the way open for the retention of the Italo-Arab 
schools in substance if not in form,which as has been 
shown was integral to the Italian' position in Libya.On the 
Arab side,it enabled them to insist upon the incorporation 
of the Kuttab into the base of the educational pyramid.
The importance of the Kuttab had already been adequately 
recognised by the Accord of Acroma,the Consultative Comm­
ittees, the Fundamental Law and in the recent Treaty of 
El-Regima, as had the use of the Arabic language for all 
religious subjects.Such a priority made it impossible to 
adhere strictly to the Ottoman form of legislation since 
the latter had sought to separate the religious system 
of education from the secular system which was developed 
on the western pattern.In their final form,therefore,the
40) See,R.Micacchi,L'Enseiqnement aux Indigenes dans les 
Colonies Italiennes,pp.510-533jor idem,"L'Insegnamente 
Agli Indigeni nelle Coloniale Italiane Di Diritto Dom- 
inio",Atti del Primo Conqresso di Studi Coloniali.Firenze. 
8-14 April,1931,Vol.IV.(Firenze.1931).ppo232-234.
recommendations of the commissioners to the Parliament 
of Cirenaica adopted roughly the same schema as had been 
drawn up by Nallino in his proposals to the Post-War 
Commission of 1919.The main difference between the 
recommendations of the commissioners and the earlier 
Nalino proposals lay in the fact that Micacchi had 
succeeded in retaining the bilingual principle and the 
Italo-Arab schools,which would henceforth be known 
simply as elementary schools.
Ifihowever,Micacchi could be said to have achieved 
what he had originally set out to preserve from the 
1914 educational ordinance ,the Arab side could also 
congratulate itself upon having developed the proposals 
contained in all its official dealings with the Italian 
government since the Accord of Acroma in 1917.The Arabic 
language was safeguarded in the latest sets of proposals 
which would be presented to a parliamentary assembly in 
which the majority of the delegates were Libyan nationals. 
But,as a result of these proposals,an educational system 
would be established in Cirenaica which would embody 
both traditional and modern aims and requirements.Only 
the most committed of zenophobes could regard the partial 
retention of the Italian language in the schools as 
undesirable,for it was clearly inconceivable that Libya 
could advance into the twentieth century,in the circum­
stances of 1920,without learning a western language and 
making use of whatever skills the Italians were prepared 
to impart through their teaching personnel and whoever 
else would be responsible for the running of the new project.
Indeed, now that it looked as if Italianisation had been 
eliminated from the syllabus or otherwise rendered 
innocuous,the retention of Italian was certainly an 
advantage rather than a political and cultural disadvantage, 
since it was necessary for the development of the country, 
and there is no doubt that the Parliament of Cirenaica 
saw the matter in such a light.
IV.The Scholastic Ordinance of Cirenaica(R.D.5 Feb.1922 
N .36 8)and:for cTripolitania(D.M.14 Sept.1922 »N.606)
“ ....the error of the dispositions of the 
Fundamental Law was the belief that the 
native population was irreparably closed 
to the penetration of our civilisation’? • (41)
Although the Parliament of Cirenaica had authorised the
setting up of the original commission for educational
reform following its first meeting of April 1921,consisting
of twelve of its own members,(42)it was soon recognised
that the work could only be completed satisfactorily,if
entrusted to a special technical commission of six
qualified experts,who would fulfil an advisory function.
(43)The Italian members of this technical commission
were Dr. Rodolfo Micacchi of the Department of Schools
and Archaeology and Dr. Angelo Piccioli,the new scholastic
superintendent for Cirenaica,who would be given the task
of implementing the project,both of whom arrived in Bengasi
towards the end of June 1921.(44)The other members of the
technical commission were Professor Alphonso Nallino
41) A.Piccioli,”La|Conquista Morale:La Scuola“ .La Raniscita 
Della Tripolitania .Ed.,A.Mondadori(Milano, 1926) ,pp.265- 
319,p.396.
42) See,MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-lsProgetto 
di ordinam.Scol.per Musulmani della Cirenaica(1919?),p.2.
43) See,Contini,F.,"Istituzioni Scolastiche”,0p.Cit.,p.26.
of Rome University(45)and twolrepresentatives from the 
Parliament of Cirenaica,Mohamed Chechia and Mahmud 
Scetuan.(46) Despite this delay,however,the commission 
worked steadily through the autumn and had completed 
its task in time for the project to be placed before the 
Parliament of Cirenaica in the New Year,so making it the 
first legislative programme to be authorised by an Arab 
parliament in Libya's history.(47)The new programme 
received the royal assent and passed into the statute 
book on 5 February 1922 and,as such,was to act as official 
educational policy in Cirenaica until 1928 when it was 
replaced by the new fascist legislation of that year.(48) 
Its chief details are as follows*
Art.I. Education for Moslems in Cirenaica shall be given 
in the following schools*
1. Kuttabsj
2. Elementary Schools;
3. Secondary Schools;
4. A High School;
5. Schools of Arts and Crafts;
6 . Schools of Agriculture;
7. Girls'Schools of Education and Work.
Art.2. Herein is outlined the precise programme for the 
Kuttabs which shall be developed entirely in the 
Arabic Language and include the following subjects*
a) The learning by memory of a part of the Koran;
b) The Principles of religion and morality;
c) Reading,writing and dictation;
d) The first notions of arithmetic;
e) General Studies.
Art.3. Establishes that the elementary schools shall offer 
courses of three year's duration to which shall be 
admitted only those pupils who have passed the final 
examination of the Kuttabs or a special test of 
admission.
44) R.Micacchi,MLe Scuole nelle Colonie Italiane di Dominio 
Diretto,"Rivista Pedaqoqica.Anno XXIII.,Fasc.Ill.,
1930,p.195.
45) Progetto Del Ordinamento Scolastico.Op.Cit.,p.26.
The curriculum shall be as follows:
a) Arabic;
b) Italian;
c) Religion and Morality;
d) Arithmetic and Elementary Geometry;
e) Calligraphy;
f) General Studies(history,geography,agriculture, 
hygiene etc.,etc.).
The instruction imparted in the Italian Language 
or the Arabic Language shall be given in accordance 
with the dispositions of Article 11 of the Fundamental 
Law.
Art•4Vi The courses provided by the secondary school shall
have a duration of four years,the final two of which 
will be subdivided into two sections*one for the 
training of merchants,accountants and Libyan 
officials,and the other for the training of 
Kuttab teachers.
Only students who have passed the final 
examination of the elementary schools;or a special 
admission test will be admitted to this school*
The curriculum of the school will consist of 
the following basic subjects*
1. Arabic;
2. Italian;
3. Moslem Law,Logic and Morality;
4. History and Geography;
5. Arithmetic and Geometry;
6 . Physics and Natural Science;
7. Calligraphy and Design;
8 • Bookkeeping;
9. Pedagogy;
10. Agriculture.
Other subjects responding tov.the needs of the 
community and the aims of the school can also be 
established on an optional basis.
Art.5. Regarding the High School,the courses of which 
ought to have a duration of three years,the aim 
of the institution shall be to provide a qualif­
ication for use in gaining admission to .the 
Italian universities or in the training of elem­
entary and secondary school-teachers.
46) R.Micacchi,L'Enseiqnement aux Indigenes,p. 533.
47) see,B.U.C.,287 for the year 1922.Also,see D.G.10 Luglio 
1926,N.2802*Funzionamento delle vecchie scuole medie 
arabe Idadia,B.U.C.,Cir.7,258;and D.G.28 Luglio 1926,
N •2850,B.U.C.,Cir.800;and D.G.23 Oct.1927,N.3134* Org- 
anizzazione delle scuole nell'interno delle Cirenaica, 
B.U.C.,11,762.
To this type of school will be admitted those 
who are in possession of a . leaving certificate 
of the secondary school;or who had passed a 
special examination of admission.
Art<66. The Schools of Education and Work for Girls will
be primarily concerned with the teaching of reading 
and writing in both Arabic and Italian,which will 
only be given to girls,whose families explicitly 
request such a form of education;all other pupils 
at these schools will only undertake a curriculum 
consisting of general studies and suitable forms 
of work.
Art.7. Instruction shall also be provided for children 
belonging to"the nomadic tribes,as previously 
promised,through the creation of special mobile 
teaching-units,with a curriculum analagous to 
that provided in the Kuttabs.
Art.8. Professional Education at Bengasi shall be
provided in the School of Arts and Crafts of 
the city,which was established by Governor 
Martini during the year 1919.
By the same article ,agricultural instruction 
shall be given in a School of Agriculture,which 
will be set up in a convenient locality.
In Article 12. is contained the stipulation that 
Arab teachers will be paid at the same rate and 
parity as Italian teachers with similar"" qualif­
ications, grades and experience,besides being 
eligible for the same bonuses and gratuities as 
applied to teachers working in the Italian 
colonies.(49)
Any assessment of the 1922 Educational Ordinance for 
Cirenaica must start by recognising the emergence in it 
of what seems to be a new spirit of compromise and accomm-
48) The places where the types of school listed in Art.l. 
of the decree were to be established were outlined in 
a special annex as: a) Kuttabs: Bengasi^Agedabia-Soluch- 
Ghemines-Tocra-Regima-El Merg-Tolmeta-El Hania-Zavia El 
Beda-Marana-Marsa Susa-Cirene-El Ghegab-El Gubba-Derna- 
Martuba-Tobruk-Bardi Suleiman(Porto Bardia);Elementary 
Schools: Bengasi-Agedabia-El Merg-Cirene-Derna-Tobruk;
Arts and Crafts:Benqasi;School of Agriculturetlocalities 
to be desiqnated:Girls Schools of Education and Work: 
Bengasi and Derna;localities in which Kuttabs can be 
set up if required by local need or popular demand:
Sidi Khalifa-el Coefia-el Guarscia-Aim Mara-Zavia el 
Faidia-el Abiar-Benina-Umm er Rgem-el Agheila-Marsa 
Luce-Um er Ahfein-Zavia el Gasrein-Zavia el Hammama- 
Zavia el Hamez-Besciara.See,R.D.5 febbraio 1922,n.368.Regol 
amento scolastico per i cittadini musulmani della Cirenaica 
B.U.C.,287.
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odation in the Italian management of Libyan affairs.
There is also a balance between the opposing Nallino
and Micacchi factions which is new,for whereas the Nallino 
approach finds expression in the provisions of the Kuttabs 
and secondary education 1,the provisions for the elementary 
school by preserving the Italian language satisfy Micacchi•s 
less nationalistic viewpoint.On the Libyan side,in exchange 
for the elimination of, the Italianising and assimilationist 
tendencies ofxthe Bertolini legislation,and the threat that 
Colosimo's proposals might extend the Bertolini premise still 
further in the direction of Italianisation,a readiness had 
been shown towards accepting the place of the Italian 
language in the curriculum of the schools excepting the 
Kuttabs.If,however, the chief strength of the new legis­
lation lay in its accommodation and tolerance,which found 
their best expressions in the"reformed kuttabs",elementary 
schools and secondary schools(all of which were now combined 
into a single interrelated system),the new law was not 
without its weaknesses as a blueprint for Libya's future 
development under Italian rule.
Three weaknesses particularly need to be mentioned: 
first,the failure to include Nallino's proposal,as outlined 
in the 1919 Post-War Commission,for the creation of a high 
school for the training of future Ulemah,whichv would have 
gone part of the way towards satisfying the demands of the 
Consultative Committees for Islamic Universities at Bengasi 
and QernajSecond,despite the demands of the said committees
for agricultural education,Article Nine failed to
provide either a programme or even a specific commitment
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to establish the required training centres in the 
immediate future,a criticism which must also be extended 
with equal rigour to the undertaking to provide Libyans 
with the opportunity of professional education,which was 
the subject of Article Nine of the new decree.(50)
Meanwhile in Tripolitania,despite Italian inability 
to proceed with the implementing of the Fundamental Law 
of that province,because of the "disturbed political and 
military condition " there,legislative efforts continued 
during 1920 and 1921 for the establishment of autonomy, 
which culminated in R.D.-10 March 1921 ,N. 316 ,of f icially 
stating that a "state of war no longer existed in the 
province".(51)In the autumn of 1921,conditions were judged 
sufficiently tranquil in the territory to enable the central 
government to empower the local governor to proceed with 
the establishing of a new administration and the calling 
of a local parliament.(52)In this brief calm before the 
storm,the governor authorised the setting up of a commission 
consisting of both Libyan and Italian citizens to prepare, 
as in Cirenaica,a new school system and an educational 
programme in full conformity with the Fundamental Law.(53)
49) ibid.(the proposition to go ahead with professional 
education at Bengasi lacks a specific commitment to 
professional education for Arabs in the form of con­
sidered programmes,and "Bengasi" here only refers 
to the existing School of Arts and Crafts set up 
by Governor Martini in 1919).
50) B.U.C.,167 for the year 1921.
5 1 ) R.D.8 Aprile 1920,N .529,che approva le norme per la 
nome per la nomina dei rappresentanti elettivi al 
Parliamento della Tripolitania,nonche la tabella 
dei relativi collegi eletorali,B.U.C.238;and R.D.23 
Ottobre 1921,N.1815.Delega al Governatore della 
Tripolitania ad emanare norme per 1 'ordinamento
The range and competence of the commission,however, was
carefully restricted to encompass only the matter of
elementary education,it being adjudged too premature,given
the uncertain political situation in Tripolitania,where
the government was only playing for time,to think; about
establishing higher grades of school•(54)The commission
was also given to understand that although the differences
between Tripolitania and Cirenaica were to be observed
in respect of Article Eleven of the Fundamental Law,in
all other respects, it was to model its deliberations
upon the work of its Cirenaican equivalent,(55)Even so,
given the latter injunction,the Tripolitanian commission's
proposals differed from the Cirenaican proposals in respect
of the relationship of the Kuttabs with the state system 
of education,In Tripolitania,the Kuttabs were to be
left out of the state system and classed as wprivate" 
schools only; and the elementary schools for Moslems were 
to be divided into a lower and higher course,in line with 
earlier Italian proposals.(56)The Commission's proposals, 
as accepted by the governor of the province and the Ministry 
of Colonies and embodied in a special ministerial decree 
for Tripolitania,are chiefly as follows*
(contin.)politico-amministrativo di quella regione e per 
le elezioni al Parliamento ed agli altri organi elettivi• 
B.U.C.,9,1922.
scoiastico per i musuimani della Tripontania,tsuu,ouo.
52) See,R. Micacchi ,L'Enseignjement auxlndiqenes,p,533 .
53)D.G.,15 July 1922.Also see,RIMicacchi,Ibid. ,p. 534.
54) R.Micacchi,L'Enseignjement auxIndigenes,p .534.
5 5) See,Tbid.,p.534;and also,D.M.14 Sept.1922:Ordinamento 
Art.1•
!
! Art.2.
Art.3.
i  u ?
Moslem education shall be provided in the 
following types of schools:
1. Boys'Elementary Schools of two kinds:
a) lower elementary schools;
b) higher elementary schools;
2. Girls' Schools of Education and Work;
3. Evening Elementary Schools.
The boys'lower elementary course shall have 
have a duration of three years.Teaching in 
the Arabic Language will be for the following 
subjects:
a) The committing of the Koran to memory;
b) The principles of religion and morality;
c) Instruction in reading,writing and 
arithmetic;
d) Elementary arithmetic;
e) General Studies(observations and description 
of objects in the environment,hygiene,rural 
studies);
f ) Manual Work;
g) Singing;
h) Gymnastics.
In the third course,the Italian Language will 
be taught in accordance with the dispositions 
of Art.Eleven of the Fundamental Law.
The Boys' higher elementary course shall have 
a duration of three years and will be only open 
to pupils who have passed the final examination 
of the lower elementary school or have sat a 
special entrance test.
The curriculum of the higher elementary ^ course 
will be as follows:
a) Teaching of the Koran,religion and morality;
b) Arabic Language;
c) Italian Language;
d) Elementary Arithmetic and Geometry;
e) Calligraphy;
f) General Studies("lezioni di cosi",history, 
geography,agriculture,hygiene,etc.);
g) Gymnastics;
h) Singing.
Material included under letters d.,e.,f.,&h., 
will be taught equally in Arabic and Italian. 
Furthermore,a fourth year will be added to 
this course in certain circumstances by the 
Ministry of Colonies at the proposal of the 
local governor.
,
Art.4. The Girls' School of Education and Work
shall consist of a five-year course of which 
the first year will be of a preparatory nature 
and the remaining four years standard.
The teaching material will be as follows:
a. The Koran,religion and morality;
b. Arabic Language;
c. Italian Language;
d. Arithmetic and elementary geometry;
e. General studies("lezioni di cosi",history, 
geography,domestic economy & hygiene);
f • Calligraphy;
g. Singing; -— -
h. Gymnastics;
i. Domestic work;
j. Women's work(not applicable to the 
preparatory course).
Art.5. The main task of the evening elementary schools
is to combat illiteracy and semi-illiteracy amongst 
adults.For such a purpose the schools will adopt 
the following courses;
1. Courses for Illiterates;
2. Courses for Semi-Illiterates;
3. Complementary Courses.
The teaching material for the above courses 
shall be as following:
a) The Koran,religion and morality;
b) Arabic Language;
c) Italian Language;
d) Arithmetic and elementary geometry.
These schools will only be established in centres 
of importance,where and when circumstances are 
favourable to the being set up.
Art.6 . Experienced Arab teachers with recognised
qualifications will in Tripolitania be paid 
at> the same rates as their equivalents of similar 
experience and qualifications and grades of service, 
etc. ,etc. i, 57)
All schemes for collaborating with the Libyans upon 
an equal basis had already struck the newly-appointed 
governor of Tripolitania,the industrialist and financier,
56) Ibid.
57) See,D.M.14 settembre 1922.Ordinamento scolastico per 
i musulmani della Tripolitania,B.U.C.,606.
Giuseppe Volpi as foolhardy and unrealistic,(58)and it
it is easily possible to recognise in this drastically
minimised educational programme,not only the hand of
Micacchi,but also the elements of future fascist policies,
which would finally restrict Moslem education to the
elementary and professional spheres.(59)Also the excluding
of the Kuttabs from the governmental system both returns
to the Bertolini premise of 1914 and points to future
educational legislation of the fascist era,when the Italo-
Arab school would again become the principal vehicle of
public instruction for Moslems in Libya.This school survives
on in the 1922 decree for Tripolitania,despite the Fundamental
Law,and,as in Cirenaica too,only slight legislative changes
would be needed to extend the teaching of Italian to the
lower elementary schools,a few of which were established 
after 1928.It should,nonetheless,be pointed out that in
Tripolitania the failure of the Fundamental Law to find 
legislative expression at this particular moment,meant in 
effect,that the chance of developing an adequate system 
of education for [Moslems was lost for good,as far as the 
development of the country under Italian rule was concerned.
5 3) Of Volpi's governorship^ Aug.1921-June 1924),Claudio 
Segre writes*"his decisive policies contrasted markedly 
with the vacillations of the earlier Liberal regimes.
By profession,Volpi was a financier whose empire was 
based upon electric power in his native Venetia.He was 
also a founder and director of several companies in 
the Balkans.In addition to his business activities,he 
had carried out a nutaber of important diplomatic assign­
ments .He had served as Italian consul to Serbia in 1912, 
negotiated the Treaty of Ouchy which concluded the Libyan 
War....He was also one of the first of the major indust­
rialists to join the Fascist party*'.See,Op.Cit.,p . 47.
59) See,R.D.21 Giugno 1928,N.1698.Norme riflettenti l'ist- 
ruzione primaria per i musulmani della Tripolitania e 
della Cirenaica,B.U.T.,19,1141•
Chapter Seven Arab Reaction to the Statutes of Libya
in Tripolitania:Failure to Implement the 
Educational and Political Provisions(1919-24)
"For the time being it is sufficient to 
affirm that by far the best results can 
be obtained if we continue to make use 
of the Italo-Arab school,providing we 
employ in it,capable and worthwhile 
teachers,knowlegeable~of the colony and 
the indigenous population".(*)
Unlike Cirenaica,the period 1919-1924 in Tripolitania was
one of political,economic and educational stagnation in
which Italian rule has little to show for itself in any
concrete or tangible form.As such,it confirms the general
premise that as far as Libyan history is concerned under
Italian rule,educational developments,as much else of a
practical nature,were almost entirely dependent upon the
success of political initiatives,even when the latter did
not necessarily(as under Fascism) meet with the voluntary
support of the mass of the population.Thus,without such
initiatives(or in the wake of their failure)practical
issues were-easily eclipsed and lapsed into incoherence
and stagnation.In approaching this period,therefore,it is
necessary to recognise at theeoutset,that„it is the failure
of political initiatives,as they affect the educational
system,which is primarily under scrutiny.
In terms of chronology, the period for educational 
developments commences with.the arrival in Libya of Micacchi 
in the Spring of 1919 and the conceding of the Fundamental 
Law of Tripolitania in June of the same year.The transfer 
of Piccioli to Tripolitania in the autumn of 1924 to re­
organise the schools for the new fascist government tech-
*) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.64.
nically ends this period from an educational standpoint. 
Mussolini's seizure of power inj October 1922,however,
t
is the main historical determinant since it is this which 
inaugurates a new epoch of which educational events form 
an: integral rather than a separate part.
I.)Elementary Education
During these years,no effort was made by either the Ministry 
of Colonies in Rome nor the Department of Civil and Political 
Affairs in Tripoli(l) to implement the educational provisions 
of the Fundamental Law of June 1919 or even the governatorial 
degree of September 1922(2),which authorised the replacement 
of the Italo-Arab schools by lower-elementary schools^in which 
the Arabic language would be the sole medium of instruction. 
The approval of the 1922 decree only two months after Volpi's 
ultimatum of 17 July to the Libyan nationalists at Misurata 
(3)seems to indicate that the government had hoped to avoid
1) Charge of the schools was basically the responsibility 
of the Civil and Political Affairs Department.The pos­
ition of superintendent appears to have been of a largely 
nominal nature and entrusted as a general rule to the 
acting director of the Italian secondary school in Tripoli, 
Cav.Mescia,until the appointment of a full-time superin­
tendent for Tripolitania in the summer of 1924.From the 
time of Dr.Angelo Piccioli's appointment in 1924 all 
subsequent superintendents were appointed by the Ministry 
of Colonies where Micacchi remained director of the col­
onial schools until the fall of the Italian empire during 
the Second World War.See,Voti,Pronunciati da Comitati
^Consul tati Indigeni,April 1919.Op.Cit^; R.Istituto 
^ Tecnico ed Regio Scuola Complemeritare >di Tripoli.Anne 
uario 1927(Tripoli. 1927) s Ancigro Piccioli to Governor 
Volpi,20 Dec.1924(MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi).
2) D.M.14 Sept.1922.Ordinamento scolastico per i musulmani 
della Tripolitania,B.U.C.,606.
3) During these final months of Liberal Italy,two policies 
began to manifest themselves in Libya:the policy of peace­
ful accommodation pursued by the Minister of Colonies, 
Amendola;and the policy of the new governor of Tripolitania 
Giuseppe Volpi,who insisted upon the unconditional surr­
ender of nationalists at Misurata to which he laid seige 
on 17 July,1922.See,The Italian Conquest of Tripolitania
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any armed confrontation through creating a climate of 
accommodation in which talks could take place,so ending 
the political anarchy of the province.(4)Though never 
implemented,however,the decree was not officially replaced 
until 1928,when the Italo-Arab schools were restored to 
their former pre-eminence as the principal educational 
instrument of Italian colonialism in Libya for Moslems.(5)
f. \ : The main reason for the lack of any serious effort on 
the part of the Italians to implement the new policies in 
Tripolitania,undoubtedly lay in the continuing political 
uncertainty,combined with weak governments in Italy itself. 
(6 )In such circumstances,political agreement was impossible 
between the Italians and the independent chiefs of the 
Gebel or with the Libyan nationalists at Misurata Port, 
who still hoped for complete independence from Italian 
rule,a goal with which no Italian administration could 
concur.The final burst of activity which had produced the 
decree of September 1922 was no more than the last splutt- 
erings of a dying flame,briefly fanned back into life by 
Volpi's arrival as governor on 3 August 1921,and almost 
as soon extinguished for an indefinite future.
In effect,it was Micacchi's policy that was adhered
(contin.)(condensed from the book by R.Rapex:L'Affirmazione
della Sovranita Italiana sulla Tripolitania) in Italian 
Rule in Tripolitania(B.M.A..Tripoli.1947).p.147.
4) Ibid.,p .20.Also,see,Evans-Pritchard,Op.Cit..p .147.
5) See,R.D.21 Giugno 1928,N.1698.
6) See,R.Micacchi,L'Ensiqnement aux Indiqenes,p.510:and 
Renzo De Felice,Chpt.XIV'Mussolini e Giolittistra riv— 
oluzione e reazione nasce il fascismo",Mussolini il 
£ivoluzionario(Torinot1965),pp.599-662.
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to by the local authorities in the province,as a result of 
which, the Italo-Arab schools were retained in existence 
irrespective of the new orientation,both as a means of 
retaining the goodwill and loyalty to the government of 
those Arabs who still continued to support Italian rule, 
and also as a guarantee that Italian sovereignty would be 
maintained in the future.(7) Thus it was that two policies 
continued to characterise Italian educational activity 
after June 1919: the official policy of cultural and 
linguistic rapprochment and the unofficial policy based 
upon pacific penetration.( :)
During the resulting stalemate,Micacchi determined to 
maintain the existing Italo-Arab schools as best he could 
in the uncertain circumstances ,while planning their 
eventual revival,through an improvement of the Italian 
teaching-personnel allocated to the existing schools,(8 )
7) Micacchi informed the Governor of Tripolitania in 
July 1919 that his"observations were inspired not by 
a vain love of criticism,but from the desire to make 
our schools efficient instruments of pacific penetration 
in the colony'* .Op.Cit. .p.2.
8) See,R.D.4 gennaio 1920,N.68,che stabilisce il ruolo 
organico degli insegnanti elementari della Tripolitania 
e della Cirenaica,B.U.C.,69.
9) In practice,the seven government schools provided the 
only form of elementary education outside the Kuttabs 
of which there were six in Tripoli and an unknown 
quantity elsewhere.In 1919,the school population of the 
Italo-Arab sector amounted to 882 and 702 for the Kuttabs 
in an area comprising nearly 1.8 million square kilometres 
for the country as a whole,and a population of 570,000 
inhabitants(aprox.),the majority of whom lived in Tripoli 
and its immediate suburbs,or along the fertile coastal- 
strip.See,Micacchi to the Governor of Tripolitania,p.66 ; 
and Malvezzi De Medici /'Native Education in the Italian 
Colonies".Educational YearbookC1931),pp.647-677.
Both government policy,however,and the political and 
military situation,which confined Italian rule to the 
city of Tripoli and the outlying garrisons at Horns,Azizia 
and the Western coastal-area,prevented for the immediate 
future any expansion of the Italo-Arab schools,despite the 
urgent need for many more elementary schools for Arabs both 
in the areas under Italian control,and in those areas where 
Italian writ did not yet run.(9)In examining the seven 
surviving Italo-Arab schools of Tripolitania,which in 
effect offered the only elementary education available 
to Arabs in the region,outside the Kuttabs(10) and the 
Italian national schools(11),it is important to avoid
10) Micacchi recounts that 25 Kuttabs were opened at the 
beginning of 1919 in Tripolitania,most of which were 
soon closed down because of the shortage of teachers.
Even so,the numbers attending these schools,which were 
for the most part attached to the local mosques,had 
risen from 670 in the previous year to 815 in 1919. 
Although he was not opposed to the Kuttabs in principle, 
recognising them as the natural product of Islamic 
civilisation,Micacchi described them as being in a 
"full state of decadence".By this he was referring
to their being "situated in small airless rooms,without 
adequate lighting,except for what light is permitted 
to enter through the small doorway.In such conditions, 
the pupils squat on the bare,flattened ground from 
where they copy down on a small slate,the lesson of 
the day,which is imparted by the teacher or fighi".
See,Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.92.
11) Official statistics for the school-year 1921-22 indicate 
that in Tripolitania alone,1525 Moslem pupils were 
enrolled in the following types of existing schools* 
Secondary(3);elementary(31) ; infant(nil);Italo-Arab 
(6 6 8 );Catholic schools(25){Jewish schools(Talmudic: 
nil){Koranic(798).F .Contini.O p .Cit.(Istituti Iscolastici. 
Della Tripol itania, Anno Scolastico 1921-1922). ---
12) See,Micacchi Report of July,1919,pp.64 & 69-71."Only in 
the city of Tripoli and only in the school-year 1921-22", 
reported Piccioli in November 1922*,*was the conspicuous 
sum of 2.988.970 Lira spent on the construction of new 
schooIs"ThisVhe added’/was spent as follows *L. 1.554.400 
Secondary schools(Italian) {trachoma schools,L. 554.600,* 
mixed elementary school at Dahara,L.319.700{Girls• prof­
essional school,L.560.270.Outside Tripoli there were only 
three scholastic centres(Zuara,Suk el-Giuma and Horns), 
though others existed in areas not under Italian control 
having been set up before 19167See,Piccioli Report of Nov. 
1922(Edilizia Scolastica),p.78.
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easy conclusions,as each school was different,despite the 
similarity of the curriculum.Moreover,the success or failure 
of these schools as educational institutions was determined by 
a variety of factors,such as the teaching personnel,buildings 
and general facilities,the school intake,and the extent to 
which they received support from the indigenous community and 
its leaders.A further vital factor in the survival and future 
development of a particular school was the attitude to the 
education of Moslems of the military resident of the district 
in which the school was situated.(1 2)
Undoubtedly,the best of these seven schools was at 
Sukh el-Giuma,in the residence of the Nuahi el Arbaa,a 
few kilometers from Tripoli itself,which had been opened 
in a blaze of publicity shortly before Micacchi*s arrival 
in Libya in 1919,and was intended not only to demonstrate 
that Italy "cared for her subjects” bu+: also to serve 
as the ideal model of the Italo-Arab school of the future.(13) 
The success of the school,which in its second year of 
existence had alre°ady enrolled 280 pupils( 14) ,was attributed 
by Micacchi to the initiative of the local commandant,
Major D'Alonzo, the support of the mayor of the municipality, 
the local cadi and notables,the purpose-built accommodation 
and the efforts of the teachers.(15)In the latter respect, 
Micacchi singled out for particular recommendation the 
efforts of the director of the school,Andrea Festa,who
13) See,Micacchi Report of July,1919,pp.64 and 69-71.
14) Ibid.,p.70.
15) Ibid.,p.69.
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was later to become a well-known colonial educator and 
the author of several notable publications in the field 
of colonial education(16).He also singled out for praise, 
Festa's assistant,Luigi Ramone.Both men had apparently 
found themselves in Libya as a result of military service 
and,though lacking in professional qualifications,had 
been singled out for the work by Major D'Alonzo,a man, 
according to Micacchi,who embodied all the ideals of 
Italy's civilising mission.(17)The Director of Schools 
was equally impressed with the work of the two Arab 
teachers employed at the school,the well-known Sheilkh 
Mohamed Kimail el Hammali,who had formerly taught in the 
Ottoman schools and would later become perhaps the best- 
known Arab teacher and educational writer in Libya under 
Italian rule:and,also, Sheikh Mohamed el Gimmi.Both men 
were responsible for the teaching of Arabic and the Koran.
(18)Undoubtedly,this school represented for Micacchi the 
best example of fruitful collaboration between Arabs and 
Italians in Libya at thgts time and could serve as a model 
for the schools of the future.(19)
The remaining Italo-Arab schools,however,were less 
well received by the local Arab population and in terms 
of their administration and general facilities were well 
below the standards set at Sugh el Giuma,though it is 
not unlikely that Micacchi emphasised the good points of 
the latter,as a part of his campaign to preserve the Italo- 
Arab school as the pincipal means of Moslem instruction 
in the colony.In Tripoli itself,the situation remained
16) Ibid.,p.70.
17) Ibid.-
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little changed from the time when in 1913 Scallabrini 
had attempted to prepare for the implementation of the 
Bertolini law of 1914;for the only elementary school 
in the old city was that of Pietro Verri,which had been 
set up primarily to cater for the Jewish quarter,and which 
Arabs were reluctant to attend for religious reasons.(20)
The only so-called change since those early days had been 
the transferring of educatorio ‘at Menschia to the relative 
security of Dahara(2 1), the principal elementary school for 
Arabs remaining as in 1913,the Italo-Arab school attached 
to the School of Arts and Crafts in the Zenghet Misran. 
(22)Despite the fact that this school was the successor 
of the original Italo-Arab annexe established by Caneva 
in the Italian elementary school on the Sciara Espagnol 
of Tripoli in 1912,and was established in spacious accomm­
odation, its popularity in 1919 was as much in doubt as it 
had been at the time of its first establishment,and Micacchi 
could only explain the fact that enrolment and attendance 
had remained”almost stationary” by referring to the epidemic 
in the autumn of 1918,which had swept Tripoli and reduced 
pupil attendance at the school.(23)Not all was so discour­
aging in this school,which offered a three-year course 
divided into two sections for the first year and one each 
for the successive two years,as the final examination had
19) Ibid.,p.261.
20) Ibid.,p.64.Also,see, F.Contini,0p.Cit.(Scuole Per Isr- 
aeliti),p.29;and Scallabrini to Bertolini,1913,Op.Cit.
21) MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-6 tPiccioli 
to Volpi,1924-1925,Tripoli,1925.
22) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.64.
23) Ibid.,pp.64-7.
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shown:44 pupils out of a total 117 actually in attendance 
at the school had been promoted to the next class, a definite 
improvement on the previous year,when only 22 out of the 
105 in attendance had been promoted-or 41% against 20%,(24) 
No attempt had been made since the school's original estab­
lishment in 1912 to add the promised higher course of two 
years,despite frequent mention of the need to provide a 
bridge from this school in particular to the Italian sec­
ondary schools in Tripoli.The Director's remarks are of 
some interest in respect of the teaching personnel who 
consisted of the acting director of the school,Signor 
Guglielmo Casano,and his Italian assistant,Maestro Crescenzo 
Di Primal and two Arab teachers for the Koran and Arabic 
languages,whom he does not name.(25)Micacchi's estimation 
of the relative competence of these teachers reflects his 
general hypothesis that the Italo-Arab schools were only 
as good as the teachers running them;the absence of a 
trained cadre of teachers(which defect he was determined 
to remedy) made it too early to judge the various merits 
and general effectiveness of these schools or indeed their 
popularity with the Arab population.The teaching personnel 
at the Tripoli school were ready fodder for the Director's 
argument: Signor Casano,who was on the role of teachers 
for the Italian Schools Abroad and had taught steadily in
24) Ibid.,p.65.
25) Ibid.,p.67.
26) Ibid.,p.6 6 .
27) Ibid.
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the schools of Tripolitania since the turn of the century, 
was described as "of mediocre culture and without any habit
of study"(26) ;Maestro Di Prima was regarded as sufficiently 
"zealous" as a teacher,but clearly in need of better direction 
than was provided by the Director of the schopl(27);the 
two Arab teachers fared no better and were described as 
lacking in "competence" and "competely untrained for this 
type of school".(28)
The other Italo-Arab school in the vicinity of Tripoli 
was in 1919 still at Menscia,where it served the needs of 
the rural suburban-areas,a population that was forever 
fluctuating,a factor having a profound effect upon the 
school and not entirely untypical of rural areas,where 
attendance figures were subject to constant fluctuations 
according to agricultural demands.(29)The later removal 
of this school to Dahara(outside the city ),where the 
population was basically suburban rather than rural, was 
already a strong possibility in 1900;for Micacchi believed 
the work of the school was insufficiently appreciated in 
the Menschia region,where the notables and local population 
had failed to encourage boys of school-age into attending 
with any regularity.(30)The resposibility for such a state 
of affairs was placed squarely at the feet of the Arab pop­
ulation of the vicinity,described by Micacchi aS^Tazyiand 
indifferent to education",the Italo-Arab school being 
invariably attended by.'.ohby the most impoverished boys 
in the district,because of the free food hand-outs provided
28) Ibid.,p.67.
29) Ibid.,p.6 8 .
30) Ibid.
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at the school by the authorities.(31)The Italian director, 
Signor Giuseppe Di Natale,was of somewhat advanced age 
to be still in the service(sixty-four)and was a teacher 
belonging to the Role of Italian Teachers Abroad.He was, 
however, entirely exonerated from all responsibility 
for the poor rate of attendance by Micacchi who claimed 
that the school itself had only managed to survive at 
all on account-of Di Natale's "industry,patience and tact". 
(32)Neither could the school-buildings be blamed for the 
poor attendance since they were spacious and pleasantly 
arranged around an inner courtyard.(33).The attendance 
figure of around 25 pupils during the actual inspection 
of the school in 1919 was not,Micacchi conceded,entirely 
unreasonable in the circumstances, and should be regarded 
as a tribute to Signor Di Natale's professional heroism, 
for,despite his "advanced age",the director was"still 
sufficiently active in the class-room,and his work was 
not lacking in general preparation,benefitting indeed 
from his long experience of school-work".(34)Thus those 
pupils who had attended with any regularity were described 
by Micacchi as "well prepared".(35)The Arab teacher,Ibraim 
Eghedia,taught in the "traditional manner"for which , puposes 
the pupils were seated on matting which covered the floor 
and wrote on a slate".Micacchi concluded that he did not 
feel himself to be sufficiently qualified to judge such 
methods,a somewhat evasive statement which became his 
invariable response to similar occasions and situations.(36)
3 D  Ibid.
32) Ibid.
33) Ibid.
Another school in the Tripoli region known as the 
Nuahi el-Arbaa which compared in many respects with the 
Menschia establishment was the Italo-Arab school of Tagiura, 
a school like the one at Sugh el Giuma under the authority 
of Major D'Alonzo, who had appointed as vice-resident of 
the area a certain Captain Valente under whose control the 
management of the school fell•(37)Unfortunately for the 
school,regardless of Valente's "lively propaganda in its 
favour",the local population remained either indifferent 
of hostile to its amenities.(38)Various explanations of 
this state of affairs were put forward by Micacchi: the 
"particular local conditions",for example,whereby the 
school was established at too great a distance from the 
surrounding farms in which the majority of the population 
of the region lived.(39)Moreover,Tagiura itself boasted 
an ancient mosque with its own particularly famous Koranic
i -
school,which although in a somewhat reduced andj abandoned 
condition by 1919,still managed to attract a good many 
pupils,especially from amongst the more substantial 
families of the region.(40)Consequently,the Italo-Arab 
school was almost exclusively attended(with the exception 
of five or six pupils from well-to-do families) by boys 
from the poorest class,and,since this area was almost 
exclusively “ : agricultural,this had the effect as in Menschia 
of making it extremely difficult to secure regular attendance.
34) Ibid.,p.69*
35) Ibid.
36) Sbid.
37) Ibid.,p.71.
38) Ibid.
(41)Micacchi also blames the ineffectiveness of the 
school upon the Italian teacher acting as director,Signor 
Vicenzo Del Campo,who failed to reach Micacchi's own 
high expectations of the Colonial teacher and his work, 
both of which were viewed as inextricably bound together 
by seals of respectability,rectitude and dedication to 
the work of. the school.This is brought out in Micacchi's
criticism of Del Campo for visiting the hostelries of 
the area imrwhich the school was situated ; the teacher's
!
neglect of his personal appearance is also brought to the 
governor's attention?and the point made that Del Campo's 
attitude not only reduced the estimation in which he was 
held by the population of Tagiura ,but had brought the 
school into disrepute with the Arab population.(42)
The central and decisive importance of the Italian 
teachers responsible for the day-to-day organisation 
and administration of the schools is again emphasised 
by the Director of Colonial Schools in his report upon 
the tiny Italo-Arab school at Zuara,a small centre established 
several kilometers outside Tripoli,where a "truly flourishing 
school could easily be set up if both the accommodation and 
the teachers better responded to the estimations and desires 
of the local population".(43)Even so,despite the unsatisfactor
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid.
42) Ibid.,p.72.Both the Micacchi and subsequent Piccioli 
reports are heavily peppered with criticism of the 
methods and mores of the teaching personnel in the 
government schools.In this respect, both men had keen 
ears for local gossip as it affected teachers,inform- 
ation readily supplied by a whole range of informers, 
though there can be no doubt that the Italian teachers 
were considerably demoralised by poor conditions and 
inadequate pay at this time.See,ibid.
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nature of the school accommodation and the absence of 
regular text-books,the school population had increased 
from 93 during 1917-18 to 130 for the 1918-19 school- 
year with an attendance rate of 85% against 64% in the 
previous year.(44)Unlike the other Italo-Arab schools 
which had remained open until the commencement of Ramadan, 
this particular school had closed at the beginning of April 
to avoid the general exodus of pupils,who,along with their 
parents,left the village to gather in the harvest.(45)Despite 
this annual problem ,it had been possible to promote 30 pupils 
to the next year or 34% of those who had attended the school 
during the school-year•(46)The running of the school was 
in the hands of two Italian conscripts,Lieutenant Napoleone 
Butera,a trained and qualified teacher,and Sergeant Luigi 
Capello,who was furnished with the certificate of the Italian 
normal schools.Both man conveyed to Micacchi the impression 
of being "intelligent and cultured men",though Butera lacked 
in the Director's opinion a certain degree of "resolution" 
to be explained,he added,by the fact that the lieutenant 
had been assigned to the school in the course of his duties 
only and had no intention of either continuing as a teacher 
or of remaining in the colony.Capello,however,made no effort 
at all and in Micacchi*s opinion seemed "unsuitable to be 
a teacher".(47)The teaching of Arabic and the Koran was not
43) Ibid.,p.73.
44) Ibid.
45) Ibid.
46) Ibid.
47) Ibid.
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provided by the school but given in the nearby mosque, 
where it was taught by three local fiqhi in the ’’trad­
itional manner"• The fighi in question are given by 
Micacchi ass Hag Bu el-Kairat,Fghi Ali ben Hag Mohamed 
and Fghi Ahmed ben Brahim.(48)
The Italo-Arab school at the military outpost of Horns, 
which marked the effective limits of Italian authority in 
Tripolitania to the East of Tripoli,was under the control 
of Signor Giuseppe Chillemi,who in 1919 had only recently 
arrived in the colony and ,although untrained as a teacher 
had apparently volunteered for the work.He would in later 
years become a well-known colonial teacher in Libya and 
along with Andrea Festa,Fulvio Contini and others,who 
Micacchi began to single out at this stage for future 
key roles in the educational service,would form part 
of the inner cadre of teachers to-:whom the effective control 
of &!L& education in the Italian colonies would eventually 
be entrusted.Micacchi was anxious at this point in his 
career not to ascribe to him the defects of the school 
which the general circumstances of the time and the teacher.'s 
own lack of experience made it difficult to immediately 
remedy.(49) Chillemi's lack of experience was nonetheless 
responsible for the low annual promotion at the end of 
the 1918-1919 school-year;for although the school appears 
to have enjoyed a 100% attendance record(54 attended out 
of 55 enrolments),a factor explained by its urban location 
and intake,only 20% had been promoted against 30% in the 
previous year.(50) The teaching of Arabic and the Koran
48) Ibid.,p.74.
49) Ibid.
50) Ibid.
was in the charge of Habib Bubaker and Sheilk Mohamed 
el-Siir,whose efforts in this respect were passed as 
satisfactory by Micacchi.(51)
Although the Fundamental Law had made primary education 
compulsory for boys,it was generally understood that 
education for girls should remain optional,and not be 
enforced,a difficult enough task in the case of male 
education.(52)The position of girls' education therefore 
remained as ambivalent as before 1919,and,as there was 
little doubt that girls* schooling would be confined to 
the principal urban centres or merely to Tripoli,where 
it would remain as in Turkish times a largely middle- 
class preserve,the question of its becoming general or 
compulsory was~never a matter of serious debate.(53)Even 
so,female education was regarded by the Italian authorities 
from 1911 until 1942 as an important area for pacific 
penetration and in?particular for the demonstration of 
Italy's civilising mission.In the latter respect,not only 
could it provide the government with an important opportunity 
to extend its influence into the home,but it also showed 
Italy in the role of emancipating women from centuries of 
bondage and oppression-a Western rather than an Eastern 
obsession.(54)
51) Ibid.
52) Micacchi regarded the question of compulsory education, 
such as had been sanctioned by the Fundamental Law of 
Tripolitania,with some degree of scepticism.The demog­
raphic condition of both colonies made it clear,he 
believed,that compulsory education could,at best, only 
be applied to areas of major population.Outside such 
areas,the law would be a "dead letter".In optimum con­
ditions, it should be dependent for enforcement upon the 
individual locality and be regulated for by the rele-
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In recognising the importance of girls' education,not 
merely on account of its intrinsic merits but principally 
as a weapon of propaganda ancl a means of directly influencing 
the home environment of the indigenous population,the 
Italians were only following the example of other colonial 
powers,who frequently pointed to the so-called subjection 
of Moslem women as a justification of colonial rule in 
Moslem countries.No attempt was ever made to explain the 
apparent neglect of girls' education in terms of socio­
economic circumstances or geographical isolation which in
some Moslem countries,su^rh as Libya, were the chief causes
r _. _
of the failure to educate girls adequately.In this latter
respect the history of education in Italy,especially in the
South and in many country areas,was little different from
✓
Libya until well after the unification of Italy itself.(55)
(contin.) vant administrative authority,who would in effect
be the "final arbitors" in such matters.See,Micacchi Report
of July,1919(the School Attendance Law),p.164.
53) Remarking upon Art.10 of the Fundamental Law,which had 
limited compulsory schooir-attendance to boys,Micacchi 
reveals all the usual prejudices and lack of objectivity 
common to colonial legislators and administrators of his 
day."The education of women in Moslem lands is full of 
problems end difficulties ",he states."And only in the 
greater centres of population,where the people have had 
some contact with Europeans over a period of years are 
they less misogynistic than in the interior.Even in the 
urban centres,however,the establishing of girls' schools 
has encountered some resistance for the education of wom­
en is regarded as in opposition to the tenets of Islam 
itself.Therefore,only a purely professional education of a 
basically practical*" character is permitted for women,as 
this type of training confers benefits upon the home.Thus 
girls are permitted to attend a special type of profess­
ional school in Tripoli;but it would be unwise to develop 
in this school the kind of education given to the female
sex in the Italian national schools.In the latter respect 
it is most important to avoid any imposition of our cult­
ure and customs at the expense of their laws and customs’*. 
Ibid.,p.!65.
The Turks had also attached importance to female education 
in Libya and had set up in Tripoli an elementary school 
which was attended by the daughters of notables and Turkish 
officers,along with a professional school analagous to the 
School of Arts and Crafts ,where orphans could acquire 
a trade,though the girls' section was without boarding 
facilities.(56)The Italians as part of their policy of 
pacific penetration before 1911 had also sought to gain 
the support of local Arab families of importance through 
encouraging them to send their daughters to the Italian 
schools in Tripoli,which catered for girls' education.
54) Ibid.,pp.75-8.
55) See,Ernesto Codignola,Italy in Educational Yearbock(1930) 
and also in the Educational Yearbook 1935>and 1929. 
Further contributions to the subject of education in 
Italy in the Educational Yearbook are byLLamberto Borghi 
(1944),Ugo Spiritu(1924) and Iclea Picco(1940).
56) See,Scallabrini Report of July,1913(Scuola Professionale 
Feminile Araba),p •9•
57) F.Contini.Op.Cit.,P.1Q.
58) Ibid.,p.10 and p.29.
59) Exact estimates of the numbers of girls receiving a 
formal education in Libya before 1911 are impossible 
to deduce in respect of Arab girls because of the 
absence of a separate set of statistics for them,the 
tendency being to compound Arab and Turkish statistics. 
Thus the Turkish elementary school for girls had a 
combined total of 80 pupils in the educational section 
and 30 in the professional section.The latter it 
appears were mainly Arab girls.Also 350 girls attended 
the Italian national school for girls,400 the girls' 
school run by the Franciscans in Tripoli and 100 att­
ended the girls' branch of the Talmudic school in the 
Jewish quarter of Tripoli.Arab girls would have attended 
all these schools with the exception of the latter,but 
as can be seen it is impossible to deduce their exact 
proportion from the total percentage because separate 
statistics were not kept.The only definite figure rel­
ating to the number of Arab girls attending public sch­
ools is given by Caruso-Ingilleri in 1912 to the effect 
that 35 such girls were attending the former Turkish 
Girls' elementary school in Tripoli.By 1913,however,
These included the girls' branch of the national elementary 
school and the girls' school in the charge of the Apostolic 
prefect which had been set up in the 1880's and entrusted 
first to French and then to Italian nuns.(57)Also the Jewish 
community had established a girls' school before 1911,though 
a good many Jewish girls were sent instead to the Italian 
schools,and it is more than likely that the former was 
intended primarily for the purposes.of religious education, 
in the manner of the Koranic schools for Moslems.(58) Thus 
female education was already well developed in Tripoli 
before the colonial period commenced in 1911.
As with male education,the immediate impact of the 
Italian occupation had been to reduce the number of schools 
in operation and not surprisingly the number of Arab girls 
in receipt of a formal education fell sharply for a number 
of years.It did not,however, die out completely as is 
shown-Lby Caruso's Ingilleri's observation that the former . 
Turkish girls school still survived on in 1912.(59)At the 
time of Micacchi's arrival in Tripoli,however,the situation 
had hardly changed since Scallabrini's inspection of this
one surviving school in the Via Misran during the year 1913, 
when he had recommended that it should be moved to more
(contin.) this school had been changed into an elementary 
professional school with around 70 pupils,which at the 
time of Micacchi*s arrival had risen to 97,all of whom 
attended regularly and 3 8% had been promoted to the next 
class for the 1918-19 school-year.See,Caruso-Ingilleri to 
Giolitti(P.C.M.).Op.Cit.; Scallabrini to Bertolini,1913, 
Op.Cit . i and Micacchi to the Governor of Tripolitania.Op. 
Cit.,p,77.
60)
Scallabrini Report of July,1913,p.9
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commodious accommodation more in convenient reach of the 
Arab quarter of the old city to which so many people 
had fled from the surrounding countryside because of the 
effects of the war.(60)The long years of stagnation since 
that time ,during which the Ministry of Colonies had virtually 
abdicated from any administrative role in Libya in favour 
of drawing up plans for future use at the Conference of 
Versailles,(61) had not changed the situation in any way.(62) 
As an educational institution,however,Micacchi expressed 
himself full of admiration for the way the school had man­
aged to survive these desolate years of administrative 
neglect when,almost against the odds,it had not only survived, 
but had even"increased considerably",and undoubtedly had 
"a great future ahead of it"•(63)Regarding the actual location 
in Shara Misran,the condition and general adequacy of the 
accommodation so provided,he could only repeat the vague 
directions voiced by Scallabrini almost five years before.(64) 
These amounted to the advice that only the removal of the 
school during the forthcoming scholastic year to a more 
central site somewhere in the old city would augment the 
attendance figures and develop the institution in the manner 
expected by the government in line with its general policy 
towards Libyan education.(64)
61) See,C.Giqlio,Gli Archivi Storici Del Soppresso Ministero 
Dell*Africa Italiana E Del Ministero Degli Affari Esteri 
Dalle Oriqini A1 1922(Leiden,1971),p.xxii.
62) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.75
63) Ibid. Also,see, Scallabrini Report of July,1913,pp.9-10,
64) Ibid.
65) Ibid.
66) Ibid.
As it existed in 1919 and on until the school-year 1921- 
1922,when the government lavished 560.270 Lire on the const- 
ruction of a new edifice,the Misran institution,officially 
designated only as an Italo-Arab school,(65) was for teach­
ing purposes divided into four sections of which the first 
was of a preparatory nature.The idea of a preparatory section 
was not without its practical advantages for it accustomed 
the new entrants to the school as a whole,and set about 
teaching them the Italian language(the principal medium 
of instruction as in the boys' schools),along with hygiene 
and the first notions of the various crafts which they
would learn in greater detail in subsequent years.(66)Following 
the introductory course,the girls were taught a variety of 
skills arid crafts of a largely practical and industrial 
nature, such as cooking,domestic work,weaving,sowing,embroid­
ery,etc. ,etc. ,along with the basic elements of a standard 
general education.The promotion rate to the next year was 
an indication of the success of the school at this curric­
ulum and averaged out at 38% which was considered by Micacchi 
to be high,Also,the school had a good reputation in Tripoli 
and received many visitors who spread its repute far and 
wide.(67)
Again,as was shown in the examination of the boys* 
schools,Micacchi was unstinting in his laudation of "worthy 
teachers",able to achieve results judged "outstanding" in 
the difficult circumstances and conditions.The success 
achieved in the Misran Institution was not surprisingly
67) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.77.
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attributed to Directress,Signorina Olga Ayra Cardella, 
a professional teacher, on the role of Italian teachers 
abroad.(68)Signora Cardella was assisted in her work and 
supervision by another "sound teacher” ,Maestra Agata De 
Meo,who was in charge of the second class and,in Micacchi*s 
opinion,”well prepared and assiduous in the conduct of her 
duties” .(69)Two other mistresses were also employed in 
the school and with whom Micacchi expressed himself to be 
fully satisfied with their work(70),along with three Arab 
mistresses:Maestra Sig.Zachi Sciaman,Maestra Fatma De Fairi 
and Maestra Mariom Cadamsi.(71)
Whereas previous advice upon the subject of government 
schools for the Moslem population:of Libya had been largely 
concerned to alleviate the problem with palliatives rather 
than with the need to find a curejMicacchi*s attitude to 
the issues involved in providing educational provision for 
Moslems in a colonial-type situation was deep reaching 
and radical in its own terms of reference.This is particul­
arly apparent in the following striking statement extracted 
from his report of June 1919*
"The vitality of this type of school is a proven fact, 
for it has both survived and prospered in the actual cond­
itions of the colony,conditions with which I have dealt 
with in full in Parts One and Two of my Report,and which 
I do not now need to repeat.Hence, my profound conviction, 
and also the conviction of all those who have taught in 
this type of school or who have otherwise gained an unsup- 
erficial knowledge of its workings,namely the conviction
68) Ibid.,p.78
69) Ibid.,
70) Ibid.
1 l )  Ibid.
that entrusted to capacious and experienced teachers in 
reasonable circumstances in which the school buildings 
are adequate and the teaching*?materials ,general hygiene, 
administrative arrahgements and curriculum also satisfactory, 
they will become most effective instruments for our moral 
conquest of the country".(72)
Thus Micacchi*s idea as to the future development of 
the elementary sector of Libyan education was to select an 
train a corps of Italian teachers to whom could be entrusted 
the mass of the Libyan population in schools where the pre­
dominating elements of the curriculum would be the Italian 
language and culture.No mention is made of the place of the 
Arab teacher or Arab language and culture,which was presum - 
ably still to be entrusted to untrained personnel! or religious 
leaders.These would simply be expected to co-operate with 
the Italian teachers(in the schools for Libyans)who would 
always hold the position of responsibility as directors 
of the school.Micacchi had already noted approvingly this 
system in operation at Such el-Giuma and for almost the 
whole period of Italian rule it continued to be the principal 
method of employing Libyans in the government schools,formal 
training not being introduced until after the establishment 
of the School of Islamic Culture at Tripoli in 1935.Tech­
nically, the question of selecting and training Italians to 
work in the Italo-Arab schools was part of the general 
question of the recruitment of personnel for the elementary 
schools of the Italian colonies.Most teachers were recruited 
from the roll of the Foreign Ministry,a special list of 
approved teachers employed by the government in the Italian 
Schools Abroad.Teachers not recruited in this way were 
labelled as incaricati on account of the fact that their
72) Micacchi Report of July,1919,p.143.
contracts were only on a yearly basis.The method of 
recruiting teachers locally and employing them on 
a temporary basis was bothseheaper and produced on 
the whole better results than the method of recruiting 
teachers from the ministerial roll since the personnel 
were already acclimatised.As such it became the preferred 
method,despite Micacchi's attempt in 1920 for largely 
political reasons to draw up a special colonial roll of 
teachers for the government schools in Libya, and led 
in 1932 to the establishing in Tripoli of a Normal School 
for the training of Italian nationals resident in the 
colony for work in the elementary schools.(73)In the 
meantime,however, the numbers of Italians ready to work 
in the Italo-Arab schools was far from sufficient and 
the government schools were only able to be maintained 
in existence at all by the use of untrained military 
personnel,who were seconded from their units to teach 
in the Italo-Arab schools,especially in country areas.(74)
III.Professional Education
Neither the Colosimo proposals of 1918(75)nor the educational 
provisions of the Fundamental Law of June 1919(76) produced 
any new initiatives in respect of professional education, 
which in Libya was conducted either at the Girls'Italo-Arab 
school in Shara Misran or in the School of Arts and Crafts
73) See,M.D.,Aug.31,1932,B.U.,Anno XIX,1932.
74) Micacchi Report of J u l y , 1919,p.64.
75) See,Colosimo Report,Op.Cit .(Professional Education),p.373
76) See, Fundamental Law of Tripolitania,Arts 10,11 and 12 > 
B.U.C.,289.
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originally set up by the Ottomans in 1896.Between April 
1916 and June 1919 this schools had been in the charge 
of the painter Edouardo Ximenes, who had reduced it to 
a level of more or less complete educational stagnation.
(77) Nothing had come out of Martini's attempt at reforming 
the school in 1915.This had led initially to the appoint­
ment of a special commission by the Ministry of Colonies 
to .examine the affairs of the school and arrive at a 
solution of its problems that would act as a blueprint 
for its future development under Italian rule(78).The 
failure to implement the commission's proposals must be 
attributed like so many other government intentions during 
this period to the virtual withdrawal of Italian forces 
from Libya following Italy's entry into the European War 
in 1915.From this time onwards the Colonial Ministry gave 
up any serious attempt to fulfil an administrative role 
in the country until the end of hostilities in November 
1918.(79)
The dust-wrappers were,however, taken off the commission's 
proposals in 1918 by Colosimo,as a part of his attempt to 
convince both the Italian public and world opinion generally 
that Italian action in the colonies justified Italy's demand 
for a larger African empire in the post-war situation.lt 
was also necessary in 1918 for Italy to convince Arab opinion 
both in Libya and in the Moslem world as a whole that the 
demands of the Consultative Committees in Libya for an effect-
77) "Under Ximenes",wrote Piccioli in 1926,"the teaching
output of the school had been reduced to nil".See,Picc 
ioli Report of 1926,p.11.
78) Ibid.
79) Ibid.
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ive policy of professional and agricultural training 
for Arabs had been or was about to be met in full by 
the government,which had already drawn up plans to remedy 
such defects in response to Libyan wishes.(80) In fact, 
however, Italy had achieved virtuallybnothing in these 
areas since October 1911,regardless of frequently reiterated
promises to fulfil a "civilising mission" in Libya,which 
, included agricultural training for Libyans and the providing 
of economic opportunities and education.
The conceding of the Fundamental Law in June 1919, 
however,meant that,action of some kind must be taken immed­
iately so as to impress local opinion and avoid the devel­
opment of another credibility gap which would undoubtedly 
damage the government's political policy towards the Arab 
population.In such circumstances,Ximene's tenure, of. the 
directorship at the School of Art9 and Crafts in Tripoli 
could be tolerated no longer by the authorities and his 
dismissal followed as a matter of course.Under Ximenes' 
administration the school had lost its rightful direction . 
as training ground for artisans and had become "a sort of 
academy of decoration and design" in which teaching had, 
as Piccioli noted,virtually ceased entirely,the original 
workshops set up by the Turks having been either closed 
down or hired out to private contractors, who used them 
of their own individual profit.In this crumbling and defunct
environment,observed Piccioli,"the director holds a ceaseless 
political polemic with his subordinates".(81)
80) See,Colosimo Report,pp.373 & 374;supra,Chapt.Six.Section 
II.,pp.162-177; and,also, the Bertolini and Martini 
legislation of 1914 and 1915,supra.Chapt.Two.Section III., 
pp.43-55.
81) Piccioli Report of 1926,p.11.
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The replacement of Ximenes with an able and qualified 
engineer was in line with the new political orientation 
in Libya ,whereby it was hoped that new policies could 
be traded for effective collaboration between Arabs and 
Italians.Again the failure of the new policies to take 
effect because of the continuance of opposition to Italian 
rule in Libya resulted in a further period of stagnation 
for the school;and a situation developed in which the 
unsuspecting new directorivincenzo Rosatijbecame the "fall 
guy".Piccioli as good as admitted such a situation in his 
report to the Colonial Ministry upon the running of the 
School of Arts and Crafts in 1926.In his report,Piccioli 
refers to the governor's original acceptance ofjRosati's 
scheme for reforming the school on 5 May 1919,a scheme which, 
says Piccioli,was excellent in every way and if implemented 
would certainly have revived the institution.Instead of 
proceeding with the implementation of the report,however, 
the government of the colony "placed every obstacle in
T'I Rosati's; path "until such a time as the unfortunate director 
had been been completely discredited as an administrator, 
though his technical capacity was never openly attacked or 
questioned.By so forcing his resignation, the government(82) 
authorities were able to easily replace him with their own 
nominee,Cav.Enrico Fasulo,a man completely"lacking in 
scholastic competence",who became,in Piccioli*s words,"the
82) During these uncertain and politically fluid years,the 
government of Tripolitania was in a complete state of 
flux as can.be attested from the rapid succession of 
governors:Garioni,G.(878rl918-16^8^1919) ;Menzinger,V.( 16. 8, 1919-10.7.1920) ,-Niccoli ,U. (11.7.1920-31. 7.1920); 
Tfercatelli,L.(1.8.1920-16.7.1921).Carlo Giqlio,Op.Cit., 
p. IV.
veritable liquidator of the school who administered to
to this much tormented institution the real coup de grace "
(83)
Further light upon government policy as it affected 
professional and agricultural training in Libya at this 
time is provided by Micacchi in his report of 1919(84). 
Micacchi attached little significance to the demands of 
the Consultative Committes in Tripolitania for more 
"specialised "professional education, in response to 
which Rosati had been appointed and had drawn up his plan 
to reform the School of Arts and Crafts.These aims made 
little sense in Libya,Micacchi added,because of the existing 
low level of economic activity in the country.This was such 
that it was pointless to think at this stage of any form 
of specialised professional education from which only a 
few Libyans would derive any benefit.(85)He supported 
this somewhat negative approach to the problem by referring 
to a report upon Algeria compiled by a certain Senator
83) Rosati's appointment had conveyed in Tripoli the 
impression that the school was at last about to enter 
a constructive period in its history under Italian 
rule.This expectation was based upon the high estimation 
in which the new director was held in his profession,as
he was already director of a School of Arts and Crafts___
in Catanzaro,/besides being the government's nominee for 
the "most important post of director of the Museum of 
Industry and Arts in Rome".Furthermore,he was regarded
as being a"pioneer of professional education in Italy".
In his Report of 1926,Piccioli completely exonerated 
the ex-director from any responsibility for the failure 
to revive the school in this period.See,Piccioli Report, 
1926, p.13.
84) Micacchi believed that the creation of a practical school 
of agriculture upon the Italian model would in the circ­
umstances of 1919 be completely ahead of time, and indeed 
no such institution was established in Tripoli until 
January 1926."Who",he asked,"would enrol in such instit­
utions, and where would they find work or make use of - 
their qualifications?"...."Only when the foundations had
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Combes.In his report,Combes had criticised the attempt 
to provide specialised forms of professional education 
in circumstances in which no need as yet existed for such 
services.lt made more sense,Combes had concluded,to set 
about creating new needs first,"supply would always follow 
demand" ,for there had to be a need for builders and 
carpenters before it made any sense to go about creating 
a supply of them.(86).Micacchi based his attitude to the 
issue of professional education in Libya tipon this laissez 
faire approach,arguing that, whereas he could not in any way
j
seek to deny that the government ought to provide for the 
professional education of Libyans,he did question the rationale 
behind attempting to train artisans,unless employment could 
be found for them to-make use of their newly-acquired skills. 
(87) At the moment ,Micacchi concluded,there was hardly 
sufficient work in the principal towns and urban centres 
to occupy European operatives.Would it be any easier,he 
asked,for Libyans so trained to find employment in their 
villages and tribes,where there was neither need nor demand 
for such operatives?(88)
(contin.) been laid through a general revival of agriculture 
in the province would it be appropriate to create such inst­
itutions, but hardly before! "See, Micacchi Report of July, 
1919,p.170. A1so,D.g.,16 gennaio 1926,n.41,che istituisce 
presso lTstituto sperimentale agrario di ;sidi 
Mesri una scuola practica d'agricoltura,B.U.T.,
5,135.
85) See,Micacchi Report of July,1919(1'Insegnamento 
Agrario e Professionale),pp.166-173.
86) Ibid.
87) Ibid.
88) Ibid.
In his own opinion,Micacchi argued,professional 
education should be of two.kinds: in the first grade 
of a purely preparatory nature ,to be conducted in all 
t£e rural schools,where it ought to consist of manual 
work with a practical aims,so as to encourage a love of the 
soil,and also manual dexterity as would be required for the 
repair and manufacture of domestic appliances.If these aims 
became the basis of government policy,he continued,Italy 
would manage to avoid the creation of a discontented class 
of specialised operatives,unable to put to profitable use 
the skills they had so arduously acquired.Instead, the man­
ually dexterous would be able to find suitable employment, 
without undue difficulty,in the familiar environment of the 
village and tribe ,where traditional ways of work were 
understood and applied by the majority of the population.(89) 
In the secondary grade,however,it would be necessary to 
provide proper professional training in suitable schools of 
arts and crafts.For the moment,Micacchi added,this training 
should be limited to those pupils for whom work opp­
ortunities could be found in the existing economic environ­
ment of the colony.Courses ought to be devised so as to 
provide a training in traditional arts and crafts for which 
a definite need already existed in the familiar environment
89) Ibid.
90) By restricting his comments to the curriculum,Micacchi 
was able to steer clear of any contentious issues assoc­
iated with the actual reform of the School of Arts and 
Crafts in Tripoli.He sought to justify such an avoidance 
of the real problem in Tripoli at least, by stating that 
the superintendency was only marginally responsible for 
the school,which at this time fell under the control of
th the local governor and the Ministry of Economics. Ibid.
of the pupils themselves.Thus any discontent could be 
avoided.lt would also be necessary,Micacchi concluded, 
to set about preparing a class of master craftsmen and 
technicians to supervise the technical and artistic require­
ments of the native industries that the government proposed 
to set up in their various stages and processes of manuf­
acture. For such purposes, every school of arts and crafts 
ought to have its own industrial museum,containing a 
sufficient range of models to include every single variety 
of products,through the whole history of their manufacture 
and development.(90)
Micacchi's philosophising would later provide the blue­
print for the future development of professional education 
in Libya as it affected the Libyan people>under fascist rule. 
In the circumstances of 1919,however,it merely provided the 
bureaucracy with the excuse to defer any real attempt to 
reform the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli,or create 
ammenities of the sort demanded by the Consultative Committees 
The growth of masonic and mafia activities in Tripoli itself 
and the succession of a series of ineffectual governors prov­
ides the background of the Rosati's dismissal in which many 
interested parties had a hand.Indeed, it is doubtful whether 
the director of the School of Arts and Crafts could do very 
much in the circumstances either to implement his own prop­
osals for the reform of the institution,or to prevent local 
entrepreneurs from moving into the school,as they had been 
accustomed to do under his predecessor,to exploit its facil­
ities, and indeed the orphans themselves,for motives purely 
of pecuniary profit,which reveals Italian rule in its worst 
of guises in Libya.
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IV.Secondary Education
Although Article 10. of the Fundamental Law of Tripolitania 
had stipulated that secondary and higher education was to 
be provided in the province,it had not laid down any part­
icular programme to be followed,a task which was to be 
entrusted to the promised Parliament of Tripolitania,when 
and if it should eventually meet.(91)ln Articlesll.,however, 
the Fundamental Law indicated very clearly that "for Moslems 
all the material of primary instruction and the scientific 
material of secondary instruction shall be taught in the 
Arabic language". Thus,the policy of the Colosimo administ­
ration was entirely negated for the latter had sought to 
provide higher education in the Italian secondary schools, 
and the opportunity whereby Libyans could also gain access 
to study at the University of Bocconi at Milan.(92)
The failure between 1919 and 1922 to evade a situation 
of stalemate at the political level in Tripolitania had dire 
consequences as far as the development of any kind of second­
ary education was concerned.Legally,having ruled out the 
type of secondary education proposed by the Colosimo Report 
in 1918,the type of secondary educational proposed by the 
Fundamental Law could only be brought about through further
political consensus,and this was entirely lacking in the 
province.The governatorial commission of 1922 by deliberately 
excluding from active consideration all matters affecting
91) See,G.Rochat,Lo Statuto Concesso alia Tripolitania nel
1919 in II Colonialismo Italiano,p .108
92) See, Colosimo Report,p.-365.
93) See,D.M.14 Sept.1922.Ordinamento scolastico per i 
musulmani della Tripolitania,B,U.C606.
secondary education upon political grounds resulted in 
the promulgation of a decree in which there was no 
mention of secondary education as such.(93)The situation 
therefore reverted,at least logically,to the Bertolini 
Ordinance of 1914 in which the government had stated 
that it would set up a "School of Islamic Culture".The 
subsequent reform of the Auqaf es-Sur had led to the 
promulgation of a further decree in 1917 whereby the funds 
of the Auqaf es-Sur were explicitly allocated to the 
establishment and maintenance of the "School of Islamic 
Culture" ordained by the Bertolini decree.The proviso,however, 
had been added that the school would not be set up until 
the government considered it to be "opportune" to proceed 
with the project.In .the meantime ,the funds of the Auqaf 
would be administered by a special commission appertaining 
to the general administration of the Auqaf itself.
The term "opportune" by not tying the government to 
a definite date meant in effect that it could proceed with 
the establishment of the school whenever it thought fit.
Even after the conceding of the Fundamental Law,this moment 
had not yet arrived,and the government sought to explain its 
tardiness in establishing the school with the excuse that 
the Auqaf still lacked sufficient balances to make it feasible 
If anything the promulgation of the Fundamental Law had 
delayed the opening of the proposed Hedersa, since the need 
to conduct the teaching of all"scientific matters" in Arabic 
raised the prospect of having to recruit Arabic-speaking 
teachers from beyond the confines of Libya as they did not 
exist in Libya itself.Such a possibility raised the danger
94) See,R.D.16 lugliol917,n.l283.Destinazione delle rendite 
dei beni awqaf,B.U.T.,26,1.;and R.D.2 Ottobre 1917,n.1656. 
Istituziono di un Consiglio speciale per 1 'amministrazione 
e la sorveglianza dei beni awqaf in Tripoli,B.U.C.,730. 
Also,see J.Briotti,!! Wagf in LibiafRoma.1935).p.42.
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of political subversion,a risk that no Italian administ­
ration would consider to be worth the candle in view of 
the general state of political and ideological upheaval
which the surrounding Arab countries were undergoing at 
this time,and from^which Tripolitania itself was far from
free.Thus the closing of the University of El-Azhar in 
Cairo for a year by the British authorities in 1921 on 
purely political grounds,far from leading the Italian 
government to reconsider its position,as far as the prop-
I
osed Tripoli Medersa was concerned, led to a hardening 
of attitude on the subject.In the* prevailing climate of 
upheaval,it was argued,how could the government of Italy 
ensure that adequate surveillance was exercised over Arab 
teachers recruited from other lands to teach in the new 
Medersa? If the Medersa project was established ,Arab 
nationalism,pan-Islamism and the anti-colonial and anti- 
Western agitatorsswho had established their headquarter 
in Jthe form of the revolutionary committee Zaghlul Pascia at 
El-Azhar^could easily transport themselves to Tripoli,where 
the conditions were only too ripe for their further devel- 
opment. (94) Against this kind of background, the Auqaf funds 
remained unused for the purposes of establishing an Islamic 
University or Medersa in Tripoli until 1928,when the project 
was again temporarily raised,though Volpi,largely on his 
own authority ,did not hesitate to extract 100,000 Lire from 
the fund's balances in 1923 for the purpose of establishing 
a new mosque in pursuance of Italo-Arab amity.(95)
95) See.Briotti.Op.Cit.,Chapt.IX.,"Gli Auqaf es-Sur",p.60. 
For the moves(which proved abortive)to establish the 
Medersa proposed in 1914 and 1915 in 1928,see MAI-AS, 
Consiglio Superiore Coloniale(1923-39),pacco 6(1928),
N .56-12.628:Ordinamento per la Medressa Superiore(Scuola 
islamica)in Tripolitania.
The need,however,for some form of alternative to El- 
Azhar could in the circumstances of 1919-1922 not be 
entirely averted by Italy,as the traditional expedient of 
sending Libyan students to Cairo and lodging them in a special 
hospice,where they remained under the vigilant charge of the 
Italian Consul-General was not immediately practical.Also,the 
need was growing for cadi,mufti,Islamic lawyers and other sucl 
officials to"replace those on the point of retirement or the 
victims of sickness or death.It was,however, the political 
danger in Cairo,which,after the reopening of the war with 
the Senusi in 1923,produced a strong backlash of anti-Italian 
sentiment throughout the Arab lands,led the government to 
tolerate interim arrangements with regard to Islamic educat­
ion in Libya.Thus came about the project known as the "Univ­
ersity of Kullia",whereby the Ulemah proceeded to establish 
a Libyan alternative to the Islamic University of El-Azhar 
in Tripoli.This project had initially been proposed by the 
Ulemah to Scallabrini in 1913,during his mission to Libya
on behalf of Bertolini, the Minister of Colonies.lt is more 
than likely that the Italian refusal to establish an Islamic
University did not deter the Ulemah from seeking to establish
one on their own account,even if the Auqaf funds could not
be used for such a purpose.
As in 1913,the execution of the project in 1919 depended
upon pooling the resources and basicj amenities * of the three
principal existing medressas so as to form what was essentia11
one large Islamic school.It also required the reorganisation
of the curriculum so as to produce a combined curriculum
embodying all the essential elements of the studies normally
pursued in the environment of El-Azhar at Cairo.Again as in
96) See,Scallabrini Report,1913,Op.Cit.,p.25;Schema Di Ordin- 
amento Per La|Medressa Superiore in Tripolitania,pp. 1-15, 
Op.Cit.;and Briotti,Op.Cit.,p.62
the case of the work of the commission established by the 
Parliament of Cirenaica to implement the Fundamental Law, 
the use of the term idadia caused difficulties,as such 
a term had no relevance to a traditional Islamic institution, 
such as the proposed Medersa.In overcoming problems of such 
a nature Nallino's advice was of great service in devising 
a higher course,as the University of El-Azhar did not have 
a set curriculum or courses of study,this being a matter 
for the individual professor ,not the university,to 
determine.The biggest obstacle in the way of implementing 
the curriculum devised by Nallino was undoubtely that of 
securing a sufficient number of suitable teachers,as the 
Italians were only prepared to allow the Ulemah to recruit 
Libyan nationals,which meant that many courses never took 
place because of the lack of qualified personnel.(95)
The three medressa involved in the project included ti>at 
of Osman Pascia,which had originally been set up to provide for 
the maintenance of one teacher and forty students;that of Ahmed 
Pascia,which provided for two teachers and thirty students;and 
the Medressa of Mustapha Pascia,providing for one teacher and 
forty students.(97)Under the Ottomans,each student received a 
sum equivalent to 20 Lire per month for school materials and 
personal maintenance,a sum increased to 60 Lire,which appeared 
to exclude accommodation and food,as this was provided by the 
schools themselves.In the new arrangements,the schools of Ahmed 
Pascia and Mustapha el-Katib became idadia,which the school att 
ached to the mosque of Osman Pascia became a Medersa or Univer-
97) §ee#Briotti,Chpt.IX, "Gli auqaf es-Sur",p.64.Also,Seal1- 
s abrini Report,July 1913,Op.Cit.,p.25;and Consiglio 
Superiore Coloniale(1923-39),pacco 6(1928),N.56-12.628s 
Istituzione in Tripoli di una Medress^Parere,Relazione 
Ministeriale N.42537 del 12 marzo,1935-XIII,p.2.
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sity,providing the higher courses. The management of 
the whole joint project was entrusted to the authority 
of a higher commission composed of the Cadi, who acted 
as president,the president of the Auqaf and a member of 
the Ulemah,who was nominated by the teachers .This comm­
ission provided for the setting up of a further sub-commission 
to administer the school.This was presided overbby the 
Mufti,who acted as president,various members of the Auqaf 
Commission,and four teachers who were mainly concerned 
with the teaching of the curriculum.The latter were to be 
assisted where necessary by various members of the Ulemah 
knowledgeable in the "Islamic Sciences".The period of 
instruction for each course was fixed at a minimum of five 
years and a maximum of six ; and progress from one course 
to the next was to be determined by an annual examination.
The conditions of admission to both the Idadia and 
were as following* a) the aspirant ought to be less than 
twenty-five years old;b)he should be able to read and write 
in the correct manner;c) he should have memorised a section
of the Koran.(98)The curriculum was as follows*
Religious Doctrine s
1. et-Tagiuid(the ability to recite the Koran with 
a certain cadence);
2) el-Hadith(Islamic Tradition);
3) Mustalah el Hadith(the legal implications and value
of tradition);
4) et-Tafsir(Koranic Commentary);
5) et-Tauhid(doctrine of monotheism);
6) el-Fiqh(Islamic Law);
7) Usil el-Fiqh(sources of the Law);
98) It should be noted that not only was the establishment
of the /Medressa tolerated by the new regime but positively 
encouraged in its development.In 1923 all grants to Libyan 
students attending El-Azhar were suspended and when ren- 
ewed^were intended for those wishing to attend the Med- 
| ressa in Tripoli.By 1928 Nallino had developed his initial 
outline of a curriculum into the scheme of a new law which 
was to have set up theIMedressa' upon a more elaborate and 
official basis at the Mosque of Murad Aga in Tripoli.Pol­
itical and financial reasons ,however,obstructed the plan. 
See,Relazione Ministeriale N.42537 del 12 marzo,1935-XIII, 
pp.l-7;and J.Briotti,Op.Cit.,p.64
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8. el-Achlak ed-Dinia(religion and morality);
9. es-Saira en Nabauia(life of the prophet);
10. Arabic languageimorjbhology, syntax, elements 
of rhetoric,eloquence,elocution,composition, 
metre,rhyme,handwriting and the composing of 
letters;
11. Science(logic,arithmetic,history,geometry and 
geography)*(99)
These courses were taught in the mosques where the students 
were lodged in accordancewith the following fashion which 
was traditional thoughout the Arab and Islamic world.On 
entering the mosque,the students formed a circle around 
the teacher or mudarris ,usually in the vicinity of a 
particular pillar,and the teacher would proceed to expound 
the sacred text with the students seated on the floor of 
the mosque around him.The students were for the most part 
without any special text-books or other such aids,though 
some equipped themselves with writing pads upon which they 
jotted down notes from the lecture.(100)
These arrangements continued in Tripoli until 1935(101) 
in which year the Italian authorities finally allowed the
Auqaf balances to be used in establishing a Medersa in 
Tripoli under the name of the al-Madrasah al-Islamiyya
al£uij^*(102J In effect,however,the easing of restrictions 
in Cairo after 1922 led to the re-opening of El-Azhar ,which 
combined with the failure to establish a Medersa in Tripoli 
in 1928,led many Libyan students continue the ancient Libyan
custom of studying there.
99) Ibid.,p.65.
100) Ibid.,p.66.
101) The writer must at this point add“that he has been
unable to trace a single reference of Libyan students 
from either Tripolitania or Cirenaica attending the 
Senusi University at Jarabub.
102) Briotti,p.66.
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Chapter Eight Preparations in Cirenaica for Implementing
the Fundamental Law:1919-1921-A period of 
Reassessment and Reorientation
"....with the exception of the major 
centres,such as Bengasi and Derna,where 
the schools equal the best in Tripolitania, 
the government schools are in an extremely 
poor condition.Most of them are located 
in cramped and poorly lighted and ventil­
ated buildings.They are for the most part 
without teaching materials and sometimes 
do not even possess school benches.Also, 
the teaching personnel are poorly^-educated 
and consist mostly of either untrained non­
commissioned officers or private soldiers. 
The latter are seconded from their regim­
ents and are neither better nor worse than 
the local'fighi'.How can we expect good re­
sults in such circumstances?"(*)
Micacchi's arrival in Libya during the Spring of 1919 was 
in response to the wishes of the Department of Civil and 
Political Affairs in Tripoli which,at the time of the Col- 
osimo Report of the previous year,had insisted that the 
carrying out of an official inspection of the schools in 
Libya should be the sine qua non of any future policy of 
reform.It was also in response to the changed political 
circumstances in both Italy and Libya,which had brought 
Nallino's orientalist policy to the fore,so threatening 
all the work of the School's Department at the Ministry 
of Colonies based as it was upon the notion of pacific 
penetration.Such changes also posed a considerable admin­
istrative challenge,since their implementation would
require the training of Libyans to work in the schools, 
and the recruitment of Arab-speaking teachers from the
neighbouring countries,where Arab nationalism and pan-
*) Micacchi Report of 1919,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1, 
p.Ill.
Islamisra had taken firm root.Accompanying Micacchi in 
his official capacity as Director of Colonial Schools 
was Dr. Angelo Piccioli who,following his appointment as 
Scholastic Superintendent for Cirenaica in 1921,would 
be responsible for education in the province to both 
the Parliament of Cirenaica and to Micacchi at the Ministry 
of Colonies.Piccioli's importance to educational develop­
ments in Libya can hardly be overemphasised,since not only 
would he implement the policy of the Fundamental Law for 
Cirenaica in the light of Micacchi's own aims and opinions, 
but in 1924 he would reorganiseceducation in Tripolitania 
in terms acceptable to the fascist leadership.The close 
working relationship between Micacchi and Piccioli,which 
seems to commence at this point,is in many respects the 
lynch-pin to subsequent educational developments in LibyaJ 
for Piccioli put into practice his chief's educational 
aims and theories,until his own promotion to the Colonial 
Ministry in Rome,where he headed the propaganda department 
from the late twenties onwards.In these years,Piccioli's 
adherence to the Micacchi line is highly typical of the 
attitude of many middle-ranking members of the colonial
bureaucracy.Such men were caught up in a centralised and 
hierachical structure of government.Upward mobility re­
quired that they serve their chief with efficiency,ded­
ication and loyalty.Piccioli in this respect is a typical 
creature of the governing bureaucracy and found no diff­
iculty in fusing his own interests with service to the 
state.It would never have occurred to such personnel to 
risk disfavour by adopting an independent approach to a 
particular problem; and the hierachical structure of
the fascist state was ideally suited to their mentality.
In the handling of native affairs,they were seldom ever 
interested in any genuine sense with the real thought 
and aspirations of the population they were supposed to 
serve.Even,as between 1919 and 1922,when official gov­
ernment policy was aimed at securing Libyan autonomy, 
the mentality of colonial officials like Micacchi and 
Piccioli was at all times essentially geared towards 
securing Italy's colonial options in the territory.In 
the latter respect,Italian nationalism and the securing 
for Italy of an imperium in Libya and Africa were inseparably 
connected in their minds and dictated their approach to 
Libyan problems at every level.If Italy had been without 
a Colonial Ministry men such as Micacchi and Piccioli 
would have found other ways of exercising their ambitions, 
drive,idealism and undoubted patriotic fervour.As it was 
their intelligence and ambition became interlocked in 
securing for Italy an empire in Africa 5 and in securing 
for the Arab population of Libya an educational future 
that could only make sense in terms of Italian colonialism. 
Before,however,turning to examine what was perhaps the 
better side of that imperial dispensation in Cirenaica, 
it is necessary to briefly take account of the existing 
arrangements as far as education was concerned,since it 
was out of the situation that existed between 11919 and 
1921 that new reforms would have to take on their new
form.This chapter will,therefore,first concern itself with 
the legacy of Italy rule in Cirenaica ,before going on 
to examine the preparations for the forthcoming reforms, 
prior to Piccioli's actual inauguration as superintendent 
at the commencement of the 1921-1922 school-year.
II.The Condition of the Schools and the Micacchi
Mission of 1919
Unlike Tripolitania,Italian rule had survived more or less 
intact as a result of the Accord of 1917 in the coastal 
areas formerly under the control of the Ottomans,and the 
schools established after 1912 still continued to function. 
(1) Nonetheless,the scholastic situation was far from stable 
when Micacchi arrived at Bengasi in the early summer of 
1919 as the schools outside the main urban areas were in 
an extremely poor condition.More than in Tripolitania,there 
was a need to bring about improvements in both the Italian 
and Arab sectors,if the Accord of Acroma was to be consol­
idated with further agreements,and the remaining elements 
of the Italian population,many of whom were on the point 
departing for Egypt,Tunisia and Italy,encouraged to remain 
in the country.(2)0n the whole,however,the general picture 
was much brighter than in Tripolitania and the statistics 
for 1918-1919 reveal that at least seventeen Italo-Arab 
schools were still in operation,with forty-two sections
r  '
and 947 annual enrolments(897 of these were Moslems) and 
an average attendance of 635 pupils.(3)In view of the 
difficulties of the times and the general uncertainty of 
the political situaion,Micacchi regarded such figures as 
a clear indication that local support was not entirely 
lacking for the Italo-Arab school,and would certainly in­
crease, once the government had attended to the defects of
of the country schools in particular.(4)As records were 
not kept by the Department of Civil and Political Affairs 
in Bengasi on the day-to-day running of the schools in 
the country areas, and as the records which were kept,were 
never forwarded to Tripoli because Of the dual nature of 
the political organisation of the two provinces,which were 
more like separate colonies,Micacchi could only obtain 
definite information about the schools in the countryside 
by visiting the military command posts outside Bengasi.(5) 
These visits provide a very clear picture of the running 
of the country schools at this time:entrusted to the res­
ponsibility and control of the local military resident, 
the schools were almost entirely run by the army which 
provided ,military personnel to act as teachers,tables, 
chairs, and other such basic equipment, and frequently 
even the school building itself.(6)As in Tripolitania,the 
personal interest of the local resident in educational
matters was an important j ingrediant in the success or
4) Ibid.,p.121.
5) Although Micacchi states that seventeen Italo-Arab 
schools were still iri_pperation in 1919,the Colosimo 
Report of Feb.,1918 provided details of the existence 
of only thirteen Italo-Arab schools for Cirenaica.Rel­
evant information upon the running of the schools was 
lacking because of the lack of central control and 
co-ordination between the two colonies.As a solution 
to this and other administrative problems affecting 
the scholastic situation in both provinces,Micacchi 
urged the government to undertake a reform of the admin­
istration which would concentrate overall administrative 
control under a single head,such as the Political and 
Civil Affairs Directorate.At another level,he argued, 
it was impossible to resolve the problems of agricult­
ural and professional education when control over these 
activities was vested as at present in several different 
ministries.See,Ibid(The Need for all the Schools to be 
dependent upon a single Administrative Authority),p.168, 
Also,see The Colosimo Report,p.380.
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failure of a particular school .Micacchi#s inspection 
of the schools therefore in 1919 was urgently needed 
if only to provide an overall picture of the scholastic 
situation.The Colosimo Report lacked basic objectivity 
because the sources upon which it had been based were 
extremely uncertain.Lacking personnel to visit the schools 
in the outlying areas,the Department of Political and Civil 
Affairs in Bengasi was obliged to depend upon information 
about the schools supplied by the military commanders in
the pacified areas still under Italian control.This inform­
ation was not always forthcoming and when it did was far 
from reliable.(7) Micacchi's report therefore is the first 
full-length study of the schools in Libya since Italian 
rule began in the country.Even so, it is far from complete, 
since the Director of Colonial Schools only had time to 
inspect the schools of Bengasi and Derna, along with those 
at Cirene,Apolonia,Chegab and Zavia-Feidia.Despite such 
regrettable shortcomings,however,the information provided 
by the Micacchi Report is objective since it was selected 
to show both the best and the worst of the existing schools 
both in Tripolitania and in Cirenaica.(8 )
6 ) Micacchi Report of 1919»Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1, 
pp.111-138.
7) Both the Colosimo and Micacchi Reports vary widely in 
their separate assessments of the number of Italo-Arab 
schools in Cirenaica,as in their use of statistics relat­
ing to these schools.Thus whereas the Colosimo Report 
estimates the number of schools to be around thirteen 
with 1022 enrolments,Micacchi states the number of sch­
ools to be seventeen with 947 enrolments.Also both 
reports difer in their estimates on a school to school 
basis.See,Ibid.(throughout) and the Colosimo Report,p.37 3#
:8) Micacchi Report of 1919:Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l,
p.1 2 1.
As in Tripolitania,the government educational provision 
for Libyans in Bengasi drew its form and inspiration from 
the pre-colonial Italian schools(9)and in the first days of 
Italian rule had led to the setting up of an Italo-Arab 
annexe attached to the existing Italian national school,along 
with the siting of a small Italo-Arab school at Berka on 
the outskirts of Sidi Daud near Bengasi.(10) In 1919 the 
original school established at Berka in 1912 was still 
functioning,but the Italo-Arab section attached to the Ital­
ian national school had been moved to the Arab quarter of 
Bengasi,as originally requested in the summer of 1912 by 
the Scholastic Deputation *(11),where it was known as the 
“Central Italo-Arab School".(12furthermore,another Italo- 
Arab school had been set up at Sabri on the outskirts of 
the city.(13)All three schools,reported Micacchifunctioned 
with regularity and were better organised than their equiv­
alents in Tripolitania,though equally suffered from poor 
buildings and inadequate school-materials,in respect of which, 
they were,he added,neither better nor worse bffithan the 
Italo-type schools attended by the children of Italian 
residents.(14)
9) See,Fulvio Contini,p.39 and the Micacchi Report of 1919,
pp.121-128.
10) ACS,P.C.M.,Amministrazione Civile e Servizi Inherenti* 
Relazione Mensile,Direzione Dei Servizi Civile,Ciren­
aica ,Bengasi(Giugno,1912)-T.1/2-308.
11) Micacchi Report of 1919(Scuola Italo-Araba Centrale),p. 
123;and ACS,P.C.M.,Amministrazione Civile e Servizi 
Inherenti*Relazione Mensile,Direzione Dei Servizi Civ­
ile ,Cirenaica,Bengasi(Sept.,1912)-T.1/2-4772,p .12.
12) Colosimo Report,p.380.Also,see Micacchi Report,p.123.
13) Ibid.
14) Micacchi Report of 1919(Italo-Arab Schools),p.122.
Established in April 1912 in a wing of the Italian 
school at Bengasi,the Central Italo-Arab school was by 
1919 in its seventh year of life,and,although for some 
time plagued by low-attendance figures(15),it had during 
the school-year 1916-1917(16) shown a sudden improvement 
by enrolling ahhundred pupils(17).This figure had,however, 
again dropped during the 1918-19 school year from 105 to 90 
pupils for reasons entirely unconnected,according to 
Micacchi,with the internal running of tfre school.(18)In 
this school,the average attendance figure more or less 
corresponded with the enrolment figure and having personally 
examined a number of the pupils,Micacchi expressed himself 
well-satisfied with educational standards.He also had no 
criticism to offer of the director,Signor G.B.Guasco,who 
taught the third section,or of his assistants,Domenico 
Catalanott and Signor Chiric,who taught the first and 
second years in the school•((19)The latter were described 
as being "younguand not particularly well educated them- 
selves-but willing to get on with the work in hand under 
the able direction of Signor Guasco".(20)Micacchi reserved 
a special word of praise for the Arab teacher at the school, 
Senusi el-Murtadi-"the best of all the local teachers,emp­
loying sound methods,good discipline"and through his know-
15) The earliest enrolment figures indicate a school pop­
ulation for this particular institution of 44 pupils 
in April 1912,rising by June to 60 pupils,32 of whom 
were in the childrens'section and 28 in the adults' 
section.Colosimo indicates an enrolment of 38 for 1915- 
1916,86 for 1916-17 and 115 for 1918-19.Micacchi,however, 
states enrolment to be 100 for the year 1916-17 and 
105 for 1918-19,which had dropped by Spring to an en­
rolment figure of 90 due to an epidemic in the town .
In the latter part of the school-year 1919 only 65 
attended.See,Relazione Mensile,Bengasi(Giugno,1912)- 
T.1/2-308;The Colosimo Report,p.380;and Micacchi Report
of 1919,p.123.
ledge and control of his subject,considerably increasing 
the credit of the school with the surrounding population"• 
(21)Micacchi advised that Senussi el-Murtadi should be 
personally congratulated by the governor upon the excellence 
of his work,besides having his salary increased.(22)
The school at Sabri had also continued to "flourish" 
although the number of pupils had decreased slightly during 
1918-19 from 142 for 1917-18 to 115 for 1918-19.(23)The 
attendance figure of 79 was equal to 69% of the original 
enrolment figure,a "good result"attributed by Micacchi to 
school's director,Signor Giacomo De Beilis,who was a prof­
essional teacher on the carefully selected"roll of Italian 
Schools Abroad,"a man(added Micacchi)of culture and 
intelligence with a good grasp of method,who had been in 
the colony for six years,and has devoted much of his time 
to a proper study of the Arabic Language and Literature"• 
(25)"A somewhat malicious critic",observed Micacchi,"might 
perhaps conclude that he considers the school in which he 
works as a sort of laboratory for the conducting of exper­
iments in the field of linguistics,though others would add 
this to his credit.In any case this ought not to detract
16) Micacchi Report of 1919,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-!, 
p.123.
3.7) Ibid.
18) Micacchi blamed the drop in enrolments and general att­
endance upon an epidemic which swept through Bengasi in 
1918.See,Ibid.,p.l24.
19) Ibid.
20) Ibid.
21) Ibid.
22) Ibid.
23) Ibid.The statistics of the Colosimo Report for these years 
vary considerably with those provided by Micacchi:1915-
from the sound advice he offers to all employed in the 
school".(26)The teaching of Arabic and the Koran at Sabri 
was the responsibility of Kalil Gallal and Beehir Badi- 
the former was described by Micacchi as being "adequately 
prepared and full of good will" though his colleague who 
taught both sections of 1A and in 2A was "not up to stand­
ard",a position upon which Micacchi declined to make any 
comment or offer any advice.(27) De Beilis himself was 
responsible for the teaching of the Italian Language in 
sections 2A and 3B of the school and also to both sections 
of the first year.(28)
The remaining Bengasine school at Berka gave Micacchi 
a less favourable impression than the Central and Sabri 
schools;and it was compared to its detriment with the 
Tripolitanian school at Menschi,which had similarly excited 
the director's hostile criticism.Both schools were also simila; 
in so far as they were each situated in rural suburbs,where 
they were subject to the demands of agriculture,with the 
result that attendance was poor and erratic.(29) Even so 
enrolments had always been relatively high and were still 
on the increase.(30)For teaching purposes the building at Sabr, 
was divided into three sections;but the teaching standards 
were generally low.Micacchi blamed this state of affairs
(contin) 16(45 pupils),1916-17(114 pupils) and 1917-18(118 
pupils.See Colosimo Report,p.380-381.
25) Micacchi Report of 1919,p.125.
26) Ibid.
27) Ibid.
28) Ibid.
29) Ibid.,p.126.
30) Micacchi provides the following school statistics for 
Berka: between 1912 and 1918 the enrolments increased
upon the director himself,Sig.Antonio Di Venere,who 
though a qualified teacher was "unenthusiastic" and had 
not acquitted himself well since his arrival in Libya.
(31) The teaching of Arabic and the Koran was in the hands 
of a local teacher by the name of Mustapha Drisa^regarding 
whom Micacchi declined to make any comment.As a general 
conclusion,however,he believed that the school would really 
profit only if Antonio Di Venere made some effort to 
utilise his undoubted abilities in a more zealous manner 
than he had done so f ar•(3 2)
In the Italo-Arab school at Derna,Micacchi believed he 
had found a Cirenaican equivalent of the Italo-Arab school 
at Suk-el Giuma in Tripolitania-an example of what such a 
school could really achieve when under the direction of able 
and zealous teachers,in reasonable circumstances,backed up 
by the support of both the local Arab population and the 
local Italian resident.The developments had been such at 
Derna that it had been necessary for the senior teacher in 
the town,Fulvio Contini,(33)to arrange for the Italo-Arab
(contin.)from 25-95 pupils with an attendance(average) fig­
ure in 1912 of 18,which in 1918 wa§ stated as being 77.For 
the year 1918-1919 enrolments amounted to 65 of whom 44 or 
67% attended.These figure should,however,be compare with 
those given in the Colosimo Report:1915-16(42 pupils);1916-17 
(96);and 1918-19(109).See,Ibid. and the Colosimo Report,p. 
380.
31) Micacchi Report of 1919,p.126.
32) Ibid.
33) Fulvio Contini had already been teaching in the colony 
for three years when Micacchi arrived in 1919,having 
originally started teaching at the Central Italo-Arab
School at Bengasi,and would still be in Libya in 1952 
and afterwards,when he contributed to Gino Cerbella's 
monthly review Libia(see,Bibliography,infra).Ibid.
school to be split up between the accommodation allotted 
to it within the existing Italian national school,and a 
house to serve as a temporary school,recently acquired in the 
Suk,where an additional section was set up.(34)A further 
reason for the creation of another section of the Italo- 
Arab school of Derna was the need to provide separate fac­
ilities for the children of Ascari troops,the latter being 
encamped in the vicinity of the town.(35)The principal 
reason,however,for the acquisition of extra accommodation 
was the expansion in enrolments which for 1918-19 stood 
at 158, with an average attendance of 158 in the Italo-Arab 
section attached to the national school(these were mainly 
Libyans),and 112 with an average attendance of 64 at the 
section in the suk(these were mainly Ascari from Eritrea). 
(36)Both sections of the Italo-Arab school of Derna were 
under the direction of Fulvio Contini,who Micacchi described 
as "an outstanding teacher and administrator".(37) In his
34) Micacchi Report of 1919,p.122.
35) Micacchi notes that the Libyans were to make use of 
the Italo-Arab section located in the right-hand wing 
of the "Prince of Piedemont",as the national school 
was called,and the Ascari,who were Christians,were to 
make use of the Italo-Arab section set up in the Suk.
See,Ibid.,p.l27
36) Ibid.
37) Ibid.(Described as a"young man with a lively intelligence 
and a good education",besides possessing"a good know­
ledge of Arabic,both spoken and literary?Contini was 
ear-marked for future promotion from this point onwards. 
By the time of Piccioli's appointment as superintendent 
in 1921,he had already become the director of Arab elem­
entary schools in Cirenaica and for this purpose was 
stationed in Bengasi.Subsequently,as Piccioli's right
band man * he.did much to implement the Fundamental Law . 
in the province,rising to become superintendent,following 
Piccioli's transference in 1924 to Tripolitania.)
role as director of Arab elementary education in Derna,
Contini was supported by an active team of capable teachers: 
Maestra,Sig.Aleardo Pallachi,Signor Raffaele Gagliardi, 
along with two Libyan teachers,Abubaker Gatesc and Kalifa 
Aisa.j Two further teachers also assisted Contini at the 
Ascari school in the Suk,which some Libyans also attended, 
Giovanni Bachetti,trained at Ascoli Piceno,and Seid Ben Ali,who
taughtr-the Koran and Arabic;for which purpose the school 
had been divided into three sections to cope with the 
separate needs of the pupils.(3 8)
The remaining Italo-Arab schools in Cirenaica visited 
by Micacchi in 1919(those at Apolonia,Cirene,Zavia-Feida 
and Ghegab)present a gloomy picture ofppoor and inadequate 
school buildings,untrained army instructors,non-existent 
teaching materials and low enrolments with even lower annual 
attendance records.(39)For example,the school at Apolonia 
was described as consisting of a"room more suited to serve 
as a warehouse than a school" where Micacchi found 35 pupils 
presided over by an Italian so-called teacher named as Felice 
Zarrug.The latter,Micacchi conceded "did his best in the 
circumstances",but was in other respects "completely without 
the slightest capacity for teaching".(40)In an even worse 
condition,it appears,was the so-called school at Cirene, 
where 53 pupils were enrolled;but only 24 attended with any 
degree of regularity.(41)In this institution,which occupied
38) Ibid.
39) Ibid.
40) Ibid.(Scuole Italo-Arabe),pp.122 & 128.
41) Ibid.,p.129.
a cellar,an Italian sergeant by the name of Franchini 
(no Christian name is given),assisted by the local fighi , 
administered what passed for a school"without books,teach­
ing materials or worse still,without any idea of teaching 
method or understanding how a school should be organised 
and run".(42)Still worse were the so-called Italo-Arab 
schools at Zavia Feidia and Ghegab,where the pupils gathered 
in small rooms,lacking in light,ventilation,benches,books 
or other remotely scholastic-like circumstances or faciltities 
under the direction of an Italian sergeant and the local 
fiqhi*(43) Micacchi severely execrated all such arrangements, 
however provisional,adding that he had been informed from 
reliable sources that by far the greater part of the Italo- 
Arab schools,which he had not had the opportunity to inspect 
himself,were virtually "identical"to these appalling circ­
umstances "or even worse,if that is possible".(44) The 
picture of education in Cirenaica depicted by Micacchi in 
his highly confidential report upon the subject could never 
have been deduced from the glossy pages of the Colosimo 
Report of February 1918.This is not surprising as the latter 
was primarily intended to convince Libyan opinion that 
something was about to be done in accordance with the wishes 
of of the Consultative Committees.More than the latter, 
however, was the intention to convince Italian and foreign 
opinion that Italy had made considerable progress towards 
fulfiling her"civilising mission" in Libya especially and 
was ready for an even larger share of the colonial cake , 
elsewhere in Africa.
42) Ibid.
Despite the preparedness of the Italian authorities 
to sanction the establishment of a school for Moslem girls 
on lines similar to the one set up in Tripoli in 1912,no 
progress had been made towards the realisation of this goal 
since it was first mooted in that year,and there is no 
reference to such an institution in Micacchi*s Report of 
1919,or to the possibility that Moslem girls were receiving 
an education in the Italian Girls* School in Bengasi,which 
along with the Boys* School had been originally set up in 
1888 and reopened in February 1912,following the establish­
ment of Italian rule in the province.(45)In failing to set up
44) Ibid.
/
45) Regarding the facilities open to Libyans in the Italian 
schools proper,Micacchi notes that 10% of the population 
of the Italian elementary schools in Bengasi was made up 
of Moslem Libyans.This figure apparently included both 
the boys and girls' schools in Bengasi and also themixed 
school at Derna,which had a combined enrolment of 482 
pupils for 1918^19JrDi Berardinis adds to this informat­
ion by stating that special provision existed in both 
the Boys and the Girls'schools for Arabs.Furthermore?
Di Berardinis advised that the national schools should 
open special preparatory courses and specially trained 
teachers should be available for this purpose.The latter# 
he concluded, ought to be able to speak Arabic in the 
Bengasine dialect.See Ibid.,p.l09; and also The_Report 
of Professor B .| Di Berardinis to the Governor of Cirenaica, 
30 March,1921,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l.
16) ACS,PCM,Relazione Mensile,Direzione Dei Servizi Civili, 
Cirenaica,Bengasi(1 Sept.1912)-T.1/2 N.4728.
47) Coro notes that a girls' elementary and secondary 
school( 'rushdiewhich was in the technical sense 
only a higher elementary school) existed in Tripoli 
before 1911.He fails,however^to makeany mention of 
possible facilities whereby girls were educated in 
Bengasi during the Ottoman period.It is more than 
likely therefore that a girls' school had not been set 
up by the Turks in Bengasi,an ommission later confirmed 
by the Scholastic Commission of 1912-13.Arab girls,however 
did attend the Franciscan girls* school at Bengasi manage< 
by the Giuseppine Sisters,who used taotfrsFrench and Italia; 
as the medium of instruction.See,Coro,F.,Chapt.XIII.,"Ist- 
ruzione iPubblica.Le Scuole Turche e quelle Europee" ,Settan- 
tasei Anni Di Dominazione Turca in Libia,1835-1811(Tripoli 
1913 )*, pp. 85-9.A1 so,infra,Chapt.Nine,Sect.TV.,pp.277-282.
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a school for Moslem girls in Bengasi,there can be little 
doubt that the authorities were swayed by local attitudes 
to the subject of female education,which they feared to 
opposeclest Italian rule in Cirenaica should become ident­
ified in the popular mind with anti-Moslem sentiments.(46) 
These doubts on the subject were further strengthened by 
the fact that the Turks had established few precedents in 
the field of female education in Cirenaica before 1911.(47)
An interesting analysis of the position as it affected 
female education in Bengasi appears in an early report 
forwarded by the Directorate of Civil Affairs in the city 
to the Italian commander in chief of Cirenaica.(48)In this 
report the Directorate cites the Scholastic Deputation,which 
had met in the Summer of 1912 to consider the subject of 
educational provision for the forthcoming scholastic year 
(0ct.l912-Julyl913),as being opposed to the opening of a 
school for Moslem girls in Bengasi.(49)The Arab section of 
the delegation had clearly deliberated at considerable length 
upon the question of whether to take up the Italian offer 
to set up a §irls’school in Bengasi in the immediate future,
48) ACS,PCM,Amministrazione Civile e Servizi! Inerenti^ 
Relazione Mensile,Direzione Dei Servizi Civili,Cirenaica, 
Bengasi(Augusto,1912)-T.1/2-4728.
49) Ibid.
50) Ibid.
6 H O
but finally declared itself to be opposed to the idea, 
for the present at least.The Directorate of Civil Affairs 
greeted this conclusion with well-seasoned remarks invar­
iably produced for such occasions to the effect that it 
could not proceed with the policy for fear of offending 
local customs which "condemned women to a life aS perpetual 
recluses in the familiar environment of the home away from 
any personal contact with the life that existed outside the 
walls of their houses".(50)The Directorate of Civij. Affairs 
at Bengasi,however,had no- intention of completely abandon­
ing its cherished aim of establishing a girls* school in 
Bengasi both as a means of furthering the aims of"pacific 
penetration"and in pursuit of Italy's"civilising mission".
It therefore urged the government not to attach to much 
importance to the views of the Scholastic Deputation upon 
the subject of female education since these tended to reflect 
the most conservative religious opinion within the Ulemah.(51) 
The latter,it added,was not necessarily representative of 
Bengasine opinion upon the subject of female education,since 
many local families favoured a deviation from strict adher­
ence to traditional norms in this respect.(52)In support 
of its case the Directorate drew attention to the practice 
amongst certain local families of educating their daughters 
in the former Ottoman School for Girls in Bengasi,which had 
besides providing a basic education had also offered train-
51 ) Ibid.
52) Ibid.
53) Ibid.
*
ing in domestic work and girls' handicrafts*(53)Evidence 
to this effect was deduced from the testimony of Signora 
Maria De Beilis,Directress of the National Italian Girls* 
School in Bengasi,who had herself under the former Turkish 
regime privately instructed Moslem girls,sent to her for 
such a purpose by their families,who had been forbidden by 
the Turkish authorities to allow their daughters to attend 
Italian or other such non-Ottoman schools^( 54)Thus in the 
Directorate's opinion,the government should not be over 
influenced by conservative local opinion upon this matter; 
but should make a start towards fulfilling its "civilising 
mission" as a means of securing "pacific penetration" in 
Bengasi.In this respect the Directorate believed that the 
local administration would have the support of a small but 
influential minority of well-to- do families,even if the 
Ulemah tended to express the opinion of the majority upon 
the subject.
Apart from the lack of government provision for girls 
(other than what facilities existed in the Italian national 
and religious schools in Cirenaica),there had also been a 
failure between 1911 and 1919,to go ahead with the policies 
intended to create professional and agricultural,as well 
as secondary education,in Cirenaica for Moslems.(55)As in 
Tripolitania,the existing Italian secondary school remained 
largely unattended by Libyans either because of the Italian 
failure to set up higher Italo-Arab schools,which might have
54) Ibid.
55) Micacchi Report of 1919,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l, 
pp.122-129.
served as a bridge to the Italian secondary schools,or 
because of social,linguistic,cultural,financial and polit­
ical factors disposing them against such schools,in the 
hope that by abstaining from entering the Italian secondary 
schools they would reinforce the Arab dase for an autonomous 
educational system.(56)Certainly by 1919 no special financial 
provision existed in Cirenaica to permit Libyan students 
to study at the Italian schools in Bengasi or at Derna,and 
without such means Arab pupils could not be-expected to 
make use of the facilities already existing in the second­
ary sector,which were therefore almost exclusively patron­
ised by the children of middle class Italian officials,army 
officers or local merchants.(57)No doubt the latter were 
anxious to retain secondary education as an Italian and 
middle class preserve, an interpretation certainly supported 
by the attitude of the Italian bureaucracy towards Libyans, 
and the reluctance of officials to press ahead with the 
implementation of changes already sanctioned by government 
policy.
Irrespective:?however,of government policy towards the 
subject of girls education,professional education and second­
ary education,the debate about which before 1919 was still 
(as best) largely academic,was the concrete need to find 
local funds to cater for the needs of abandoned children.
I"
This growing problem was still in 1919 mainly attended to 
by local charities,the funds for which purpose were grossly 
inaidequate(58) The problem,moreover,had been considerably
56) Ibid.(Scuole Secondarie),pp.100-108.
57) Ibid.(Scuole Private ed Istituzioni Sussidiarie della 
Scuola),pp.100-108 and 235-238.
58) Ibid.,p p .235-238.
aggravated by an epidemic in the summer of 1918,which had 
ravaged both Bengasi and Derna,leaving many children dest­
itute of parental support and without government aid condem­
ned to perish "without food or aid of any kind".(59) The 
Italian authorities could not easily remain indifferent 
to thei.physical needs of these numerous starving waifs;and 
wide ranging provisions,similar to the measures adopted by 
Caneva. in Tripoli in 1912,were taken to alleviate their 
needs.(60)
III.Initial Action in Reforming the Schools in Accordance 
the Aims of the Fundamental Law of Cirenaicai 1920-1921
At , .
"With regard to the project for Libyan education,
Currently being considered by the Parliament,I 
have outlined as clearly as possible in the enc­
losed proposals,ways whereby articles 10 and 11 
of the Fundamental Law might be implemented".(61)
"....the promiscuous mixing of race,religion, 
culture and the sexes not only makes teaching an 
impossibility for all concerned,but also deters 
parents from sending their children to schools 
where such conditions obtain...."(62)
The uncertainties regarding the government’s intention to
implement the Fundamental Law of Cirenaica were not finally
dissolved until October 1920 when with the signing of the
Treaty of Er-Ragima,it was agreed by "both parties"(the Emir,
Sayyid Idris El-Senusi and the Italian government)that
"lower elementary schools(Ibtidaia) and secondary schools
59) Ibid.
60) Ibid.
61) MAI-AS,Campani Report of 2 Aug.1921,BengasiiFondo Volpi, 
Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1,p.5.
62) MAI-AS,Contini Report of June,1921,BengasiiFondo Volpi 
Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l,p8.
(Idadia)"would be established"according to the needs of 
particular places".(63)The particular places stipulated 
by the Treaty where these schools were to be set up included 
a lower secondary school (Idadia) and higher secondary 
school(Alia) at Bengasi,a higher elementary school and 
lower secondary school at Derna,along with higher elementary 
schools at Tobruk,Gedabia and Merg,with further higher 
elementary schools at Marana and Zauia el-Beda as soon as 
the need arose.(64)While the final details of Article 13 of 
the Treaty were being thrashed out by the special commissions 
set up by the Parliament of Cirenaica,prior to finding
i
expression in the Royal Decree of February 1922,the local 
educational establishment in Cirenaica was instructed to 
start preparing the ground for the implementation of the 
proposed reforms,even before Piccioli,who was in Bengasi 
at this time,had actually assumed the mantle of superintendent 
in any active sense at least.Too much was at stake politically 
for Italy to show a tardy hand in managing these affairs at 
this time,since the changed political atmosphere and the 
meeting of the Parliament of Cirenaica had imparted an 
urgency to educational matters, which was as new as the 
Parliament itself.
As one of the principal areas designated for the prop­
osed reforms,Bengasi*s schools had already been highly 
praised by Micacchi,who had compared them with the best in 
Tripolitania.The absence of a scholastic superintendent*
63) See,supra ,p. 175.
64) Ibid.
however,prevented any radical steps from being taken 
during 1920-1921 in the form of acquiring and furnishing 
new buildings and hiring teachers from both Italy and the 
neighbouring countries for the creation of the higher 
elementary and lower and higher secondary schools stipulated 
for the city by the Treaty of Er-Ragima.Such steps^ as these 
in Cirenaica*s chief metropolis would have to await the 
arrival^in Bengasi of Piccioli himself.In the meantime,the 
task of inspecting and preparing the schools for the new 
policies fell to Professor Di Berardinis,the senior teacher 
at the Italian secondary school,who was obliged to reduce 
his daily teaching programme in order to keep his afternoons 
free for inspecting and supervising both the Italian-type 
schools and the Italo-Arab schools,which,as he was most 
anxious to impress on the authorities,caused him a good 
deal of extra work and added responsibilities at the expense 
of his normal teaching duties.(65)
Regarding the condition and running of the Italo-Arab 
schools in Bengasi ^ Berardinis while not seeking to overtly
i'..
question the purpose of these schools as instruments for 
the spread of Italian language and culture,tended to take 
a less glossy and possibly more realistic view of tfrem than 
Micacchi,whose primary concern in 1919 had been to impress 
the athorities with the idea that all things being equal 
the Italo-Arab school could both perform well and also be 
popular with the mass of the population as well.This differ-
65) MAI-AS,Dt Berardinis Report of 30 March,1921,Bengasi * 
Fondon Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1,p.l•
ence in attitude is apparent both in the professor's 
estimate of the popularity of the schools and also in the 
different picture* he draws of the Italo-Arab school at 
Berka when compared with the Central school under the 
direction of the "estimable” Giovanni|Randazzo#(66)Thus 
we find,barely a year after Micacchi's departure from Libya, 
that enrolment at the Central School,which he had described 
as constantly on the increase since 1917,reaching in the 
school-year 1918-19 a hundred pupils had for the school- 
year 1920-21 on Berardinis* estimate dropped to 34 enrol­
ments for the first year(all of whom attended),26 for the 
second year(22 of whom attended) and 16 for the third and 
final year of whom only 15 attended regularly.(67)The sister 
school at Berka showed an enrolment figure of 52 of whom 
about thirty attended with any degree of regularity,a figure 
which should be compared with Micacchi's estimate of 65 
enrolments of whom 44 were said to attend regularly•(68)
Di Berardinis,however,follows the Micacchi analysis of the 
two schools to the extent of distinguishing between the high 
standards attained at the Central School and the low stand­
ards permitted at the Berka school,which ,like Micacchi,he 
blames on the poor direction and defective teaching of Antonio 
Di Venere,who was still in charge of its fortunes.(69)In 
defence of Di ’Senere, however, he points out that regular teach­
ing at Berka is almost impossible because of the need of the 
pupils to attend the mosque at Berka,where they received
66) Ibid.
67) Ibid.
68) Ibid.
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instruction in the Arab Language and the Koran.a situation, 
argued Berardinis,that could only be remedied by establishing 
a school in which both aspects of the curriculum could be 
taught under the same roof.(70)
The professor has nothing to say about secondary 
education as far as it affected the Arab population or in 
connection with the remaining Bengasine school at Sabri, 
but does make reference to certain important suggestions, 
concerning the practical improvement of the Italo-Arab 
schools in Bengasi,which had been drawn up by the newly 
appointed director of the Central School,Giovanni Randozzo. 
Randozzo's proposals were as following*
1.-to set up preparatory classes under the direction of 
an Arab teacher,knowledgeable of Italian,whose task would 
be to teach pupils how to gradually express their ideas in 
Italian and hold conversations in the language as well*
2.-to establish post-elementary facilities,so as to 
help Arab pupils unable to complete their home-work because 
of domestic circumstances to develop studious habits;
3.-to establish complete elementary courses under a 
single roof,so as to ^void the situation occurring,whereby 
Moslems left the school to obtain instruction in the Koran 
and the Arabic Language at the mosques,since this frequently 
resulted in their receiving more instruction in the Koran 
and Arabic than in Italian and other elements of the 
curriculum;
4.-the scholastic jcalendar should also be modified in 
order that due account might be taken of the Moslem religious 
feasts,so that pupils can derive greater profit from the 
schools than at present;
5.-to furbish the schools with experimental garden plots,
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as at least 80% of the pupils attending the Italo-Arab 
schools in this area were the sons of local farmers.(71)
While expressing his support for all these proposals, 
Berardinis doubted whether it would be practical to follow 
them up with suitable action.Randozzo*s final suggestion, 
for example,whereby garden-plots ought to be acquired within 
the immediate vicinity of the schools,was not really pract­
ical because of the shortage of suitable terrain within 
Bengasi itself.Berardinis suggested instead that the Direct­
orate of Civil Affairs at Bengasi ought to accept the gov­
ernment's offer of the use of the experimental farm at Berka 
for school work on a twice monthly basis.(72)
Berardinis makes reference to at least one development 
in response to the demands of the Consultative Committees 
for professional education following Micacchi's visit,namely 
the setting up in Bengasi of a School of Arts and Crafts 
for the training of Libyan artisans and craftsmen.(73)This 
school had attached to it an Italo-Arab school which had the 
somewhat specialised function of preparing boys for entry
into the newly created School of Arts and Crafts apart from 
fulfilling the normal funtions of the Italo-Arab school.The
Arts and Crafts School with its Ital-Arab annexe,as Berardinis
had indicated,proved to be extremely popular in the town and
had enrolled 54 pupils in the first class(37 attended),25 in
the secohd(18 attended)and 12 in the third(6 attended).Also,
22 pupils had enrolled in the first professional class of the 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
70) Ibid.
71) Ibid.
72) Ibid.
, 73) Ibid.
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of the School of Arts and Crafts of whom' 22 attended 
regularly-most of the latter,he added,were of Italian 
nationality,which indicates that the school had been set 
up to serve both Arab and Italian needs,in which respect 
it was completely different from the School of Arts and 
Crafts in Tripoli.(74)Berardinis expressed his conviction 
that the new school with its Italo-Arab section had a prom­
ising future ahead of it.It was,he concluded, under able 
and enthusiastic direction and the two Italian teachers 
who worked in the school(both had recently arrived from 
Italy) were of such qualities that there was no doubt that 
the pupils would derive great benefit from their lessons.(75)
* * * * *
The making ready of the schools of Derna for the impending 
reforms fell during the school-year 1920-1921 to the Director 
of Primary Education in Cirenaica,Signor Fulvio Contini,of 
subsequent fame as a colonial educator in Libya and the Italiai 
colonies.Although still a very young man,Contini was already 
sufficiently experienced to carry out such a tasljj- This would 
certainly not have come his way at this time in his career 
had he remained employed as a school teacher in Italy,where 
at this time there was considerable unemployment‘amongst 
teachers,which would lead many to seek their fortunes in 
the colonial schools in the years ahead,where if nothing else 
pay was certainly higher than in Italy itself.In the six
74) Ibid. Also,see the Piccioli Report on the School of 
Arts and Crafts of 1926:MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.13/1, 
Fasc.B-1.
75) Ibid.
months prior to Piccioli*s actual assumption of the super­
intendency Contini*s role became identified with respon­
sibility for the establishing a lower elementary school 
(ibtidaie) at Derna,along with that of a higher elementary 
school(ruscedia) and the first course of lower secondary 
school(idadia).(76)At Tobruk where Micacchi had not inspected 
the schools in 1919 Contini was to establish a higher element 
ary school(ruscedia).(77)
In Derna,however,Contini was able to make a head start 
in these arrangements through the support of the local milit­
ary resident,always a key person in such arrangements,for 
the army provided a large bakery building which was to be 
converted into a school as a means of implementing the new 
reforms in the Arab sector.(78)This building,enthused Contini 
was well suited for conversion into a school and would adeq­
uately accommodate the needs of all three; projected Arab 
schools under a single roof?(79)The new school was named
after the great victory at Vittorio Veneto,a choice of title 
that while encouraging the nationalists amongst the Italian 
community must have cast some doubts in Arab circles about 
the longevity and sincerity of Italian intentions.Contini 
describes the bakery building allocated as the school of 
Vittorio Veneto as consisting of eight spacious well-lighted 
rooms,divided by ample corridors and overlooking a large 
semi-covered inner courtyard,ideal for recreational and
76) MAI-AS,Contini Report of June 1921,BengasiiFondo Volpi, 
Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1,p.l.
77) Ibid.,p.5.Also, see Micacchi Report of 1919,p.127 and 
supra,p.241.
78) Contini Report,Op.Cit.,p.l.
79) Ibid.(the three schools were the lower elementary school, 
the higher elementary school and the lower secondary sch­
ool, See, infra, p253 )
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gymnastic purposes,as the equipment provided by the"Fund 
For Sports And Recreational Purposes"could be stored away 
next to the caretaker's office under the esplanades*(80) 
Moreover,the building was well situated and fitted out 
with running water,modern toilets(luxuries indeed by the 
standards of 1919 in Libya),besides having ample grounds, 
for experimental plots of the type referred to by Rand- 
Ozzp in connection with the Italo-Arab schools in Bengasi.
The site could also easily be given a pleasing and impressive
aspect,added Contini,through the planting of trees and 
shrubs,which should be done in the summer vacation, so 
making the school a "worthy equal" of its twin,the National 
School in Derna,known as the Prince of Piedemont*He also 
anticipated j that pupils from both schools could share the 
gymnastic facilities at Vittorio Veneto and arrangements 
to this effect would be drawn up in time for the commence­
ment of the school year 1921-22*(81)
Already by the commencement of the Spring term, the 
Italo-Arab section at the Prince of Piedemont had been 
moved into the former bakery so as to become the proposed 
ibtidaie at the commencement of the 1921-22 school-year. 
(82)Thus Contini was able to inspect the first year of 
the ibtidaie while it was still,technically speaking, 
an Italo-Arab school.Both at this time and subsequently,the
first class was in the charge of |jannetta Umberto for Italian
and jsyed Ali el-Mabruk for Arabic and the Koran.Thirty-two
80) Ibid.,p.2.
81) Ibid.
82) Ibid.,p.3.
t
had been enrolled at the beginning of the Spring term for 
both sections which had an average attendance of 22,though 
25 were present at the time of the inspection, which can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that Contini was well 
known in the locality having served himself as an element­
ary teacher at Derna.(83)In the second class, instruction 
was given by j Michele Abbadessa f o r  Italian and Califa Aisa. 
iLehui-i for Arabic and the Koran.Twenty-five pupils had 
enrolled ,though only twelve attended regularly ,eleven of 
whom were present at the t i m e  of the inspection.(84)The 
third class was taught by Jannetta Elpidio and Abubaker 
Gateze ,with fourteen pupils enrolled of whom fourteen were 
said to attend regularly,though only eleven were present 
at the time of Contini's inspection.(85)
^  As Contini was not empowered to make provision for
I
the functioning of the higher elementary and lower secondary 
schools for the school- year 1921-22 in any definite sense, 
because the proposed reforms had not yet received the official 
stamp- of approval from the Parliament of Cirenaica,though 
this was indeed expected by all concerned, he could only 
make provisional arrangements of an uncertain and limited 
kind.This is particularly apparent with regard to teaching 
personnel and he proposed no new changes in this direction,
Jannetta Umberto and Michele Abbadessa having only commenced 
teaching in Libya in the previous January and bpth needing 
time to adjust to their new surroundings.(86Nonetheless,
83) Ibid.,p.3.
84) Ibid..
85) Ibid.
86) Ibid.
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he considered it wise not to be caught unprepared, and 
for the forthcoming school- year when the reforms were 
expected to take effect,he proposed that class one of 
the Ibtidaie should continue to be divided,as at present, 
into two sections,one of which would be entrusted to Signor 
Jannetta Umberto*who had the advantage of having taught 
for two years in the previous Italo-Arab school and also 
being the possessor of a good knowledge of Arabic as it 
was spoken in the region.The remaining section of class 
one should be give to the charge of j Calif a Aisa Lehuti 
who would,as at present,teach Arabic and the Koran.(87) 
Class two,Contini advised,should be entrusted to the Dir­
ector of the school,Signor|Jannetta Elpidio and an Libyan 
teacher jjAbubaker Gateze ,as the governor of the colony 
(Giacomo De Martino) did not consider it advisable to 
recruit a teacher from Syria or Egypt,despite the repeated 
request for such a person by the local population and the 
municipality of Derna.(88)No new dispositions were made 
for class three which was to be the responsibility of the 
teachers in charge of class two.It i s “not clear whether 
the latter omission was in fact,as Contini affirmed, a 
gesture towards "economy” (two teachers could be transferred 
to another school or have their contracts terminated)»or a 
psychological indication of the prevailing uncertainty.(89) 
The educational situation at Tobruk and its surrounding 
region was far less well prepared for the impending changes
87) Ibid.
88) Ibid.,p.4.
89) Ibid.
t
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than the Derna area,though the condition of the schools 
was not as bad as in some of smaller urban centres already 
referred to.(90)It was,however,imperative for the Italian 
authorities to improve the school at Tobruk,as it had been 
ear-marked for development by Article Thirteen of the Treaty 
of Er-Ragima a^.a lower and higher elementary school(91)and 
the government could not afford to lose face by failing 
to bring about the expected transformation.Contini*s task 
was not an enviable one,since Micacchi had not inspected 
the school in 1919,and no up-to-date information was to 
hand upon its functioning.There were also communications 
difficulties due to a lack of transport,and Contini was 
delayed in Derna beyond the date of his expected departure 
for Tobruk,not actually setting out until 11 June and 
remaining on arrival until 16 June.(92)Despite such difficult­
ies ,he was at least clear as to the manner in which the 
school was to be organised in the year ahead,should the 
proposed reforms receive parliamentary and royal sanction. 
Three schools were to be set up as follows*
1.A mixed Italian elementary-school,until the third 
class;organised on rural lines,such as was the pattern in 
Italy;to cater for all non-Moslem children of both sexes 
in the region;
2.A lower Arab elementary-school of three classes(ibtidaie 
in confomity with the projected law currently before the 
Parliament of Cirenaica;
90) Ibid.p.5.Also,see supra p.242.
91) See, su£ra Chpt.Six,p. 175.
92) Contini Report of July 1921,p.1.
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3. A higher Arab elementary-school of three classes 
(ruscedia);to be constructed out of the existing Italo- 
Arab school;again in accordance with the projected law, 
now being considered by the Parliament of Cirenaica.(93)
If this development plan was to be realised in the immed­
iate future,however,as the Parliament of Cirenaica and the 
Italian government would expect in the normal course of 
events ,radical action was required in view of the numerous 
deficiencies of the existing school,which is graphically
described in true t o  life terms by Contini in the pages 
of his report that deal with the situation at I Tobruk .(94)
The principal cause of the defective condition of the exist­
ing Italo-Arab school,opined Contini,lay in the appalling 
state -of the school facilities,which like others in Cirenaica 
at this time,were reduced to the cramped confines of a single 
poorly ventilated and inadequately lighted room.This miserable 
accommodation let directly onto the thoroughfare outside, 
and was the only place in the vicinity where the teaching 
of Arabs,Jews and Italians took place.(95)The other reason 
for the failure of the school lay in the expedient adopted 
by the Department of Civil Affairs in Bengasi,whereby young 
and inexperienced teachers,such as the present incumbent, 
Signor jrilippo Russino who was entirely new to Libya besides 
being completely unprepared for his duties,were directed 
to distant and isolated posts,where they were forced to
93) Ibid.,p.5.
94) Ibid,pp.5-10.
95) Ibid.,p.6.
96) Ibid.
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largely fend for themselves without outside aid or advice*
”It would be wiser in the future” ,pleaded Contini,”to avoid 
sending inexperienced teachers alone to work in isolated 
centres,such as Tobruk” •(96)Other factors,observed Contini, 
had also made a powerful contribution to the failure of the 
school.It had,for instance,ceased to funtion at all during 
Ramadan,which ended on 15 December,1920,so effectively red­
ucing the school-year to less than five months.Furthermore, 
the ethnic and religious composition of the school,and the 
problem of having to operate for teaching purposes from a 
single room,made it virtually impossible to teach more than 
j one ethno-religious group at a time,so reducing the school- f- 
day to under three hours per group.(97)Thus,Signor Russino 
taught the Arab-Moslem pupils between 8 and 11.00 hours;
| Ahneida Asila El-Msutari taught them again between 13 and
i
i
[ 15.00?hours jand Cadi Sidi Abdalla Sceriff gave them their
I
I final lessons for the day between 15 and 1600 hours.(98)
j ”Even with a better and more experienced teacher than Russino” ,
i Contini remarked,”it would be hopeless to expect results
I
i
| different from those obtained in the present circumstances.” (99
L
f
| ’'Moreover(continued Contini),these appalling circumstances
s'
| were aggravated by the virtual absence of any proper school-
j
! furnishings(the existing benches had been loaned by the near­
by naval base at Tobruk and were completely unsuited to the
! needs of young children|for whom they were mostly too large)
and the total lack of teaching materials remotely relevant
i
or applicable to Libyan needs”(100)
97) Ibid.,p.7.
98) Ibid.
99) Ibid.,p.8.
100) Ibid..p.10.
263
In attempting to find a solution to the problems pres­
ented by the school at Tobruk and the need to ensure that
the new feforms could be implemented on time,Contini intell­
igently reduced the whole problem to its basic elementsj 
given the approval by the Parliament of Cirenaica of the 
projected ordinance,it would be necessary to have available 
by October(at the latest),three types of accommodation.First, 
a room to serve as a'*mixed”school for Italians,Europeans 
and possibly Jews;two further rooms to serve as the basis 
for the projected lower and higher elementary-schools for 
Libyans;and a further room for the director,along with a 
closet-room for storage purposes.(101)Uhable to forecast 
future trends, Contini at this point further divided the 
problem into a long-term and short-term solution; the long­
term solution could take the form of new buildings,the re­
adaption of existing buildings(the army had offered an art­
illery barracks for possible conversion into a school) or 
the acquisition of private property,which could be suitably 
adapted to the purposes of a school.(102)Contini,however, 
ruled out of practical consideration any form of "definitive 
solution" for financial reasons,estimating that to convert 
the artillery barracks into a school would cost at least 
^100.000 Lira, an apparently astronomical amount by the 
standards of the day,and unthinkable to Contini's reckoning 
in view of the government's straitened financial and economic
101) Ibid.,p.11.
102) Ibid.
103) Ibid.
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circumstances.(104)The renting of private accommodation 
would be much cheaper,Contini estimated,and ought to 
cost not more than 300 Lira per month to:; hi re, although 
extra resources would have to be found to cover the cost 
of conversion to scholastic purposes.(105)The best solution 
for the immediate future,it seemed,was the acquisition of 
the local Church Hall in Tobruk upon which ar°u^d 30,000 
Lira would have to be spent in converting it to educational 
requirements.(106)There was unfortunately opposition to this 
latter scheme from the local commissariate who,had Contini*s 
plan been accepted by the authorities,would have been obliged - 
to find alternative accommodation for the parish, at their 
own TobruK headquarters.(107)
* * * * * 0 
Contini*s failure to find even a provisional solution to 
the educational problems of Tobruk'within terms of his 
limited brief must have left him feeling disinclined 
to wrestle with similar,apparently intractable problems at 
El-Merg.He therefore seems to have used the excuse of lack 
of transport facilities and the need to visit Tolmeta,which 
had not been inspected by Micacchi in 1919,to leave the 
problems of El-Merg,a well-known educational blackspot,and 
other areas designated for development by the Treaty of 
Er-Ragima,to his colleague,Romeo Campani.(108) Campani was 
consequently responsible for inspecting most of the remaining
104) Ibid.,p.11.
105) Ibid.
106) Ibid.p.13.
107) Ibid.
108) Ibid. p.16.
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Italian and Italo-Arab schools in the colony in anticipation 
of the forthcoming reform.(109) These included the schools 
at Cirene,where he pronounced the Italo-Arab school to be 
good but the building inadequate and an Italian school to be 
also required;Di Marsa Susa,where the standard of teaching 
is the worst imaginable,the school in a complete state of 
abandonment,and the local government commissariate entirely 
without any interest whatsoever in educational matters:E1- 
Merg at which the building is unsatisfactory and in need of 
urgent improvement.(110)Campani had also earlier in the 
year carried out an inspection of the schools at Derna,the 
arrangements of which he had approved, and kept and exper­
ienced eye on the running of the schools at Bengasi.Apart 
from the continual problems associated with poor and unsuit= 
able buildings,Campani also used this occasion to itemise 
other matters relevant to an improvement of the Arab schools 
particularly in the year ahead:
1.-In the Italo-Arab schools little is learnt by the 
pupils because of the poor preparation of the Arab teachers. 
They are only accustomed to having to teach reading and the 
Koran along with a little writing^which is far from suffic­
ient for today's needs.Also the teaching of Italian is badly 
conducted•
2.-The substitution of untrained Libyan teachers by 
professionally trained Libyan teachers ought not to be 
difficult,providing they were paid adequately ,and that
109) MAI-AS,Campani Report of 2 Aug.1921,Bengasi,Fondo Volpi, 
Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1,pp.1-5.
110) Ibid.
111) Ibid.,p.4*
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those whom we continued-to employ in an untrained capacity 
were properly supervised by Italian teachers with an 
adequate knowledge of Arabic,
3.-Establish in Bengasi a Normal School for the 
adequate and proper training of Arab teachers.
4.-Make obligatory an elementary knowledge of Arabic 
(both written and spoken) for all teachers employed in 
Libya who are on the colonial roll.Such a facility ought 
to be an indispensable prerequisite of future promotion 
within the ranks of the educational service in Libya,
5.-Pay an extra allowance of not less than L.1000 
to teachers possessing Arabic;make the first course of 
the Italo-Arab school exclusively in Arabic; and improve 
the general economic conditions of both Arab and Italian 
teachers in Libya.(Ill)
The Micacchi Report of 1919,along with the Berardinis 
and Contini Reports of 1921,while not detracting from the 
institution of the Italo-Arab school*which Micacchi was 
most concerned should continue,despite the Fundamental Law 
of 1919,all agreed that the government schools for Arabs 
in Cirenaica were under-subscribed ,for the most part lacking 
adequate accommodation and suitable personnel,whether Italian 
or Libyan,besides being urgently in need of all the normal 
teaching prerequisites,such as benches,teaching aids,furn­
iture and school materials.The inspections of 1921 had shown 
how hopeless it would be to attempt to implement the forth­
coming proposals for reform,which were then in the process 
of getting approved by the Parliament of Cirenaica,despite 
the acquisition of a large building(the former army bakery)
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at Derna for conversion into a school,without a major 
inflow of finance,expertise,teaching personnel and 
school materials in the near future.The evidence seems 
to indicate that by the end of the 1921 school-year, 
these points had finally impressed the authorities in 
Rome with a mood of new urgency ,and-that improvement 
was finally in the air and would take practical form 
during the succeeding school year.(112)
112) By Nov.,1922,Bengasi had been provided with two large
new buildings to serve as Italian primary and secondary 
schools,to be also served by a sports'hall,still to be 
completed.Moreover,a further two,large buildings had 
been completely renovated,one to comprise the Arab girls 
professional school(in Via Otman Bacheh)and the other as 
the Central Kuttab(in Via Berbi).A ’notable building* 
had also been acquired in Via Sciabbi(at the cost of 
L.104.600)to accommodate the Arab secondary school or 
Idadia.The kuttabs attached to the mosques of Biscek 
and El-Mustari had been resystemized and were ready 
for use.At Berka,the best building in the suburb had 
been acquired and refitted to serve as an elementary 
mixed school;and the existing Italo-Arab school and 
Kuttab were being expanded into six rooms.At Merg,a fine 
new school had been constructed at the cost of L.125.000. 
L.17.600 had been spent so far on improving the existing 
facilities at Cirene,though it was planned to build a 
new school at the cost of L.190.000.Only provisional 
arrangements had been undertaken at Marsa-Susa,though 
L.90.000 had been set aside for the resystemizing of the 
school.At Zavia-Feidia,L.40,000 had been set aside for 
the transformation of a military redoubt into as school 
and the technicians had almost completed their plans for 
the project.In Derna the following work had so far been 
completed:1.the repair and modernisation of the existing 
Technical School at a cost of L.2.500.00;2.the construct­
ion, systemization and repair of the Arab girls'school at 
a cost of L.22.000;3.the general improvement of the schoo: 
of Prince of Piedemonte.Further improvements'were also in 
the pipe-line,for instance L.150.000 was to spent on fur­
ther improvements at the Technical School and L.65.000 on 
the Kuttab at Beled.At Tobruk,L.5.000 had been spent on 
converting a private building into a primary school.Event 
ually the Artillery Barracks there would be transformed 
into an educational complex to serve the needs of the 
whole area .Many other plans were also in progress for the 
Arab and Italian sectors in the”small centres” ,so far 
largely unaffected by the reforms.See,Piccioli Report of 
November.1922.Op.Cit.,pp.74-77.
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Chapter Nine The Implementing of the Fundamental Law:
1921-1922-A Year of Change and Expansion
"SIGNORI DEPUTATI
The Government is proud to be able to 
announce that it has provided almost comp­
letely for the immediate actualisation of 
the new scholastic ordinance of the Moslem 
population of Cirenaica#as was approved by 
the preceeding session of Parliament."(*)
"EXCELLENCY,
The year 1921-1922 represents a most 
important period of transition for the 
schools of Cirenaica;for in this period, 
the new schools for Libyan citizens will 
have to be established in accordance with 
the Statute of Libya and the Treaty of Er- 
Ragima".(**)
In view of the general condition of most of the schools 
in Cirenaica before October 1921 and of the Italian gov­
ernment’s committal to implement Article 13 of the Treaty 
of Er-Ragima,the new superintendent,D r . Angelo Piccioli, 
had an immense amount of reorganisation to complete foll­
owing his appointment in the summer of 1921,and the prom­
ulgation of R.D.N.368 in February 1922,whereby the new 
reforms finally entered the statute book.In assessing Picc 
ioli’s achievements ,we cannot afford to forget the imp­
ortant preliminary reorganisation carried out by Fulvio 
Contini during the previous scholastic year,as there is 
not doubt that,without it,Piccioli would never have been 
Aable to inform the Parliament of Cirenaica in April 1922 
that the government had provided "almost completely" for
*) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1;Piccioli Report 
to the Parliament of Cirenaica,Bengasi,April 1922,p.l.
* * )MAI-AS, Fondo Volpi, Cart. 6/2, Fasc.B-1 : Piccioli.-Report 
to the Governor of Cirenaica,Bengasi,10 November 1922,
p. 1.
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the implementing of the new scholastic ordinance,(1)
Indeed,the achievement in so short a space of time 
seems remarkable,given that in the previous year(October 
1920-June 1921) there had been only 21 government 
schools for Moslems in Cirenaica,whereas at the time of 
Piccioli's account of his first six months as superintendent, 
less than a year later,this number had increased to 60 
such schools,and a further six were on the point of being 
opened,bringing the total number of schools functioning by 
the end of the 1922 scholastic year to the figure of 67.(2) 
Despite such progress,many of the problems facing the super­
intendent were still far from resolved,and at this stage 
of the implementation process,Piccioli was mainly concerned 
to provide the Parliament with the necessary proof that 
Italy had fulfilled her side of the bargain.(3)He was,even
so,concerned to acquaint the assembled delegates with the 
difficulties he was having to face."This work",he told the
Parliament,"cannot be done in a day,but must be seen as the
fruit of constant activity extending over a period of many
years".(4)Piccioli presented the problems under three heads:
school accommodation,teaching personnel and school materials.
The problem of securing adequate school buildings could 
only be dealt with satisfactorily on a long term basis,Picc­
ioli reminded the delegates, but the government was treating 
the matter as an issue of great urgency and no time was being
wasted in finding a concrete solution to it.In the latter
1) Piccioli Report to the Parliament of Cirenaica,April 1922,
p. 1.
2) Ibid. (most of these schools consistedof only a single room)
3) Ibid.Also,see MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1:Prog- 
etto di ordinam.scolastico per i cittadini musulmani della 
Cirenaica,pp.1-5.
4) Piccioli Report of April 1922,p.l.
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respect,the authority responsible for providing school 
accommodation was the Ministry of Public Works,which had 
worked out a special strategy,existing buildings were 
renovated and refurbished where possible, otherwise plans 
were drawn up for the construction of new buildings,(5)In 
this way it was intended to remedy the immediate problems 
caused by a lack of suitable accommodation while at the 
same time providing a long-term solution for the future. 
Unlike previous efforts at resolving the shortage of schools 
for Moslems in Libya,on this occasion,no effort was being 
spared to find a definite solution to the lack of proper 
schools.For this purpose the government had allocated sums 
of money for which there was no equivalent in the past hist­
ory of education in Libya.In support of his statements 
Piccioli furnished the Parliament of Cirenaica with the 
following statistics:
Cost of work now cost of work under1
being undertaken preparation
Bengasi Area 36.400 Lira 115.000 Lira
Merg *• 3.064 " 125.000'
Cirene w 24.000 M -------------
Derna “ 26.000 H 65.000 "
Tobruk " 3.000 "
92.464 ” 305.000
5) See,Piccioli Report of November 1922(Edilizia Scblastica), 
pp.74-78.Also the Piccioli Report of April,1922,p.2 .For 
further information upon the construction of modern schools 
in Libya,see Rodolpho Micacchi,L*Edilizia Sc .olastica in 
Tripolitania(Firenze,1934)•
6) Piccioli Report of April,1922,p.2..Also,see Piccioli 
Report of November,1922,p.3.
At the commencement of the school-year 1922-1923,Piccioli 
was able to inform the new governor of the colony,Eduardo 
Baccavi, in the midst of his fleeting tenure of the govern­
orship (1.10.1922-1.12.1922) that the school building prog­
ramme was making good progress though "much still remained 
to be done".Good accommodation had been secured for the 
Moslem schools at Bengasi,Merg,Derna^and Tobruk,but out'' 
of-the-way centres in the "interior" had still to receive 
their propoer complement of schools,though plans had been 
laid to this effect.It was,however, a bad sigh .that Piccioli 
failed to provide financial details of future developments 
fdr the new governor.in respect of which he was soon to be 
criticised for overspending. { J )
No less difficult a problem was that of providing 
experienced and suitably qualified teaching-personnel,for 
until the new Arab secondary schools were able to produce 
Libyan teachers in about four years' time,it would be necessar] 
to staff the schools by provisional means(§) The provisional 
solution adopted by Piccioli involved employing personnel 
from the former Italo-Arab schools,whether Arab or Italian, 
supported by a certain number of fighi from the Kuttabs.(9)
In selecting Libyan teachers,attention was focussed upon the 
need to choose candidates knowledgeable in Islamic doctrines, 
yet at the same time able to use modern methods of teaching.
In this "difficult and delicate task",Piccioli informed the 
Parliament in April,"the government had not hessitated to 
fully consult with the Cadi and Mufti of the major localities,
7) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.3.Also,see MAI-AS, 
Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-1sPiccioli Report to the 
Governor of Cirenaica,Bengasi,August,1923,p.37.
8) Piccioli Report of April 1921,p.3.
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rather than rely upon the judgement of Italians alone” *(10) 
Even by these methods,it had not always been easy to arrive 
at the right consensus of opinion, and on such occasions, 
when difficulty had arisen in selecting the right applicant 
for taa post,the expedient had been adopted of summoning 
all the f ighi of the district to a grand meeting,where they 
sorted the matter out amongst themselves.(11)A different 
approach,however,had been necessary in finding teachers 
for the new Arab secondary schools-and,to fill these vacancies 
the Italian Legations in Bderub  ^ and Alexandria in Egypt 
recruited a small number of Arab teachers.(12) It was also 
necessary to recruit through the Italian legations in Moslem 
countries for female teachers for the new girls* school in 
Bengasi.(13)In the final analysis,however,the superintendent 
was obliged to depend in the main upon the existing stock 
of Arab and Italian teachers in the colony.This was a far 
from satisfactory situation as he admitted to the Parliament 
in April,since such teachers were insufficiently qualified 
and experienced to handle all aspects of the curriculum in 
the new schools,especially at the secondary level.(14)Picc- 
ioli could only promise that a special new course would be 
set up at Bengasi for training Arab teachers in modern methods
a proposal that was never implemented until the establishing 
in Tripoli of the Madrasah al-Islamiyah al-ulya in 1935 
though following the promulgation of the royal
9) Ibid.,p.3.
10) Ibid.
11) Ibid.
12) Ibid.
13) Ibid*
14) Ibid.
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decrees of 4 January 1920(N.68) and of 5 February 1922(N.368), 
various procedures were inaugurated bj Micacchi for screening 
Libyan and Arab teachers trained in neighbouring states,before 
allowing them to take up positions in the government schools 
(15)In April 1922,however,Piccioli was concerned to exude 
sweetness and light in order to convince the Cirenaicans 
that, the superintendency was full of good intentions.Also,as 
the following table indicates,that Italy was prepared to 
back up these intentions with hard cash t
— Teachers
hired
i Current Financial | 
Commitments(1922) Ii.....  .......  •
Teachers hired for the 
Kuttabs................... 28 141.762.25 Lirej
Teachers hired for the 
elementary schools....... 29 259.473.50 Lire!
Teacher s h i  red for the 
girls' schools........... 7 55.3000.50 Lire
Professors hired for the 
Arab secondary schools of 
Bengasi and Derna........ 10 32.600.00 Lire!
74 489.136.25 I
TT67
By the time of Piccioli's report to the Parliament of Ciren­
aica, a considerable amount of school-material had been distrib­
uted to the new schools.Piccioli believed this particular prob-
15) Ibid.,p.4 .Also,see B.U.C.,69 and B.U.C.,289.The arrange­
ments whereby Arab teachers were selected for employment 
in the government elementary schools for Libyans are out- 
by Micacchi in L'Enseignment aux Indigenes, 1931,pp. 558-65.
16) The Piccioli Report of April,1922,p.4 (Piccioli notes
in the margin of page 4 that during the previous school- 
year,”only twenty teachers were assigned to the govern­
ment schools for Arabs for whom., a budget of around L. 
TQ9.000 was allocated.” )-
lem had two dimensions; the need to acquire suitable teach­
ing materials,such as text-books,maps,wall-charts and the 
like;and the problems associated with the acquisition of 
school furnishings,especially school-benches.(17)The mat­
erials already distributed included geographical maps in 
Arabic which had been specially obtained for the superint­
endency by the Italian Consul-Generals in Egypt and Syria, 
More problematical had been the acquisition of wall-charts 
and Piccioli had expressed his dissatisfaction with exist­
ing types available in the Middle East.Instead he had 
instructed theJUnione Tipocrrafica at Bengasi to produce 
wall-charts in Arabic for the new schools in accordance 
with his own specifications.(18)1t was not,however,until 
October,when forty tons of school benches and other types 
of class-room furniture arrived from Italy,that the second 
.aspect of the problem could be,, dealt with, though the new 
furniture was not installed in the schools until the comm­
encement of the New Year 1923.(19) Even so,100,000 Lira 
had been spent in providing school materials and furnish­
ing during 1922 and,at least in this respect,Italy could 
be said to have honoured her pledges to bring educational 
improvement to Cirenaica.(20)
17) Ibid • I-. ^
18) Ibid.,p.5.Also,see Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.5.
19) Ibid.
20) Ibid. From an annual budget of 828.150.00 Lira for the 
whole elementary sector in Cirenaica in 1923,Piccioli 
deduced that 124.032.00 Lira had been spent on providing 
exercise books,stationery,educational material,Froebel- 
ian material,charts and maps.See,Piccioli Report of 
August 1923,p.52.
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II. The Reformed Kuttabs
"The Central Kuttab at Bengasi has this 
year increased its school population two­
fold over the previous year".(21)
It is virtually impossible to locate a single reference
from the officials of the Department of Italian Schools
which says anything favourable towards the Libyan Kuttabs,
or in any way supports the Nallino contention that they were
essential for any system of Arab education in Libya.(22)
Micacchiin 1919 described the Kuttabs in both Tripolitania
and Cirenaica as being "in a complete state of decadence",
though he reluctantly concedes the poor condition of the
vast majority of these schools has failed to undermine their
popularity with the mass of the population.(23)The Director
of School? observed further that in the area still under
Italian rule in Tripolitania 815 pupils attended the Kuttabs
for the 1919 school-year,whereas 615 had attended them in
the previous year.(24)The poor organisation of the schools
in Cirenaica before 1919 prevented him from obtaining any
figures for attendance at the Kuttabs,though he noted that
they were either"in the principal centres'Jwhere they were
"outside the government control",or in the tribal areas ,
where they were "mobile" in that they seemed to move around
from place to place.(25) Of these traditional religious
schools,apart from the ones attached to particular mosques,
21) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-lsPiccioli Report 
to the Governor of Cirenaica,15 February,1924,p.18.
22) See,C.A.Nallino,the Post-War Commission’s Report of 
January,1919(L,istruzione nelle colonieil.-l Kuttab).
p. 1 3 2.. '
23) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l:Rodolpho Micacchi 
to the Governor of Tripolitania,1919,p.92.
24) Ibid.
the great majority were conducted in small rooms,consrating, 
observed Micacehi,"of a floor of hardened earth,with a
single opening in the wall,which served as a door,and through 
which came both light and air.In such places,where clean­
liness and any form of hygienic awareness are completely 
unknown,the pupils receive the teaching of the -Koran,while 
squatting either on mats or more commonly on the bare 
ground.The slate upon which they write ,in the manner of 
a little blackboard,wiping it clean with water and clay 
when they want to cancel what they have written,is the only 
didactic* equipment in sight",he concluded.(26)
For the moment,however,the Department of Schools at the 
Colonial Ministry,which had replaced the Department of Italian
Schools all 'estero at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the
body in charge of all educational matters affecting the colon­
ies, was obliged to swallow its dislike of Kuttabs,as the 1922 
ordinance had provided for the modernisation of 34 Kuttabs.(27) 
Of these,however,only 24 had been reorganised at the time the 
new reform became law,leaving nine still to be set up,a delay, 
Piccioli explained,caused by local difficulties of a purely 
practical nature in particular commissariates.(28)It was hoped, 
however,that by October 1922 all the schools ordained by the 
new decree would be fully operational.(29)
25) Ibid.,p.130
26) Micacchi's criticism of the poor condition in which he 
found the vast majority of Kuttabs was by no means con­
fined to such schools.He also criticised rural Italo-Arab 
schools and the private schools,whether Moslem,Jewish or 
Catholic.The "hygienic condition of these",he wrote,"is. 
reflected in the buildings,which are unsuitable even for 
the raising of farm-animals.Morever,the condition of the 
children is undescribably repulsive-dirty and tattered,I 
do not know whether to blame the teachers or the society 
for tolerating such an appalling state of affairs.Even so, 
whoever or whatever is responsible,the situation in these 
schools is most grave,and rigorous sanitary measures must 
be taken to prevent the further spread of infection by 
bringing them under government control and surveillance." 
Ibid.,pp.94 & 81.
<i/7 ^
It is very likely,however,that Piccioli's confident 
assessment and prediction of the situation in April 1922 
was more designed to gain the collaboration of the Arab 
delegates at the Parliament than to state the real level 
at which the new decree had been implemented.The govern­
ment in pursuit of its policy of collaboration in Cirenaica 
had undoubtedly made financial provision for the implement­
ation of the 1922 ordinance but,as was subsequently shown, 
not to the extent of implementing it entirely,at least in 
the first instance.(30)This is apparent from an examination 
of the situation confronting the superintendency in Ciren­
aica following the Fascist seizure of power| in October 
1922.The scrapping of the Liberal government’s policy of 
collaboration involved Piccioli in a struggle with the 
Department of Finance to preserve what he could of the 
existing reforms in the colony. In the ensuing debate,he 
revealed not only that he had lacked the means in 1922 to
implement the whole decree,but that the superintendency had 
been instructed by director Micacchi to proceed with financial 
caution.Thus out of the 32 Kuttabs which the 1922 ordinance 
had indicated should be either modernised(this referred to 
nine Kuttabs already in existence) or freshly created,only 
10 were in fact "transformed" by a government subsidy.(31)
27) por the places where the Kuttabs were to be instituted 
by the government in accordance with Art.1.of the 1922 
Educational Ordinance for Cirenaica,see supra ,Chpt.Six, 
Note 49.,p.185.
28) See,Piccioli Report of April 1922,p.5.
29) Ibid.
30) See,Piccioli Report of Aug.1923,p.37.
31) Ibid.,p.38.
The ten reformed Kuttabs were those at Bengasi,Berka, 
Merg,Ghemines,Tolmetta,Marza-Susa,Cirene,Derna(two)and Tobruk. 
(32) These it is interesting to note were all in urban centres 
and correspond with the areas specially inspected during the 
school-year 1920-21 by Fulvio Contini,Professor Bernardinis 
and Romeo Campani(33).As such they had been specially chosen 
by Micacchi as the areas where the new ordinance of February 
1922 should initially be implemented, and Piccioli was able 
to inform the governor of the colony in Novemeber 1922 that 
reformed Kuttabs had been finally set up in these areas.(34) 
The success of the Reformed Kuttabs with the local population 
led many fiqhis bo approach the regional commissariates to 
request that they be taken on the government roll as theirr 
livelihoods were at stake due to a loss of pupils to the new 
schools.(35).A shortage of funds and the changed political 
circumstances in 1923 prevented the policy from being devel­
oped any further,though plans had been drawn up in 1922 to 
extend the subsidising of Kuttabs to the Senusi Zavias of 
Cirenaica in accordance with the | Emir's wishes at Er-Regima, 
and the opportunity presented to the Superintendency of devel­
oping collaboration amongst the nomadic and semi-nomadic 
sections of the population.(36) The failure to develop the 
programme of subsidising and reforming the Kuttabs at this 
point,and the subsequent Fascist exclusion of the Kuttabs 
from the government programme of education,was a mistake which 
subsequent policies would never entirely rectify.
32) Ibid.
33) See,supra,Chpt.Eight.Section III.,pp.249-259.
34) See,the Piccioli Report of Aug.1923,p.37;and of Nov.1922,
pp.6-8.
35) Piccioli Report of Nov.1922,p.10.
36) Ibid.,pp.8-10.
IU.The Establishing of Arab Elementary Schools
’•Regarding the school at Agedabia,the govern­
ment has informed His Highness,the Emir* that 
in accordance with the new scholastic ordinance, 
it intends to establish two schools:one a Kuttab 
and the other ancElementary School".(37)
Far more susceptible to rapid solution than the vexed problems 
of the Kuttabs was the transformation of the existing Italo- 
Arab schools into Arab elementary schools.Again the problem 
had been largely attended to in the previous school-year 
by Continijand it is no exaggeration to affirm that the new 
schools,ofrwhich there were seven,all pre-existed the ord~ 
inance of February 1922•(3 8)Moreover,as indicated by the 
new decree,they were to be set up at existing urban centres, 
where the six regional commissariats had their headquarters ;. 
these were at Bengasi ,El-Merg,Cirene,De m a t  Tobruk and Aged-»-\ ' 
abia.(39)Both in his April report to the Parliament of Ciren­
aica and in his November report to the governor of the colony, 
Piccioli avoids direct reference to the physical improvement 
of the existing Italo-Arab schools,which were to become the 
new elementary schools for Libyan citizens,other than to
indicate the amount of money allocated to school buildings
*
generally.(40)Perhaps*it was not regarded as necessary in 
view of the Contini,Berardinis and Campani reports of the 
previous year which had dealt quite extensively with this 
problem.Instead,he concentrated upon the internal reform 
of the schools upon the following lines:
1 .the removal from the former Italo-Arab schools of
37) Ibid.,p.ll.
38) See,Piccioli Report of Aug.,1923,p.38.
39) See supra,Shapt.Six.Note 49,p.185;and,also,Piccioli*s 
Report of Nov.,1922,p.10.
40) See^supra,p.265.Also, see,Piccioli*s Report of Nov.,1922 
(Edilizia Scolastica),pp.74-77(in this section of the 
report Piccioli details new school constructions either 
already completed or in progress for 1922-3). _____
all non-Moslem pupils(for whom separate schools had been 
provided);
2. the adoption of the new programmes elaborated by
a special Ministerial Commission and proposed to the Ministry 
of Colonies during September 1921;
3. the renewal of all didactic materials in response 
to the proposals of the Ministerial Commission;
4. the allocation of an adequate complement of teaching 
personnel for the implementation of the new reforms.(41)
The previous school-year had witnessed the implementation 
of the first of these aims at Derna,and no doubt the other 
commissariats,where the Arab elementary schools were to be 
set up,saw similar changes during the school-year 1921-22, 
once the accommodation problem had been resolved.(42)The 
acceptance by the Parliament of Cirenaica and the Ministry 
of Colonies of the commission's proposals led to the latter 
entering the statute book during ithe current school-year in 
the form of the educational ordinance of February 1922.(43) 
Piccioli had ensured that adequate stocks of didactic material 
had been purchased from neighbouring Arab countries to satis­
fy the bilingual character of the new school- programmes or, 
when this wasn't possible,had caused school materials in 
Arabic to be specially produced locally.The bilingual characte 
of the decree,unlike its equivalent in Tripolitania,certainly
41) The Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.11.
42) See,supra Chapt.Eight,Section III.,pp.249-262.
43) See,supra Chapt.Six,Section III.,pp.177-182;and also 
Section IV.,pp.182-191.
aided its implementation ,since(given the wave of anti-Western 
feeling throughout the Arab world at this time) it is more 
than unlikely that the Italian government would have been un­
prepared to recruit Arab teachers from surrounding countries, 
for fear of spreading Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism.There 
is no doubt that the exclusively Arabic character of the 
elementary schools ordained for Tripolitania for the Fund­
amental Law of June 1919 greatly complicated its implement­
ation by the Italians.Not only did Italy not possess at this 
time sufficient numbers of Arab-speaking teachers for the 
elementary schools,but it was quite unprepared to recruit 
such teachers from neighbouring Arab countries for fear of 
the political consequences.From the Italian standpoint,the 
conceding of political autonomy to Libya in 1919 was not 
intended to place Libya on the road to either complete ind­
ependence or to a further outbreak of the smouldering colon­
ial war.Only a separate study of the complex politics surr­
ounding the grant of autonomy in Tripolitania in 1919 will 
provide an indication of all the motives of the Arab side 
both in the general and in the particular respect.
To round off the work of the previous school-year in 
preparing the existing Italo-Arab schools for conversion 
into Arab elementary schools,Piccioli made his own cont­
ribution by converting the Italo-Arab schools at Marsa Susa 
and Tolmeta into elementary schools of the new type.(44)Also 
in response to the representations of the population of Ghem- 
ines to the regional commissariat of that area a new school
44) Piccioli Report of November,1922,p.11.Also,see supra. 
Chapt.Eight,Section III.,pp.249-262. — —
45) Piccioli Report of November,1922,p.11.
was opened there as well.(45)A further elementary school 
and Kuttab was also scheduled for immediate establishment 
at Agedabia in response to the wishes of the Emir himself.
Idris,however, in a letter dated 2 September 1921 from the 
camp at El-Abiara ,while thanking the government for the 
interest it was showing in the field of public education, 
and approving the institution of the two schools,advised 
procrastination for some time ahead, because of the diff-
culty in selecting suitable teachers adapted to the area, 
and also because of the need for more work to be undertaken 
upon the school buildings themselves.(46)The Emir,Piccioli 
pointed out,wished to reserve for himself the choice of the 
right moment,when it would be "opportune” to set up the school 
and would communicate this to the superintendency by letter 
at a later date.(47)
TV * The School of Education and Work
’•It is impossible to deny that the Girls'School 
at Bengasi,which was set up barely two years ago, 
constitutes the greatest practical success of our 
little scholastic organisation in Cirenaica".(48)
The absence of any kind of public education other than that 
provided by the religious system in Libya before 1895 no 
doubt inhibited the development of female education in the 
country.(49) Although the Ottomans established an elementary
46) Ibid.,p.l2
47) Ibid.
48) Piccioli Report of August 1923,p.39.
49) Francesco Coro,Settantasei Anni Pi Dominazione Turca in 
Libia', 18,35-1911 (Tripoli , 1913) ,p. 85.
school for girls in Tripoli after 1899,it is not absolutely 
clear whether they did so in Bengasi,and more likely, not.
(50) This does not mean, of course, that girls were
completely without educational opportunities both before and 
after 1911,as facilities existed in the Italian schools and 
also in the form of private tuition,though the latter espec­
ially was restricted to families with the necessary financial 
means.(51)According to Piccioli,the opposition to the educat­
ion of girls came from traditional circles i'ii which "the 
education of girls is considered to be contrary to religion". 
(52)The superintendent also blamed opposition to the educat­
ion of girls upon long-standing misogyny which was,he added,
"less pronounced in areas,such as urban centres,where contact 
existed with Europeans".(53) Thus there is at least some 
truth in the Italian claim that they introduced into Libya 
the notion of female education,even if they only began to 
develop i£ in Cirenaica"" ten years after the commencement of 
colonial rule in the colony, and at the specific behest of 
an Arab Parliament.If this latter support was not to be alien­
ated at the first instance,it was necessary for this aspect 
of the new reform to win popular support and also directly 
benefit the Arab families involved.lt was not purely altruisti 
reasons that dictated the level of the government's benevolenc 
but the policy of pacific penetration.Even so,regardless of
50) See Ibid.,Chpt.XIII.,Istruzione Publica-Le Scuole Turche 
e quelle Europee,pp.85-89;and Ettore Rossi,"La Colonia 
Italiana a Tripoli nel Secolo XIX",Rivista delle Colonie 
Italiane,Anno IV,N.12,Dec.,1930,p.1067.
51) See suprachpt.Eight,Sections II.and III.
52) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.16.
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political criteria,and the need to restrict such education 
to the level of basic literacy and the domain of the purely 
practical,the establishing of two schools for girls(one at 
Bengasi,and the other at Derna) was undoubtedly a sound 
and necessary precedent.(54)
Established at the commencement of the school-year 1921- 
1922 at Bengasi and Derna,the school population of the former 
had by November reached 80 and,added Piccioli," would have 
easily exceeded this figure but for the limitations of space 
imposed by the building".(55)rhe programme adopted by the 
schools wisely avoided any attempt to duplicate the programmes 
normally adopted in the Italian schools which could have 
invited censure from Arab quarters,(56) Instead,a special 
programme was adopted which became the standard pattern in 
the colonial schools for girls for the remainder of the 
Italian occupation of Libya.(57)This programme emphasised 
subjects of relevance to the home,such as domestic economy, 
hygiene,what the Italians termed "domestic morality" and 
various practical crafts that were traditional in Arab lands. 
(58) The future survival of these schools and their increase 
in popularity depended,Miccachi believed,upon confining the 
curriculum to these traditional areas.(59)For these purposes 
out of a weekly total of 25 teaching hours,15 were devoted
54) Ibid.,p.15.
55) Ibid.
56) Ibid.
57) Roland De Marco writes that the total enrolment in these 
schools reached 758 for the school year 1934-5.The school 
was divided into three sections:"a two-year section in 
which the programme of studies was the same as the boys, 
with the exception that domestic training was substituted 
for book-keeping,gardening,gynasties and sports; a three 
year practical course;and a one year complementary course"
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to the practical aspects of education,such as embroidery, 
weaving and tapestry-making,and five to "arab disciplines” , 
such as the Arabic language and the Koran.The remaining five 
hours of this rudimentary curriculum was to be devoted to 
the acquisition of Italian,but on a purely "optional” basis. 
(60}
The teaching of this programme at the Bengasi school was 
assigned,writes Piccioli, to "two good Arab teachers"Signora 
Hamida Lanesi and Signora Bedina Surer Bej,along with three 
Italian mistresses,including the directress of the school, 
Signora Lyta Lebboreni,whom Piccioli describes as theVclev- 
erest teacher in Bengasi".(61)Similar praise was bestowed on 
the teaching personnel at the Derna school which included a 
Moslem mistress,Halina ben Bahri and two assistants,along 
with "one of the best teachers in the district",signora Nella 
Matini.(62) Both of these schools were well fitted out and 
equipped with material from the recent consignments of school 
materials specially obtained by Piccioli from either Italy 
or the neighbouring Arab countries.School materials whether 
in the form of text-books,exercise books or the silk and cottoi 
fabrics used by the girls during the practical sessions were 
initially supplied free of charge,though such a situation woulc 
not continue to obtain during the next school-year,except for
(contin.)De Marco,however,unfortunately fails to distinguish 
for lack of documentary sources between programmes on the 
statute book and those which were actually implemented.In the 
latter respect,it is extremely doubtful whether the full- 
statutory programme for female education was ever implemented, 
especially outside important centres,such as Tripoli and Beng­
asi.See,R.De Marco,The Italianization of African Natives(New 
York,1643),p.31.
58) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.16.
59) Micacchi Report of 1919(La donna musulmana e la scuola), 
p.165.
the most necessitous students.(63) Great stress was also 
placed upon general hygiene in the running of the school, 
both with the aim of increasing awareness amongst the pupils 
of the causes and remedies of many infections common in 
Libya at this time,and also with preventative factors in 
mind.These matters were entrusted by the superintendency to 
the Department of Health in Bengasi which assigned to both 
schools a Special offical,Dottoressa Tria,who approached 
her work with "great efficiency and zeal" to the considerable 
satisfaction,notes Piccioli, of the families of the pupils, 
the Department of Health and the superintendency itself.(64) 
Although separate estimates of the cost of the two new 
projects in financial terms is * not unfortunately contained 
in the existing documentary sources, some idea of the general 
importance of the projects can be gained from Piccioli's 
description to the Governor of Cirenaica in November 1922.
The Bengasi institution was allocated to a "fine building" 
in Via Osman Barak (Number 69),which comprised five rooms, 
along with a kitchen and other small rooms,and an ample 
courtyard with a"magnificant balcony^".The building added 
Piccioli had been systematically redecorated and and renovated
60) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.16.
61) Ibid.,p.!7.(Piccioli *s frequent castigations of the male 
teachers(immediately prior to his purging both Arab and 
Italian personnel during 1923 and 1924 in response to the 
change in regime) and frequent effusive praise for women 
teachers raises the question of personal bias in all his 
assessments of personnel.In such matters,it is difficult 
to know whether he was motivated by fear,lest his reports 
were less confidential than he hoped;or a complete refusal 
at times to exercise his objective judgement when politica 
criteria were not involved.Certainly,women teachers on net 
receive fewer castigations than men in these reports and 
it is likely Piccioli adopted a lighter attitude to them 
than he did to men,or because he believed their work to
be more deserving of praise)
62) Ibid.
63) Ibid.,p.18.
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in accordance -with its new requirements.(65) Despite all 
its attractive amenities ,however,the buildings assigned 
to the Bengasi institution were purely provisional,and for 
the future it was proposed to construct an entirely new 
school on land belonging to the Beni Auqaf..This,when it 
transpired,would be to the North of the present school 
buildings, but still in the same Via Osman Barek.lt was not 
possible,argued Piccioli, to move the school from Via Osman 
Barek,because of the latter*s centrality and convenience 
for the most heavily populated Arab section of Bengasi.(66) 
Also at Derna, the existing buildings were adjudged adequate 
for existing requirements,but would be extended during the 
comingrschool-year(1923) and private and public land had 
been acquired for such a purpose.(67)
V.Professional Education
" ’While the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli 
sinks still further into ruin and is facing final 
closure,that of Bengasi is on the point of getting 
organised in accordance with criteria which will 
have the maximum practical effect.'**( 68)
Although the new girls * schools were in part concerned with 
professional training,the main aim of professional education 
in Libya at this time was the professional training of boys. 
Agricultural education should also have been included in 
the scope of the latter,but all such schemes were still 
judged far too premature by Micacchi and nothing of a pract­
ical nature was attempted in either Tripolitania or in
64) Ibid. 7-
65) Ibid.,p.16.
66) Ibid.,p.17.
67) Ibid.Also see Piccioli*s Report of Aug.1923,p.39.
68) Rodolpho Micacchi,Director of the Department of Schools 
at the Ministry of Colonies to the Secretary Gerneral,
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Cirenaica until the De Bono and Badoglio Eras.(69)In the 
meantime,an interesting development took place at Bengasi 
which had its source both in the demands of the former 
Consultative Comraittes of Cirenaica for a "specialised” 
industrial training(70),and in policy elaborated by Micacchi 
in 1919 to the Ministry of Colonies,for the teaching to 
Libyans of local arts and crafts.(71)
Initially intended by the reforming governor,Giacomo 
De Martino to serve the needs of Moslems,the School of Arts 
and Crafts established in Bengasi b y  R.D.June 1919,No 1343 
was well-eguipped from government sources with modern mach­
inery and properly trained teachers recruited from Italy.(72) 
As such it comprised professional courses of three years, 
which aimed to teach both industrial skills of the type
i
particularly requested by the Consultative Committee(73)jand 
also local arts and crafts such as were taught at the School 
of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli.(74)In all other respects,how­
ever, the Bengasi institution was completely different from 
its Tripoli equivalent,and would in fact become the model 
for the reform of the latter,following Piccioli*s transfering 
as superintendent to Tripolitania in 1924.(75)lt also had 
attached to it,an Italo-Arab section,which was reformed into 
an Arab elementary school in 1922 (76) and boarding accomm-
(contin.)S .Contarini in 1923(as quoted by Piccioli in his 
report of Aug.1923),Ibid.,p.44.
69) See,Micacchi Report of 1919(Ii*insegnamento agrario e 
professionals),pp.l66-168;Segre,C..Fourth Shore.3.The 
De Bono and Badoglio Eras,pp.57-82?and MAI-ASjFondo 
Vari,Cart.14/2,Fasc.B-11.ilstituzione di una scuola 
sperimentale per gioventu Fascista,1928.
70) See,supra »Chapt.Six,Section II.,pp.171-177.
71) See, su£ra,chapt.Five,Section III•,pp.141-149;and Chapt. 
Seven',"5eCtion III,pp. 219-222.
odation to provide Arab students frbm all parts of Cirenaica 
with free food and board while completing their professional 
studies at the school.(77)Not surprisingly,as De Berardinis 
noted in his report of 30 March,1921,the school-was 
crowded with pupils and had proved a great success for the 
new policy of collaboration with the Arab population (78), 
though the professional courses of which only the first 
class had so far been established,consisted "almost entirely 
of Italians” .(79) No doubt this situation would have changed 
had the reform been allowed to develop for the preparatory 
courses instituted in the elementary school would gradually 
have brought Libyan pupils up to the standard required to 
profit from attendance at the industrial section.Instead, 
it is doubtful whether any Libyans reached the industrial 
school and certainly after 1922 the tendency was for Italians 
to enter the industrial section and for Libyans to take up 
arts and craftis.This became the pattern for the remainder 
of Italian rule in Libya and was fully in accordance with the 
policy worked out by Micacchi himself in 1919.(80)
The process of changing the school from an institution 
primarily intended to serve the needs and interests of Libyans 
both in the field of traditional arts and crafts but also
72) See.supra.Chapt.Eight.Section III,p. .Also,Piccioli*s 
Report of Aug.1923,pp.43-48.
73) Amongst some 20 separate proposals for the modernising 
of Cirenaica,the Consultative Committes had particularly 
requested the government to provide professional training 
in the field of agriculture and industrial skills in 
special schools of Arts and Crafts.See,MAI-AS,Cirenaica 
1918-19,Pos.140/3,Fasc.22 bis Comitati Consultati:in mat­
eria d'istruzione publica,6 Feb.1919,No.192.
74) Ibid.Also see,R.Micacchi,L’Enseighment aux Indigenes,p552.
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in the acquisition of modern industrial skills,for which 
the school had been uniquely equipped,was engineered by 
Piccioli between 1922 and 1924.It was not a difficult aim 
to achieve for,unlike the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, 
De Martino's creation in Bengasi was not an autonomous inst­
itution but a creature of changing political circumstances, 
brought about by Italian legal procedure and financed, entirely 
from Italian sources.(81)Even so,Piccioli approached the 
problem with great caution and refused to be drawn into open 
political debate on the subject of the school's future role, 
when challenged to do so by Safi ed-Din during a session of 
the Parliament of Cirenaica*(82)Instead,he preferred to bide 
his time and contented himself with drawing up a special rep­
ort upon the school's future,which he addressed in the Feb­
ruary of 1923 to the governor of the colony.(83)It was not, 
however,until 1925 that a special decree was enacted to bring 
the running of the Bengasi School of Arts and Crafts into 
line with the regime's new policy.(84)By this measure,Picc­
ioli 's proposals to the governor Cirenaica of August 1923, 
whereby a fourth year was added to the professional course 
entered the statute book,as did his proposal to transform 
the school into an autonomous institution with its own man­
agement and financing.(85)By this time the school had long
75) See, MAI-AS,Fondo Vari,Cart.14/1,Fasc.B-l.:Piccioli to 
the Governor of Tripolitania,Tripoli,20 Dec.1924,p.8; 
and Fondo Volpi,Cart.13/1,Fasc.B-ltPiccioli*s Report
on the School of Arts and Crafts at Tripoli(27.6.1926),p.89
76) See, Piccioli's Report of April 1922,p.11.
77) Ibid.
78) See,su£rafChapt.Eight,Section III.,p.
79) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l•jReport of Professor
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ceased even to pretend that it aimed primarily to serve 
Libyan needs and had become in effect two institutions* an 
industrial section in which it would have been difficult 
to have found any Libyan students5 and a professional and 
arts and crafts section,which the government encourgaged 
Libyans to make use of in line with the new economic pol­
icies of Fascism.(86)The new decree merely licensed the 
existing situation by transforming the school into an 
autonomous institution(now known as the Industrial School 
of Bengasi),whereby,following the Gentile Refdrm of Italian 
education in 1924,the courses for Italians were modelled 
upon those of the new industrial schools in Italy, and the 
courses for Libyans were organised in accordance with spec­
ial regulations drawn up by the Ministry of Colonies.(87)
(contin.)B.De Berardinis to the Governor of Cirenaica,Bengasi,
30 March,1921,p.6.
80) See.supra.Chaot.Five.Section III.,pp.141-149;Chapt.Seven, 
Section III.,pp.219-222;and also,R.Micacchi,L ’Enseiqn- 
ment aux Indigenes,pp.552-555.
81) See,Piccioli Report of November 1922,pyl8;and Picciol's 
Report of August 1923,pp.43-48.
82) Safi ed-Din*s remarks had been chiefly intended to draw 
attention to the lamentable state into which the School 
of Arts and Crafts had fallen in Tripoli.He had urged 
Piccioli to restore it to its former grandeur under the 
Turks.Piccioli had replied that the Italian nationzhadz. 
nothing to learn as far as education was concerned from 
the Turks.Italy,he concluded, **was an old civilisation 
with lofty traditions of learning,who had taught and was 
still teaching the world** .Piccioli was subsequently to 
eat his own words when he learned the true state of the 
Tripoli school in 1924.Piccioli*s Report on the School 
of Arts and Crafts in Ripoli,1926,p.94.
83) Piccioli*s Report of Aug.1923,p.43.
84) See,D.M.15 Sept.1925,che approva lo.statuto della R. 
Scuola industriale di Bengasi,B.U.Cir.,10,1187.
85) Piccioli Report of Aug.1923 and February 1924,pp.48 and 
16 respectively.
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VI,Arab Secondary Education:the Idadia at Bengasi and Derna
"Of most particular importance in the new ordinance 
are the secondary schools for Moslem citizens:by these 
means,Arab youth can,on the one hand,be prepared for 
higher education and,on the other, be initiated into 
certain professions,such as primary school-teacher, 
merchant,public functionary and clerk,etc.,etc."(88)
Born of political expediency and nourished by doubt,incap­
acity and frequent prejudice on the part of the Colonial 
Ministry and the new regime,it is surprising that the two • 
idadia,founded at Bengasi and Derna in 1922,were able to 
survive on as far as 1928,when they were finally abolished. 
(89)It is certainly not the task of this section to analyse 
all the faults,difficulties and problems of these two ill- 
fated institutions.At least,it can be summarized,they man- 
* aged in difficult political and other circumstances to prov­
ide a modicum of secondary education for Arabs.They also 
provided the only training for Moslem school-teachers until 
the long-awaited Medersa was eventually established in 1935, 
and in this respect alone the disappearance of the two schools 
in 1928 was a serious blow to Arab education.Here,however,the 
primary object is to simply indicate the extent to which the 
policy of the Liberal government was implemented in the final
86) R. Micacchi.L •Enseiqnment aux Indigenes,pp.552-554sand 
F. Contini,”Storia delle istituzioni Scolastiche della 
Libia” in Libia(Tripoli,1953),pp.28 and 41.
87) Ibid.Also,see R.D.31 gennaio 1924,No 472,0rdinamento 
Scolastico della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica,B.U.T., 
13,179 ; and D.G.28 luglio 1926,No 2850,Ordinamento delle 
vecchia scuola industriale di Bengasi,B.U.Cir.,8,400;and 
R.D. 28 giugo 1928,No 1698,B.U.T.,19,1141.
88) MAI-AS,Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l.:Progetto Dell’Ord- 
inamento Scholastico Per Musulmani Della Cirenaica(Relaz. 
senza data,con traduz.in arabo),p.5.
89) See,R.D. 21 giugno 1928,No 1698.lslorme riflettenti l*ist- 
ruzione primana per i Musulmani della Tripolitania e 
della Cirenaica,B.U.T.,19,1141.
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year of the old regime.
Established initially in^provisional accommodation at 
the Central Kuttab in Bengasi and in the Italian Technical 
School at Derna(90),the two schools were well received by 
the local population.The provisional accommodation allocated 
to the Bengasi Idadia was replaced by more permanent build­
ings in the Via Sidi Sciabbi by October 1922;and the Derna 
Idadia was also about to be moved into more suitable acc­
ommodation at the same time.(91)Piccioli in November exp­
ressed himself to be fully satisfied with the original 
enrolment of 6 pupils in Bengasi(a figure which had increased 
to 16 by November)and 33 at Derna.(92)In order to popularise 
the new schools still further,no admission fees were charged 
by the government,a situation which changed in later years.(9j
F?omr.their very initiation,the central problem with the 
idadia can be summed up as language,teaching personnel and 
politics.These problems ought not to be regarded as separate 
issues or disputes but must be seen as part of a single 
compound problem,namely colonialism itself.In the latter 
respect,the educational issue with regard to the idadia 
took the form of a triangular-type situation from which 
there was no rational egress for either Arabs or Italians, 
except possibly by recourse to further armed struggle,which 
in fact occurred from 1922 onwards,as the Libyans made a
90) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.14.The choice of 
the Italian Technical School as the place where the 
idadia was to be initially established at Derna seems 
strange in view of Contini's efforts during the prev­
ious school year .See, Chapt.Eight,Section II I., p.25(5.
91) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.14.
92) Ibid . By August 1922,language and consequent learning 
difficulties had reduced attendance at Bengasi by a
half and at Derna to the number of 23.See,Piccioli Report
final bid for independence.
In order to facilitate the Italian position in Ciren­
aica regarding education the Fundamental Law of October 
1919 had stated:
«i
For Moslems,in all the classes of the elementary and 
secondary schools,the teaching of religious matters, 
language,Islamic sciences,Arab literature and history 
sfahll be in the Arabic language.Other subjects can be 
taught in Italian” .(94)
Thus,unlike Tripolitania where the Fundamental Law had 
stipulated that all elementary-type education must be 
conducted in the Arabic language,the government was free 
in Cirenaica to make considerable use of the services 
of Italian teachers in the schools.The fact,however,that 
the 1922 Ordinance had stipulated that instruction in the 
government Kuttabs should be exclusively in Arabic and 
Italian should remain optional in the new elementary 
schools ought in practice to have led to an emphasis upon 
the use of the Arabic language as the principal medium of 
instruction in these schools.This was no doubt the case 
in the Kuttabs and elementary schools,despite the contin­
ued use of Italian teachers in the latter.Unfortunately, 
the government had been able to find outside Libya only
3 Arabic-speaking teachers to work in the idadia at 
Bengasi and Derna(95) with the result that three quarters
93) Piccioli’s Report of Nov.l922,p.l5;and of Aug.1923,p.41.
94) A.Piccioli,La Conquista Morale:La Scuola in La Rinascita 
Della Tripolitania,Ed.A.Mondadori(Milano.1926),p.297.
95) Professors Said Sinnon from Bierut along with Salem 
El-Nefati and El-Trabelsi of Alexandria in Egypt.See, 
Piccioli Report of Nov.1922,p.13.
96) The eight Italian teachers(3 from Bengasi and 5 from 
Derna)taught the students at both idadia: mathematics, 
science,design,Italian language and physical education. 
The three Arab teachers taught the Arabic language,hist-
of the curriculum was taught by eight Italian teachers 
normally employed in the Italian secondary schools at Bengasi 
and Derna.(96)
Piccioli blamed the lack of Arab speaking teachers in 
the two idadia upon the difficulty of recruiting suitable 
Arab teachers in nearby countries;and it was possibly the 
failure to recruit Arab teachers to work in Libya that dis­
credited the new secondary schools before the Libyans.The 
difficulty of recruiting teachers outside Libya for this 
work also doomed the idadia in the eyes of the Fascist 
regimejfor like its Liberal predecessor it was deeply con­
cerned at the possibility that the schools would become 
politically active.All the surrounding Arab countries were 
at this time deeply affected by Arab nationalism and pan-Isl- 
amism and it was believed that these movements which were 
fundamentally opposed to colonial rule in Libya would enter 
Libya by means of the schools.The chance of this happening 
could be greatly reduced if the need to recruit Arab teachers 
abrpad was eliminated by abolishing the new secondary schools 
entirely.Secondary education for Arabs in Libya depended upon 
collaboration and it was not until 1935 that the country was 
judged ready for a further experiment at secondary education
(contin.)geography and Arabic calligraphy for fourteen hours 
of lessons per week.See,Piccioli Report of Nov.l922,p.l3.
97) It is likely that the decision to phase-out the idadia 
was taken during 1923,but the need to implement the 
Gentile Reform for Italians,and also,the recency of 
the new decree for Libyans led to procrastination on 
the part of the superintendency.Piccioli was also opp­
osed to the Idadia because of the danger of creating 
an intellectual class amongst the Libyans which would
criticise Italian rule.The main danger,howevejr, was 
the risk of recruiting anti-Italian teachers in other 
Arab lands who would introduce nationalism and pan-Islam
into Libya.See,Piccioli Report of Aug.1923,p.41.
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involving cultural autonomy.By that time,the ground had 
been well prepared in advance and the government had few 
reasons to fear that political subversion would result.(97)
In Piccioli*s opinion,it was a”vain hope”for the govern­
ment to expect to recruit Arab teachers to work in the idadia 
who were both highly cultured and politically uncommitted. 
During the previous school-year ,the Italian consul-generals 
in Tunisia and Algeria had failed to find such teachers and 
in the end if had been necessary to recruit Arab professors 
from Egypt and Syria,"countries” ,he added,”in which the 
pan-Islamic movement was particularly active.(98)It had thus 
proved necessary to entrust Professor El-Nefati with virt­
ually the entire curriculum in his particular subjects at 
the Derna idadia.The absence of a qualified Arab teachers 
for the Bengasi idadia had made it necessary to employ the 
best qualified Libyan teacher there,namely the veteran Mustafa 
Driza,”one of our oldest and most efficient teachers” .(99)
The situation had been improved somewhat at the commence­
ment of the school-year 1922-23 due to the recruitment of two 
more Arab teachers(Professors Sinnon from Bierut and El- 
Trabelsi from Alexandria).Piccioli expressed his satisfact­
ion with the two Egyptian professors,El-Nefati and El-Trabelsi 
but confessed to some initial anxiety on political grounds.(10(
98) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.13.
99) Ibid.The difficulty in recruiting Arab teachers from 
neighbouring countries to work in the new idadia presented 
Piccioli with a problem when he addressed the Parliament 
of Cirenaica in April 1922 and he ommits all reference
to the new schools.See,Piccioli Report of April 1922.
100) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.l3.
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His chief problem,it seems,was with Professor.Sinnon of 
Bierut,whose contract,he had decided,would not be renewed 
at the end of the school-year.Sinnon,it appears,was the 
type of subversive who would later become quite common amongst 
both Arabs and Italians opposed to Fascism.On the surface 
he appeared to be a model of loyalty and had,added Piccioli, 
written many articles in newspapers and journals which 
praised the government's educational activity in the colony. 
Unfortunately,he gave himself away as a political"undesirable’ 
by being excessively attached to the policy of collaboration 
through autonomy which,as Piccioli rightly sensed in the 
November of 1922,was fast on the way out.(101) The ultimate 
sin of the professor from Bierut,in piccioli's eyes, was the 
former's close association with the Sennusi leader Safieddin, 
with whom'E Piccioli had crossed swords on more than one occ­
asion in the sessions of the Parliament of Cirenaica."There 
was no doubt about it,the man was highly suspicious",concluded 
the superintendent,"and should be repatriated as soon as it 
was convenient and not later than the end of the school-year 
in June 1923".(102) A far more ideal person,from Piccioli's 
point of view,was the Egyptian professor at Derna,El-Nifati 
whose"conciliatory attitude markedly differentiated him from 
Sinnou"."Professor Nifati",opined Piccioli,"by his general
sympathy and understanding had won the approval of the 
metropolitan element".(103) * *
101) Ibid.,p.13
102) Ibid. Also,see supra.Noter82.p .286.
103) Ibid.,p.14.
*) Although there is no direct evidence from the primary
sources of Libyans attending courses at any of the three 
existing Italian secondary schools,five scholarships were 
provided in April 1922 to El-Azhar in Cairo and a further
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VII.Condominium and the Question of Supervision and Control
"The Fundamental Law of Tripolitania also sanctions 
the principle of compulsory education for Moslem 
boys.Perhaps,I may be permitted to express some 
scepticism as to the possibility of enforcing comp­
ulsory instruction amongst the majority of the Libyan
population Only in the greater centres is it
likely to be possible,though it will remain a dead 
letter elsewhere".(104)
Given the obsession of the Colonial Ministry(and its acolytes 
in the Department of Schools)with the aims of pacific pen­
etration, moral conquest,political control and guarding against 
possible subversion in the schools for Libyans,through the 
employment of Arab teachers from lands such as Egypt and 
Syria where Arab nationalism and the pan-Islamic movement 
had a stronghold,the idea of handing over control of the 
schools to Libyans(or even sharing such control) stood 
little chance of effective implementation,regardless of the 
official concession of autonomy in 1919.Even so,it was 
necessary to go through the motions of condominium even if 
the idea of condominium itself meant very little in terms 
of reality itself. Thus at the educational level,between 1919 
and 1923 at the latest,a number of projects designed to 
effect collaboration were put into practice;before fizzling 
out like damp squibs in the changed,or not so changed,polit­
ical atmosphere following the Fascist coup of 1 October 1922
Before,however,turning to examine this particular aspect 
of colonial rule,it is necessary to indicate the extent to 
which decentralisation in any form was contrary to the under­
(contin.) five to the Istituto Tecnico at Derna.The amounts 
of Lira concerned added up to 66.000 and more such grants 
were planned for the next school-year.During 1923 three Moslem 
were sent to secondary schools in Italy,but at the end of the 
year all scholarships to Libyans were discontinued at the orde: 
of the governor.See,Piccioli Report of April-1922,p.12;and the 
Piccioli Report of Aug.1923,p.49.
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lying trends.By calling in July 1919,albeit "in parenthesis*', 
for administrative reforms,whereby the colonial schools would 
come under the direction of a single department at the Ministry 
of Colonies(that of Civil Affairs),Micacchi was in one respect 
at least anticipating the greater bureaucratisation that would 
follow from the unification of the two colonies(Tripolitania 
and Cirenaica) under Pietro Badoglio's governorship in 1929. 
(105)The movement towards-ever more central control would 
become a dominant tendency under Fascism as the imperial 
theme gained momentum and came ever closer towards final 
fulfilment.By 1936,Micacchi would find himself in the position 
of educational supremo for the whole of Mussolini's empire.(1CK 
Despite,however,the domination of bureaucrats both 
under Liberalism as under Fascism,the organisation and admin­
istration of the educational service would require,perhaps 
more than any other aspect of colonial administration,the 
co-operation of the Libyan population.In the circumstances 
of condominium itself,between 1919 and 1922,the Parliament 
of Cirenaica was primarily intended to become the principal 
instrument of collaboration.Educationally its role in this 
respect was mainly confined to approving the worfc of Italian 
officials,as in the case of the educational commission of 
Cirenaica in 1921(107)*and there is no evidence of it putting
104) Micacchi Report of July 1919,p.164.
105) At this time the Moslem schools in Cirenaica were not 
controlled from Tripoli,but came under either the Dep­
artment of Civil Affairs in Bengasi or under the auth­
ority of individual military residents.More generally, 
only the government elementary schools in Tripolitania 
came under the control of the superintendent,the comm­
ercial and professional schools,as in Italy,falling 
under the authority of different ministries,such as
forward proposals of its own as far as education was con­
cerned at least.Once the parliament had sanctioned R.D. 5 
February 1922 No 368,individual and local participation 
would be required,before condominium could be descibed as 
working effectively.The chief areas in which individual and 
local participation was required were those included under 
the separate heads of the Viqilanze Didattica e Disciplinare 
Delle Scuole.the Difesa Sanitaria Delle Scuole,the Patronato 
ScolasticQ and in the Consiqlio Dell'Istruzione. Although 
it is not possible to examine in detail the activities of 
all these bodies,which mainly came into existence only in 
the October of 1922 and then were" transformed** or "developed" 
under Fascist rule, it is necessary at this point to examine 
their activities in relation to the fulfilment of the 
Fundamental Law of 1919.
Although the Bertolini legislation of 1914 had required 
the participation of cadi,mufti and notables to act in the 
capacity of an educational board,in respect of the supervision 
and gontrol of Kuttabs allocated to receive a government 
grant,it is unlikely that this system was ever in effect 
put into operation in Libya.(108)Arab collaboration,however, 
was central to the whole concept of autonomy put forward 
in the Fundamental Law of 1919,and it was essential that it
(contin.) those of Public Instruction,Industry,Commerce and 
Work and Agriculture.See,Ibid.,p.168.
106) See,R.D.L.24 Luglio 1936,No 1737.0rdinamento Scolastico 
della Libia,B.U.L.,30, 1060.
107) See,sugra.chpt.Six,Section III.,pp.177-182.
108) See, suEra,chpt.Three,Section II.,pp.69-74.
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should be seen to operate with the full cognisance and 
support of the cadi,mufti,notables and tribal sheikhs, 
wherever schools were established in Cirenaica.Areas of 
particular importance in the field of educational collab­
oration were those of school attendance,which had been 
made compulsory by the Fundamental Law for all Moslem boys 
at the elementary level,and in the general running of the 
reformed Kuttabs and ior.the distribution of food and cloth­
ing and in the maintenance of hygienic vigilance. Collab­
oration, however , did not in Italian eyes involve executive 
responsibilities or political control which would,as before, 
remain firmly in the hands of Italian representatives and 
officials.In the Italian interpretation of the term,collab­
oration meant,making the system work,not handing over its 
ultimate direction and control to Libyans.
Micacchi expressed his disquiet with the idea of comp­
ulsory instruction for Moslem boys in Libya almost as soon 
as the idea was promulgated in the form of the Fundamental 
Law of Tripolitania in June 1919.(109)The demographic conditior 
of Libya,he believed,would render such a disposition a dead 
letter in all except the greater urban centres.As such the 
implementation of the disposition should be left to its 
originators,namely the Libyans themselves.(110)1t remained, 
however,the responsibility of the government to suggest a 
mehhod whereby this might be done,and Micacchi suggested to
109) See,Miccachi*s Report to the Governor of Tripolitania, 
July 1919,p.164.
110) Ibid.
Ill) Ibid.
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the authorities that the system adopted by the French in Algeria 
offered the best hope of implementing compulsory education 
in Libya.(111)By such a system ,the problem of ensuring that
pupils attended school regularly would be entrusted to a 
special scholastic commission composed of six members,three 
of whom^ would be nominated by the government and three by 
the native community.The commission would meet under the 
chairmanship of the mayor or administrative director and the 
teacher running the school would act as secretary.The comm­
ission should be responsible for compiling a list of boys 
of school age and therefore eligible to attend school.An 
activity of such importance,Micacchi believed,ought to be 
entrusted to the School Charity Board(Patronato ScholasticO), 
and bodies of this nature should be set up in every scholastic 
centre.At present these bodies only operated to relieve the 
needs of poor pupils;but they could also be used for creating 
an environment favourable for the development of the school,4 
especially in areas where government schools were virtually 
unknown.(112)
Institutions,such as Charity Boards for Education,did 
not exist in Cirenaica in 1919 because whatever funds were 
available for charitable purposes were channelled into other 
organisations such as Charities organised by the Church.(113) 
Piccioli,however,in 1922 recognised the need to raise the numbe 
of Moslems attending school from the pityable figure of1,710 
pupils,which as he admitted to the Parliament of Cirenaica in
112) Ibid.,p.166.
113) Ibid.,p.135.
114) Piccioli Report of April 1922,p.16.
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April 1922 was still "very small in comparison with the
total number of the population and to the number of schools".
!
(114)In pursuit therefore of Micacchi's earlier proposals 
regarding School Charity Boards,who would be responsible for, 
amongst other matters,school enrolments and attendance,Picciol 
announced to the Parliament of Cirenaica in April 1922 the 
Government's intention of establishing such boards through­
out Cirenaica.(115) In each locality such boards would be 
administered by a Council consisting of 11 members of whom 
5 would be Moslems,5 Italians and 1 Jewish.By April 6 School 
Charity Boards had already been set up at places such as 
Bengasi,Derna,Merg,Tobruk and Marsasusa.Depending upon the 
number of Schools in the area,the government had assigned to 
the boards the sum of L.37.000 for the current year,which was 
allocated as follows s
The School Board at Bengasi.• . . . . . . . . . . .L. 10.000
" " " " Merg   * , 4.000
•• " " Cirene " 6.000
Derna
" Tobr­
uch
a) for school
meals * 6.000
b) for school 
assistance
2.000
” " Marsasusa.............. " 3.000
Individual Boards devised their own method of providing 
school meals,clothing,school materials and other such 
necessities in addition to the monies made available for 
such purposes by the government.(116)
115) Ibid.,p.16.
116) Ibid.,p.17.
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The new ordinance also required that an inspector 
should be appointed for the superintending of the new 
Arab schools and also the free Kuttabs which were not in 
receipt of a government subsidy. (117)This -’delicate task" 
was entrusted by the government to the Mufti of Bengasi,
Saied Hussein Bin Iusef Budigiagia,who was recommeded to 
the Regent,Commander Pintor,by the leading notables of the 
city.The appointment of such a man as inspector of schools 
would,they suggested,confer moral credability upon the new 
schools,especially in the interior of the country.(118)Acc­
ordingly, the hlufti commenced his position as inspector of 
schools in the middle of December 1921 with a special address 
to the people of Bengasi,urging them to support the new 
schools as much as possible.(119)No doubt>the government’s 
failure to implement the new decree adequately by recruiting 
Arab teachers was one of the reasons why only five pupils 
had enrolled by June 1922 at the Bengasi Idadia.(120) This 
may also have been a contributing factor in the Mufti's 
obvious decision during 1922 not to co-operate in implement­
ing the new decree ,except in a token fashion.(12:1)By October, 
Piccioli was beginning to regret the initial appointment of 
Budigiagia as inspector of Arab schools;but could not proceed 
to dismiss him because of the Mufti’s important**moral and 
social position "in Cirenaica.(122).As a way out of his
117) See,R.D.5 February 1922,No 368,B.U.C.,287.
118) Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.19.
119) Ibid.
120) Piccioli Report of Aug.1923,p.40.
121) Piccioli Report of Nov.1922,p.19.
122) Ibid.
predicament,Piccioli suggested to the regent that Mufti 
Budigiagia's should be informed that,although he could 
remain as inspector of Arab schools,his executive functions 
would be carried out by a secretary whom the government was 
about to appoint.Piccioli suggested for this role either 
the trusted subaltern,Mustafa Driza,then working in the new 
idadia at Bengasi,or the Egyptian professor,Salem El-Nefati, 
who had been appointed to teach at the idadia at Bengasi.(123) 
A final organ of collaboration intended to "worthily 
crown the scholastic edifice of Cirenaica" also came into 
existence during 1922;and was known as the Consiglio Del 
Istruzione or Counsil of Education,a title it would continue 
to bear during the remainder of Italian rule in Libya.(124) 
Intended to perform a purely consultative function(125),it 
was composed of 6 Italians(metropolitan!),5 Arabs and one 
Jew.(126).As such it did not originate in the Statutes of 
Libya of 1919,but was almost certainly the brain child of 
Rodolfoi Micacchi,who by submitting it in a special minister­
ial brief to the Governor of Cirenaica in November 1921,ens­
ured that such a proposal became part and parcel OF .th^  new 
educational ordinance,when it was finally promulgated in Feb­
ruary 1922.(127)The aim of such an institution,advised Micacch:
123) Ibid.,pp.19-20.
124) Piccioli*s Report of April,1922,p.14.See,D.G.9 Nov.1922, 
No 940,B.U.T.,13179.
125) Originally intended only to advise upon the choice of 
teaching materials to be used in the Libyan schools, 
Piccioli was initially concerned lest it should assume 
a political role and seek to obstruct or criticise the 
government.This risk,he later believed,was worth taking - 
as it was hoped the Council would do much in a consult­
ative role to improve the efficiency of the schools,beside 
increasing the participation of Arabs in the affairs of 
the country.See,Decreto del 25 Dicembre 1921,No 19742;
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)
in his brief of 11 November 1920(No 3070),"would be to 
secure a greater difusion of education amongst the Libyan 
citizens,in respect of which,it was opportune to gain the 
support of the most authoritative and cultured amongst the 
notables.Such persons ought to be called upon to collaborate 
in the solving of educational problems affecting the indig­
enous population through participation in a special Council 
of Education.This should be modelled upon that of a similar
body set up by the French in the Regency of Tunisia...... ”(128
Like the Superintendency itself,which was primarily"only 
a technical and consultative organisation” ,within the Depart- . 
ment of Civil and Political Affairs at Bengasi,(129)the Counci 
was designed to both complement its activities ,provide the 
notables with a suitable outlet to their pride and ambitions, 
and also ensure that the running of the Libyan schools met wit}' 
Moslem approval.As such it was therefore a not unimportant 
institution and was to meet regularly,twice a year,under 
the chairmanship of the Superintendent.(130)Basically intended 
by Micacchi in 1921 to advise over the choice of school mat­
erials for the Libyan population,an issue which had caused 
much controversy in the past,its functions were widended
(contin.) and the Piccioli Report of November 1922,p.65.
126) Ibid.,p.64.
127) See,Ibid;and,also,R.D.5 February 1922,No 368,B.U.C., 
287.
128^ BicciolirReport of November 1922,p.64.
#
129) Ibid.,p.85
130) Ibid.,p.64.
131) Ibid.,p.65.
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by the Ministry of Colonies on the eve of the Fascist coup 
| of October • 1922' to include*
1.-assisting the Scholastic Superintendent to fulfill 
laws and regulations;
2.-advising the Scholastic Superintendent upon questions 
determined by the government in relation to the progressive 
development of all the scholastic and educational institutions 
in the colony;
3.-prearranging with the Scholastic Superintendent,the 
implementation of Art.10 of the Fundamental Law,whereby 
instruction is compulsory for Moslem boys;as well as impl­
ementing the current legislation relating to the compulsory 
instruction of the metropolitan population.For these purposes, 
the Council is empowered to set up a committee of five members 
under the chairmanship of the Scholastic Superintendent ,to 
study ways whereby the law affecting compulsory instruction 
may be enforced;
4.-advising upon the hiring of Libyan personnel:for the 
schools for Moslem citizens;
5.-advising upon future modifications of the existing 
legislation as it affects school-programmes,text-books used 
in the schools and upon the institution of new infant and 
elementary schools or optional courses that the government 
might seek to set up in the future.(131)
Although the establishment of the Council of Education 
had been authorised by D.G. 12 February 1922,it had still 
not met by the end of the year.The reasons for this delay, 
Piccioli explained to the new governor,Eduardo Baccari,lay 
in the difficulty in securing the attendance of all the member 
none of whom had been in Bengasi during the first half of the
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year.(132)He,himself,had also been extremely heavily occupied 
during the year establishing the new schools,conducting a 
series of long inspections(133) and in a special mission 
to Tripolitania,at the behest of the new governor Volpi,a 
task which had been entrusted to him by no less a personage 
than the Minister of ColoniesjGiovanni Amendola. (134)It was, 
however,important that the Council of Education should meet 
as soon as possible and Piccioli urged the governor to fix 
a date for its Convening.(135)
132) Ibid.,p.6 6 .
133) There is no doubt that Piccioli and his aid,Fulvio 
Contini had been under very great pressure during 
1922.The need to implement and consolidate the decree 
of February 1922 had required an immense amount of 
work in setting up schools and dealing with numer­
ous other problems of a practical and theoretical 
nature.The statutory requirement that three inspect­
ions per year of the schools be carried out was per­
haps and excessive burden given the lack of regualar 
transport facilities and Piccioli requested the Min­
istry to reduce it to one for the year ahead.Educat­
ion still seemed to come last in the government’s 
priorities,and,whereas other officials at the Depart-; 
ment of Civil and Political Affairs had received extra 
clerical and manual personnel during the previous year 
to help deal with the increase in government activity, 
the Superintendency had not.Thus the burden of endless 
clerical work,as well as dealing the receipt of schol­
astic materials from Italy and stocking them in the 
warehouse,appear to have fallen upon the shoulders of 
the two men .Well might Piccioli complain that both he 
and Contini had”reached the end of their normal powers 
of physical resistence due to the abuse of continual 
effort” .See,Ibid., pp*66 and 86.
134) Ibid.,p.6 6 .
135) The non-executive character of the new Council of Educat­
ion is emphasised in the following list of possible 
issues,submitted by Piccioli to the Governor,as a suit­
able agenda for its first meeting.These include:the norms 
to be adopted for implementing Art.10 of the Fundamental 
Law,as it appertained to compulsory instruction;changes 
in the new scholastic calender;methods of employing Lib­
yans as teachers;changes in the programme of the Technica 
Commercial School at Derna;along with other like, matters. 
See,Ibid.,p.67.
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Chapter Ten Final Recapitulation and Conclusion
"The political and socio-economic premise of 
the fascist regime was in part established 
and in part realised between the end o f *25 
and the end of *27.In hardly more than two 
years,Italy radically changed its political 
face;the final vestiges of the old Liberal 
State were almost completely swept a w a y )
The change over from the old regime to the new regime in
Libya had no immediate legal effect upon the education of
Moslems which still continued,officially at least, to be
i
organised imterms of the Statutes of Libya.The transition 
to Fascism proceeded more rapidly in Tripolitania to which 
Piccioli was appointed as Scholastic Superintendent in Oct­
ober 1924.Not only was Tripolitania pacified more rapidly 
than Cirenaica but also,as no attempt had been made to 
implement the Fundamental Law of 1919,the Italo-Arab schools 
had continued in operation,or simply remained to be re-opened 
as different areas once again came under Italian occupation. 
During this period,the Superintendecy under Piccioli was 
mainly concerned with the education of "metropolitan citizens*,* 
as Italians were termed,both to consolidate colonial rule,by 
encouraging Italians to settle in Libya(a relatively new pol­
icy), and also in response to the Gentile Reform of Education 
in Italy,whereby major changes were required to bring the 
secondary sector especially in line with changes in Italy. 
These years saw the construction of many new schools,especial1 
in Tripolitania,where developments had lacked behind Cirenaica 
both in the Arab and Italian sectors.New school-complexes
*) Renzo De Felice,Capitolo quarto,La prima strutturazione 
dello Stato fascisto,Mussolini il fascista,L"Orqanizzaz- 
azione dello Stato fascista 1925-1929(Torino,1968),p.297
grew up rapidly in both Bengasi and Tripoli as the entire 
system of Italian secondary education evolved by Gentile 
was transported to Libya.By the end of 1925 both colonies 
possessed the full courses of the Ginnasio-Liceo,the Istituto- 
i Tecnico > the new Complementary School courses,devised by 
Gentile,and by 1927 a| Scuola d'Awiamento e Professionale 
for training artisans and technicians.Needless to say * these 
lavishly equipped and solidly apportioned new schools had 
little or no impact upon the Libyan population,for whom they 
were not intended,and were vigorously criticised by Socialists 
and other anti-Fascists as socially divisive,until such crit­
icism was finally silenced by the regime.
None of these changes either in the secondary or in the 
elementary sector of Italian education had much if any effect 
upon the education of Libyans,very few of whom attended the 
Italian schools,whether religious or lay.By 1928,however,the 
war against the Libyan Independence Movement was in the milit­
ary sense(if not in the political sense)over,and it only 
remained to crush the final remnants o f  resistance to Italian 
rule in Cirenaica.Also,by this time,the regime had consolidate 
its position in Italy.The time was clearly ripe for the Duce 
to make the necessary overtures of friendship in Africa and 
the Moslem world generally if he was to win support for his 
developing strategy of colonial aggrandisement in Africa.It 
is from 1927 onwards that most modern historians believe 
Mussolini moved from a reflective to a dynamic stance in 
colonial politics.Certainly by 1932 he was beginning to 
seriously prepare for the Ethiopean campaign.
The new mood of the regime found expression in Libya in
the form of a series of administrative ,organisational
and political measures,intended to placate Moslem opposition 
to Italian colonialism,and win over Libyans generally to the 
side of Fascism,in what was depicted by Fascist apologists, 
as a new revolutionary struggle against the old colonial
powers for the future development of Africa.Educationally,
accommodation was to be the theme of the regimes strategy 
for which purpose Micacchi's "third theory" was to provide 
both the essential aims and didactic philosophy.This remained 
so for the remainder of Italian rule in Libya,and was exp-
i
ressed in the form of a new educational ordinance(R.D.21 June, 
1928,No 1698)for Tripolitania and Cirenaica.Articles l.and 2 
of the new decree divided elementary education into three 
general categories;boys'elementary schools;girls'schools 
of education and work;and evening schools for pupils unable 
to attend during the day.Such schools vere to comprise a 
three-year lower course,to be universal throughout the country 
and a two-year course,which would be set up only in particular
places in accordance with local needs.Article 3 determined 
the curriculum,which was in all respects identical to that 
devised originally for the Italo-Arab schools,and expressed 
in Martini's legislation of 1915.1n both the lower and higher 
elementary schools,soon to revert to their earlier nomenclature 
as Italo-Arab schools,Arabic and Italian was more or less 
evenly balanced with three hours of both per day,in the lower 
course,and four of Italian and two of Arabic per day in the 
higher course.As with the Bertolini and Martini legislation 
of 1914 and 1915,the organisation,administration and curricul­
um of the revived Italo-Arab schools was closely modelled
upon that of the Italian elementary system itself,despite 
Micacchi having voiced his criticism of such a tendency in 191^
Teachers of Italian nationality for the Libyan schools 
were to be recruited in the same way as they were recruited 
for the Italian schools,the exact method being laid down 
in Art.29 of R.D.31 January 1924,No 472.Arab teachers for 
the Libyan schools were,on the other hand,to be chosen from 
Libyans already in posession of either valid teaching qual­
ifications; or following an examination set by a special 
commission of the Ministry of Colonies .Art.17 of the decree 
of 1928 revived the’Bertolini provisions affecting Kuttabs, 
but exluded Kuttabs themselves from the government system, 
by not offering these schools any kind of subsidy,should 
they conform with Italian requirements.Art.18 suppressed 
the idadia completely and ordered that the two schools in 
question at Bengasi and Derna should close their doors as 
soon as those pupils who had been admitted to the schools 
in the school-year 1926-7 had taken their final exams.Thus 
the decree of 1928 which was officially listed,following 
the union of the two colonies in December of the same year, 
only as Reaio Decreto 21 giugno 1928,No 1698>Norme 
riflettenti 1 'istruzione primaria per,i musulmani della 
Tripolitania e della Cirenaica (l),both determined the pattern 
of elementary schooling for Moslems in the future,and also 
abrogated the educational provisions of the earlier Fund­
amental Laws.
By confining the new decree to purely elementary educat­
ion, the regime planned to revive the Bertolini-Martini prop-
1) See,Gazzetta Ufficiale del 3 agosto 1928,n.180;or B.U.T., 
19,1141.
osals for establishing in Tripoli a School of Islamic 
Culture.For such a purpose,the Ministry of Colonies pre­
pared the scheme of a special law defining the nature and 
aimscof the proposed institution for promulgation at the 
same time as R.D.June 1928 N .198,which announced the closure 
of the idadia at Bengasi and Derna.The proposed decree 
was not ,however,promulgated as political circumstances in 
Libya were still not considered to be sufficiently secure 
to permit the establishing of an institution that would have 
depended for its administration and organisation upon teachers 
recruited from neighbouring Arab lands.Instead,the old system 
of sending specially selected cadres of students at the gov­
ernment's own expense to El-Azhar was readopted.This method 
was bath cheap and safe,since not only had the earlier agg- 
itation at El-Azhar been brought under control by the British, 
but special facilities had been provided by the Italian Consul 
General in Cairo,whereby Libyan students would largely live 
and study in a special ruak under the watchful eye of an Italo- 
phile sheikh.(12)This method,which continued to function until 
the actual establishment of the Medersa in 1935,was,further­
more, much less financially burdensome than the estimated 
outlay of L.8000.000 required to set up the Medersa,of which 
only L.4.000.000 was'then available from the balances of the 
Auqaf funds.By 1934,however,the needs of the Duce's Islamic 
politique and an embarassing anti-Italian demonstration by 
the Libyan students studying at El-Azhar caused Mussolini to
2) MAI-AS,Libia,Pos.150/31(1913-1935),Fasc.146:Scuola 
Superiore Islaraica,12 Marzo 1935,p.3.
instruct the governor of Libia,Italo Balbo,to press ahead 
with opening the much delayed institution .Modelled upon the 
scheme drawn up by Professor Nallino in 1928,the decree 
establishing the Medersa was finally promulgated as R.D.
13 May 1935,No 1365.(3)
The final element in the Fascist plan for the education 
of Moslems in Libya lay in the need to bring to fruition the 
ideas upon professional and agricultural education worked 
out by Micacchi in 1919 and as yet hardly applied in the 
schools.Derived from policies evolved by the French for 
Algeria,the essential reasoning behind Micacchi*s scheme 
was to prepare Arabs and Italians for different goals in 
the economic and agricultural sector by providing them with 
different and separate educational facilities.Under Piccioli* 
superintendency in Cirenaica,this system had already been 
given a trial run.In the form of D.G. 28 of July 1926,N. 
2850(4),whereby the former School of Arts and Crafts at 
Bengasi became an industrial school on the Italian model 
with a special orientation to suit colonial circumstances, 
official sanction was given to Micacchi*s system.(5)The 
attempt,however,by Piccioli,following a thorough invest­
igation of the School of Arts and Crafts at Tripoli,to 
change it more or less into an industrial school,such as 
had already been set up in Bengasi was doomed to failure.
3) Intended for the education and training of cadi,mufti, 
elementary school-teachers and minor officials in the 
government employ,the School of Higher Islamic Culture,. 
in the year 1939-40,had enrolled 147 students.See,MAI- 
AS,Comitato per la Documentazione delle Attivita Ital- 
iana in Africa,Fondo Felsano,Scaffale 103,Pacco 6 :Pub- 
lica Istruzione,Libya(no page reference provided).
4) See,B.U.C.,8,400.
5) See, supra Chapt.Nine,Section V.,pp.2 - 2 •
Equipped by the Turks with its own revenues and autonomous 
status,which the regime had no wish to otherwise divert 
or abrogate,Piccioli*s original plan of reform,which would 
have organised the school to cater for both Arab and Italian 
needs,was commuted into D.G.10 May,1929,No 259.(6)By this 
decree Italians were allowed to make use of the facilities 
at the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli;but the finan­
cial arrangements were organised on different lines,so as 
to avoid giving the impression to Libyans that the patrim- 
onYy of the school was being used to finance the training 
of Italians.In fact,however,Italians made extensive use of 
its workshops and other technical facilities and special 
access was provided for such a purpose to the recently 
created Scuola d*Aviamento Professionale,which was const­
ructed on land immediately adjacent to the School of Arts 
and Crafts and originally owned by it.Despite such adjust­
ments to suit the autonomous status of the School of Arts 
and Crafts in Tripoli the programme of studies and aims of 
the school were little different from those of the Libyan 
section of the Industrial School at Bengasi.Both such instit­
utions basically aimed to provide an arts and crafts type 
training or an artisans course.Training for more advanced 
type skills was primarily intended for Italians and although 
Balbo tried to introduces an element of flexibility into 
the system by providing special apprenticeship type courses 
the overall effect was minimal.(7)
6 ) See,B.U.T., 1057.
7) See,D.M. 1 Dec.1937,Approvazione dello Statuto della 
Scuola Musulmana di mestieri e arti indigene di Tripoli, 
B.U.L. 1938,5,187; and Guglielmo Quadrotta.Sviluppo E 
Realizzazioni Dell *Artiqianato in Libia(Roma,ly 3 8-XV17,
pp.2-28.
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The theme of "separate but equal development"which 
Fascism did not invent but borrowed from the French in 
Notth Africa,where it meant something different,(8)was 
also apparent in the new provisions for agricultural 
education to which Piccioli was instructed to give his 
attention in 1925,as a means of increasing Italian settle­
ment in Libya.By the subsequent decree of 16 January!1926 
No 41(9) there was established at the Experimental Instit­
ute ,which had been set up in the first days of Italian 
colonial rule at Sidi Mesri on the outskirts of Tripoli, 
a school of practical agriculture.(10)Ten rural schools 
were also to have been set up,but in 1925 De Bono believed 
that the need for these was of lesser urgency than the est­
ablishment of a central school :;of practical agriculture, 
for which he allocated L.450.000 from the colonial budget. 
Modelled upon the Italian schools of agriculture(with nec­
essary modifications to fit in with the climatic and soil 
requirements of Libya)it provided both theoretical and 
practical instruction on a four-year basis.There is no doubt 
that the principal aim of the school was to train Italians 
as intelligent and efficient farmers,although provision was 
made for the admitting of Libyans to the practical course,as 
soon as "political circumstances" were judged right.Gradually 
however,the agricultural training of Libyans was in part prov 
ided for in the special rural schools,which were set up after
8) See,A.Scham,Chapt.4,Franco-Muslim Education in Lyautey 
in Morocco(New York,1970),pp.144-161.
9) See,D.G.16 gennaio 1926,No 41,che istituisce presso I'lst- 
ituto sperimentale agrario di Sidi Mesri una scuola prat- 
ica d'agricoltura,B.U.T.,5,135.
10) See,MAI-AS,Fondo Ufficio Studi del Soppresso Ministero
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1932 in certain areas,or in special courses of a rudiment­
ary nature attached to certain Italo-Arab schools.
Under the dynamic governorship of Italo Balbo(1.1.1934- 
28.6.1940) the theme of"equal but separate development" 
was greatly accelerated;and it is likely than Balbo sought 
to model some of his policies in this respect upon those 
developed by Lyautey of whom he was an avid admirer.(11)
Even so,the basic policies worked out by Micacchi in 1919 
and expressed in the educational ordinance for Moslems of 
1928 remained in essence unchanged,despite the revising 
of the 1928 decree in 1936 to bring it in line with a new 
administrative strategy for the Italian empire as a whole. 
(12) Thus,although Balbo may have improved the quality and 
quantity of much educational provision for Libyans,he failed 
to alter its philosophy and essential aims.He was also res­
ponsible for establishing on Libyan soil tens of thousands 
of Italian peasant farmers at the considerable expense of 
the Libyans themselves."Equal but separate development",in 
the final analysis,was far from equal however separate;and 
could only have eventually resulted in a colonial war on 
the scale of Angola had Mussolini's empire in Libya survived 
intact the Second World War.” :.ch
Any final appraisal:of Italian educational provision for
(Contin.) dell Africa Italians,Cart.14/2,Fasc. B 11- Istit- 
uzione di una scuola sperimentale per gioventu fascista(19- 
28).
11) See,Claudio Seqre,Fourth Shore,The Italian Colonization 
of Libya(Chicagg?1974),p.87.
12) See,R.D.L.24 luglio 1936,n.1737.Ordinamento scolastico 
della Libia,B.U.L.,30,1060;and Legge 23 maggio 1940,n. 
719.Modifies all'ordinamento scolastico della Libia 
approvato con R.D. 24 luglio 1936,n.1737,B.U.L.,39,1476,
Moslems in Libya must of necessity depend upon the making 
available to the historian of the archival resources of 
the ex-Ministry of Italian Africa and also the colonial 
depositories of primary sources in Libya and elsewhere in 
the world.At the level of elementary education or general 
literacy it is likely that the Italian contribution to 
Libyan development will be judged less harshly than it has 
been in the past.Conservative estimates of the number of 
elementary schools functioning in 1939,when the Italo-Arab 
schools were closed down because of the war and never re­
opened, indicate that around 115 such schools were in oper­
ation by this time.(13)Perhaps as many as 9,679 pupils 
attended the elementary schools in the final year of their 
existence,though official estimates give a much higher figure. 
(14) At the level of professional and agricultural educat-
i
ion,the record is less good and there is no doubt that Libyan 
development in these areas was sacrificed by the Duce to 
appease the land hunger of the South and unemployed in Italy's 
cities.Much more controversial and difficult to judge is- 
the Italian contribution to Libyan development at the level 
of secondary education.Following thirty years of Italian 
rule Libya had no more doctors,engineers,administrators or 
the like than she possessed in 1911 after more than three 
hundred years of Turkish rule.No doubt political,linguistic, 
cultural,economic and even religious arguments can be deduced 
to to indicate why this was the case.They will never,however, 
be able to explain away such facts,which will always remain 
an incontrovertible|indictment,against the Italian occupation ; 
of Libya.
13) MAI-AS,Fondo Vari,Cart.14/1,Fasc.B-liSchools and Schol­
astic population of Libya 1939-40(unsigned or paginated).
14) See,Infra,Statistics(D),p.
CONCLUSION
"The period 1911-1921 was in essence both uncertain 
and transitory for Tripolitania.Neither the Arabs 
nor the government were able to find a satisfactory
political solution   ...... the return to a
policy of force,however,followed from the revolution 
of the Italian right".(*)
Such was the ultimate fate of Italian educational policy 
in Libya.The search for diplomatic compensation and national 
prestige in Africa had led to the occupation of Libya in 
1911.It followed from such a premise that Italianization 
and the claim to be fulfilling some kind of "civilising 
mission” would.ensue at the educational level.Arab rejection 
of both and Italy’s inability to pursue either very satis­
factorily because of administrative unpreparedness and milit­
ary weakness prevented Libya from becoming(for educational 
purposes,at least)an Italian version of French North or 
West Africa.Arab desire for independence in 1919,against a 
background of political and economic weakness in Italy;the 
virtual abandonment by the moderate imperialists at the 
Versailles Conference of Italy’s African ambitions in favour 
of ambitions closer to home;and the general climate of opinion 
after the ending of the Great War,which favoured indigenous- 
type policies,all contributed towards the policies expressed 
in the Statutes of Libya.
As seen by Italian historians of the Fascist era and 
subsequently,the policy of the Statutes of Libya is depicted 
as purely transitory.This should not blind us today from 
recognising,however,that had the political centre not collapse 
so dramatically in Italy during 1922,the concession of the
*) Giorgio RochatJIl Colonialismo Italiano (Torino,1973), 
p.98 I
Statutes might have made a more durable impression upon 
the educational issue as it affected Moslems.Certainly the 
years 1921-1923 reveal a most remarkable attempt on the 
part of the government to fulfil its own part of the Treaty 
of Er-Ragima.On the Arab side too,there was a certain degree 
of support for the Treaty,especially in Cirenaica,though 
Arab attitudes in the long-term were dictated by the pattern 
of developments both in Italy and in Tripolitania.Whether 
the policy of "equal but separate development" could have 
developed and prospered would,in the normal course of events, 
have depended upon the maintenance of a delicate balance 
between basically opposed forces.This,however, was not to be, 
though it must be argued that,despite the second Italo-Senusi 
War,Italy still had the legal and moral obligation to continue 
the policies of the Statutes in one form or another.This she 
failed to do,a fact which is part of the tragedy of history.
It is also extremely doubtful whether the period 1919-1922 
was as transitory as Fascist and post-war historians have 
interpreted it,as being.The Fascist writers of Libya's colonia: 
history regarded the conceding of the Statutes of Libya as 
a national humiliation.According to such a view,the second 
Italo-Senusi war was fully justified in so far as it restored 
national pride and overturned the humiliating statutes of 
Libya.A closer examination of the facts shows,however,that 
the period of the protectorate was one of gradual consolidat­
ion as far as Italian rule was concerned in Libya.Educationall 
the attempts at extending and improving the governments 
provision for Moslems was part of a policy of colonial consol­
idation.Great efforts were also made from 1921 onwards at
improving the schools for Italians as well.Micacchi himself 
recognised during his inspection of 1919 that Italians 
could only be successfully encouraged to remain in Libya 
if the schools there were as good as the ones in Italy.Indeed 
the years 1921-3 should be rightfully compared with the 
years 1911-13 as far as Italian effort at consolidating 
colonial rule are concerned.lt is also more likely that 
the spectacle of Italian rule consolidating itself rather 
than that of Italians leaving Libya in increasing droves 
that determined the Libyan nationalists to make a final 
armed bid for independence from colonial rule.In Cirenaica, 
on the other hand,the continual decline of Senusi power 
during the 19th and early years of the 20th centuries no 
doubt led the Senusi leader to adopt a more resigned and 
cautious approach to Italian rule.The determination of the 
nationalist party in Tripolitania and the emergence of 
hardline politicians in Italy made Idris's position no 
longer tenable after 1922 and caused him to flee the country 
for the remainder of the colonial period.
If the period 1919-1922 was primarily concerned with the 
consolidating of Italian rule in Libya,there was little 
equanimity amongst Italians as to how this was to be most 
satisfactorily achieved.The nationalists and Africanisti 
favoured "close-ended” aims and methods involving notions 
derived from European colonialism of an earlier period.The 
moderate imperialists,centre party politicians and socialists 
on the other hand,were less united and favoured a more"open- 
ended" approach to colonial problems.The Fundamental Laws 
derived their chief support from the latter as opposed to
the former political alliances in Italy.The rival Micacchi
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and Nallino approaches towards the education of Moslems 
reflected the intellectual and political divisions of 
Italian opinion upon the Libyan question.Libyans themselves 
were no*. less divided in their common attitudes towards 
the|Fundamental Law and the educational policy expressed 
by it.Thus,although it would be difficult to find much 
evidence to the effect that the Italian nationalists and 
Africanisti had a body of direct support amongst the Libyan 
population,the Consultative Committees seemed to have been 
broadly in favour of the Colosimo programme of 1918 as a means 
developing the country.There was also plenty of indigen­
ous support in Cirenaica for the Er-Ragima programme of 
educational reform subsequently developed into a broad 
compromise formula embodying elements ofj both the Micacchi 
and Nallino approaches.In Tripolitania,however,the Libyan 
nationalists saw the Fundamental Law as a means of consolid­
ating colonial rule and were unprepared to go along with 
it until independence had been agreed in principle and a 
date set for the evacuation of Italian troops from the 
country.Thus educationally,the pre-1919 situation-prevailed, 
and Micacchi was provided with a carte blanche to consolidate 
Italian rule in accordance with his own tastes and inclinat­
ions.
In the final analysis,the uncertain and often hostile 
attitude of the Ministry of Colonies towards the Funamental 
Laws played an important part in ensuring their failure.The 
political implication of Articles 10,11 & 12 in Tripolitania 
was an important reason why the new educational policy was 
never put into effect.In Cirenaica,the same applied though 
tp a lesser extent.Not all the educational work carried out
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Piccioli in Cirenaica during 1922 especially should be 
seen as fulfilling the Fundamental Laws.Both Piccioli 
and his chief were opposed in principle to the Fundamental 
taws;and not only contributed directly to the formulation 
of colonial policies in education that found acceptance 
during the Fascist era;but also through their administrative 
efforts and reform of the cadre of teachers made possible 
the implementation of such policies.As Rochat has indicated, 
the triumph of the right issued in the second Italo-Senusi 
War.' By the same token,the triumph of the right also ensured 
that the policies evolved by Micacchi in 1919 would embody 
the needs of the new colonialism.From this point onwards 
the clock could never be put back to 1919;neither could it 
be put forward to Libyan independence.Both aspirations 
disappeared in 1922 for much the same reasons;if they ever 
reappeared it would be for different reasons,impossible to 
foresee in 1922.
FINIS
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Raccoltg degli atti dei commandi dei Corpi d* 
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MAP I.: ITALY *S COLOxNIAL EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE 
LIBERAL ERA ( The Times.January 6,1920)
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MAP IV.:LIBYAN FRONTIERS FOLLOWING THE MUSSOLINI-LAVAL 
AGREEMENT OF 1935(Giorqio RochatfIl Calonialismo Italiano 
(Torino,1973)tp.l03)
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Libia
Tripolitania : area:912.500 square kilometres 
population(adults):550.000
population!1931 census):Libyans 512.800;Italians
and foreigners 30.900
Cirenaica: area 1931:851.400 square kilometres 
population(adults):2 25.000
population!1931 census):Libyans 141.950;Italians
and foreigners 18.500
II.Statistics : (A) Relating to educational provision for Italians 
and non-Italians attending the Italian schools all'estero in Trip­
olitania prior to 19.11 (ACS,PGM#T.l/2-447:Relazione sull opera com- 
piuta dalla direzione generale dei servizi civili per tutto marzo, 
Tripoli,1912)
THE SCHOOL-YEAR 1910-1911
Type of School
Tripoli: Technical-Commercial School
( attached to this school was 
a Commercial Museum,Metereol- 
ogical Observatory and a Med­
ical Dispensary)........ .. . .
Boys* Elementary School...... ,
Evening School for Adults... .
Girls* Elementary School to 
which was attached a Profess­
ional School..................
- Infant School
School of the Orphanage of the 
National Association of Italian 
Missionaries .. ................ .
Boys' Elementary School 
of the Catholic Mission of the 
Franciscan Fathers ...........
Girls* School of the S. Giuseppe 
Sisters.   ......................
Pupils
Masc.i Fem.
63
327
148
135
11
166
348
125
11
353
Total
63
327
148
348
260
22
166
353
Horns: Boys' Elementary School with 
a Commercial Museum Attached....
School for Adult Illiterates ...
Girls' School of the Association 
of Italian Missionaries.........
92
60
75
92
92
75
Derna: Boys* School of the Catholic
Mission of the Franciscan Fath­
ers .............................. 47
Girls' School of the Catholic 
Franciscan Mission.............
Total......... 1049
50
962
47
50
2011
342
II.Statistics t (B) Relating to educational provision for Arabs, 
Turks and other Moslems in Tripoli prior to 1911( ACS,PGM,T. 1/2 
447 : Relazione sull opera compiuta dalla direzione qenerale dei 
servizi civili per tutto marzo,Tripoli,1912)
THE SCHOOL-YEAR 1910-1911
J, Pupils
Tot. Male Fem.
Description
Tripoli • Tech.Course 
(mixed)
" - Elementary 
(male)
105
280
65
280
40
f - - , • 
Arab and Turki
*i it «i
99 19
(Female) 80 - 80 H •» M
" - Sch. Arts 
& Crafts 
" - Professional 
(Female)
120
30
120
30
All Arabsx )
•i H
" - Normal(2) 60 - - Almost all Arabs. •)
" - Military 400 400 - Mainly Turks
" - Infant Sch. 105 80 25 A r ab and Turk; r a c  a
" - Af tempon;:**. 
of Committee 
of Union S, 
Progress 200 120 Arab and Turk
I ” - Evening Sch.f •'H tl
• • ^  \ ; .........
n 99
99
" - Koranic Schs 
No 16
" - Medresse to 
No of 5(3)
120 120 Maihly -Jewish
)Impossible to trace any 
)Statistics in relation 
)to these schools
)
Bengasi: Elementary
Koranic Schs 
No ?
) •• it ii it / •• It M II
)
totals 1,460
*Dr.A.Picciolli,"L *istruzione|pubblica in Libia",La Libia in 
Venti Anni di Occupazione Itairanated.T.Sillani).Ministprn 
Delle Colonie(Roma,1933-XI.),p.l22.
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8
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4
8
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II.Statistics! (D) Relating to educational provision for Moslems
in Libya for the final school-year of Italian occupation.1939-40 
(MAI-AS,Fondo Felsano,Scaff.103,Pac.6:Pub.Isti.Libya»Roma,27.5.172)
No PLACE NAME OF THE SCHOOL PUPILS
TRIP )LOLITANIA : a) Prov nee of Tripoli - Secondary Sclhools
1.
2.
Tripoli
it
Sch. of Higher Islamic 
Studies 
" Artisans Course
147
50
3. •t " Student Nurses Course 22
Total............. r- 219
1.
Tripoli
ft
Elememtary Schools 
Prince ofjPiedmont: 555
2/
«• Arts and Crafts 90
3 . It Emilio De Bono 239
i 4 - 
f
It Benito Mussolini with separ­
ate sections at : El Hani, 
Bir Accara and Gargaresc.•.. 418
5. tt Tagiura 54
6. ft Gurgi 49
7. ft Gargaresc 57
8 . ft Fortino( Centre for Re-educ­
ation) ..... ............ .... 48
Boys* Elementary Schools
9. Suk el Giuma •• •• •• 180
10. Tagiura tt tt tt 52
if Garabulli t» t» tt 39
12. Sghedeida tt tt tt 48
13. Sidi Mesri tt tt tt
( boarding accomodat­
ion)
50
14. Castel Benito tt tt tt 56
15. Sidi Bu Argub it tt tt 42
16. Castel De Bono tt it tt 42
17. Suani Ben Adem tt tt tt 49
18. Azizia it it tt 42
19. Zanzur tt tt it 21
20. Mahmura tt it tt 60
21. El Hascian tt tt tt 39
~ 22. El Maja t> tt tt 57
~23 . Zavia tt it !• 154
24. ’
i
Sorman it tt it 113
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No. PLACE NAME OF THE SCHOOL
—  .....
1
PUPILS I
Conti*rned
25. Sabratha Boys 1 Elementary Schools* 103
26. Agelat H ii •I 198
27. Zuara Citta «« ii ii 213 j
28. Zuara Marina i* ii it 90
29. Regdalin •• •I ii 54
30. El Massa •• ii ii 66
31. Garian •• •i H 129
32. Sgaief it •• 62
33. Bu Maad ii •I ii 86
34. Tigrinna ti •i ii 62
35. Mizda it it ti 55
36. Nesma ti •i it 29r
• Suani Fessane »i •i it 27
38. Gheriat •i •i •• 36
39. Chiola ii ii H 50
40. Jeffren I. ii •i 134
41. Rihaina ii H it 65
42. Zintan ii •i ii 79
43. Giade ii it it 122
44. Rehibat M it ii 71
45. Regeban n it M 36
46. Giasc it it It 47
47. Bighighila ' H it It 48
48. Cabae H w tt 74
49. Nalut It II H 169
Sinau Wt •1 tt 34
51. Berg II II II 51
52. Gadames It II tt - 125
Total••• ==4§1§=
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS ..
1. Tripoli Girls* Schools of Education '427
and Work
2. Suk el Giuma vt n II 40
3. Tagiura M n n 19
4. Zanzur tt ' •i it 30
5. Agelat It •i H 40
6. Zuara tt ii II 60
7. Garian tt it II 34
8. Tigrinna tt ti II 17
i
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No. PLACE NAME OF THE SCHOOL PUPILS
Continu ed
9. Mizda Girls' School of Education 
and Works
18
10. Giade ft M  tt
Total............
INFANT- SCHOOLS !
25
790
1 . Tripoli Attached to the Girls' 
Professional School
KORANIC SCHOOLS :
90
1 . Tripoli City Kuttab 28
' i i Suk e l 'Giuma «• 53
\
and region W
3. Garian and region «« 97
4. Nalut H N 18
5. Zavia " " tt 41
6. Zuara tt 226
- 263
b) Province of Misurata:
1 . Misurata Town Boys' Elementary School 132
2. Misurata Marina H  M M 37
3. Tauerga M  I. M 32
4. Sirte II M M 96
5 Nufilia V  M  tt 35
6. Zauiet Mahagius tt «  tt 57
£7. Neni Ulie tt tt tt 122
8. Suk el Kenis t* t . M 92
9 *  , Zliten H  M M ‘ 84
10. Horns tt M M 102
11. Gussabat tt N  tt 120
12. Tarhuna M  M  tt
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS i
59
968
1 . Misurata . Girls’ School of Education 28
and Work
2. Horns M  It M 86
3. Zliten tt M  M ____3 9
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No Place Name of School PUPILS
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5. 
6;>
7.
8. 
9.
1.
Bengasi
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS s
Girls' Schools of Education 
and Work
KORANIC SCHOOLS *
Derna
Bengasi and Dist. 37
Barce 6
Tecra 3
Soluch 4
Agedabia 9
Total.. ......
b) province of Derna:
59
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS:
Derna Boys.Vittorio Veneto 4 416
Tobruk H General Stasio 64
Port of Badia Italo-Arab 36
Giarabub it •* it 21
Berta(Gubba) • I II M 33
Alba If If It 12
Fiorita II •• ** 15
Cirene tt M  H 25
Apollonia tt It tt 70
Total.,
PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS
Girls' Schools of Education 
and Work
179
692
95
348
PLACE NAME OF THE SCHOOL
Continued
Misurata District 
Horns
Zliten
CIRENAICA : province of
Total.
KORANIC SCHOOLS : 
Kuttab
Bengasi
Bengasi - SECONDARY SCHOOLS
Boys' Artisans Course 
Elementary Schools:_________
Total
1. i Bengasi Boys ' Prince of Piemonte 531
2 1 99 • N " Gen. Torelli 152
3.
1* ft
9
l« V . Veneto 52
4. 9 99 • W della Berka 116
5.
9
I El Geofia 
♦
" Italo - Arab 19
6. • Eida Califa 99 tt it 30
7.
9
I Driana 19 H  II 35
8 . ! Tecra 99 M  II 41
9.
9
I Tolemaide 99 II II 18
10. ! Barce 99 II II 78
11.
i
j Gardes Abid 99 II II 32
12. El Abiar 99 •1 M 37
13.
9
,* El Guarscia 99 II II 46
14 S Giardina 99 It N 37
r
9
J Soluch 99 • I II 25
16. J Ghemines It • I M 29
17.
9
| Zuetina •
19 II II . 18
18. J Agedabia 99 • 1 II 85
19. | El Magrun 19 •1 II 10
20. I El Agheila 99 H  II 15
21. ,* Gialo 
•
99 •1 II 43
22. 1 Augila tt •1 II 43
23. I Gigherra 
•
99 •1 It 19
24. I Marada 99 It II 15
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II.Statistics: (E) Relating to financial provision for the 
educational service in Libya during the school-year,1922- 
1923 (MAI-AS »Fondo Volpi,Cart.6/2,Fasc.B-l:Report from 
Dr.Angelo Piccioli to the Governor of Cirenaica,Aug.1923,p.51)
Funds assigned to the scholastic service for the_year_1922-23 
were allocated as follows;
Art. 2(regular personnel)..............   L. 326. 000
" 7(official expenses)........... ....... . .** 11. 650
” 25 (School of Arts and Crafts)........ . .** 150. 000
35 ([finances required for the function­
ing of the different schools).....1* 1080. 000 
39 ( finances required for the original
establishment)..  .............  ** 100. 000
•i
Total L.1703. 650
In the course of the year,fvarious cancellations to one 
or other of the above articles was required,bringing the
precise situation by 30 June 1923 to the following balance*
Art. 2 (regular personnel)................... L. 198.962.00
* 7 (official expenses)•••••••  ••••* 23.470.80
" 25(School of Arts and Crafts)..........** 149.872.00
'* 35( Finances required for the function­
ing of the different schools)...... .”1-042*800.00
" 39( finances required for the original
establishment) ••••••• ...” 241.053.10
Total L.1.656.157.90
(*)" Thus”,observed Superintendent Piccioli” regardless of
widespread speculation to the contrary,both inside and 
outside government circles,the funds available for 
education during 1922-3.were in excess of those act­
ually spent by the Superin tendency .*See, Ibid. ,p*51 »
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II.Statistics: (F) The objectivity of the statistical
evidence before 1943
Disraeli’s aphorism that"there are lies,damned lies and 
statistics” rings particularly true for education in Libya 
before 1943,0bjectivity is hard to come by and it is always 
necessary to compare the official statistics with a more 
conservative estimate culled,wherever possible,from the 
documentary sources.This approach,however,is only possible 
until 1922,after which the documentary sources for educat­
ion's for much else relating to colonisation in Libya, are 
hard to come by.Broadly speaking,therefore,statistics relat­
ing to the schools before 1922(with the exception of the 
Colosimo Report of February 1918) can be regarded as acc­
urate within their own terms.This is also true for the 
Ottoman period as well,despite its dearth of statistical 
material relating to education,as the material available 
to the authorities was compiled by Sheikh Hamali,a notable 
Libyan teacher who was employed in both the Turkish and 
the Italian schools after 1911.Furthermore,the considerable 
and important statistical material contained in government 
reports ought to be regarded as largely valid}even if Mica- 
cchi was obsessed with the need to convince the authorities 
in Rome with the workability of the Italo-Arab school.The 
importance of confidential government reports lies not 
only in the validity of their statistics,but also in their 
general objectivity,since they provide both the enrolment 
figure at the commencement of the school-year and also the 
actual figure for attendance.This is particularly useful 
to students of education in Libya,as it shows that whereas 
the orginal enrolment could be high,attendance tended to 
be much lower,especially in country areas,a feature that
has continued well into the post-colonial period.
There is more need for caution,however,in interpreting 
the large statistical tables that appear frequently in 
government-sponsored publications of the Fascist era.During 
this period elementary education got into its stride and 
the Fascist case that many more schools were opened and 
enrolments amongst Libyans increased cannot be disputed.
What can be disputed are the numbers of new schools that 
were set up and the extent to which enrolments increased. 
Reliable answers to such queries are not easy to arrive at 
in view of the in-built tendency to exaggerate so as to 
demonstrate how much more had been achieved by Fascism 
when compared with the puny results of the old regime.
Perhaps,if all the educational statistics for the period 
beginning 1922 were placed in a computer for sorting and 
analysis,the results might bear a reasonable comparison
with the truth.Again,the non-availability of archival material 
for the Fascist era makes it difficult to arrive at an object­
ive assessment of the true position regarding attendance and 
enrolment.The previously unpublished material for 1939-40 
is possibly the best guide to both the number of schools and 
the number of enrolments at the end of the colonial period. 
Even so,the statistics provided in appendix D should not 
be taken completely at their face-value.The tendency towards 
exaggeration,in order to show Italy's contribution to Libyan 
development in its best light,was almost as much a feature 
of the work of the Comitato per la documentazione delle Att- 
vita Italiane in Africa as of its predecessor,the Ministry 
of Italian AfricaJEn the latter respect,the subject of Moslem 
education in liibya has continued to excite political interest 
aiBQngstSboth Italians and Libyans,even after 1945.
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